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Abstract  
This comparative history seeks to understand the impact of new media in the 
Conservative Party.  It does this with the analysis of case studies of original empirical 
research that are used to form cultural histories of the party 1951-1964 and 2005-2012.  
Both periods were characterised by significant techno-cultural advances in Britain in the 
form of television and the internet, respectively.  This thesis asks, firstly, what role the 
advent of television played within the party, 1951-1964; and, secondly, what role the 
advent of specific internet technologies played within the party, 2005-2012.  A third 
question is used to conduct a comparative history that reflects upon the two periods.  It 
asks how the new media of television and the internet compare in terms of their impact 
on the organisational culture of the party.  Historian John Ramsden described the 
party’s organisation as a ‘social organism’.  Likewise, Richard Cockett likened it to a 
‘Darwinian’ organism that utilises adaptability for survival.  Similarly, this thesis 
evaluates the party in terms of its evolution.  It does this using insider perspectives.  
1951-1964 is informed using the collections of the Conservative Party Archive.  2005-
2012 is explored using methods that are influenced by ethnography.  Diverse accounts 
using on- and off- line sources are included with oral testimonies of party insiders.  This 
thesis takes an integrated approach to techno-cultural and socio-political studies, which 
allows a more holistic view through the cultural lens.  The thesis argues that the impacts 
of new political mass communication technologies on the Conservative Party’s 
organisational culture have been to further contribute to an evolution away from a mass-
party culture to a more technologically-centric culture, in which television 1951-1964 
played a role in demanding further professionalisation of central-party culture; and 
internet technologies 2005-2012 most notably synthesised with the party in subcultures 
at the grassroots, which the author calls ‘Cyber Toryism’. 
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ONE  
The Conservative Party and New Media 
 
Since the creation of the printing press in the fifteenth century there has been a chain of 
successive new media
1
 that have in their own ways revolutionised the manner in which 
British society has communicated with the masses.  The development of mass 
communication technology has evolved in line with wider societal and cultural changes.  
These historic advances occurred in tandem with developments in British parliamentary 
democracy and the advent of political parties.  The British Conservative Party
2
 has a 
genealogy and history that stretches over a 350 hundred year period.  Throughout that 
time, political parties have had to change and adapt in order to remain electorally 
competitive in societies undergoing cultural evolutions during periods of apparent 
                                                     
1
 In the context of this thesis, the term ‘new media’ relates to the advent of relatively new mass 
communication, or computer-mediated communication, technologies and techniques in history, like 
television in the 1950s and 1960s, and the internet in the 1990s and 2000s, with a specific focus on their 
role and uses by political parties, in this case the British Conservative Party, in political engagement and 
political phenomena.  For further definition of new media in historical contexts, see, Benjamin Peters 
and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, ‘New Media’, in Peter Simonson, Janice Peck, Robert Craig and John Jackson 
(eds.), The Handbook of Communication History (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013), p. 257-271. 
2
 The Conservative Party is generally considered to be the political embodiment of conservatism in 
Britain.  The term ‘the Conservative Party’ is used to describe the mainstream national Conservative and 
Unionist Party of the United Kingdom, which includes the Scottish Conservatives and Welsh 
Conservatives.  Since the devolution of certain powers from the United Kingdom Parliament to the 
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, the Conservative parties of Scotland and Wales have 
developed increased autonomous identities in relation to administering their respective devolved 
elections.  Sources for this research inform perspectives on the Conservative Party in England and 
Wales, but not Scotland specifically.  A similar approach to investigating the Scottish Conservatives was 
conducted in 2003.  See, Alexander Smith, Devolution and the Scottish Conservatives: Banal activism, 
electioneering and the politics of irrelevance (Manchester University Press, 2011).For clarity, this thesis, 
when referring to the Conservative Party, is describing the British Conservative Party as a broad 
collective, or aspects of its nature and/or function as a political phenomenon.  This thesis uses the term 
‘the Conservative Party’ interchangeably with the phrase ‘the party’ and also synonymous phrases like 
‘the Conservatives’, ‘the Tory Party’ and ‘the Tories’ in order to refer to the loose national collective of 
participants and groups with some official or unofficial affiliation to the party’s political existence and is 
therefore a wide and generalised term.  When referring to specific groups, roles or periods within the 
party’s history or organisation, certain official and unofficial labels are attributed.  Variations of official 
and academic Conservative Party nouns and terminology are used, e.g. the use of the term 
‘Conservative association-elites’ would refer generally to individuals in positions of power within 
Conservative parties at the local level of the party organisation, or specifically in the context of a named 
association like, for example,  the Anglesey Conservatives.  In order to aid the comparisons of different 
periods in Conservative Party history, unofficial labels are attributed, using the name of the party leader 
who represented the national Conservative Party at that point in history.  These include the party from 
1951-1964 under: Churchill’s Conservatives, 1951-1955, Eden’s Conservatives 1955-1957, Macmillan’s 
Conservatives, 1957-1963, and Douglas-Home’s Conservatives, 1963-1964; and, in the contemporary 
context, Cameron’s Conservatives 2005-2012.  These labels are used in the general context in the 
recognition that the role of the party leader, which includes their leadership team of supporting party 
officials, acts as a cultural symbol in the internal and external dynamics of the party from local to 
international levels at those periods in history for which these individuals are the public face of the 
British Conservative Party.  
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continuity and change.
3
  As a comparative history, this thesis is interested in the impact 
of changing techno-cultural trends on the British Conservative Party.  It addresses this 
using two empirical case studies, which together  represent two of the most significant 
techno-cultural developments across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.   
The advents of television (TV) and the internet in the twentieth century are 
examples of technologies that first developed in the wider cultural context and, 
subsequently, presented challenges for the Conservatives, and other parties, to adapt to 
new techno-cultural trends.
4
  Both developments in mass communication coincided with 
times of significant social, cultural and political change in Britain, and elsewhere.  
Television in the late 1940s and early 1950s was a new audio-visual broadcasting 
medium that entered the homes of ordinary people in the form of entertainment and 
factual programming via the British Broadcasting Company/Corporation (BBC).
5
  TV 
was a symbol of prosperity, emancipation and modernity in an era that had begun its 
recovery from the austerity of war.
6
  ‘The domestic nature of television...’, now in the 
contemporary context, ‘...is a concept that is taken for granted.’7  In this new 
millennium, amid the backdrop of an increasingly transient and globalised world 
economy, the internet - a dynamic and ever-evolving international network of 
computerised interactive digital-communication that has allowed the development of 
user-led interactive multimedia technologies, for the exchange of communication, 
socialisation, information, learning, and entertainment - has facilitated the virtual 
compression of time and space; and greater freedom, choice and access to information 
                                                     
3 
Jon Lawrence, ‘The Culture of Elections in Modern Britain’, History, Vol. 96, No. 324 (2011), pp. 459-
476. 
4
 In the case of television and elections, see, M. Even, The evolution of political television in Britain and 
its influence on election campaigns 1950-1970, Doctoral Thesis, University of Oxford (1986).  For 
television and the Conservative Party, see, Michael Kandiah, ‘Television enters British politics: the 
Conservative Party Central Office and political broadcasting 1945-55’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio 
and Television, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1995), pp. 265-284; Mark Cason Jarvis, The Conservative Party and the 
Adaptation to Modernity 1957-1964, Doctoral Thesis, University of London (1999); Mark Jarvis, 
Conservative Governments, Morality and Social Change in Affluent Britain, 1957-64 (Manchester 
University Press, 2005), Chapter 7; and, generally, for British political parties and television, see, Jon 
Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford University 
Press, 2009), pp. 170-232.  In the case of internet technologies and political parties, see, Wainer Lusoli 
and Stephen Ward, ‘Digital Rank-and-file:  Party Activists’ Perceptions and Use of the Internet’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 4. (2004), pp. 453-470; and Rachel Gibson, Paul 
Nixon and Stephen Ward (eds.), Political Parties and the Internet: Net Gain? (Routledge, Abingdon, 
2005).  See, also, Chapter Two and the references to the work of Philip Howard.  For further reading on 
the party’s adaptation to industrial and social change, see, T. F. Lindsay and Michael Harrington, The 
Conservative Party 1918-1970 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1974), p. 2. 
5 
For an example of a cultural history on the early role of the BBC in Britain, see, Thomas Hajkowski, The 
BBC and national identity in Britain, 1922-53 (Manchester University Press,  2010).   
6
 Jarvis, Morality, p. 123. 
7
 Milly Buonanno, The Age of Television: Experiences and Theories (Intellect Books, Bristol, 2008), p. 13. 
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for the individual and collective.
8
  This research is influenced by the well established 
central thesis of British liberal media history that the ‘process of democratisation was 
enormously strengthened by the development of modern mass media.’9  Historically, 
advances in the democratic process in Britain, like the five major extensions of the right 
to vote, between 1832 and 1928, were accompanied by significant developments in 
mass communications, like the supposed freeing of the press in the eighteenth century 
and growth in film and radio in the early twentieth century.  These major developments 
occurred prior to universal suffrage in 1928.  Therefore, this thesis is based on the 
assumption that, in terms of media power, the advents of television and the internet, 
both of which developed at times of an historic peak in enfranchisement, were 
unrivalled in their potential as tools for democratic and political activity. 
In recent times, the study of media seems to have become synonymous with 
cultural studies.
10
  However, historically, the term ‘culture’ has been applied to times of 
human tension in order to represent the clashing of two or more ideas or groups.  One 
example is the ‘struggle for culture’ (kulturkampf) between church and state in 
Germany during the 1870s, which later became known as the ‘culture wars’.11  In this 
sense, cultures become most salient when the status quo of one culture is challenged by 
some form of cultural change.  The same principle can be applied to the political arena.  
Pierre Bourdieu, for example, described political parties as being agents that play the 
most significant part in a parliamentary democracy because they interact ‘in a 
sublimated form of civil war’.12  Analysis of the times and places in which opposing 
ideas, practices and policies clash, can reveal the different cultural traditions of political 
parties.  The intra-party dynamics, i.e. internal interrelations, of British political parties, 
like the Conservative Party, can be viewed in this manner.  Internally, where the 
different organisational groups and factions interact, divisions and unifications of 
                                                     
8
 Nicola Green, ‘On the Move: Technology, Mobility, and the Mediation of Social Time and Space’, The 
Information Society, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2002), pp. 281-292. 
9
 James Curran, Media and Power (Routledge, London, 2002), p. 4. 
10 
See, John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Blackwell, Oxford, 
2003).  A typical problem with cultural studies of any kind is that the term ‘culture’ is open to wide 
interpretation.  Clifford Greetz, whose ‘interpretive theory of culture’ has influenced many historians, 
attempts to solve that problem in defining it as: ‘...an historically transmitted pattern of meanings 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which 
men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.’  See 
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, New York, 1973), p. 89. 
11 
‘Kulturkampf’ is a term used by the early anthropologist Rudolf Virchow, see, Christopher Clarke and 
Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth Century Europe (Cambridge, 
2003). 
12 
Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, introduction and edited by J. B. Thompson (Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1991), p. 181. 
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practices and values are identifiable. Between these dynamics, symbolic forms of 
communication are exchanged, which can be interpreted both historically from archival 
evidence and contemporarily through observation and testimony.
13
  This thesis aims to 
present such cultures using comparisons of different groups within the Conservative 
Party at different points in its history. 
Scholars of political parties and political history have tended to divide 
themselves into subfields that address areas like political communication, party 
organisation, party systems and party development.  Political communications tends to 
focus on the marketing strategies that political parties use to connect with the electorate.  
Traditionally, scholars of party organisation have been interested in the structural 
components of political parties.
14
  Party system theory and party development has led to 
a focus on generic party models and ideal types.
15
  Political histories often provide 
valuable panoramic views of the most salient aspects in the chronology of a party,
16
 but 
tend to focus on the upper-echelons of party dynamics.  The outcome of these 
sometimes divergent approaches to the study of political phenomena has meant that the 
historiography is fragmented in places.  Therefore, some often latent political 
phenomena have been neglected in academic research and scholarly literature.  This has 
provided this thesis with an opportunity to contribute to filling some aspects of these 
gaps in our understanding.  Influenced by ideas in cultural history,
17
 this research 
attempts to do so using an integrated and more holistic approach.  It draws upon aspects 
of a range of scholarly disciplines in the social sciences and, as such, does not claim to 
adhere to any particular disciplines in absolute terms.  Rather it seeks to borrow 
deliberately selected aspects of appropriate theories and concepts, which in some way 
                                                     
13
 Geertz, Interpretation, p. 89. 
14
 Chrysa Lamprinakou, ‘The Party Evolution Model: An Integrated Approach to Party Organisation and 
Political Communication’, Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2008), pp. 103-111. 
15
 Helen Margetts, ‘The Cyber Party’, in Richard Katz and William Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party 
Politics (Sage, London, 2006), pp. 528-535. 
16
 See, for example, Stuart Ball, The Conservative Party since 1945 (Manchester University Press, 1998); 
Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds.), Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005); and John Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics since 
1830 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008). 
17
 The discipline of cultural history has no definitive description.  However, its works tend to place their 
emphasis on understanding the symbols of specific groups, in specific places, at specific times.  See, 
Peter Burke, What is Cultural History? (Polity, Cambridge, 2008).   Burke, a cultural historian, predicted 
that there would be an ‘extension of the New Cultural History to include domains previously neglected,  
among them politics...’ (p. 104.)  He emphasises that: ‘The links between politics and the media are only 
just beginning to be explored.’ (p. 107.)  Cultural history is different to other related disciplines in that 
where other disciplines might fragment phenomena into smaller and isolated cases, the cultural history 
approach allows for a more holistic representation.  For a cultural history of British politics, see, 
Lawrence, ‘Culture’. 
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relate to the study of the Conservative Party and new media, in order to build the case 
evidence for historical comparison.  The aim is to seek a deeper understanding of the 
role that specific technologies have played in the Conservative Party’s evolving 
organisation and culture.   
  Max Weber’s significant works in political sociology, in which he ‘was less 
concerned...to analyse the historical structure of the state than to clarify the nature of the 
political phenomenon in general’,18 has influenced the thinking behind the approach that 
this thesis takes to understanding the Conservative Party.  In line with the Weberian 
view, it is therefore appropriate to identify Conservative Party characteristics, such as its 
responses to the advent of new media, in order to determine what is significant about 
the party’s nature and evolution.  Rather than comparing multiple political parties at one 
point in history, this thesis compares the Conservative Party at multiple points in its 
own history, which together constitute the two main periods of interest, 1951-1964
19
 
and 2005-2012.
20
  As Kay Lawson suggests, ‘the advantages of the case study approach 
is its ability to reveal the true dynamism of the interaction of political variables, and the 
relative strength of each in different contexts, at different times.’21 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is used to outline, explain and discuss 
the research questions in more detail.  It includes an account of the archives and sources 
that have been used to inform the primary research.  This is followed by an introduction 
to the approach of the research, with a discussion of how the research questions are 
addressed.  Finally, this chapter outlines the overall structure and content of the thesis, 
with a chapter by chapter summary of the main arguments and findings that constitute 
the basis of this work. 
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The Research 
 
The central problem addressed by this thesis is to understand, historically, what impact 
mass communication technologies, in terms of their advents as new media, have had 
upon the British Conservative Party.  The word ‘advent’ is important in terms of 
exploring the below research questions.  This research seeks to elucidate an historical 
understanding of how new media arrive, assimilate and develop in Conservative Party 
organisation and culture, specifically.  These integrated intra-party dynamics are 
considered to be within the internal environment of the Conservative Party, which this 
thesis refers to as the party’s organisational culture.  The work understands that (1) each 
case study is unique and individual, in terms of its countless variables; (2) political 
phenomena are also socio-cultural phenomena for which there are many potential 
external influences in wider society; and (3) such phenomena have no predefined 
historical trajectories.
22
  Significant long-term phenomenological trajectories can only 
be identified retrospectively using observations over significant periods of time.  
Therefore, the central research problem of this thesis lends itself to the rigorous and 
empirical historical approach.  The comparative history is used in order to focus on two 
extended periods in Conservative Party history for comparison.   
This thesis is interested in specific cases, at specific points, in the party’s history 
in terms of (1) the advent of the party’s cognitive assessment of the potentials for and 
uses of new media; and (2) the party’s intellectual and physical day-to-day interactions 
with new media.  The term ‘impact’ is considered to be the repercussions and 
consequences of phenomenological events; and the role that they play in cultural aspects 
and the nature of Conservative Party organisation.  The impact of these events can be 
limited to an individual or a small collective, or be wide-reaching for the party, or range 
on a scale anywhere between the two proportions.  This work is built on the basis that 
certain new mass-media, which arrive in a socio-cultural context, arrive in the 
organisational culture of political parties in different ways in time and space.  
Furthermore, it uses both particular/minutia and general/overarching cultural themes.  
Therefore, the historical impacts of new media in each case study are treated as being 
organisationally and culturally unique. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions are focused on developing an understanding of the party’s 
organisational culture at both micro- and macro- cultural levels.
23
  This research does 
this in asking the following research questions.  Firstly, what role did the advent of 
television play within the Conservative Party, 1951-1964?  As introduced above, 
Television’s development as a medium for mass communication followed a period of 
expanding enfranchisement in Britain.  How political parties respond to these 
developments in the democratic systems in which they exist tells us something about 
their evolution.  Therefore, in an increasingly globalised and technologically dynamic 
world, questions are emerging about the impact of internet technologies on changing 
political organisations.  This leads naturally to a  second research question that asks 
what role did the advent of specific internet technologies play within the Conservative 
Party, 2005-2012?  These two main periods of interest in the comparative history are 
separated into smaller empirical case studies.   
1951-1964 is presented in four separate periods: the party under the leaderships 
of (1) Winston Churchill, 1951-1955; (2) Anthony Eden, 1955-1957; (3) Harold 
Macmillan, 1957-1963; and (4) Alec Douglas-Home, 1963-1964.  This 13 year period 
of continual Conservative governance was contextually characterised by Britain’s 
imperial retreat.
24
  It was a time of significant cultural change of which the advent of 
television was a part. In contrast, between 1997 and 2010, the Conservative Party 
endured 13 years in opposition, while ‘New Labour’ presided over a cultural transition 
to a new millennium.  From the illusive ‘millennium bug’ in the year 2000 (Y2K) to the 
first release of Apple’s ‘iPad’ in 2010, the New Labour period was partly characterised 
by developments in computer-mediated communications.   
One question for scholars of the contemporary Conservative Party has been: 
how and to what extent has the party changed under the leadership of David Cameron?
25
  
To some extent, this thesis joins a number of wider works in the pursuit of the essence 
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of that question.
26
  However, it does so with an examination of the party 2005-2012, 
with a sharp focus on its culture in the run-up to the 2010 General Election
27
 and with 
particular interest in addressing the role of new communication technologies in its 
organisation.  Lilleker and Jackson’s study of Web 2.0 tools used by six party websites 
in the 2010 General Election found that the political parties used differing strategic 
approaches to these technologies.
28 
 Therefore, comparisons with other parties are not 
made extensively in this thesis, because it would not enlighten significantly further the 
research questions.  However, there is some discussion of other British parties, for 
contextual purposes, in parts II and III.   
During the 1951-1964 period, the technological nature of the medium of 
television meant that its technological application in the party’s user culture was 
relatively uniform when compared to the fragmented nature of communication 
technologies in the contemporary period, which has been symbolised by its vast range 
of internet-based multimedia and multipurpose technologies.  Therefore, in order to 
identify the specific characteristics and roles of each medium, where appropriate, the 
analysis of those research questions which relate to internet technologies are categorised 
by either the specific nature of the individual internet-based communication technology, 
like email,
29
 or are grouped into technological types.  For example, Facebook.com, 
Twitter.com and blogs can be categorised together as ‘social media’.30  In addition to 
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these internet-based technologies and applications, other internet-based case studies, to 
which the research questions are applied, include: campaign websites; ‘WebCameron’; 
‘MyConservatives’; and ‘Merlin’.31  It is clear that the two technologies of television 
and the internet are different in many ways in terms of their application, uses, techno-
cultural impact and historical development as new media.  Identifying their basic 
differences is useful to the exploration of the research questions.  However, it plays only 
a minor role in this research.  Instead, the focus of this work is to compare the two 
historical sets of empirical evidence in order to develop a deeper understanding of how 
the Conservative Party has responded to the advent of the two most notable new media 
in its history, since the event of universal suffrage in Britain. 
The research questions are designed to explore the primary hypothesis that, in 
the case of the Conservative Party 2005-2012, the advent of the internet impacted in 
terms of loosening aspects of the party’s long-established hierarchal organisation; and 
facilitated a degree of cultural empowerment in the technologically-savvy cohorts at the 
party’s grassroots.  This is in contrast to a secondary hypothesis which states that the 
impact of television, upon the Conservative Party 1951-1964, was to contribute to a 
degree of cultural tightening, in the hierarchical context, in the organisation of its power 
relationships between (1) an increasingly professionalised-elite at its centre and (2) the 
mass-membership at the grassroots.  The concepts of tightening, or ‘centralisation’, and 
loosening, or ‘decentralisation’, are used in this thesis.  The aim is to provide the reader 
visualisation tools with which to build pictures that illustrate the strength of grip held by 
the Conservative Party’s central-hierarchy over the wider-party organisation.  This is 
particularly in terms of giving indications of shifting power-dynamics between the 
central-party and grassroots participants.
32
  Southern and Ward’s study of the impact of 
the internet in the campaigns of the five main British political parties in the 2010 
General Election uses similar concepts.  They conclude that new web-based 
applications, like social media, provided a veneer of localism and, therefore, gave the 
appearance of a general trend towards decentralisation.  Moreover, their research found 
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that any general decentralisation from internet use was ‘countered’ by the increased 
centralisation of party databases.
33
  
A supplementary research question is used in the final stage of this comparative 
history.  It brings together analytically 1951-1964 and 2005-2012 in the final part of the 
thesis.  It asks:  how do the roles of the new media of television and internet, in their 
respective periods, compare in terms of their impact on the organisational culture of the 
Conservative Party?  This question is addressed in order to (1) identify and compare the 
modes of adaptation, e.g. deliberate top-down drivers of change and/or organic change 
driven from the bottom-up, which have in some way influenced the party’s evolution; 
and (2) to discern what these impacts mean more generally for the party’s organisational 
culture, and the distribution of power within the party hierarchy.   
When compared to more traditional studies of political parties and media, which 
tend to take a more narrowcast approach, the comparative history approach provides a 
more panoramic view, albeit it an incomplete view of the party’s chronology between 
the two cases.  To some degree, this is a limitation of the work.  However, in taking two 
specific dissections of the party’s history, it enables a close-up comparison of the 
party’s responses to potential drivers of party evolution that have been separated by a 
significant distance in time.  Furthermore, this thesis is primarily interested in the 
party’s response to developments in new mass communication technologies that have 
some significant socio-cultural omnipotence.  Therefore, as this thesis is interested in 
the party’s response to the two most notable techno-cultural advances in British new 
mass communications since universal suffrage, a study that includes the party between 
1965 and 2004 could tell us something about how the party’s organisational culture has 
evolved, and how the party has developed new ways of connecting with the voter, but it 
would not provide a significantly brighter illumination of the central research interests 
of this thesis.  This is largely because there have been few other, if any, new media 
since 1928 which could claim a comparable degree of socio-cultural impact to that of 
television and internet.   
Therefore, in summary, rather than being a study which simply compares two 
different media, this work compares two different histories of the Conservative Party’s 
relationship with new media during two different periods of technological expansion in 
Britain.  Each historical case study is used to compare against the other in order to 
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develop a meta-historical perspective of the role of new media in the Conservative 
Party’s organisation.  This view of the Conservative Party’s history is grounded in the 
analysis of detailed empirical evidence and narrative.  It assists the research questions in 
indicating how the roles played by each mass communication technology in the 
Conservative Party compare in terms of their impacts on its organisation and culture.  It 
elucidates also an understanding of the party’s response to these new media; and what 
this tells us about the party’s nature and characteristics in its past and its more recent 
history. 
 
Archives and Sources: 1951-1964 
The research questions relating to the 1951-1964 period were informed with access to 
sources held in the Conservative Party Archive (CPA), Bodleian Library, Oxford.
34
  The 
catalogue contains manuscripts in relation to CCO, the Parliamentary Party and the 
National Union, a collection of private papers, and non-manuscript materials that 
include party publicity ephemera; transcriptions of speeches; press releases; and 
photographs of party leaders.
35
  The CPA’s most extensive collections date from the 
early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century.  However, in line with the 
sensitive nature of the Conservative Party’s role in the British state, the materials held in 
its collections are not released for general research until they become at least 30 years 
old.  Therefore, the CPA was an extensive and informative source for 1951-1964, but 
was not available whatsoever as a source for materials relating to 2005-2012. 
In the first instance, I accessed the CPA’s Online Catalogue.36  I identified files 
which contained materials relating to Conservative Party organisation, publicity, 
activism and management between the period from 1950 to 1965, which resulted in 
excess of 130 files.
37
  These included files on Conservative Party: publicity and 
propaganda; broadcasting; television; radio; film; press matters; gramophone records; 
procedures; area organisation; constituency organisation; membership; campaigning; 
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elections; leadership; MPs; marginal seats; intelligence; and correspondence.  These 
were areas of investigation that fell in line with the type of sources, and lines of enquiry, 
that I had access to in representation of the contemporary period.  I then searched each 
file for relevant manuscripts and artefacts that would be usable as evidence in the 
arguments of this thesis.  The manuscripts available for analysis consisted mostly of 
political memoranda.  Political ‘memoranda have proven useful to...historians seeking 
to explain internal decision-making processes and the motives and rationale behind 
certain principles’.38  Therefore, internal Conservative Party memoranda have provided 
this thesis with a rich understanding of the developments involved in the process of 
adaptation to technological change within the party’s organisation. 
The sources of the materials contained within the files were represented most 
frequently by textual discourse-exchange between Conservative Party participants.  
These included, but are not limited to Conservative Party: members and supporters; 
CCO officials; leaders; MPs; candidates; professionals and employed staff; local and 
area agents and publicity officers; voters; activists; and Young Conservatives (YCs).  
This wide range of sources has provided the thesis with diverse insider perspectives for 
analysis, on the role of television in party’s organisation 1951-1964.  However, other 
perspectives from outside the party include: broadcasters, like the BBC; broadcasting 
authorities, like the Independent Television Authority (ITA); other political parties, like 
the Labour and Liberal parties at inter-party meetings on broadcasting; letters from non-
Conservatives; and press articles.
39
  These perspectives offer the wider cultural-context 
in which to place the understanding of the party’s dynamics 1951-1964.  I used all 
fragments of evidence that were relevant to answering the research questions and 
mapped them across 1951-1964 in order to develop findings.  These finding were 
woven together to form the 1951-1964 narratives and analyses presented in Part II of 
this thesis. 
It is pertinent to take a critical view of the role of the CPA sources in this thesis, 
because of the gap of half a century between the types of sources accessed to inform the 
two main periods of interest.  A limitation of this work is that it is not currently possible 
to gain the same level of access to CCHQ sources 2005-2012 as is given to the sources 
at the CPA for CCO 1951-1964.  Therefore, the 1951-1964 chapters are naturally more 
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centred-on CCO than those depicting 2005-2012.  However, the strength of using the 
1951-1964 sources is that in the context of a comparative history the work is given a 
richer perspective.  A number of scholars, some of whom are introduced in Chapter 
Two, have addressed the advent of television in the Conservative Party context.  
However, there are no apparent published works in the current historiography that, have 
compared extensively two sets of original analyses of primary sources in relation to 
television, 1951-1964, and the internet, 2005-2012, in the context of the Conservative 
Party’s organisational culture.  Therefore, it is on this basis that the thesis claims to 
offer originality to the academic study of the Conservative Party.  Furthermore, a 
greater degree of originality can be claimed for the use of sources in the contemporary 
period, because of the nature of the privileged access I had to the Conservative Party in 
the process of developing this thesis in the run-up to the 2010 General Election.  An 
account of these sources is outlined below. 
 
Archives and Sources: 2005-2012 
Contemporary materials and human testimony
40
 were gathered in order to inform the 
research questions that apply to 2005-2012.  The contemporary period has been based 
largely on my personal access to an extensive national network of participants within 
the Conservative Party.  I have been a continuous member of the Conservative Party 
since 2006, which was prior to the development of these research questions.  
Furthermore, from 2008 onward, as a Conservative activist, I have enjoyed significant 
access to engagement within the party at the grassroots level, with occasional trips to 10 
Downing Street and CCHQ.  Aside from this research, I had taken steps to fulfil 
personal political aspirations.  However, when I eventually embarked on this research, 
there was no way to predict that I would be presented with such a wide-range of 
firsthand opportunities in which to participate and observe the Conservative Party at a 
range of levels and in a number of contexts for use in this thesis.   
 Some of the roles that I performed inside the Conservative Party included being 
a: Conservative Future (CF) branch chairman and president; Conservative councillor; 
and Conservative parliamentary candidate.  Holding that combination of roles in 
addition to other official and unofficial roles within the party, while conducting doctoral 
research on the party in the run-up to a general election, was an opportunity to gain 
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access to new and alternative materials and sources that had not been used before in the 
academic context.  Many of the sources were accessible because of my friendships, 
close-links and personal access to networks in the party.  Some of the sources were 
accessed in the run-up to and during the 2010 General Election and others we accessed 
between May 2010 and October 2012.  These sources are used to inform a number of 
case studies in Part III. 
In the run-up to the May 2009 local government and European elections, I began 
a participant observation, with ethnographic leanings, in the electorally Conservative 
County of Surrey, with a focus on the Runnymede, Weybridge and Spelthorne 
Conservative Group (RWSCG).  The RWSCG consisted of the two autonomous 
Conservative associations whose MPs represented the Runnymede & Weybridge and 
the Spelthorne constituencies.  As will be evident, the ethnographically-inspired field 
work snowballed significantly to present me with many other opportunities for 
interaction within the party at a variety of levels throughout its hierarchy and in a range 
of geographical, socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts.  It included a period in 
the run-up to the 2010 General Election when I was selected as the Conservative PPC 
for the Labour-Plaid Cymru marginal constituency of Ynys Môn | Anglesey.   
The evidence presented in Part III is a result of this intensive experiential 
research in the field of Conservative politics and elections.  Therefore, the work draws 
on a wide-range of sources in addition to the researcher’s observations and memoirs.  
These include: unpublished documents; published documents; articles and 
communications; formal semi-structured interviews with Conservative Party 
participants; and information supplied direct to me by anonymous Conservative-
insiders, which I refer to as informants/respondents or where appropriate using a generic 
label for general identification of the source like ‘activist’ for example.  As in Part II, 
where appropriate, I reference usable sources in the footnotes.  However, the 
ethnographic-based evidence detailed throughout the contemporary research chapters, 
like personal narrative, is presented without specific references to the ethnographic 
source e.g. research logs/journals, except for specific citations in reference to text from 
an informant’s interview or useable forms of correspondence like non-sensitive emails.   
 From early 2008 to mid-2010, I engaged in a number of data gathering exercises 
both on- and off- line.  I collected and catalogued in the digital form, an extensive range 
of emails, social media data, like Facebook and Twitter interactions, and 
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ConservativeHome.com
41
 stories.  The email archive was saved digitally using the 
ant@politician.com email account via the Mail.com email provider, which included 
communications from: Conservative associations, like Anglesey, Cities of London and 
Westminster, Hammersmith, Kingston, Richmond Park, Runnymede & Weybridge, and 
Spelthorne; Tory-affiliated groups, like The Bow Group,
42
 ConservativeHome, 
Conservative Way Forward,
43
 The Tory Reform Group;
44
 and CCHQ 
communications.
45
   
Using an approach based on snowballing techniques, I joined, observed and 
sampled a range of Facebook groups and pages related to the Conservative Party in the 
run-up to 2010.
46
  These data were accessed directly via my personal account on 
Facebook.com.  The Facebook groups accessed included: three university-based 
CF/society groups: University College London (UCL) CF, Kings College London 
(KCL) CF, and Aberystwyth University CF; four association-based Conservative Future 
groups: Aberconwy CF, Runnymede & Weybridge CF, Richmond Park CF, and Cities 
of London & Westminster CF; three Tory parliamentary candidates: Ridge-Newman for 
Ynys Môn, Nigel Huddleson for Luton South, and Michelle Tempest for West Durham; 
and four Tory-affiliated groups: Tory Reform Group, The Bow Group, Conservative 
Way Forward, and Progressive Conservatives.
47
  The Facebook pages accessed included 
Conservative Party-affiliated pages of: Anthony Ridge-Newman, Ynys Môn candidate; 
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Boris Johnson, London Mayor; David Cameron, party leader; David Jones, Shadow 
Minister; Kwasi Kwarteng, Spelthorne Candidate; Robin Walker, Worcester Candidate; 
and the party’s four main groupings of: Conservative Future; Conservatives; Scottish 
Conservatives; and Welsh Conservatives.  The other parties’ pages included: Labour 
Party; Liberal Democrats; and Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrats leader.  In the run-up to 
the 2010, I sampled, again using the snowball approach, and saved in Portable 
Document Format (PDF), a range of Conservative Party websites, web pages, like 
www.conservatives.com, and other sites like the ‘Total Politics’ magazine’s website in 
order to capture and cite statistics and facts within this thesis.  These included also some 
web-based news and blog articles. 
 From October 2006 until October 2012, I kept a range of paper-based 
communications from the party and its participants in relation to my party membership.  
During three election periods: (1) London Mayoral Election 2008; (2) European 
Election 2009; and (3) General Election 2010, I collected a range of other paper-based 
materials, like campaign ephemera and Conservative Party campaign guidance.  I 
collected pertinent Conservative Party publications and observational data at 
Conservative Party conferences in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.  During that time, I 
collected also a range of observational data.  Many sources grew out of my personal 
involvement in the Conservative campaigns of 2008, 2009 and 2010.  I gained a number 
of informal-informants who were accessed both on- and off- line.  Their identities, for 
ethical reasons, will remain anonymous in this thesis.   
There are some significant ethical considerations and problems in relation to this 
work.  I have resolved these in line with the Royal Holloway, University of London, 
ethical guidelines.  I did this by submitting an ethics form to my supervisor in the 
process of designing the research.  Subsequently, I made some considered choices about 
how to approach the use of information in these chapters.  Unlike the 1951-1964 period 
of this thesis, 2005-2012 falls within the traditional 30 year timeframe that is generally 
considered to be an acceptable length of time for the release of documentation and 
information into the public domain.  Moreover, when dealing with an organisation like a 
political party, a significant portion of the information, to which I have had personal 
access, would be considered sensitive.  Therefore, I have had to consider my role and 
position of trust within the Conservative Party.  Even though I overtly informed various 
Conservative Party participants about my research topic, as my roles within the party 
developed, my authentic commitment to the roles I held within the party meant that it 
was unmanageable and unrealistic to inform every individual inside and outside the 
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party with whom I had contact in the course of carrying-out my political and 
organisational roles and academic interests. 
Therefore, I have consciously sanitised aspects of the narrative informed by 
anonymous informants in order to ensure that the information disclosed is both ethical 
and appropriate to the research aims.
48
  In the course of this research, I developed good 
relationships with a large number of informants.  I am committed to maintaining their 
anonymity.  The manner in which I address this is based on Alexander Smith’s 
approach to protecting ‘identities’.49  Unless I have at some point gained direct, written 
and informed consent from a specific informant, e.g. through the semi-structured 
interviews, or unless the informant has made comments in a public on- or off- line 
forum like a blog or at a party conference event, I endeavour to not refer to the 
informant by name in relation to a direct quote or cited information.  In most cases, I 
believe it to be ethical to maintain the informant’s anonymity.  However, where an 
individual held an overt and official role in the political process, e.g. a chairman or 
officer of a Conservative organisation, I have engaged my judgement on a case-by-case 
basis in terms of the extent to which I reveal the actions, sentiments and identities of 
such individuals.  Therefore, in some cases, rather than directly naming the 
individual(s), where appropriate, I use generic terms like ‘association officer’ in order to 
indicate the type of individual and source from which the information came.  I give 
general indication to the group and/or location in which the information originated, e.g. 
‘from the Anglesey association’. 
I refrain from identifying the source type only in the instances where I suspect 
that indication to the source-type would lead to revealing the identity of the informant.  
However, an exception to that rule is for those artefacts, e.g. emails and internet 
postings, which were clearly intended by the author for public distribution or audience.  
Examples of this would be an auto-response email from an MP or a widely distributed 
correspondence from a political group.  I include some verbatim text contained in 
emails sent by myself on Conservative Party organisation matters.  In such cases, the 
names of other Conservative participants are quoted, but only in the capacity of their 
overt and/or public roles within the party.  These instances are in relation to the 
participant’s role as a prominent actor in a specific- or meta- narrative that is integral to 
the explanation of an example or scenario with historical relevance to illustrating 
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aspects of my response to the research questions.  I endeavour to not include anything 
that would be considered secret or sensitive in nature.  However, in certain instances, 
potentially sensitive materials may have been used to inform general arguments and 
observations to give cultural texture to the narrative.  In these cases, the sources are 
anonymised.   
The campaigns featured in the case studies demonstrate to some extent how 
some individuals are willing to engage in activism and campaigning for specific 
candidates and/or causes, and are willing to display their support in public groups in 
internet venues like Facebook, Twitter and on political blogs.  However, it is important 
to note that these party-workers and supporters are not necessarily ‘paid-up’ members of 
the Conservative Party.
50
  The dichotomy of this observed phenomenon challenges what 
it means to be a Conservative member and harks back to the term often used by CCO in 
the 1950s to describe the ‘Conservative supporter’.51  Through my observations, I 
witnessed firsthand the value that these supporters bring to the party.  In many respects, 
each supporter may be of greater value to the party in monetary terms than the price of 
an individual membership subscription.
52
  Therefore, I use interchangeably the terms 
‘supporter’ and ‘member’, and often use the term ‘Conservative participant’ as a 
catchall phrase, with the loosest possible definition to indicate an individual who 
engaged in some supportive interaction within the party, either through a physical act of 
support in word or deed; or through financing the party in some way, either through 
donations, events or membership subscriptions.  I use the terms ‘registered’ member or 
‘paid-up’ member, in references to precise membership data, which was, in itself, the 
vocabulary used by the officers of the Conservative associations with whom I had 
contact. 
A diverse oral history
53
 of retrospective testimonies from respondents, who were 
actively engaged in official and unofficial roles inside the Conservative Party, has 
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offered this thesis a range of insider perspectives of their observations and analyses of 
the role of the internet in the 2010 General Election.  The ten oral history accounts were 
drawn from pre-arranged interviews and were conducted between 12 March 2011 and 1 
July 2011, ranging approximately one year from the 2010 General Election.  In terms of 
this research, the respondents were given a letter, informing their consent, and asked to 
sign a declaration giving their permission for their testimonies to be used in relation to 
this thesis and subsequent publications.  The interviews were recorded on a digital 
recorder and later transcribed by a professional transcription service.  The individual 
transcripts were emailed to the corresponding respondents who were given 14 days to 
respond with any amendments.  Subsequently, in using the text from the interviews, I 
have edited final inclusions in respect to formatting, correcting grammar, and removing 
passages of text or arrangements of words that either added no meaning to the context 
of the response, e.g. ‘you know’, or confused the respondent’s intended meaning.  The 
transcription service did not provide an entirely accurate transcription of some of the 
phrases and jargon.  Therefore, I edited and corrected also these errors accordingly.  The 
oral testimonies these respondents have provided a range of insider perspectives that 
have fed an alternative oral history narrative of the Tory Party’s use of new media in the 
run-up to the 2010 General Election and beyond.    
The official roles of the ten respondents in 2010 were: Councillor Ben Howlett, 
key national CF activist (elected National Chairman of CF 2011-2013); Craig Elder, 
Deputy Head of New Media at CCHQ; Councillor Hugh Meares, Chairman of 
Runnymede & Weybridge Conservative Association (RWCA); Iain Dale, author of and 
commentator on the Iain Dale’s Diary blog; Jonathan Isaby, Co-Editor of the 
ConservativeHome blog; Oliver Cooper, key London CF activist; Councillor René 
Kinzett, Prospective Parliamentary Candidate (PPC) for Swansea West Conservatives; 
Robin Walker, Conservative PPC for Worcester (successfully elected to Parliament); 
Therese Coffey, Conservative PPC for Suffolk Coastal (successfully elected to 
Parliament); and councillors Mr Derek and, the late, Mrs Diana Cotty, RWCA officers 
and activists.
54
  Each respondent was considered to be unique in terms of their 
interaction with the Conservative Party in the run-up to the election.  Therefore, the line 
of questioning was prepared in advance based on their unique role and position within 
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campaigns in specific geographical locations.  For some respondents, their campaign 
universe expanded as far as a neighbouring constituency.  For others, campaigning 
across many different locations in England and Wales occurred.  Therefore, the 
interviews were semi-structured in order to allow the freedom for culturally rich and 
qualitatively detailed responses to be given for analysis.   
 
The Approach 
This comparative history is influenced by academic thought in the disciplines of 
Cultural Studies, History and Political Science.  In addition to the traditional archival 
approach used to inform 1951-1964, the methodological approach to the contemporary 
period is influenced by ethnography, which provides the comparative history with an 
ethnographic sensibility.
55
  The work is addressed from a standpoint using the insider 
perspective.  This provides an insight into Conservative Party phenomena in relation to 
the research questions; and provides an opportunity for analysis of the role of new 
media in the Conservative Party from diverse sources from within the party itself.   
Using interpretive analyses influenced by hermeneutics, this thesis is interested 
in detailing and describing the cultural minutia of how the Conservative Party and its 
constituent-parts used specific new media, in the microcultural context.
56
  These 
fragments of minutia are used to build piece-by-piece the wider view of the party’s 
macroculture, which tells us something about its responses to the use of technology in 
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the context of its wider cultural history.
57
  An aim of the analysis is to give greater 
holistic texture to vivid descriptions of Conservative Party phenomena.  Therefore, the 
description of individuals’ interpretations, judgements and perspectives are used to 
enhance the cultural narratives using subjective indicators like the assessment of 
atmospheres, feelings and images.  These indicators provide rich descriptions of the 
cultural phenomena of interest. 
Another aim of this thesis is to unearth potentially latent phenomena in 
Conservative Party history.  Providing an absolute list of variables that constitute the 
party’s culture would defeat the purpose of the thesis, and is beyond its remit.  
However, it is always useful in any cultural study to develop an awareness of the types 
of holistic indicators that might be addressed in the work.
58
  Not all indicators were pre-
defined, but those which were include Conservative Party: attitudes, behaviours, beliefs, 
bureaucracies, cultures, customs, innovations, lifestyles, motives, perceptions, 
resources, structures, and symbols.  The analysis involves also the assessment of some 
key historical Conservative Party characteristics in relation to its evolution.
59
  These 
include Conservative Party: activism and engagement;
60
 age and demographics;
61
 
adaptability;
62
 association autonomy;
63
 awareness and consciousness; deference;
64
 
discipline; geographical locations; hierarchies;
65
 ideas and ideologies;
66
 leadership;
67
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organisation; pragmatism;
68
 reaction to new technologies;
69
 and traditions.  There are 
also some main fixed objects of interest like Conservative Party: artefacts; affiliated 
groups; cadres; cohorts; factions; leaders; and participants, all of which are addressed as 
individual units for analysis.  Analyses of the dynamics between combinations of these 
key factors constitute some of the main themes discussed throughout this work.   
 
Thesis Structure and Outline 
 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis is presented in four parts.  Part I, of which this chapter is part, aims to be an 
introduction to the research, historiography and other influences on which this thesis 
builds its ideas and arguments.  Building on what has been introduced above, Chapter 
Two discusses scholarly perspectives in the disciplines of Cultural Studies, History and 
Political Science.   
Parts II and III contain the four research chapters.  Part II represents the 
Conservative Party 1951-1964, with two chapters.  The first of these chapters, Chapter 
Three, presents and analyses the archival evidence on the role of television in 
Churchill’s and Eden’s Conservatives.  The second chapter of Part II continues this 
approach, but moves forward in the chronology to represent Macmillan’s and Douglas-
Home’s Conservatives, in Chapter Four.   
Part III takes a four decade leap toward contemporary times in order to examine 
the role of the advent of specific internet technologies in the Conservative Party 2005-
2012, and consists of two chapters which present evidence from oral testimonies and 
participant observation.  Chapter Five presents oral testimony and researcher memoires’ 
detailing the role of internet technologies in Conservative associations.  These form a 
number of campaign-based case studies that act like snapshots of specific vistas of the 
party at the grassroots between 2008 and 2010.  The second chapter of Part III, Chapter 
Six, builds on the individual snapshots taken in the previous chapter to provide a more 
panoramic view of the role of internet technologies in Cameron’s Conservatives at the 
national level.  This is informed using extensive oral testimony and some numerical 
data that grew-out of participant observations.   
Part IV presents the comparative history in two chapters.  Firstly, Chapter Seven 
compares the findings for the Conservative parties of the 1951-1964 period and the 
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findings for Cameron’s Conservatives 2005-2012.  Part IV concludes with a reflection 
on the main narratives, analyses, arguments and findings in Chapter Eight.  This 
precedes the Bibliography, which includes organised lists of primary and secondary 
sources; and the Appendices, which include the full interview transcripts for each 
respondent’s oral history testimony.  
 
Outline of Arguments 
The main purpose of Part I of this thesis is to discuss how various academic influences 
inform the research questions and method.  Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 
Two introduces ideas like modernity and postmodern thought and argues the importance 
of placing the analyses of the case studies in their time-specific contexts.  The chapter 
takes a critical approach to the analysis of Helen Margetts’ ‘cyber party’.70  It is argued 
that aspects of her evocative model appear somewhat impaired, but that it is 
nevertheless a useful concept when adapted to explain certain phenomena observable in 
Cameron’s Conservatives 2005-2012. 
 Firstly in Part II, Chapter Three argues that from Churchill’s Conservatives to 
Eden’s Conservatives 1951-1957 the party was rooted in a mass-based culture that was 
transitioning from being a political party which seldom recognised the importance of 
television as a political medium to incorporating opportunities at all levels of the party’s 
diverse hierarchy for interaction with the new medium.  In contrast, Chapter Four 
argues that the party underwent a significant process of evolution between 1957 and 
1964 in terms of its cultural and organisational approach to political television.  By the 
end of the period, the advent of television acted as a driver of change that contributed to 
influences that in turn saw a tightening of operations, thus forming a more centralised 
and professionalised-party.  It is suggested that this contributed to a new TV-centric 
culture in the party’s organisation, which was accompanied by a  decline in the party’s 
traditional mass-based culture. 
 A half century jump from Part II takes the reader from late modernity to the new 
millennium in Part III.  Chapter Five introduces themes relating to the role of the 
internet in Cameron’s Conservatives like the: digital and age divide; digital 
bureaucracy; digital campaign-enhancement; dissolution of geographical boundaries; 
heterogeneity of Conservative associations; integration of new technologies in 
traditional hierarchies; and rapport and digital trust signals.  Chapter Six expands on 
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these themes and integrates them into the wider arguments for the 2005-2012 period.  
The chapter relates its findings to Margetts’ idea of ‘the Cyber Party’ and argues that, in 
the run-up to 2010, a newly empowered organisational subculture evolved at the 
Conservative Party’s grassroots, which I call ‘Cyber Toryism’. 
 Finally Part IV, provides a comparative history in Chapter Seven, which argues 
that the advent of internet technologies facilitated a culture in the party which in turn 
contributed to a loosening of the grip that the central-party had held traditionally over 
the organisation of its communications since the late 1950s; and that between 2005 and 
2010 there was some redistribution of power away from central-elites to those 
Conservative participants at the grassroots who embraced innovative uses of specific 
internet technologies.  Therefore, the thesis concludes in Chapter Eight that, since the 
late 1950s, the impact of the advents of new political mass media on the Conservative 
Party’s organisational culture have been to contribute to an evolution away from a 
mass-party culture to a technologically-centric culture, in which television 1951-1964 
significantly penetrated central-party culture; and internet technologies 2005-2012 most 
notably synthesised with the party in subcultures at the grassroots. 
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TWO 
Theory and Historiography 
 
 
This research could have taken a number of different paths to the study of the 
Conservative Party.  The most obvious alternative to comparing histories through the 
cultural lens is to choose one of the diverse parsimonious approaches to the study of 
political parties in Political Science.  However, few political scientists engage with 
methods that embrace the complex dynamics of political parties in a holistic-cultural 
context.
71
  This chapter takes a critical approach to the presentation of the work 
influencing it in the academic areas of cultural theory and the study of political parties.  
The first section outlines some of the theoretical influences including communication 
culture, organisational culture, political culture, cultural methodology and digital 
culture.  The second section addresses the historiography and academic perspectives in 
relation to the Conservative Party and new media in the periods of interest.  The chapter 
argues in favour of addressing the study of political parties on an individual case basis, 
using in-depth cultural analysis.   
 
Cultural Theory 
 
John Thompson draws on diverse theoretical strands like cultural history and 
communication theory in order to provide some basis for the understanding of the role 
of media in the context of modernity,
72
 which this thesis argues is significant to the 
interpretation of the role of television in the Conservative Party 1951-1964.  
Thompson’s main thesis states: 
 
...that we can understand the social impact of the development of new networks of 
communication and information flow only if we put aside the intuitively plausible idea that 
communication media serve to transmit information and symbolic content to individuals whose 
relations to others remain fundamentally unchanged.  We must see instead that the uses of 
communication media involves the creation of new forms of action and interaction in the social 
world, new kinds of social relationship and new ways of relating to others and to oneself.  
When individuals use communication media, they enter into forms of interaction which differ 
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in certain respects from the type of face-to-face interactions which characterises most 
encounters of daily life.
73
 
 
In this respect, this thesis approaches television, 1951-1964, and the internet, 2005-
2012, as impacting on the interactions between participants within the Conservative 
Party in new ways.  This means that new cultural phenomena are observable in the form 
of adaptations in their behaviours, attitudes and approaches to new media.  Furthermore, 
this thesis is particularly interested in identifying and detailing Conservative participant 
interactions with new media and using the dichotomies, in terms of how they differ 
from general face-to-face human contact, in order to place the cultural analysis in 
context. 
Thompson’s theory is useful in that it identifies the broad sociological 
connections of power relations between the individual and the political arena, and 
provides a theoretical understanding for how communication technologies can mediate 
it and facilitate the formation of new cultures and social networks.  In light of the recent 
developments in social networks online, one could argue that Thompson’s words were 
prophetic.  However, although Thompson recognises the historical development of a 
globalised society, he takes a sceptical stance on the idea of a postmodern age.  In that 
sense, Thompson’s theory is useful as it helps  contextualise the wider issues of 
modernity in which this thesis has an interest for the 1951-1964 period.   However, the 
advent of the highly globalised and networked world in which Cameron’s Conservatives 
developed in the run-up to 2010 requires this research to embrace some plasticity in its 
approach.  Therefore, Thompson’s ideas are used cautiously in the contemporary 
context. 
Edgar Schein’s ideas and approaches in relation to organisational culture74 go 
some way in providing contexts for the analysis of sub- and micro- cultures in 
postmodern society in relation to the role of culture and individual leadership in 
organisations.  Schein’s interdisciplinary model for cultural analysis draws upon the 
fields of anthropology, sociology and psychology.  His integrated approach is based on 
gathering empirical evidence that is rooted in his own experiences and observations; and 
the use of interdisciplinary academic theory, as a method to explain what he observes.  
His book has been developed from the earlier editions to recognise the growing 
diversity and complexity that organisational phenomena have been shown to exhibit as 
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the time continuum has moved forward.  Schein stresses the necessity to evolve one’s 
thinking in line with organisational evolutions, which is a flexibility that lacks in 
Thompson’s approach to cultural theory.   
Hierarchical parties like the Conservative Party are influenced by the 
organisational role and political vision of the party leader.  Schein argues: 
 
...(1) that leaders as entrepreneurs are the main architects of culture, (2) that after cultures are 
formed, they influence what kind of leadership is possible, and (3) that if elements of the 
culture become dysfunctional, leadership can and must do something to speed up culture 
change...
75
 
 
These points are useful for the development of an understanding of the relationships 
between the Conservative Party leadership and other party dynamics.  Points two and 
three are applicable to the understanding of the long view of change in the Conservative 
Party, especially in chapters Three and Four to explain how the party changed rapidly 
under Macmillan to Douglas-Home.  Schein’s idea that organisational leaders are 
entrepreneurs is useful in chapters Six and Seven as a possible explanation of how 
innovations of individuals in leadership roles impacted on changing uses of new 
technologies in Cameron’s Conservatives.  Schein rightly points out that developments 
in computer-mediated communications have caused the dynamics of relationships 
between leaders and their organisations to culturally evolve in response to the expansion 
of the interconnectivity of globalised networks.  This helps to address the explanation of 
the overall developments in Conservative Party culture over longer periods of time and, 
therefore, has given a particularly useful theoretical grounding for arguments in the 
comparative history in Chapter Seven.   
 There are significant differences between Thompson’s modernist and Schein’s 
postmodernist perspectives.  Thompson argues that the networking capabilities of 
contemporary technologies is important to the understanding of changes in human 
behavioural response, but that it does not collectively mark the advent of a new age.  
Conversely, Schein suggests that evolutions in the complexities of internet technologies 
means there is a fundamental divergence between (1) the traditional hierarchies, and (2) 
contemporary networks, of organisations.  Therefore, the dichotomies produced from 
the conflation of these two approaches is useful for the assessment of the differences 
observed in the evidence from the two periods of interest, such as the traditional 
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hierarchy of the Conservative Party 1951-1964, which is discussed in Part II; and the 
dynamic network characteristics of the Conservative Party 2005-2012, which are 
discussed in Part III. 
It is useful to explore some of the thinking behind political culture in order to 
place the concepts of Thompson’s communications culture and Schein’s organisational 
culture more deeply in the political context.  The multiple strands of thought in relation 
to political culture were brought together by Dennis Kavanagh in the 1970s.
76
  At that 
time, Kavanagh suggested that the scholarly approaches in political culture were 
‘concerned with orientations towards political objects’77 and that it ‘may be seen as the 
overall distribution of citizen’s orientations to political objects.’78  He describes 
orientations as the motives, norms, symbols, knowledge, awareness, emotions and 
judgements relating to the political system.  Objects in politics are outlined as the parts 
that comprise the political system including state institutions, political organisations and 
the perspectives of the individual.  It was a broad approach that was largely focused on 
the description of macrocultural interactions between objects within the political 
system.  Kavanagh presented key themes such as political parties being ‘subcultures’ of 
the political system, ‘political socialisation’79 and ‘political culture and change’.   
This thesis considers political socialisation, to be the process by which 
individual Conservative participants learn the cultural and hierarchical ways of 
Conservative Party networks at the microcultural level.  This may lead to subsequent 
dynamic interactions between: individuals and collectives; informal and official 
collective groups; hierarchical and structural phenomena; and new and traditional 
media: symbols, objects, attitudes, approaches and behaviours.  Political culture and 
change is used as a meta-historical concept in order to help explain and compare the 
influences of wider historical trends and phenomena, in the two periods of interest.  The 
thesis recognises a range of interconnected influences, with both internal and external 
origins, upon the Conservative Party’s cultural and organisational responses to change, 
but focuses on the uses and influences of media and technologies in the societies in 
which it has operated at different points in time; and how this relates to its intracultural 
dynamics. 
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Philip Howard’s studies80 approach the role of new media in the wider context 
of changing political cultures in specific societies.  Although his work is often set in 
entirely different contexts to this thesis, his basic ideas are applicable to aspects of this 
framework.  He suggests that in addition to ‘abstract values and ideologies’ political 
culture is influenced by technology and that our ideals, electoral leanings and opinions 
are shaped by technological evolution.
81
  This thesis is influenced by Howard’s idea 
that, firstly, technology can evolve and, secondly, that it has the power to impact on 
individuals and groups.  This supports the assumption on which this thesis is based that 
certain techno-cultural evolutions in wider society lead to new media innovations which 
have the potential to impact at micro- and macro- cultural levels in the Conservative 
Party. 
 Like Kavanagh, Howard uses political culture as an approach to develop an 
understanding of the macrocultural perspective.  In doing so he is able to draw on the 
diverse strands of political communication studies that address political engagement in 
Middle Eastern countries.  However, the work lacks the kind of cultural texture that 
would be gained by an approach with an ethnographic sensibility.  Howard is himself a 
proponent of creatively adapting ethnographic methods for research in e-politics and 
political culture.  ‘As new forms of social organisation and communities appear, 
researchers must adapt their methods in order best to capture evidence.’82  He describes 
ethnographic approaches as ‘the systematic description of human behaviour and 
organisational culture based on first-hand observation.’83  His innovative ‘network 
ethnography’ is an integration of network analysis and ethnographic methods.84  This is 
an example of how researchers have to become increasingly creative in order to tackle 
the challenge of understanding the cultural implications of the rapid developments in 
internet technologies.   Howard argues for ‘a more cultural analytic frame that allows 
one to treat singular innovations and acts as conditions and symbols of important 
cultural change in the way we conduct our politics’.85  And for ‘a more sensible 
analytical frame’ that ‘treats technological innovation as co-evolutionary with 
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organisational behaviour.’86  This idea fits neatly in the context of this thesis under the 
assumption outlined above that developments in technology can trigger changes in the 
evolution of the Conservative Party’s organisational culture.  Like Howard, the socio-
cultural anthropologist Alexander Smith is interested in using ethnography to 
understand political cultures.  Smith’s ethnography of the Scottish Conservatives in the 
run-up to the 2003 Scottish parliamentary and local elections
87
  joins David Seawright’s 
work on the Scottish Conservatives
88
 in addressing the party from a cultural perspective.   
Smith’s ethnographic study of a Conservative association is focused on 
describing and understanding the culture of its bureaucracy and activism, and how the 
Scottish Conservatives interacted in social and political contexts.  In this sense, it has 
some similarities to the approach taken by this research and is, therefore, a useful 
reference point for Part III of this thesis.  However, conversely, this thesis places the 
social and political contexts in the background and puts the view of the party’s 
relationship with new media in the foreground.  Smith’s study pays some attention to 
the traditional communication practices at the Conservative association level, such as 
the use and symbolism of the ‘InTouch’ leaflet.89  Although there is further mention of 
the use, coordination, and quality, of communication technologies in the campaign, the 
analysis of the role that new media played is not a focus of his work.  The setting is also 
quite different. Since Scottish devolution, Conservatism north of the border has 
underperformed when compared with the Conservative Party’s progress in England and 
the devolved electoral region of Wales.
90
  Therefore, the wider political backdrop in 
which this thesis is set is different in temporal and geographic terms because it presents 
primary data that is concerned mainly with the Conservative Party in England and 
Wales 1951-1964 and 2005-2012. 
Smith’s ethnographic account describes the process of him becoming a 
Conservative Party insider: 
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Employing the anthropological approach of participant observation, I became involved in the 
Conservative campaign for the 2003 local government and Scottish Parliament elections.  I 
attended meetings, branch and fundraising events as well as leafleted and canvassed for local 
Tory candidates along with countless volunteers.  I worked with party professionals and 
strategist as they drafted, formatted and produced dozens of the discursive artefacts that I will 
discuss in forthcoming chapters.  I also enjoyed access to meetings of the Core Campaign Team, 
a group of seven individuals that met regularly in Dumfries between January and April 2003 and 
coordinated the party’s campaign across the region.  I also participated in meetings of Alex 
Fergusson’s campaign team in Galloway and Upper Nithsdale and worked closely with the 
Conservative candidate David Mundell on his campaign for the Dumfries constituency.
91
 
 
Smith states that his academic interests in the party began before he became actively 
involved within it.  In contrast, I became a Conservative member at least two years 
before considering and conducting this study.  Therefore, as my political interests 
predate my academic interests, Smith and I have approached the ethnographic study of 
the Conservative Party from opposing ends of the same plane.  
 The internal dynamics of Conservative Party organisation and its relationship 
with new media requires an approach that is both flexible and able to represent the 
complexities of the rich specifics it exhibits.  Ethnography is a long-established tradition 
in cultural studies and has come ‘to refer to an integration of both firsthand and 
empirical investigation and the theoretical and comparative interpretation of social 
organisation and culture.’92  Ethnography can successfully illuminate what most other 
approaches do not consider relevant.  There are significant parts of everyday cultures 
that go unnoticed by those living in them, and the positivistic methods that are often 
employed to research them.  Conversely, organisational ethnographers seek to draw out 
the intricate everyday aspects of the organisational environment.
93
 
 
Although the quotidian experiences of people working in organisations may, to some, hardly 
seem exciting, for organisational ethnographers much of the intriguing “mystery” of 
organisational life is hidden in the ordinary exchanges of ordinary people on an ordinary sort of 
day.  From every perspective, the intricacies of everyday organisational life can be better 
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grasped not through questionnaires developed and analysed while sitting in an office, but by 
going out into the organisational “field”.
94
  
 
Approaches to studying political histories, organisations and cultures, tend to, like 
Philip Howard’s work, address the more salient issues.  Therefore, much of the 
everyday mechanics which collectively power the political machines of our democracy 
remain latently unrecorded.  Conversely, this thesis seeks to connect the everyday 
practices of the ordinary party-participant to the more prominent, or glamorous, aspects 
of Conservative Party cultural-life.  To-date, Smith’s work on the Scottish 
Conservatives is the closest to that aim in the Conservative Party context. 
The history of ethnography demonstrates that it ‘does not have a standard well-
defined meaning.’95  Central to the ethnographic tradition has been its looseness and 
methodological adaptability that allows the researcher to mould an ethnographic 
research design to the phenomenon in question.  Subsequently, the practice of 
ethnography is open to wide interpretation.  In this sense, using methods with an 
ethnographic sensibility to investigate the role of the internet is no different to the 
‘remoulding’ that ‘has arisen from the fact that ethnography has been associated with, 
and also put in opposition to, various other methodological approaches.’96  All new 
technologies that revolutionise the ways in which humans communicate, stir human 
interests as they begin the process of cultural integration - like cave paintings, paper and 
pen, the printing press, telegraphy and telephony, the gramophone, film, radio, 
television, mobile communications and, more recently, the internet.   
Advances in the ways in which humans interact with technology has led to 
expansion in the theory and practice of ethnography, like the developments in ‘virtual’, 
‘internet’ or ‘online’ ethnographies.97  The internet as a new and academically 
unfamiliar medium has raised debates in terms of how to approach online research.  As 
the internet has become integrated in everyday culture, these debates and their resultant 
theories have become less relevant.  The argument for making a special case for virtual 
ethnography has not gained much traction in academic literature.  The inherent 
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flexibility of ethnographic methods means that it should be employed innovatively in 
order to best fit the specificity of the research questions and the phenomena in question.  
Therefore, there are unique considerations to be taken with every ethnographic study 
and, although the online environment has presented new problems for studies with 
ethnographic leanings, there is no absolute approach applicable to using ethnographic-
based methods that involve the internet.   Ethnographies associated with internet studies 
are likely to require a different approach from one study to the next, because cyberspace 
and its impact in the offline world has dynamic implications.   
That said, there are some prominent characteristics that are evident in most 
ethnographic practices.  For example: 
 
Ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily 
lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or 
asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – 
in fact, gathering whatever data are generally available to throw light on the issues that are the 
emerging focus of inquiry.
98
  
 
The benefit of ethnographic-based approaches is that they can be unstructured and open 
ended.
99
  This is significant for cultural research involving emerging phenomena, like 
much of what is observable in contemporary techno-cultural trends.  In order to have a 
fixed research design from the outset, one has to know exactly what data is available for 
analysis.  Ethnographic fieldwork usually involves unknown, developing or snowballing 
events.  A rigid approach could obstruct access to potential sources of exceptionally 
significant data.  A prime example of this is exhibited in this thesis.  If flexibility had 
not been central to the initial research design, then, the opportunity to use my 
experience as a Conservative PPC in 2010 would have been lost, because I had no way 
of knowing whether or not I would become a Conservative candidate when I first 
embarked on designing this research.  As events transpired, the thesis became enriched 
by unique access to firsthand insider-observations from the candidate’s perspective. 
A further consideration is to assess what benefits the ethnographic tradition can 
provide the historian.  In general, comparative approaches to scholarly analysis are 
universally accepted across a range of disciplines and have become an established 
academic convention.  Using comparative methods with new media ethnographies is 
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encouraged in order to widen the scope of an otherwise ‘parochial’ perspective.100  
Similarly, combining ethnographic-based methods with a comparative approach is an 
invaluable tool for the cultural historian, allowing them to integrate the methods for 
viewing contemporary objects with traditional historical practices for viewing the past.  
The combined approach provides a resultant research design that assists the comparison 
of similar phenomena at different points in history and, thus, both periods are provided 
with greater depth and perspective.   
Approaches to online media, political engagement, socialisation and culture 
have been largely focused on consumption, production and impacts on voting,
101
 rather 
than the nuances of cultural interaction.  Studies that do consider online political 
interaction tend to be generalist, quantitative and devoid of cultural descriptions and 
analysis.
102
  One key example is research by Baumgartner and Morris.
103
  Their survey 
of 3500 young people involved in the 2008 US presidential primaries showed that social 
networks had no significant impact in political participation over other forms of media.  
This tells us little about the role that these technologies played in daily culture.  Chris 
Atton’s work,104 especially his use of cultural history to present a discourse analysis of 
British National Party (BNP) web pages, is a beginning to the redress of imbalance in 
the literature.  Moreover, work using theory with a digital-cultural emphasis has begun 
contributing to a web of ideas.  For example, Matt Hills’ secondary analysis of scholarly 
perspectives on digital participatory culture and social networking
105
 discusses the role 
of ‘nomadic communication’ through the use of mobile phones with wireless internet 
access.  Hills suggests that as digital technology rapidly develops, human culture is 
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evolving alongside, and some propose that ‘there is ample reason to believe that human 
evolution is accelerating.’106   
This thesis leans toward those works that argue in favour of more holistic 
approaches that tell us something about cultural impact with a view to gaining greater 
understandings of the roles that digital communication technologies play in our lives 
and organisations.  Abstract positivist alternatives using questionnaires, surveys and 
large sample sizes tell us something about generalised trends or patterns of opinion; but 
tell us little about real observable-interactions between humans and technology at the 
boundaries of the offline world and cyberspace.  When the results from human studies 
are taken to higher levels of abstraction, the less representative of real-world 
phenomena the results become.  Approaches that are culture-centric, like Michele 
Willson’s investigation of the politics and ethics of disembodiment;107 Kevin Robins’ 
account of the place of geographical space in techno-culture;
108
 and Kahn and Kellner’s 
analysis of the role of techno-cultures in globalisation,
109
 generate a theoretical 
grounding through which the multidimensionality and complex intricacies of human life 
and its increasingly integrated relationship with advanced technologies can be fully 
understood in relation to human development. 
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 The Historiography: Conservative Party and New Media 
 
Overview 
No historical work featuring twentieth century British television is complete without 
reference to Asa Briggs’ extensive study of British broadcasting history.  His work, over 
five volumes, is the probably the most authoritative account of the rise and expansion of 
television in Britain.
110
  Similarly, Burton Paulu provides a comprehensive historical 
review of the development of British television 1920-1980.
111
  Although both Briggs 
and Paulu usefully detail matters surrounding the development of political television, 
their books do not provide extensive analyses of television’s impact on the 
organisational developments in British political parties.  Academic literature providing a 
thorough examination of the Conservative Party’s relationship with new media in the 
twenty-first century is scarcer than that of the twentieth century.  Those scholars who 
have begun pursuing interests in e-politics and new political communications have 
tended to compare a range of political parties using parsimonious models that produce 
generalised outcomes.
112
  Therefore, they provide only a thin representation of the 
complexities in which individual parties operate and evolve in terms of their adaptation 
to the use of new media.   
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Until the 1970s, twentieth century Conservative Party history had been 
neglected for many years and consisted mostly of political biographies.
113
  The first 
substantial analysis of local and national Conservative Party organisation was work by 
John Ramsden covering 1902-1940,
114
 which he developed from earlier doctoral 
research.
115
  Following Ramsden,
116
 there have been a number of subsequent notable 
scholars whom have made significant contributions to the academic tradition of 
studying British Conservatism and the Conservative Party.  These historians and 
students of political parties include Stuart Ball,
117
 Tim Bale,
118
 Andrew Gamble,
119
 
Timothy Heppell,
120
 Philip Norton,
121
 and Anthony Seldon.
122
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There is a significant historiography that deals with Churchill’s leadership,123 
especially his role as Prime Minister during the wartime coalition.  Many of these works 
depict the party’s respective ‘collapse’ and ‘revival’ either side of Clement Atlee’s 
premiership.
124
  As Stuart Ball notes, much of the work on Churchill has addressed the 
war period in a ‘pattern of neglect of the post-war decade which is apparent in many 
other works on Churchill’.125   Biographical accounts of Anthony Eden have been 
largely focused on Britain’s international relations and reveal little about his 
relationship with Conservative Party organisation.
126
  A similar approach has been taken 
to the prominent biographies on Harold Macmillan.  D. R. Thorpe focuses his 
biography
127
 on analysis of the major themes of Macmillan’s premiership like the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Profumo Affair.  Alistair Horne takes a critical stance 
towards the premier, arguing that Macmillan’s demise, as Tory leader, was because he 
became distracted by foreign matters and subsequently mishandled British affairs.
128
   
While biographical approaches contribute significantly to Conservative Party 
historiography, their sharp focus on the narratives of individuals, especially party 
leaders, means that some of the more mundane aspects of changes to the day-to-day life 
of party-culture are overlooked.  This thesis attempts to narrow the gap in our 
knowledge of ‘the everyday’ with narratives that describe the interrelationships between 
varieties of actors within the party.  The remainder of this chapter provides a broad 
discussion of the main scholarly perspectives in relation to this thesis in order to 
contextualise the Conservative Party’s evolution and relationship with new media. 
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Conservative Party Studies in Context 
Political science is a multi-theoretical discipline that is divergent in the ways in which 
political parties are investigated.  The two approaches of political communications and 
party organisation are most commonly used to elucidate an understanding of how 
political parties behave.  However, these strands of party behaviour analysis are 
assumed to be ‘in highly different contexts.’129  In the case of the Conservative Party, 
there is a cultural relationship between the organisation of party members and the 
modes by which the party machine communicates with voters.  For example, it is the 
local delivery networks and Conservative associations who often mobilise delivery of 
the ‘InTouch’ leaflet.130  Therefore, fragmented political science approaches in isolation 
are less able to provide the holistic picture needed to assists our understanding of the 
dynamics between the evolving uses of new media technologies and the complexities of 
Conservative Party organisation.
131
  It is for this reason that this thesis takes a critical 
view of political science approaches while borrowing some of their influences, and 
integrating them into the approach to this work.   
As introduced in Chapter One, the Conservative Party’s history is rooted in the 
genealogy of democracy.  Cultural evolutions in Britain led to advances in the country’s 
democratic system which in turn facilitated the formation of political parties, like the 
Whigs and Tories, in Parliament.  Further evolutions in the parliamentary system saw 
the institutionalisation of Whigs and Tories in formalised party organisation like that of 
the Conservative Party under Robert Peel, Prime Minister, 1834-1835 and 1841-1846.  
However, unlike the formation of the British Liberal Party at the Willis Room in 1859 
or the beginnings of the British Labour Party with the Trade Unions of 1900, the 
Conservative Party has ‘no such neat historical occasion...as a point of entry for the 
student of conservatism.’132  Maurice Duverger argued that party centralisation is an 
inevitable result of the institutionalisation process.  His hypothesis suggests that parties 
that developed outside parliament, like Labour, will more likely be centralised than 
parties, like the Tories, which naturally evolved in Parliament.
133
  Samuel Huntington
134
 
                                                     
129
 Chrysa Lamprinakou, ‘The Party Evolution Model: An Integrated Approach to Party Organisation and 
Political Communication’, Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2008), p. 103. 
130
 Alexander Smith, Devolution and the Scottish Conservatives: Banal activism, electioneering and the 
politics of irrelevance (Manchester University Press, 2011). 
131
 Lamprinakou, ‘Model’. 
132
 Philip Norton and Arthur Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism (Maurice Temple Smith, London, 
1981), p. 90. 
133
 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (Methuen, 
London, 1964). 
52 
 
considers ‘social forces’ as playing a significant role in the development of political 
parties.  Although his work is theoretically similar to that of Duverger, Huntington’s 
model relates to multiple parties within political systems, which in turn provides a 
broader view of party development.  However, both approaches are limited because they 
over-simplify the complexity, uniqueness and specific nature of an individual political 
party’s existence.  Therefore, it is important not homogenise political parties, but rather 
address the nature of each political party based on its individuality. 
John Ramsden’s authoritative representation of the Conservative Party 1940-
1975
135
 provides a lucid description of the Conservative Party’s organisation as a ‘social 
organism’, which adapts and changes, or evolves, over time.  Ramsden explains in great 
detail how a range of factors interrelate both inside and outside the party to influence its 
evolution and what we understand as its history.  Mark Low claims that in order to 
regain its electability, the post-Major Conservative Party organisation underwent a 
process of ‘evolution’ which resulted in a shift of power from the local associations to 
the party’s new managerial centre, but with ‘room for further development’.136  
Similarly, this thesis aims to understand the shifts in power in the party’s organisation 
which occur through its cultural evolutions.
137
  
Richard Cockett suggests that: ‘Like the best of Darwinian organisms, the 
Conservative Party has always had as its greatest strength the ability to adapt and 
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survive.’138  Conservative adaptations have meant that the party has survived to be one 
of the oldest and most successful extant political parties in western democratic history.  
Some scholars suggest that the Conservative Party has exhibited throughout its history 
the recurring characteristics of both continuity and change.
139
   
   
While the Conservative Party’s longevity is testament to political continuity, the party’s 
evolution is not simply a smooth adaption to its changing political environment.  As well as 
powerful elements of continuity, periods of discontinuity can be identified in the party’s 
evolution.
140
 
 
This thesis understands observed changes in Conservative Party evolution as being both 
incremental changes over a longer period of time and rapid changes after periods of 
slight or no change.   
Evolution theory is the antithesis of the revolutionary model.  Many of the 
theoretical influences in this thesis, like the work of Edgar Schein, and Philip Howard 
are grounded in the assumption that the evolutionary process in human culture is 
intrinsic.  The two main schools of evolutionary thought are (1) the classical 
evolutionists’ developmental perspective; and (2) the contemporary evolutionist 
perspective that is inspired by the Darwinian model of natural selection.  Like species in 
biology, these models can be applied to societal and cultural phenomena.  This thesis 
leans towards the notion of punctuated equilibrium which is more generally accepted in 
social theory.
141
  For clarity: 
 
...punctuated equilibrium refers to a discontinuous conception of political time in which periods 
of comparatively modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense 
moments of transformation.
142 
 
Punctuated equilibrium has been handily applied to the understanding of both 
political
143
 and organisational
144
 phenomena. 
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Chrysa Lamprinakou’s ‘Party Evolution Model’145 recognises that a party’s 
unique electioneering characteristics develop throughout its evolution, and is therefore 
an advance on Duverger’s ideas, and Huntington’s model, mentioned above.  
Lamprinakou’s work is grounded in ‘institutionalism’, which is a theoretical approach 
in the field of international relations.  The ‘Party Evolution Model identifies to what 
extent the implementation of sophisticated marketing techniques that form the party’s 
electoral behaviour is related to the party’s historical and organisational past.’146  The 
Party Evolution Model is a theoretical approach that attempts to synthesise two 
traditionally divergent approaches to party behaviour in the political sciences: (1) party 
organisation and development; and (2) political communications and marketing.
147
   
Lamprinakou’s critical analysis of existing approaches to party development 
culminates with synthesis in her Party Evolution Model.  Rather than a narrowcast 
perspective of the party, the Party Evolution Model allows the researcher to analyse 
how parties ‘have evolved over time with regard to organisational evolution and 
change.’148  Lamprinakou claims that other models give ‘only a partial and incomplete 
account of party behaviour’ and ‘that by not taking into account the distinct political 
cultures of parties they tend to treat party member behaviour as predefined and fixed.’149  
Political marketing models often take a blinkered approach to the study of the winning 
of elections.  Lamprinakou argues that in doing so they ‘tend to ignore institutional 
constraints of party organisation and provide a more superficial approach to party 
behaviour.’150  
Lamprinakou’s theory makes good progress in synthesising party organisation 
and political communication.  But, although the model is both campaign and 
organisation focused, it overlooks a detailed perspective on political culture and 
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organisational culture, like the works of Philip Howard and Edgar Schein, respectively.  
Lamprinakou does however argue in favour of a cultural understanding of parties, 
because other approaches: 
 
...fail to identify the parties as dynamic organisations whose intra-party relationships are 
characterised by struggles over the organisational distribution of power.
151 
 
Therefore, this thesis builds on Lamprinakou’s ideas, because it borrows aspects of her 
approach and combines it with more culture-centric perspectives.  This thesis diverges 
from Lamprinakou’s interest in ‘marketing techniques’ and rather places greater 
emphasis on the role of specific communication technologies as new media in the 
party’s ‘historical and organisational past’.  In borrowing some of the Party Evolution 
Model’s ideas in tandem with those of Schein’s approach to organisational culture, this 
thesis gains an  understanding of party development that places a greater emphasis on 
‘internal organisational and structural evolution and the election campaign attributes of 
party behaviour’.152  
Other approaches to explaining party behaviour include the study of party 
development and models.  Duverger first identified what he argued to be the structural 
differences of cadre and mass parties.
153
  The ‘cadre’, or ‘caucus’, party is based on the 
assumption that elite political activists dominate the selection of favoured candidates on 
the party’s behalf.  The emphasis is placed on the quality of the selector-activists rather 
than their quantity.
154
  The ‘mass’ party model unites a large membership of participants 
who are organised in regional branches and subscribe to one national party identity.  
The prominent British parties of the 1951-1964 period could be argued to have 
exhibited mass-based characteristics.  Otto Kirchheimer’s ‘catch-all’ model155 describes 
a system in which the party leadership is strengthened and party membership plays a 
more peripheral role.  Angelo Panebianco’s ‘electoral-professional’ model emphasises 
the importance of party leadership being supported by a team of professionals rather 
than a mass of amateur volunteers.
156
  Richard Katz and Peter Mair’s ‘cartel party’157 is 
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argued to be a model in which parties respond to the decline in political participation by 
colluding with rival parties for the use of state-funded electoral provisions.  However, 
Mair states that, unlike what he claims to have observed elsewhere in Western Europe, 
Britain is the exception to the cartel-party trend.
158
 
Helen Margetts argues that nothing is predetermined in terms of the ‘trajectory’ 
of party development and notes that ‘earlier models have co-existed with later ones.’159  
Most of the models that have emerged to replace the mass-party explanation of party 
behaviour have tended to underestimate the impact of new types of activism in Britain 
in the internet age.  Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that local activism has 
been playing a significant role in electoral performance of political parties in Britain as 
recently as 2010.
160
  Those who prescribe to the concept of party ideal types have come 
to a consensus that there has been a general decline in party membership since the 
1960s.
161
  Some believe that this has led to changes in the traditional mass-based party 
system in Britain.
162
  Leon Epstein, who grounded his ideas in the ‘oligarchic’ party 
model,
163
 claims that complex parties, like the Conservative Party, are controlled from 
the top and that ‘strong counter-organisational tendencies represented by new campaign 
techniques involving mass media, professional skills and large financial contributions’ 
challenge the mass-party model.
164
  Ward et al. suggest that, although the internet had 
not ‘matured’ in terms of its role as a medium for political communication, impact on 
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intra-party change is plausible.
165
  They suggest that computer-mediated 
communications could either (1) further weaken party membership; or (2) strengthen 
and empower party participation with a new model in which electronic platforms offer 
the attraction of greater networking opportunities.   
Douglas Carswell and Daniel Hannan are examples of two Conservative 
politicians, who claim to have been empowered by evolutions in the nature of the 
internet and its relationship with British politics.   In the run up to 2010, both Carswell 
and Hannan were active users of internet-based applications like blogs.
166
  Their self-
published book
167
 describes radical ideas for libertarian reform, and extols the virtues of 
the internet as a revolutionary medium that gives greater choice to the consumer.  They 
suggest also that the internet can be used to empower the outside politician, over party 
bigwigs.
168
  On one notable occasion Hannan himself exemplified this phenomenon, 
when his rhetorical attack on Gordon Brown in the European Parliament went viral on 
‘YouTube’169 within hours.  In his blog for the Telegraph he reported that: 
 
The internet has changed politics – changed it utterly and forever. Twenty-four hours ago, I 
made a three-minute speech in the European Parliament, aimed at Gordon Brown.  I tipped off 
the BBC and some of the newspaper correspondents but, unsurprisingly, they ignored me: I am, 
after all, simply a backbench MEP.  When I woke up this morning, my phone was clogged with 
texts, my email inbox with messages.  Overnight, the YouTube clip of my remarks had attracted 
over 36,000 hits. By today, it was the most watched video in Britain.
170
 
 
This demonstrates how the advent of the internet is believed to have changed the nature 
of politics in Britain.  In Part III, the thesis explores how relatively insignificant actors 
in the democratic process can now, through the democratising power of the internet, 
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alight digital platforms from which to usurp traditional political hierarchies and the once 
powerful agendas of the traditional media.
171
 
In light of this increased democratic activity facilitated by the internet and, more 
specifically, social media,
172
 a shift of power in intra-party structure, facilitated by 
internet technologies, has real potential for the empowerment of grassroots participants.  
Helen Margetts suggests that these kinds of changing trends in party development are 
indicative of a new ‘ideal-type’ of party in Britain.  Therefore, Margetts proposes ‘the 
cyber party’ as a potential party-type to succeed the mass-party model, as parties in 
Britain transition further away from traditional modes of party structure.  The cyber 
party is defined as a political party that exploits wider techno-cultural trends, with 
increased use of internet, and other computer-mediated communications, and integrates 
its organisation with new trends in internet-based citizen participation.  Margetts argues 
that the cyber party
173
 is an alternative response to the cartel-party and that both types of 
parties can exist simultaneously – at the same time and in the same political system.  
Furthermore, both forms of party may share characteristics, for example ‘the blurring of 
the distinction between members and supporters’.174  Evidence presented Part III would 
suggest that this was the case in the Conservative Party 2005-2012.  But evidence in 
Part II suggests that the case was also the same for the party between 1951 and 1964, 
when the party was arguably at its height as a mass-based party. 
Margetts’ theory is underpinned by the assumption that the internet is the ideal 
space for political and democratic activity and that the internet is playing a 
deinstitutionalising role in British political parties.  Her ideas were first being developed 
over a decade ago in 2001
175
 and have not gained significant traction in the wider 
literature since the formal publication of the cyber party concept in 2006.
176
  Perhaps 
this is because there are some weaknesses in the cyber party concept.  For example, 
Ward et al. suggest that ‘one could reasonably argue that any new members recruited 
via the internet would have weak attachments to the local party’.177  They attribute this 
to the impersonal characteristics of internet use.  If this is found to be the case, then, as 
the internet and political parties continue to co-evolve, the cyber party model is likely to 
                                                     
171
 Jose van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2013), p. 10. 
172
 Rachel Gibson, ‘Party Change, Social Media and the Rise of “Citizen-initiated” Campaigning’, Party 
Politics, online: DOI: 10.1177/1354068812472575 (2013), pp. 1-15. 
173
 Margetts, ‘Cyber’, Handbook. 
174
 Margetts, ‘Cyber’, ECPR, p. 8.  
175
 Ibid. 
176
 Margetts, ‘Cyber’, Handbook. 
177
 Ward, Gibson and Nixon, ‘Internet’, p. 29. 
59 
 
be limited in its potential.  Ward et al. also suggest that there is greater potential for 
dissent in internet-based party membership, which is another potential limitation for 
cyber-based parties.  Chapter Six provides evidence that demonstrates examples of 
internet-based dissent in the Conservative Party since 2005.  Chapter Eight suggests that 
Margetts’ valuable ideas would have greater impact if rooted in a cultural and more 
organic frame. 
This thesis rejects assumptions which state that generic models of party 
development can characterise absolute representations of party behaviour.  Instead, it 
supports the premise that every political party is organisationally unique and its 
evolution is influenced by (1) the intricacies of its process of formation, and subsequent 
history and characteristics; and (2) cultural influences from its external environment.  
Therefore, understanding the influence of the party’s unique ‘genetic’ characteristics is 
central to the understanding of how it responds to, for example, new media.
178
  This 
thesis does accept that general trends in the ways in which political parties operate can 
be useful to the discussion of influences on the party’s culture, therefore, it sets 
concepts, like the ‘mass-party’, in a cultural context.  Although this thesis does not 
subscribe to Margetts’ ideas of the cyber party in their published form, her evocative 
idea has influenced the explanation of latent phenomena, in the organisational culture of 
the Conservative Party, which have been unearthed through observational and 
testimonial evidence in Part III.  Furthermore, this thesis recognises that complex 
political parties like the Conservative Party can exhibit a combination of elements that 
would be familiar characteristics in a number of theoretical party models. Therefore, the 
use of such characteristics, which are drawn from a range of concepts, is useful to this 
thesis for background contextualisation when discussing wider historical and cultural 
trends in the party’s evolutionary development.  
Another approach in the pursuit of understanding political parties is to assess 
party change in individual and complex case studies.  Tim Bale tends to take this 
approach to his work on the Conservative Party.  In line with the aforementioned 
punctuated theory, he argues that between 2005 and 2010 the Conservative Party 
exhibited rapid change in its organisation under Cameron’s leadership.179  Bale’s 
subsequent book, which offers a valuable holistic view of ‘the drivers of party 
change’,180 takes a long-view historical approach to the analysis of Conservative Party 
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change over five decades.  Bale found that Conservative Party change is a complex 
process and dependent on dynamic relationships between the above, and other, factors.  
Moreover, Bale’s ‘overall findings’ suggest that the various drivers of change play 
different roles in a range of areas of the party and in different ways.
181
  Therefore, it is 
important not to homogenise and overly simplify findings, which is the danger for many 
parsimonious approaches.
182
 
The traditional approach to twentieth century Conservative Party organisation 
has focused on the structure of the party.  This has been represented significantly in the 
Conservative Party historiography.
183
   The early evolution of the Conservative Party, 
which evolved out of aristocratic groupings in Parliament, has been characterised as a 
party with a tradition of deference in which the constituent parts of the party 
organisation deferred power and responsibility to a social elite at the top of the party.
184
  
According to A. Potter,
185
 the Conservative Party in the run-up to the 1951 General 
Election was characterised by a nineteenth century tradition of party-wide discipline 
that was maintained through the party’s deferential structure in which the party leader 
was respected as the authority figure.  In reference to the Conservatives, Robert 
McKenzie claimed that ‘it would be difficult to envisage a more tight-knit system of 
oligarchic control of the affairs of a political party’.186  These ideas influenced the 
traditional view of the party’s hierarchy as being ‘monarchical’ in which the party 
leader at the top held significant power over the lower levels of party organisation.  
However, it should be noted that both McKenzie and Potter were reflecting on the party 
at a time of Conservative domination.   
Furthermore, the ‘oligarchic’ model187 of directly interconnected groups within 
the party has been disputed in favour of the ‘baronial’ model, which describes a more 
fragmented organisation and distribution of power among diverse levels and 
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collectives.
188
  Arguably, the latter model is indicative of Conservative Party 
organisation before William Hague’s ‘Fresh Future’ reforms in the wake of the party’s 
defeat to ‘New Labour’ in 1997.   Tim Bale describes Hague’s changes as bringing 
‘together the party’s voluntary, professional, and parliamentary components into a 
unified structure for the first time, giving those at the centre new rights to intervene at 
constituency level.’189  This correlates also with Mark Low’s aforementioned 
assessment of the party’s evolution and suggests that there has been some tightening of 
centralised-control in party’s organisation since 1997. 
Andrew Taylor argues that, historically, the party leaders have held ‘the right to 
pronounce authoritatively what constitutes as Conservatism in any given period.’190  
This would suggest that the ideological leanings of specific leaders can influence the 
party’s culture at points in its history.  Moreover, it would perhaps explain why the 
party’s ideology is thought to constitute a diverse broad church of ideas that have ‘long 
been a blend of paternalist and libertarian traditions’,191  the emphasis of which has 
shifted throughout the course of its history.  Some scholars believe that the party holds 
the ability to put aside its ideological leanings in order to take a pragmatic approach to 
managing change with the aim of winning elections.
192
  ‘Because of this, all 
Conservative leaders have faced charges of opportunism and betrayal; and historians 
generally judge them by their success in adapting to change.’193   
The source of the Conservative Party’s ability to adapt and change has been 
argued to be as a result of these so called pragmatic characteristics.  The party ‘has its 
roots in a tradition of practice, a belief in the superiority of enlightened pragmatism 
which is taken to be the genius not only of Conservative but also of British political 
practice.’194   In terms of Cameron’s selection as party leader, Timothy Heppell suggest 
that the ‘Conservatives were re-engaging with the merits of pragmatism in the pursuit of 
power’.195  This would suggest that there is something inherent in the nature of the 
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Conservative Party which drives shifting cultural trends that can ignite phenomena into 
being - in order to influence evolutionary change in the party when environmental 
conditions allow it.  This thought is returned to in Chapter Six when the thesis proposes 
that the grassroots of the party underwent a cultural response to synthesise with the uses 
of specific internet technologies 2005-2010.   
 
New Media in the 2000s 
 
By 2005, the internet, as tool for daily organisation, had been assimilated significantly 
throughout British society and had grown also to play a role in the personal and 
professional lives of ordinary individuals.
196
  In the cultural context ‘evolution’ and 
‘technology’ are often cited together, which is evident in the following perspective on 
the rapid evolution of internet technologies in human culture. 
 
Since 1997 computerised systems for socialising have offered a fascinating arena of symbolic 
evolution. Children in many countries are routinely logged on to social network software 
whenever possible.  This practice allows them to keep in touch with their friends almost all of 
the time that they are not in school, engaged in physical activity, or in bed.  Even during those 
times they may have their mobile phones switched on.  From an evolutionary viewpoint, the 
speed of adoption of social network software is staggering.  Social network software such as 
Facebook, Hyves, LinkedIn, Plaxo, Twitter, Xing and others have spread with speeds that exceed 
flu epidemics, and we are just getting started.
197
 
 
However, what is of interest to this thesis is not simply an analysis of the general trends 
in the use of social networks, but rather ascertaining whether the Conservative Party’s 
internal culture responded to technological changes in the wider culture and, if so, how 
it manifested itself in its organisation.  
The general elections of 2001 and 2005 were not considered significant in terms 
of political web-campaigning.  According to Downey and Davidson, ‘the internet did 
not play a qualitatively greater role in the 2005 election than it did in 2001.’198  Between 
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the 2005 and 2010 elections, the Conservative Party underwent notable change.
199
  
Under the new leadership of David Cameron, the party attempted to detoxify its dated 
‘nasty party’ image and rebrand itself as an electable and progressive alternative to New 
Labour.  While he was leader of the opposition, Cameron’s contemporary style of 
leadership involved the use of internet applications like WebCameron, a video blog.  
The advent of it has been cited as the first significant use of e-politics in Britain.
200
  
However, Ward et al. have suggested that rather than for use in political marketing, 
‘internet-based technology might have a greater impact internally within parties’.201  In 
part, it was this hypothesis that influenced the original idea from which this thesis was 
developed.  WebCameron’s symbolism, and how it was used for reaching the voter, is 
discussed in further Chapter Six. 
In terms of political communication in the 2010 General Election, one could be 
forgiven for overlooking the internet, and questioning whether, in fact, television was 
actually the new political medium in Britain at that time.  Arguably, in some respects, 
2010-style political television was indeed a new medium in British election culture.  It 
was the first general election in British history in which the party leaders went head-to-
head in an American-style leader debate.
202
  In terms of academic interest in political 
communication, the television debates have gazumped thus far the historical 
prominence of the internet in the campaign.
203
  There have been some general academic 
examinations of techniques used in 2010, most of which survey the internet as one 
constituent part of overall campaign activity.
204
  These works tend to address and 
compare the activities of the main British parties, but not so much attention has been 
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given to an in-depth study of the role of the internet in the Conservative Party’s culture 
in 2010. 
 
New Media in the 1900s 
 
The twentieth century was a period when mass democracy shaped the organisation of 
political parties and the Conservative Party embraced new methods for electioneering in 
order to reach out to a larger voting pool.
205
  One notable example was Stanley 
Baldwin’s use of film and radio to communicate the new Conservative ideas of the 
time.
206
  Taylor suggests that: 
 
The Conservatives were fortunate that the advent of mass democracy was accompanied by the 
emergence of new media suited to mass political communication, and in Baldwin they had a 
leader who appreciated the possibilities of the new technologies and who worked hard to 
master them.
207
  
 
A number of additional scholars have examined the Conservative Party’s relationship 
with the new medium of film.
208
  It is thought that film was used to educate already 
converted voters and that it had little impact on winning new votes when compared to 
the political media which came after it.
209
 
In the post-war years, the new method of political communication was 
television.  The first election broadcasts were transmitted in 1951.
210
  In 1953, an 
interview with Harold Macmillan was the first political broadcast outside of an election.  
Tim Bale suggests that Macmillan’s appeal as Prime Minister was enhanced later by his 
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‘increasingly confident use of television’.211  Similarly, Richard Cockett claims that 
Macmillan ‘was one of the first politicians to recognise the importance of mastering the 
art of television, and his polished performances helped him considerably in his 
career.’212  Colin Seymour-Ure’s book213 provides elucidations of the relationships 
between prime ministers and the media, and argues that, as Churchill’s successor, Eden 
was the first prime minister to take initiative in the process of managing media relations, 
‘because of his awareness for the potentials of television’.214  Moreover, he suggests 
that Macmillan furthered this approach with the continuation of a ‘strategic review of 
broadcasting and politics’.215  The theme of mastering a new medium tends to be 
recurrent in the historiography of the Conservative Party’s relationship with new media 
in the early to mid-twentieth century.  Scholars have tended to address the party leader’s 
ability to adapt to the medium, rather than providing an in depth understanding of how 
television impacted specifically on the ways in which the Conservative Party went 
about organising itself.  Although this thesis considers leadership as an important factor 
in understanding the dynamics of the party’s relationship with media, it recognises that 
it is one of many factors in a complex web of interactions that together contribute to 
Tory Party culture. 
There are a number of more general texts in the historiography that have a 
greater emphasis on television, but these are not necessarily focused on change in the 
organisational culture of the Conservative Party.  Mark Jarvis’s analysis of television 
and the Conservative Party, 1955-1964,
216
 addresses the impact of the advent of debates 
about commercial television.  However, rather than significantly relating this to party 
organisation, Jarvis explores the wider-symbolism of television in relation to the 
Conservative Party Government.  He focuses on the case of the Pilkington Committee, 
which was assembled to address developments in British broadcasting; and what the 
outcomes of the Pilkington Report, which ultimately led to an increase in pirate radio, 
can tell us about morality in Britain’s social history.  Jarvis concludes that: ‘Television 
and radio were defining elements of the affluent society.’217  Tim Bale identifies the 
advent of television as an additional driver of change in the Conservative Party 1951-
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1964. Like, Mark Jarvis, his analysis of the role of television in the party is focused 
largely on the role of the advent of commercial television, except with a greater focus 
on party policy and the resultant impact on interrelations between Conservative 
parliamentarians, CCO figures and political elites.  Bale’s overall emphasis is different 
to that of this thesis, because new media, i.e. television, play a more minor role in his 
1951-1964 narrative; although, like this research, he does provide detailed analysis of 
the party’s organisation.218   
While these works detail effectively the broad relationships between 
broadcasting and political development in Britain, they tend to focus on the elite figures 
in the party and the more salient issues in the historic record.  Accounts detailing less 
familiar aspects of the party’s culture, and thus the more latent-factors hidden in the 
everyday lives of political participants, are scarcer.  Furthermore, although works, like 
Ramsden’s books, which cover the 1951-1964 period, provide invaluable expressions of 
the Conservative Party at that time, most accounts are thin when it comes to the impact 
of the developments of political television in the party’s organisation.  This thesis 
attempts to add greater depth to this understanding in Part II, which follows, with a 
narrative in two chapters on the Conservative Party’s organisational culture and the role 
of television 1951-1964. 
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Part II 
The Research: 1951-1964 
68 
 
THREE 
Television in Churchill’s and Eden’s Conservatives 
1951-1957 
 
 
The post-war Conservative Party suffered electoral defeats in 1945 and 1950 to 
Labour’s Clement Atlee.  However, the Conservatives returned to power on winning a 
slim majority of 16 MPs
219
 at the 1951 General Election, on 25 October, under Winston 
Churchill.  Their success has been attributed to both a rethink of party policy and a 
restructure of the party’s organisation220 under Lord Woolton, Chairman of Party 
Organisation, October 1946-July 1955,
221
 and Stephen Pierssene, General Director, 
October 1945-August 1957.
222
  Woolton, who insisted on the use of the tag ‘Socialist’ 
to replace ‘Labour’ in Conservative vocabulary,223 and has been described since as the 
‘greatest of all Conservative Party managers’,224 was ‘horrified at the apparent lack of 
system’225 in the party’s organisation.  However, rather than interfering with the day-to-
day procedures of the party-workers, he focused on developing the party’s propaganda, 
funds and membership.  One of his notable changes in party organisation was to limit 
candidate donations to £25 p.a., thus democratising the candidate selection process and 
forcing the local associations to raise funds through their supporter-base.
226
   
These changes in the Conservative Party came about at a time when a culture of 
civic bureaucracy had begun proliferating in the form of committee meetings and 
increased regulation.  At the same time, the post-war re-launch of television was subject 
to strict regulations that stemmed from the bureaucratic-style of the Atlee 
government.
227
  Early political television
228
 had been characterised by its formal and 
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rehearsed appearance in which politicians read scripts to camera.  However, in 1951, the 
Conservative Party was the first political party to deviate away from that approach in 
using the broadcaster
229
  Leslie Mitchell to perform a pre-rehearsed ‘question and 
answer’ format with Anthony Eden.230   
The historian Richard Cockett has contributed to Conservative Party 
historiography with his narrative
231
 that introduces the major themes of television’s 
impact on like, for example,  Conservative Party: organisation; broadcasting style; 
declining use of film and rising use of television; electoral motives;  and relationships 
with broadcasters and publicity professionals.  Michael Kandiah’s article232 on 
broadcasting and CCO, 1945-1955, is probably the closest match to the themes 
addressed in this chapter that exists in the current historiography.  Kandiah focuses on 
the decline of radio and rise of television.  He argues that the BBC and Conservative 
Party formed a mutually beneficial and symbiotic relationship that impacted on CCO 
‘broadcasting strategies’ and developments in the ‘politicisation of television’.   
This and the following chapter, which together constitute Part II of this thesis, 
expand on Cockett’s and Kandiah’s themes by presenting a wider view and deeper 
analysis of the role of television in the organisational culture of the party 1951-1964.  
Firstly, this chapter seeks to understand the impact of television in the Conservative 
Party during Churchill’s post-war premiership and Eden’s subsequent premiership.  The 
chapter addresses the period in two sections.  A section on Churchill’s Conservatives 
focuses on the party’s culture surrounding the use of a range of publicity and 
propaganda techniques.  The section also assesses aspects of the party organisation in 
the early 1950s and provides a detailed discussion on the party’s attitude to the advent 
of political television.  The second section on Eden’s Conservatives presents an analysis 
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of the changing nature of the Conservative Party organisation at the time of Eden’s 
premiership.  Like the first section, the role of television is placed into context with 
some discussion of additional political media that the party used for reaching voters.  
However, greater attention is given to the party’s understanding of, and awakening to, 
the advent of the television - with a deeper analysis of its impact on the party’s 
traditional hierarchy and cultural behaviour as a mass-based party.
233
 
 
Churchill’s Conservatives 1951-1955 
 
Party Organisation and Churchill’s Conservatives  
By 1952, Churchill’s Conservatives, with the cooperation of 507 Conservative 
associations, raised their membership subscriptions by 351,708 in a ten week period to 
an approximate figure of 2.8 million, of which 124,000 were considered to be Young 
Conservatives (YCs).
234
  This was the first recruitment campaign in four years, the last 
being when the party was in opposition.  The campaign was used as a ‘platform’ for 
government ministers to influence public opinion,
235
 and is a demonstration of the party 
using its mass-based culture to promote its propaganda agenda.  The Conservative 
associations were notified of the recruitment campaign by a letter which included a plea 
for support from Churchill, Woolton and Eden.
236
  This is an example of the resource-
intensive procedures that were used to communicate with the mass-membership of a 
national party in the early part of the 1950s; and a time in which Conservative Party 
elites used their hierarchal status to engage their volunteers in greater face-to-face 
interactions with the masses at the grassroots.
237
 
During Churchill’s premiership, the party held the collective memories of post-
war electoral defeat and maintained a determination, which was reminiscent of 
Churchill’s war-time spirit of defiance, not to return to such disappointing times.  
Therefore, Churchill’s Conservatives went to great lengths to ensure that the 
organisation of the party was ‘always up to date, and flexible to meet new needs as 
                                                     
233
 See, Duverger in Chapter Two. 
234
 CPA CCO 500/11/5 Conservative Recruiting Campaign, Report to the Executive Committee of the 
National Union, 1952; and CCO 4/6/251 Letter from R. K. Carrick to J. G. Smyth, 31 August 1954. 
235
 CPA CCO 500/11/5 Conservative Recruiting Campaign, Report on Organisation, 1952, point 4. 
236
 CPA CCO 500/11/5 Conservative Recruiting Campaign, letter from Churchill, Eden and Woolton to 
association chairmen, 28 May 1952. 
237
 Jon Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
71 
 
they’ developed.238  By 1954, the party’s self-perception was that its national and 
provincial organisation had ‘been flexible and adapted itself to change.’239  
Furthermore, Churchill’s Conservatives believed that the National Union and CCO 
evolved in line with the provincial and area organisation.
240
  Since May 1886, when a 
‘Special Conference’ was convened to divide up the party’s provincial areas based on 
the traditional regional divisions in England & Wales, the party’s view of its 
organisation outside of CCO was that it had developed organically in line with the 
growth of regional populations and party membership.
241
  Therefore, Churchill’s 
Conservatives at CCO held self-belief in their ability to adapt and change, and viewed it 
as an organisational attribute.  
By 1952, the party had begun to explore the role of the area offices and their 
relationship with CCO departments and local associations.
242
  There was the recognition 
that ‘paperwork’ and bureaucracy could be a hindrance to the efficiency of operations, 
and that the circulation of minutes ‘had greatly extended since the war.’243  Moreover, 
there was a desire for CCO agents to be freed from paperwork.  It would allow them to 
focus on being contact points for MPs, candidates, agents and association chairmen; and 
to act as liaisons, thus facilitating centralised agendas.   This demonstrates that the party 
was prepared to take an introspective and critical assessment of its own organisation and 
make deliberate practical changes to its behaviour in order to improve its operations.
244
  
CCO had begun to express its wish to take responsibility for all circulated material, 
signalling a desire to further centralise specific aspects of the party’s operations.  The 
central-party understood that in order for it to function in a modern context, the local 
associations had to surrender some aspects of their autonomy to CCO.  
 In addition to this internal view, the assessment of mass or ‘public’ opinion had 
become a growing interest for the central-party.
245
  Area Publicity Officers were tasked 
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with gathering such information through a fortnightly survey at the association level.
246
  
The central-party held the same interest in the views of the national Conservative Party 
membership.  There was particular attention paid to comparing, by region, the general 
trends in the opinions of party members. The matters of concern for CCO included 
determining the state of party morale; understanding how party policy was resonating 
among its members; and establishing party opinions in relation to propaganda.
247
 Again, 
this highlights the party’s desire to be introspectively self-aware.  Churchill’s 
Conservatives’ substantial investment of central-party resources in the process of 
ascertaining and understanding the mood of its members, suggests that they were indeed 
committed to an organisational culture in line with the type of mass-party characteristics 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.  In understanding the views of their members, 
the Conservatives ensured that the party organisation was able to adapt in order to 
satisfy its supporters, thus promoting the growth of a large and engaged campaigning 
workforce.  Ultimately, this would enable the post-war Conservatives to hold on to 
electoral power at the subsequent election.   
As a mass-based party in the early 1950s, the Conservative Party sought votes 
from the mass-electorate largely through its people-centric organisation.
248
  However, 
following the impacts of universal suffrage, the party had begun adapting to 
developments in mass-communication technologies, like film and radio, to reach new 
audiences.
249
  Subsequently, many in the party became proponents of providing the 
electorate with ‘political education’.250  The progress of early television had been 
interrupted, because the impact of World War II on national security and austerity 
meant that it went into hibernation at the BBC from 3 September 1939 to 7 June 
1946.
251
  Television’s slow development from its primitive roots at the end of the 1920s 
meant that radio remained the primary broadcasting tool prior to 1955.
252
  However, by 
November 1952, the potentials of political television were beginning to stir interests in 
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Churchill’s Conservatives, shown by a survey of public opinion that was conducted by 
the party, called ‘The Viewers View’.253  
As television began its ascent as a potential political tool in the minds of CCO- 
officials, the role that film was playing at the association level was beginning its 
decline.
254
 
 
There was general agreement, with the exception of the East Midlands Area, that our film 
propaganda was not worth the money it must cost... steps should be taken to terminate at an 
early date our use of IPUs [Indoor Projector Units] and the production of films.
255
 
 
This suggests that there was an early awareness of changes in general technological 
trends at a range of levels in the party organisation, and  that the party’s introspective 
and methodical approach to understanding the impact of external factors on its 
organisation led the party to begin reassessing its practical behaviour and uses of 
technology. 
 
Propaganda and Churchill’s Conservatives  
CCO propaganda was a tactical extension of party strategy, and was only put into action 
after being approved by the party chairman.
256
  It shows that, unlike some other aspects 
of the party organisation, the party’s publicity was already relatively centralised in the 
early 1950s.  However, this did not mean that party propaganda escaped criticism from 
its members.  The central-party was quick to recognise that it had a problem when its 
supporters began questioning the quality of its output in comparison to that of the 
Labour Party.
257
  After the initial euphoria of winning the 1951 General Election 
subsided, ‘much concern’ set into the psyche at CCO that the Government was 
receiving ‘adverse publicity’.  The Conservative-elite placed the blame for that on the 
mechanisms of ‘Government propaganda and publicity since 1945’ in that it had been 
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‘set up under the socialists and therefore … not … entirely in line with Conservative 
thought and intentions.’258   
In the run-up to the 1951 General Election, Churchill’s Conservatives, on 20 
August 1951, mounted a ‘National Advertising Campaign’.259 It was led by Mark 
Chapman-Walker, Director of Publicity, and Colin Mann, Chief Publicity Officer.  It 
was customary to send a letter from the respective CCO official(s) to the desired party 
recipients in order to announce the launch of a centrally-devised initiative.  In the case 
of the National Advertising Campaign, a letter from the Chief Publicity Officer went 
out to all Constituency Agents, CCO Agents and Area Publicity Officers.  It was 
common for association chairmen and/or agents to respond discursively with praise 
and/or critique in relation to both internal and external Conservative Party matters.
260
  
This trend of interactivity at the grassroots continued and was even encouraged by the 
central-party.  
CCO provided the constituency associations with clear instructions on how to 
use propaganda in local publications and broadcasts, in order to encourage their 
participation locally in such media.
261
  This included a list of their respective local 
newspapers
262
 that had been deemed appropriate by CCO for participation in the 
campaign.  Adverts were supplied free-of-charge by CCO to the Conservative 
associations for use in local newspapers.  In this case, an organisational dichotomy of 
freedom versus control was being exhibited by the central-party.  On the one hand, 
CCO was encouraging the associations to engage with the media with a greater freedom 
of interactivity; but, on the other, it was enacting control over certain aspects of those 
interactions.  The use of manipulative tactics such as this is evidence to suggest that 
there was a move towards a more centralised-CCO approach to party organisation.  The 
modus operandi used by CCO was to be respectfully coercive, rather than dictatorial.  
Stuart Ball suggests that CCO achieved control over constituency associations because 
of the party’s deferential temperament.263 
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In terms of propaganda output, film was the medium that CCO had held the 
most control over since the early part of the twentieth century.  By the 1950s, it was an 
already established medium for use in political communication.
264
  However, along the 
party’s journey towards prominent use of television, there was a process of convergence 
in the uses of the two audiovisual media.
265
  For example, political films that were aired 
on television were also shown at cinema evenings and other party social gatherings.
266
  
This suggests that Churchill’s Conservatives took a conservative approach to making 
sudden changes to its publicity practices; and favoured instead a more cautious 
approach to change.
267
  Steady incremental changes in this manner support the idea that 
the party underwent gradual evolutionary processes that shadowed over time the 
technological developments of the mid-twentieth century. 
As a largely agrarian party, the use of 16mm film projectors, also known as the 
‘cinematograph’, was widely used by Churchill’s Conservatives in rural constituencies 
in order to take conservatism to small villages.
268
  These cinema evenings used popular 
films, to draw in an audience, which were prefaced with a political speech on film.  A 
similar approach was taken in attempts to galvanise the party supporters. One film 
called ‘The Personal Touch’ was used to educate campaigners on the best practice for 
canvassing.  The party’s use of film as a medium in that way was in keeping with its 
wider 1950s policy-agenda which aimed to encourage a more educated British public.
269
  
In addition to film, the use of gramophone records was integrated into party events, 
which were considered to be ‘quite attractive social evenings’ for local Conservative 
Party supporters.
270
  The in-house use of film and gramophone records at constituency-
based political evenings gave Churchill’s Conservatives relative freedom and control 
over the ways in which its message was administered and how it went about attracting 
audiences.  This was in contrast to television with its limited audience potential, 
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restricting regulation, and necessary dependence on cooperation with the BBC for any 
broadcast.
271
 
The Conservative and Unionist Film Association, based at 70 St Stephen’s 
House, Westminster, played a significant role in the party’s propaganda output during 
the early 1950s.  It communicated directly with Conservative associations in relation to 
‘advertising material’ and produced booklets for the Sound and Film Library, which 
included both 16mm and 35mm films on topics ranging from political propaganda and 
history to general entertainment films.
272
  ‘The Vote’, an educational film, is one 
example of many film lectures used by the party.
273
  Before television had taken its 
place, film was considered to be ‘invaluable’ for political education.  MPs used film to 
communicate with their constituents, but it was a costly medium at £25 per two and a 
half minute speech.
274
  CCO regularly loaned IPUs to constituency associations for use 
free-of-charge,
275
 but also provided them with advice on the most appropriate projectors 
for purchase.
276
  It is evident that throughout the 1950s, the legacy of film, as a 
precursor to television, had an influence on the role of television in Conservative Party 
organisation and the ways in which the party managed and processed television as a part 
of its propaganda output. 
 For the Conservative Party, the problem with recorded media, like film and 
gramophone records, was that they had a relatively short political shelf-life.  The 
Speaker’s Department at CCO considered that most gramophone records became 
outdated within three months, and some ‘considerably sooner.’277  It was this factor 
which determined the party’s decision against the use of long-play records.  The party 
used gramophone records in order to distribute snippets of Churchill’s speeches.278  
However, the party became aware that there were limitations to the medium.  For 
example, the listener had to turn-over the disc after just four minutes, thus interrupting 
the speech.  CCO believed that this was potentially the reason for a decline in the sales 
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of Churchill’s voice.279  The newer medium and recording technology of tape had a 
greater capacity for lengthy recordings.  However, in the early 1950s, the Radio and 
Recording section at CCO did not have the facilities to transfer recordings from 
gramophone to tape, nor did it have the budget to record all ministerial speeches to tape 
directly from radio broadcasts.
280
  Therefore, Churchill’s Conservatives at CCO were 
aware of the limiting factors inherent in specific media types.  They made assessments 
in terms of the likely organisational impacts that would be had from the integration of 
any new medium in CCO operations, and recording-technologies were deemed as a low 
priority.  The party considered the cost implications and organisational factors to be the 
most salient concerns when proposing change and investment in new publicity 
techniques and only invested its recourses in methods that its elite decision-makers 
considered most effective.   
 Looking ahead to the 1955 General Election, in 1952 CCO outlined a three stage 
tactical propaganda strategy.
281
  The plan stated the party’s intentions to use all media in 
an ‘intense’ manner as it progressed toward the election.  It outlined its intent to use 
party-workers; briefing newspapers; constituency magazines, CCO publications, films, 
ministerial speeches, membership campaigns and press campaigns, but made no 
mention whatsoever of television or broadcasting.  This finding suggests that, in 1952, 
television was relatively low on the party’s publicity agenda as a medium with any 
significance in terms of electoral impact.  However, in 1954, with the development of 
the Radio and Television section, the party’s attitude to television changed sharply. This 
rapid shift, which was preceded by a period of steady incremental change, suggests that 
the evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium, outlined in Chapter Two, is useful in 
explaining the party’s evolution in this case.   
Furthermore, although in previous years film may have been considered to be a 
declining medium for political communication, the looming general election created a 
flurry of activity in the use of film strip projectors in lecture halls.
282
  The trend 
coincided with the party’s realisation that television could be used to its advantage and 
that party supporters should be educated to use the medium for mutual benefit.  
Therefore, Churchill’s Conservatives’ use of propaganda tools could be characterised by 
its undulations and oscillations of internal opinion and action - in terms of the changing 
ideas about which media it thought to be useful to its aims. 
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 The 1954 CCO film production ‘TV Can Tell It’ was used in association and 
branch meetings.  The film was tailored to its niche audience of Conservative Party 
supporters in order to instruct them in what they should be looking-out for on television.  
In a letter from Chapman-Walker to all Conservative associations, members were asked 
to take photographic evidence of Government projects in their local areas which could 
be used for propaganda in television broadcasts.   
 
In view of the growing importance of TV I am sure you will appreciate how necessary it is for 
the party as a whole to cooperate in, and contribute to, the production of television Party 
Political Broadcasts. In order to explain how this can be achieved we have made a 16mm 15 
minute film...
283
  
 
The party was beginning to awaken to the idea that the trends in political television in 
the United States would soon be witnessed in Britain.
284  
This was in keeping with the 
wider public discourse:  ‘Indeed, much of the productivity debate at that time can be 
characterised as being about how far British industry should be “Americanised”.’285  
CCO realised that it needed to begin restructuring its central, regional and constituency 
organisations in order that it may foster a culture which would enable the necessary 
change needed to develop its use of the medium for political advantage.  In the 
transition, the party used the more familiar medium of film in order to help facilitate the 
necessary changes in attitudes and activities among its mass-membership.  This signals 
that 1954 was a symbolic year in the advent of political television and its role in the 
party’s propaganda. 
 
Broadcasting and Churchill’s Conservatives  
Prior to the 1950 election, broadcasting was a contentious issue between the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties, especially on the topic of the allocation of 
election broadcasts.  A precedent was first set in 1939, when the Conservatives and 
Labour were given five broadcasts each and the Liberals two. However, these numbers 
doubled during the 1945 election and led to subsequent ambiguity over the allocations 
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of election broadcasts.
286
  The Conservative Party became concerned that its close 
political relationship with the National Liberals would lead to the Labour Party insisting 
that the National Liberals’ broadcasts would need to be deducted from the overall 
Conservative allocation.  Ambiguity, frequent inter-party meetings, and the parties’ 
cautious approaches to the topic of television, were characteristic of the period. This in 
turn had some impact on the ways in which Churchill’s Conservatives interacted 
internally, which manifested itself in a timid and contemplative approach to the use of 
television.  However, the extent to which these factors impacted on the party’s 
dynamics was tempered by the status of radio as the incumbent and dominant 
broadcasting medium.
287
 
Some in the Conservative-elite at CCO believed that radio was ‘a greater vote 
winner than all other media of propaganda combined.’288  Frequently, although not 
always, in organisational and semantic terms, there was little distinction made between 
the medium of radio and television.  In terms of the organisation of party publicity, 
documentation on both radio and television were often filed together to under the label 
of ‘Propaganda - Broadcasting’.289  This indicates that in the early 1950s, Churchill’s 
Conservatives viewed television as a subsidiary of its parent broadcasting medium of 
radio.  Quite often, the two broadcasting media were addressed as being synonymous.  
Instead of using intra-party processes to differentiate between the two broadcasting 
media, the party largely focused its thoughts and attentions on: the ratio of broadcasts 
allowed for each party; the broadcast content; the quality of broadcaster performance 
technique; and which Conservative-broadcasters to use.  
In the run-up to the 1951 General Election, a meeting held at the Home 
Office,
290
 agreed that the allocation of radio broadcasts would be repeated based on the 
allocation of the 1950 General Election, giving the Conservatives and Labour five 
broadcasts each and the Liberals three.  The radio broadcasts were ordered on a set 
calendar of dates with time slots of either 6.15pm or 9.15pm and were national 
broadcasts, with no options given for regional broadcasts.  As for television: 
 
                                                     
286
 CPA CRD 2/20/6 ‘Note by Mr Hepburn after talk with Mr Profumo’ on General Election Broadcasts, 
October 1949. 
287
 Seymour-Ure, Broadcasting, pp.88-89.  
288
 CPA CRD 2/20/6 Report attached to memo from SH Pierssene, General Director, on Party Broadcasts 
at the 1950 General Election, 12 December 1949, p.1. 
289 
See, for example, CPA CCO 4/4/250 - Propaganda - Broadcasting - 1950-2; CPA CCO 4/5/289 - 
Propaganda - Broadcasting (A-M) - 1952-4; CPA CCO 4/5/290 - Propaganda - Broadcasting (N-Z) - 1952-4; 
CPA CCO 4/5/291 - Propaganda - Broadcasting, Mr. Hare's file - 1952. 
290
 CPA CRD 2/20/7 Meeting minutes ‘General Election Broadcasts, 1951’, held 21 September 1951.  
80 
 
The BBC were anxious that [the] medium should be used; the Labour Party were not in favour 
of using it ... and the Conservative Party wanted to go into the matter further and be free to 
reopen if necessary.  Later it was agreed that the Labour, Conservative and Liberal parties 
should each have a TV broadcast of 15 minutes (8-8.15pm).
291
  
 
Therefore, in the run-up to 1951, with radio as the dominant and favoured broadcasting 
medium for elections, television was viewed with some suspicion by all the main 
political parties and its political development was tentative as a consequence.  However, 
Churchill’s Conservatives, when in opposition, were more open to the potential uses of 
television for political gain than Atlee’s governing Labour Party. 
In April 1951, Churchill’s private secretary sent a note of thanks292 to Pierssene 
for his memorandum on ‘Political Broadcasting’,293 in which he notes that Churchill 
said that he would be keeping it nearby.  The document addressed the ratio of Party 
Political Broadcasts between the Conservatives, Socialists and Liberals, which at that 
time was set to the ratio of 6:5:1, with the governing party being entitled to the most.  
The paper argued that the ratio should be altered in line with changes in the numbers of 
votes cast between the 1945 and 1950 elections.  The document also noted that scripts 
from broadcasts should have been made available by the BBC for the party leaders, but 
none had been provided for CCO.  Pierssene was aware that, by the end of 1952, 
Britain’s television coverage was set to reach 78% of the population and that a number 
of key marginal seats would be brought into the coverage area as progress on 
transmitters was made.  Therefore, it was logical that the party who mastered the 
political broadcast could make significant electoral gains in constituencies that came 
into reach of television coverage.   
The crucial question that Churchill’s Conservatives were asking themselves was 
whether they would gain or lose-out with the introduction of the televised Party Political 
Broadcasts.  Pierssene and his colleagues believed that viewers would become irritated 
if televised-political broadcasts in the evening became too frequent.  Therefore, CCO 
was reluctant to take the lead. Even if the party had a slight advantage, it recognised 
there would be a significant additional workload for its staff.  The party was also aware 
that it would have to invest in, to a greater extent, preparing and rehearsing speakers for 
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broadcasts.  The party’s perceived poor performance in other broadcasts had knocked its 
confidence and subsequently tempered its enthusiasm for mastering the medium. 
 However, on winning the 1951 election, Churchill’s Conservatives did begin to 
seriously prepare for any eventuality in terms of television’s role in politics.  The party 
was cautious in its approach, but realised that all levels of the party organisation would 
benefit from a richer understanding of the medium and how it compared to the more 
familiar broadcasting medium of radio.  This was demonstrated by their production of a 
pamphlet named ‘Taking on Television’,294 which was written to give a comprehensive 
introduction to the world of television and included details of the location of the two 
British television studios one at Alexandra Palace, North London, and the other at Lime 
Grove, West London.  The publication also detailed the practical considerations for 
television including matters like dress, make-up, microphones, cameras, gesture and 
movement, focus, lighting, programming, scripts and rehearsals.  Again, the 
Conservatives’ early approach to television was in line with their wider policy in favour 
of a more educated population.  It also illustrates the commitment that the party had to 
understand, what was considered to be, a relatively unknown and mysterious medium, 
which, like the political world, had its own distinct working practices and culture.  Here 
we witness the merging of these two cultures and more specifically, the Conservative 
Party’s first steps to integrating television media culture into its own organisation and 
collective psyche.  Furthermore, through the dissemination of this type of literature, the 
central-party was taking active steps to exert its influence throughout the party, thus 
signalling that its organisational and political culture was expected to adapt and change 
in line with the political inevitabilities which came with the evolution of broadcasting 
technologies. 
In the process of adaptation, the training and rehearsing of party broadcasters 
became a priority. The facilities at CCO included recording equipment and coaching 
from the research and publicity departments.  The party was intent on widening the pool 
of what was considered to be ‘a small variety’295 of talented Conservative-broadcasters 
who were being used by the BBC.  There was considerable discourse between the 
various levels of the party hierarchy with discussion and criticism of Conservative-
broadcasters.
296
  The party was acutely aware that its broadcasting communications 
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were lagging and needed to change.  Using watching panels, the party began monitoring 
broadcasts in order to assess the performance of its speakers and the impact of the 
actions of the BBC monopoly.
297
  The process of self-monitoring and assessing speaker 
quality is a key example of how the party adapted in order to begin mastering television.  
The party was sensitive to how its collective voice sounded, appeared and was 
perceived. Therefore, broadcasting media impacted directly on party organisation and 
its awareness of self-image.   
 By 1952, the number of TV Licences had reached 1.5 million
298
 and the party 
was beginning to invest more extensively in developing its broadcasting talent.  
Although television was yet to surpass radio in the views of the CCO-elite, it was being 
placed on a more equal footing.  In January, Woolton wrote to all Conservative and 
Liberal Unionist MPs to advertise its broadcasting facilities at CCO. 
 
I want you to know about the facilities which the Central Office has to offer in the tuition and 
practice of sound and television broadcasting...  The BBC hold very firmly to their right to 
choose the speakers for their programmes and the Central Office is rarely even consulted.  The 
BBC are, however, influenced very considerably by broadcasting ability, and in their capacity of 
purveying entertainment they tend to repeat successes.  It is therefore desirable for us to excel 
in broadcasting technique... We have recently set up a television studio equipped with a 
television set, mock camera, lights, etc.  Mr Wyndham Goldie, who has considerable knowledge 
both as an actor and producer, will be available at this studio for advice on television technique 
and production.
299
 
 
CCO began receiving a significant amount of correspondence from Conservative 
agents and supporters with concern for the poor quality of Conservative-speakers on 
radio and television.
300
  It was noted that Conservative-speakers were receiving 
criticism in the press for their lack of broadcasting talent.  The CCO-elite were 
concerned about the widely held belief among the Conservative agents and supporters 
that CCO and the Parliamentary Party had some influence in the speakers who were put 
forward to the BBC.  A communication was ordered to go out to the constituency 
associations in order to explain that it was not the case.  The complexities of early 
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television, like its relative newness, legislation and the monopoly of the BBC, meant 
that there was confusion about the roles of and relationships between the BBC, CCO 
and Parliamentary Party in the making of political television. 
The BBC’s choices in Conservative-speakers were fuelling suspicions within the 
Conservative Party that they were biased in Labour’s favour.301  Such suspicions had 
been raised for a number of years due to incidents like discrepancies over the allocation 
of audience tickets for political programmes.  One occasion resulted in 250 tickets for a 
political programme being sent to both the headquarters of the Labour and Liberal 
parties, but a much reduced number allocated to Conservative supporters.  Furthermore, 
unlike the other parties, the Conservatives were not given the opportunity to centrally 
distribute their tickets, which had to be collected from Southampton Borough 
Council.
302
  Later, CCO ‘made very strong protests to the BBC about the unfairness of 
the party-balance in the feature “In the News”’.303  It was because of incidents like these 
that there was a strained relationship, throughout the party hierarchy, with the BBC.  
The BBC was keen to expand its coverage of politics to include the ‘Ministerial 
Broadcast’ on television, which was already a feature of their radio programming.  It 
‘thought that at some stage ministers would find it necessary to use television to make 
their broadcasts fully effective, and wondered if the time had now come for an 
experiment to be made in this field.’304  Both the Conservatives and Labour felt that it 
was not time for ministerial broadcasts to be televised.  However, within months of that 
consensus the Conservatives changed their mind and decided to take the lead on 
ministerial broadcasts.  At a CCO meeting with the General Director and the officers of 
the Publicity Department, an action plan was put into effect to encourage ministers to 
participate in broadcasts and to adopt a style and technique suited to television.
305
   
Attention had been given to the trends in broadcasting-techniques used in 
American presidential elections and CCO was keen to source copies of the scripts in 
order to learn from them.  John Hare MP was tasked with addressing the matter of 
ministerial broadcasts with the Conservative Chief Whip in Parliament and to discuss 
who would be the best initial ministers to use in, what were considered to be, 
experimental television broadcasts.  CCO arranged for television-technique 
demonstrations to be conducted with ministers at the Scarborough Conference.  Mrs 
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Crum-Ewing was tasked with providing the General Director with a costing for an 
instruction film on political broadcasting. 
By this point, the advent of television had begun to have a significant impact in 
the culture of the party-elite.  The leaders of the party engaged in regular 
communication exchanges in order to debate the matters related to television.  The new 
medium had also created a sense of trepidation, even though there was a clear 
awareness that the trends the party was witnessing in American politics were inevitably 
coming to Britain.  Television was not a passive medium for those involved in the 
making of the broadcast.  It required action and significant resources by both the 
organisation and the individual.  Therefore, the party-elite were required to work 
together in ways in which they were less accustomed.  The party engaged in greater 
interplay between the various CCO departments, Downing Street and the Parliamentary 
Party in order to develop a culture in which the party would be fit to lead in televised 
political broadcasting.  Increased exchanges of letters and internal memoranda on the 
subject of political television further intensified the bureaucratic-culture of the party in 
the early 1950s.  The advent of political television roused and stimulated a broad 
interaction from individuals that represented all hierarchical levels of the party. 
1953 was the year of the first televised Royal Coronation.  By that time TV 
Licences had reached in excess of 3 million.
306
  It was also a significant year in the 
Conservative Party’s relationship with television, with Harold Macmillan’s appearance 
in the first televised-broadcast outside of an election period. Subsequently, other 
Conservative MPs were developing an appetite for appearing on the medium.
307   
However, the confusion among MPs over the selection process for BBC broadcasts 
continued, which suggests that, for all of the resources and bureaucratic procedures 
CCO was using to communicate with MPs on the complex matters of political 
television, the party was unable to effectively establish a cohesive understanding on the 
main aspect of the new medium that involved its political colleagues. 
A comparative audit of the appearance of MPs showed that 84 Conservatives 
versus 91 ‘Socialists’ were featured on BBC television in 1952.308  CCO and 
Churchill’s Conservatives believed that the Labour Party benefitted from the BBC’s 
television monopoly.  Subsequently, CCO felt that ‘commercial television ... [would] 
give a “platform” to free enterprise, capital and management’ and that it was ‘highly 
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desirable … from the point of view of the party organisation’ for commercial television 
to come into effect at least one year before the 1955 General Election.
309
  The Tories 
understood that the legislation and capital of commercial television would be outside 
the remit of CCO.  However, with an emphasis on propaganda, Churchill’s 
Conservatives saw an opportunity to use the advancement of television for the 
enhancement of their electoral strategy, believing ‘that commercial television would be 
advantageous to the Conservative Party.’310  In this instance, CCO demonstrated that, 
although there had been some reservation in respect to its approach to the development 
of political television, because of the potential impact on its organisational workload, it 
was prepared to exert the necessary change within its organisation as soon as it had 
identified an opportunity in the development of the medium that would allow a 
significant electoral advantage over its main opponent.  
Churchill’s Government took its time to deliberate and announce its stance on 
commercial television.  Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Committee on Sponsored 
Television, chaired by Sir Robert Grimston, with the support of the 1922 Committee, 
asked CCO to publish and distribute to the wider Conservative Party their pamphlet in 
support of ‘sponsored’ (commercial) television.311  However, this placed CCO in a 
challenging position.  Although the CCO-elite were in support of Grimston’s proposal, 
it believed itself to be constitutionally-bound to ‘propagate’ only Conservative 
government policy.  However, the Chief Publicity Officer did not want CCO to appear 
that it was not in support also of the Parliamentary Party.   
CCO was under pressure from the Parliamentary Party to combat the Labour 
Party’s ‘monopolist’ propaganda.  Therefore, CCO printed an amended pamphlet, 
which Woolton believed did not commit Churchill’s Government to supporting 
commercial television.  27,000 of these were distributed to associations.
312
  However, 
this was to the disappointment of Prime Minister Churchill who wrote to Woolton 
asking for the pamphlets to be recalled.
313
  This highlights how the party organisation 
was in a state of flux over the developments in television; and how the major arms of 
power within the party can be in conflict on matters about which they disagree.  In this 
case, the dilemma for CCO was its squeezed position between the wider-party 
                                                     
309
 CPA CCO 120/1/1 Memo from S. H. Pierssene to Churchill giving the views of CCO on commercial 
television, 11 April 1953.  
310
 Ibid. 
311
 CPA CCO 500/27/1 Letter from Chief Publicity Officer to the Chairman on ‘Commercial Television’, 22 
June 1953. 
312
 CPA CCO 500/27/1 ‘Copy of Letter from Lord Woolton to the Prime Minister’, 13 August 1953. 
313
 CPA CCO 500/27/1 ‘Copy of Letter from the Prime Minister’ to Woolton, 11 August 1953. 
86 
 
membership, the Parliamentary Party and Churchill’s Downing Street administration.  
The debate surrounding the developments in television accentuated the dynamics 
between the different arms of the party organisation and displayed that sometimes their 
agendas could be out of sync.
314
  The advent of television was creating tension within 
the party’s organisation, which was indirectly contributing to a strain on its internal 
relationships. 
Debating the role of television was not only the preserve the party-elites.  The 
possible uses of television for political gain also occupied the minds of the constituency 
agents.  At a meeting of the National Society of Conservative and Unionist Agents in 
1953, television was discussed with extreme interest.  Subsequently, the Conservative 
Agent’s Journal published a section on the ‘possibilities of TV’, which described 
television as a powerful medium for propaganda.
315
  The party believed that a higher 
density of the population had access to television in traditional ‘Socialist’ areas, with an 
estimate of two ‘Socialists’ to one ‘Conservative’.316  The Tories considered this to be 
to their advantage, figuring that it gave them a greater audience than Labour for the 
conversion of voters.  Subsequently, in the mid-1950s, CCO encouraged an interactive 
television culture, especially among the party membership in domestic settings.
317
  In 
addition to the film ‘TV Can Tell It’, which aimed to educate party supporters in the 
ways of television, Churchill’s Conservatives planned an interactive scheme, in order to 
engage the national party, called ‘Television Meetings’.318  
The purpose of the meetings was for Conservative supporters to show 
Conservative propaganda and programming on television, between general election 
periods, to those in their communities who did not own a TV set.  Participants for the 
scheme were targeted using lists compiled by party activists in the constituencies.  
Television owning Conservatives were identified by local party activists, who went out 
into the constituency in order to notate which Conservative-households appeared to 
have external television-aerials.  The process was similar to the notation used in 
canvassing, except the letters ‘TV’ were used instead of an initial to denote voting 
preference.  Conservative supporters were sent a letter seeking their participation.  They 
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were asked to invite ‘a few electors’ into their homes.319  Participants joined the scheme 
by sending a reply-slip to their respective Conservative association.  They were 
subsequently contacted with dates and times of Conservative-broadcasts and 
encouraged to invite ‘a number of those who normally take little interest in politics or 
who while not being supporters are not convinced opponents.’320  According to Milly 
Buonanno, in 1950s Britain, there was a wider cultural trend in which people who 
owned television sets opened their homes to those families and individuals without.
321
  
Therefore, the Conservatives were responding to this wider trend and used it to their 
advantage. 
The Tories had hoped to use the TV meeting scheme to gain some electoral 
advantage over Labour.  However, their plans were confronted with a number of 
setbacks.  The scheme was leaked to the press,
322
 around which time the press were 
speculating that television had ‘killed the public meeting’ and encouraged a culture of 
‘Fireside Politics’.323 The following day, the Labour Party announced in the press its 
‘open-house plan’.324  It encouraged owners of TV sets to invite their neighbours into 
their homes to watch a Labour Party broadcast.  The format of the production was in an 
innovative film-style that was in contrast to traditional broadcasts that usually centred 
on a specific political speaker.  The leakage of information and the subsequent press 
attention created a flurry of activity and correspondence throughout the Tory 
organisation from the grassroots upward.  An official at CCO found ‘...the original 
leakage of confidential matter’ of the TV meetings to be ‘disturbing’.325  However, the 
agent of the Blackpool Association was ‘not too surprised at this leakage’326 and had 
believed it impossible to keep a scheme of that nature secret.  Another setback to the 
scheme included the limited television coverage in some parts of the country.  
                                                     
319
 CPA CCO 4/5/302 Confidential draft on ‘Scheme for Television Meetings’, Appendix A, 1 July 1953 . 
320
 Ibid., Appendix D. 
321
 Buonanno, Television, p. 15. 
322
 CPA CCO 4/6/328 Article ‘Hustings on TV – Tories Plan Home Groups to Win Unconvinced’, The 
Manchester Guardian, 15 February 1954. 
323
 CPA CCO 4/6/328 Article by Philip Goodhart, ‘Fireside Politics’, The Daily Telegraph, 13 February 
1954.  For reading on the origins of the concept of fireside politics, see, Douglas B. Craig, Fireside 
Politics: Radio and Political Culture in the United States, 1920-1940 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 2000). 
324
 CPA CCO 4/6/328 Article ‘Socialists to Show TV Film’, The Daily Telegraph, 16 February 1954. 
325
 CPA CCO 4/6/328 CCO Memo from Mr Homan to Miss Spencer, 17 February 1954. 
326
 CPA CCO 4/6/328 Letter from Agent of Blackpool Conservatives to Watson, 15 February 1954. 
88 
 
Consequently, not all associations were able to engage in the TV meetings scheme.
327
  
Nevertheless the scheme went ahead as planned. 
 It is clear that television was beginning to rouse interests and excitement across 
the party organisation. Furthermore, the medium was playing a role in changing the 
activities of both individuals and groups within the party from the grassroots to the 
highest levels of the Conservative hierarchy.  CCO demonstrated the all-encompassing 
cultural shift towards television by involving its general administrative staff in 
rehearsals for a television broadcast, to which they were invited to participate as a 
mock-audience.
328
  Labour had raised the bar with their innovative film-style political 
broadcast and, subsequently, the Conservatives soon began experimenting in similar 
ways.  Lindsay and Harrington suggest that Labour’s television broadcasts were largely 
superior to those of the Conservatives until the late 1950s.
329
  However, as early as 1954 
the Conservatives were investing significant resources in the attempt to outperform 
Labour.  The production of ‘telefilms’ for broadcast were particularly resource 
intensive.  ‘Almost the whole office staff’ were required to contribute to the production 
of a ‘political telecast’.330  Therefore, by 1954, political television had become a serious 
competitive consideration for political parties in Britain and, therefore, had begun to 
impact on changing party organisation and culture. 
 
Eden’s Conservatives 1955-1957 
 
The 1950s were often characterised by the remnants of wartime rigour, which impacted 
also on political television.  The development of the Fourteen Day Rule in 1944, which 
restricted the broadcasting of any matter debated in Parliament in the previous 
fortnight,
331
 meant that political broadcasting, in particular political television, was 
governed by significant rules, regulations and acts of Parliament.  In this manner the 
advent of television was having an impact on the affairs of state, Parliament and 
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broadcasters.  But the process of regulating television, and its role in the political arena, 
also played a day-to-day role in the organisational culture of political parties.  This was 
especially the case for the ruling party in the 1950s.  As Labour before it in the late 
1940s, the Conservatives Party of the 1950s held the mandate to steer the development 
of television broadcasting and, subsequently, its role in British politics and wider-
society.  The subject of television brought together the organisational and political elites 
of the three main parties with their equivalents from the broadcasting institutions.  
Meetings were often held at Parliament in the form of inter-party committees.
332
  
Letters, memos and discussions were exchanged between the CCO and Postmaster 
General outside of the inter-party meetings.
333
  The Parliamentary Committee on 
Broadcasting played also a role, as did the occasional backbench MP and broadcaster.
334
 
Eden’s Conservatives held regular internal discussions through memos and 
meetings in order to prepare for the external meetings on broadcasting.  The topics 
concerning Conservative interests on broadcasting matters included: the training of 
party-workers to monitor broadcasts; appreciation indices relating to Conservative 
political broadcasts; regional political broadcasting considerations; the televising of 
Conservative Party conferences; the use of BBC and ITA facilities for making political 
broadcasts; the use of Ministerial Broadcasts and the annual quotas for Party Election 
Broadcasts and Party Political Broadcasts; how best to use political broadcasts to the 
party’s advantage; and the training of Conservative broadcasting talent.335  Like other 
pertinent matters of the time, the debates, discussions and actions in relation to 
television were detailed in typed minutes.  The party used and integrated its resources at 
the Chief Whip’s Office, under Edward Heath MP at 12 Downing Street, CRD and 
CCO.  
Intercommunication between these groups was managed with deliberate care in 
order to assess matters relating to the role of television in the party’s operations.  
Lengthy deliberations were used to facilitate agreement between the three groups of the 
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Conservative-sophisticate.  The resultant collective argument or policy ensured that 
there was unity within the party-ranks and that there would be a course of action for 
effectively delivering on their objectives.  This process ultimately ensured that the party 
moved the topic of television forward in order that the developments in the medium 
would serve best the interests of the Conservative Party and its senior administration. 
The time and resource intensive culture of bureaucratic-deliberation and debate, which 
was sometimes considered to be a cumbersome and an inefficient process for those 
dealing with the party-machine,
336
 was not exclusive to the issue of television.  
However, the party’s investment in these matters reveals that Eden’s Conservatives took 
a keen, but cautious, approach to the new medium, which in turn had an impact on the 
inner-working dynamics of the party.  The suspicious nature of Eden’s Conservatives 
towards the use of broadcasting as a political tool can be demonstrated by the words of 
Selwyn Lloyd MP who, on a BBC Home Service radio election broadcast, said that it 
was ‘a risky occupation these days for politicians to broadcast’.337  Lloyd’s statement 
reveals that there were individuals in the party, in addition to Eden, who believed that 
there were risks for politicians to engage in the art of broadcasting.  It was also a 
symbolic admission of the party’s anxiety towards changes in new media trends. 
The developing nature of political television was playing a role in catalysing a 
debate within the party on regulatory matters.  Externally the Government opposed 
Labour’s argument against relaxing the rules on televised Ministerial Broadcasts,338 
which would have allowed junior ministers to broadcast on television programmes on 
an ad hoc basis, in line with the allowance for such broadcasts on radio.  However, there 
was a growing discourse on the matter between party-elites at CCO.
339
  By keeping to a 
minimum the television appearances of up-and-coming Conservative ministerial talent, 
Eden’s Cabinet ministers would receive maximum airtime and publicity, albeit shared 
with backbenchers.  The party leadership, and CCO, had less control over television 
appearances by backbenchers, because the broadcasters held the right to choose which 
parliamentarians or party representatives they intended to feature in their own 
programmes.  The Conservative argument against maintaining the rigid attitude towards 
television appearances of junior ministers grew out of the concern that good backbench 
television performers might have begun to dominate political programming, and thus 
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develop uncontrollable ‘egos’ that would have had the potential to work against party 
unity.
340
  The party-elite were reluctant to submit to the view that there were greater 
benefits to junior ministers informing the public through the medium of television than 
backbenchers.  This Conservative-on-Conservative internal debate reveals a narrowcast 
Conservative-centric approach to the discussion of the development of political 
television and suggests that the party’s motives in relation to television were, at least in 
this case, egoistic. 
 
Propaganda and General Election 1955 
The general election of 26 May 1955 elected Anthony Eden as Churchill’s successor. 
As Prime Minister, Eden in the House of Commons benefitted from a Conservative 
increase, from the previous 16 seat majority in 1951, to a 59 seat majority in 1955.
341
  
The run-up to the election was characterised by a diverse use of propaganda and 
publicity techniques.  Eden’s distinguished and photogenic portrait was used 
substantially in the artwork for the National Poster Campaign,
342
 which espoused the 
message that Britain had improved significantly under the Conservatives.  Printed 
leaflets, such as the first and second ‘Election Address’ and the ‘Introductory 
Leaflet’,343 and adverts in the press, called ‘stereos’, remained a significant part of the 
Conservative campaign.
344
  J. W. Hinchcliffe at Conservative CCO was responsible for 
the organisational process for gramophone records, which were used by candidates in 
order to distribute recordings of their own voices.
345
  Continuing the trend evident in 
Churchill’s post-war premiership the party’s communication with voters remained as a 
diverse mix of propaganda and publicity techniques.  Television was merely a junior 
political medium in 1955, even though that very year ‘viewing exceeded listening for 
the first time’.346 
Between 1951 and 1955, the party underwent a learning exercise, through which 
it changed and adapted its organisation.  In learning from the party’s experience of the 
1951 General Election, the Chief Publicity Officer, Chapman-Walker, reminded his 
team of Area Publicity Officers that their the role was to facilitate the work of the media 
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and frontbench MPs in promoting the party within their respective regions.
347
  The Area 
Publicity Officers were specifically assigned to the local newspapers and regional BBC 
Headquarters.  At that time, the role of these regional BBC Headquarters was to provide 
local radio broadcasting rather than television.  The Area Publicity Officers were 
encouraged to ensure that panels of party supporters were in place in order to listen to 
and report on the content of BBC regional sound broadcasts, with a special focus on 
news bulletins.
348
  At the constituency level, interaction with the media was the 
responsibility of the association agents.  This demonstrates how during the period 
between elections, CCO identified its propaganda and publicity weaknesses; and it 
exerted significant central-control in order to reorganise the management of its publicity 
through its professionalised-workforce. 
 
Eden’s Conservatives and Understanding Television 
After the 1955 election, CCO, particularly the Chief Publicity Officer, engaged in 
dialogues in order to analyse television’s role in the election, and British politics in 
general.
349
  The impact of television was of interest to the party, the focus of which 
continued to centre on understanding public opinion and their reaction to specific 
election broadcasts.
350
  The party collated data from different polls including the Gallup 
Poll, the Daily Express Poll, the Viewers View, and the BBC’s ‘Audience Research’, 
and compared the results. The data analysed included the views of party-workers and 
supporters.  The report notes that ‘TV critics judged Mr Macmillan as a TV star.’351 
This was timely because, through the party’s earlier analysis of trends in American 
political television, finding new Conservative broadcasting talent was becoming 
increasingly pertinent to its interests.  The party’s extensive gathering of public opinion 
data served to further confirm its own predictions. 
The party believed that the responses to surveys of party supporters were likely 
to be skewed due to bias.  Therefore, the party subsequently factored that into the 
analysis of the results.  The party attributed its election win to three areas: (1) the 
government’s previous record; (2) the unity of the party, and (3) Eden’s personality.  It 
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was noted that it was not possible to discern the impact of the election publicity in 
general, like leaflets and posters.  However, as the party’s three televised ‘election 
programmes’ focused on selling the three aforementioned areas, the party felt that it was 
likely that television had played some role in their win at the general election. This new 
found confidence in and recognition of television’s impact, in the party’s election 
chances, was a significant factor in its approach to television in subsequent elections.  
The CCO report noted also the value of BBC television to its aims.  This belief was due 
to the understanding that 75% of the audience, approximately four million viewers, 
were individuals who were unlikely to attend a political meeting and yet gained some 
exposure to politics through television.  Therefore, the party believed that television was 
a valuable tool for capturing the political interest of potential future voters. 
In addition to the CCO-elites, the influence of television on the 1955 election 
was a matter of interest for party members. For example, further to the speculation in 
the press prior to the election, some party supporters at the grassroots believed that 
television was impacting on the decline of the traditional public meeting.
352
  
Furthermore, the party-elites encouraged an integrated participation for the ordinary 
party member in their use of some CCO television-facilities.  This development 
included, for example, a symbolic open-invitation to ‘anyone’ wishing to view political 
‘telefilms’, at designated show times, at CCO.353  By 1956, a trend of letter-writing in 
the form of Conservative supporters expressing an array of viewpoints in their critique 
of perceived broadcaster-bias and confusion over the rules and allocation of political 
broadcasts had further developed into criticism of the broadcasters and the 
Government’s broadcasts, with particular criticism of the Labour opposition.354  For 
some individuals the confusion over how the relationship between British politics and 
television was constituted evoked emotional-responses to which CCO responded with 
letters that explained the process and rules of political broadcasting.
355
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Television and Impact on Eden’s Conservatives 
Television coverage of the Suez Crisis,
356
 especially when Eden was criticised by the 
opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell, led to one Conservative association holding an 
emergency meeting to discuss the matter.
357
  Following the emergency meeting, a letter 
was written by the association agent to CCO to express the collective view held by the 
Conservative individuals present at the meeting.  The party supporters of Harrow West 
Conservative Association strongly felt that the Labour opposition should not have been 
able to attack the Government via a broadcast at a time of national crisis.  The party-
elite considered this to be a ‘spontaneous expression of support’358 for Eden’s approach, 
from which Eden himself was said to have gained ‘encouragement’.  The letter was 
followed by a number of written interactions between CCO and the association agent.  
This case indicates that, by 1956, television broadcasts had the potential to motivate 
grassroots supporters into some form of action.  Moreover, as Conservatives, their 
beliefs and loyalties could be stimulated by what they saw on television, e.g. an attack 
on their leader evoked an emotional response which, in turn, led to greater interaction 
between the association and CCO. 
This consequence of the advent of television is further demonstrated by the 
central-party’s actions to keep ‘every’ candidate updated on the content of election 
broadcasts.  In the run-up to the 1955 election, CCO decided to use resources in order to 
send all candidates transcripts of broadcasts by ‘all’ the main parties.359  This indicates 
how the party-elites, as the dominant decision-makers within the party organisation, had 
recognised the importance of television broadcasts in the wider-party interests, which 
again led to actions that guided the dynamics of television’s role and development in 
interrelationships throughout the party.  The general social interest in the new medium 
is a potential explanation for why there was seemingly little resistance by the wider-
party in adapting to the changes brought on by the onset of television.  This resulted in 
an observable and active approach to television, at all levels of the party, with the party-
elites steering the course and directions which the wider-party followed.  Therefore, it is 
plausible to suggest that, in this way, television played a role in contributing to a shift in 
the organisational culture of the party at virtually all levels of its hierarchy.   
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However, culturally, the watching of political television in 1956 remained on the 
periphery of the lives of some groups within the party.  For example, the General 
Director expressed concerns that the CCO Agents rarely had chance to view political 
television due to their evenings being taken up with Conservative functions.
360
  The 
party responded to this phenomenon in its usual bureaucratic manner.  The matter was 
addressed in another CCO report on television.
361
  Although Eden’s Conservatives’ 
recognised the importance of television, and considered ways to address any party-
imbalances against the medium, the party-elite continued its traditionally cautious and 
considered approach.  CCO understood that it functioned as a catalyst for change in the 
wider-party and was, therefore, cautious about committing the wider-party to changes 
which might have had unknown consequences.  
The new problems posed by television were followed by an ordered response 
which included a process of identification, thought, consideration, reflection, solution 
and action. The process was mediated by face-to-face human interaction through 
meetings, often at a committee level, and a prolific exchange of letters, memoranda and 
other paperwork.  Although this included interaction between members representing all 
levels of the hierarchy, actions on matters concerning television were often centred-on 
CCO.  The decision making was formulated through a discursive process between CCO 
and parliamentary elites.  The lower levels of the hierarchy were led from the party’s 
centre, and the rank-and-file were expected to fall-in-line via centralised instruction.  
The result of these processes was that the advent of television encouraged steady and 
considered changes in the party’s internal-dynamics which in turn led to some cultural 
evolutions within the party organisation through sustained incremental change. 
 
Eden’s Conservatives and the Importance of Television 
In general, television and radio broadcasting in the mid-1950s were organised by CCO 
in line with other political media of the time.  However, there was beginning to be some 
differences between the use of broadcasting media and other forms of propaganda.  This 
change was manifested through the party’s bureaucratic dissemination of its ideas to the 
wider-party organisation.  Throughout the 1950s period, most general communications 
to the wider-party, on publicity and propaganda matters, were disseminated via letters 
and memoranda.
362
  However, in the case of broadcasting media, the party made also a 
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special effort in the output of the ‘TV and Radio Newsgram’ publication, which 
symbolises, not only the increasing importance of television, but also Eden’s 
Conservatives’ commitment to a mass-party culture.363  They used the medium of the 
‘Newsgram’ in order to disseminate updates, changes and developments in broadcasting 
to the wider-party, but made it clear that the publication was not to be distributed to the 
general public.  Party communications on the subject of broadcasting via the Newsgram 
was not necessarily a one-way output.  It was accompanied often by a two-way dialogue 
through paper-based written forms of communication between party-elites and the other 
party-groups, including letters from the grassroots.   
In an example case, a number of Conservative MPs received complaints from 
constituents and party supporters relating to perceived bias against the Tories in BBC 
programming.
364
  MPs replied directly to the constituents and then passed-on the 
complaints to CCO.  Donald Kaberry subsequently wrote to Sir Ian Jacob of the BBC 
and included one of the letters of complaint.  Jacob responded stating that the ‘difficulty 
about the letter you enclose is that its allegations are based on suspicions.’365  The 
suspicion surrounding politics, broadcasting and the potential for bias was a reoccurring 
characteristic of the 1950s period.  Bias was difficult for the party to prove.  Therefore, 
it led to bureaucratically-intensive exchanges between party supporters in order to lodge 
complaints with the broadcasters.  
This type of dialogue was not entirely unique to the subject of television.  
However, the advent of the medium as a tool in the political sphere certainly led to an 
increase in the frequency and volume of the internal-interactions between party-groups.  
Through the production and dissemination of the Newsgram, the party-elite were 
signalling to the wider-party organisation that broadcasting media were indeed 
important tools for political communication and therefore worthy of greater attention 
and understanding.  Furthermore, the developing prominence of television for CCO is 
demonstrated by the Chief Publicity Officer’s comments to the Conference of Area 
Publicity Officers, in which he explicitly noted ‘the growing importance’366 of 
television propaganda for the Conservative Party. 
 The growing ‘importance’ of television for the party was becoming a widely-
espoused view, by 1956.  The General Director was keen to reiterate the ‘vital 
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importance of developing radio and TV talent among’367 party supporters.  MPs were 
also being encouraged to engage in political television.  Selected MPs were invited to a 
luncheon at CCO in order to discuss ‘aspects of television in relation to party 
propaganda’368 and CCO-elites held cocktail parties for the BBC and ITA officials.369  
Some party-elites believed that the importance of television was ‘increasing daily’370 
and that the party needed to consider new ways of improving its television-techniques.  
This may have been a response to criticisms from its members that questioned the 
party’s ability to communicate effectively when appearing on television,371 with 
concern that the Conservatives were underperforming against their ‘socialist’ rivals, 
who were often considered, by both friend and foe, as superior in their grasp of 
television-techniques.
372
 
  Subsequently, the Tories decided to further enhance their broadcasting abilities. 
This manifested itself in the training of its supporters, which included PPCs and their 
team members, like local constituency-elites. These included association officers, 
prominent activists and YCs.  The ‘Radio and TV Course’ was used to administer 
training in ‘TV Opportunities’ and ‘Voice Technique’ for the selected participants.373  
The party drew-up lists of individuals whom they considered appropriate for 
participation in the training.
374
  The process of selection encouraged discussions 
between CCO-elites about why particular supporters were chosen, and to question 
whether those who were not chosen for participation would become jaded and de-
motivated. The party believed that the savvier their supporters were in the ways of 
television, the more effective the party would become in representing itself on the small 
screen.  However, CCO proceeded with caution as it realised that, as a mass-based 
party, it needed to maintain a dedicated workforce at the grassroots in addition to a 
resource of media-trained supporters. 
CCO perceived television to be a new medium that would appeal particularly to 
the younger generation.  This is demonstrated by the party’s action to feature the YCs 
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and their political school in the making of political broadcasts like the television film 
‘Come Our Way’.375  The film was designed to entice new younger-members to the 
party.  The move to incorporate more party supporters in the making of television 
programmes was characteristic of Eden’s Conservatives, when compared to the party at 
other times between 1951-1964.  The broadcasting training which had been traditionally 
offered by CCO to MPs, was opened up to the wider-party like the young Margaret 
Thatcher who attended the one-day Radio and Television course, in 1956,
376
 three years 
prior to her election as the member for Finchley.  The objective of this training was for 
Conservative participants to ‘make the best use of any opportunity that is offered to 
them by the BBC and ITA... [and] to suggest how Conservatives can create their own 
opportunities for getting on air, by the submission of good and original ideas for 
programmes.’377  
In this instance, it conflated the opportunities open to parliamentary politicians 
and general party supporters.  Furthermore, the very acceptance of party supporters 
engaging in television suggests that there was a sentiment of trust held by the upper-
levels of the hierarchy for those operating at the grassroots.  This is particularly 
symbolic when considering the cautious nature of Eden’s Conservatives towards the 
medium.  The deference held by the party-workers for their leadership was rewarded by 
a relatively unsuspicious and trusting sentiment towards their supporters, which was 
held in balance through a type of cultural and organisational symbiosis.  CCO staff were 
given permission to contribute to BBC and ITA political television programmes - 
although there were rules given by the party that limited their contributions to being in a 
private capacity; and on matters other than party organisation, unless they had gained 
permission from the General Director.
378
 
The party’s interactions with television encouraged increased discourse among 
CCO-elites.  A process of self-reflection and self-criticism developed at CCO on the 
matter of the widely held belief that ‘Socialist’ TV personalities were dominant. 
 
I am sure that the present situation does not result from any bias in the BBC and ITA, but is due 
to the personal activity of and enterprise of Socialist individuals, and it is this which we must 
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encourage among our own people.  How best this should be done I would not know so far as 
members and candidates are concerned, but I am taking steps in my department to provide 
what help we can.
379
 
  
The party responded to this matter of concern by enhancing further the training of its 
supporters.  Eden’s Conservatives held one-day courses in the regions for a range of 
party individuals from senior YCs to PPCs.
380
  The five-hour courses, which were 
instructed by Brigadier Hinchcliffe and Mrs Crum-Ewing of CCO, consisted of an 
intensive programme that included TV opportunities; voice technique; demonstration of 
TV; practical exercise; initiating programmes; and illustration in programmes.
381
  
Variations of these courses were used also to train association agents and Members of 
Parliament.
382
  By 1957, CCO had coordinated a considerable programme of training 
events which had become referred to as the ‘Radio and Television Schools’.383   
For the very first training course, Conservative MPs were identified and 
selected, through a discursive process at CCO in which a ‘cross-section’ of ‘likely 
types’384 were identified.  Donald Kaberry and other CCO-elites handpicked the 
members in order to satisfy the objectives of the central-party.  However, Kaberry stated 
his anxiety on the matter.  He was keen to ensure that the first group were told that they 
were the first group, but that other courses would follow.  Clearly, Kaberry was 
sensitive about offending other Conservative and parliamentary colleagues.  It suggests 
also that television training was becoming viewed as a desirable opportunity. 
By the end of 1956, Kaberry believed that it was important for CCO to focus its 
training away from agents and other non-MPs and give priority to MPs.  This 
demonstrates an evolving process in which the party went from an open and inclusive 
stance on training in television-techniques; to a more considered and restricted approach 
in which the selection for training became more elitist. 
 
Frankly I think we must concentrate on MPs. It is quite clear that more and more are being 
approached direct in the House of Commons by programming companies and the BBC. The 
                                                     
379
 CPA CCO 4/7/361 Memo from Schofield to The Chairman and General Director on ‘Television 
Activities’, 3 January 1956.  
380
 CPA CCO 4/7/361 ‘Radio and Television One Day’s Course for West Midlands Area’, 19 June 1956. 
381
 CPA CCO 4/7/361 ‘Radio and Television: Programme for One Day’s Course’, 19 June 1956. 
382
 CPA CCO 4/7/361 Memo from the General Director to all Central Office Agents and Area Publicity 
Officers on ‘Radio and Television Training’, 22 June 1956. 
383
 CPA CCO 4/7/361 Memo from Hinchcliffe to Kaberry and Schofield on ‘Radio and Television Schools’, 
7 December 1957. 
384
 CPA CCO 4/7/361 Note from Kaberry to Mrs Crum-Ewing on ‘Television and Broadcasting Training’, 
25 January 1956. 
100 
 
sooner we get through the list of all the MPs the better it will be for us.  I think they should 
have top priority.  I should also like to get down to a selected list of candidates as soon as 
possible, after the MPs have been.  I think the agents should come a long way down the list as 
soon after both the above.
385
 
 
The party’s hierarchical structure, which had until this point been relatively flexible in 
its approach to the role of television in the party’s organisation is shown here to have 
tightened to some extent.  The party based its priorities on a logic and order rooted in 
the importance of achieving its central aims.  In the wake of Suez, the opposition party-
personalities had begun profiting from their relative freedom to experiment with the 
new medium – and Eden’s Conservatives did not want to be left behind.386   
However, naturally, the Conservatives were confined by their role as the 
governing party in addition to a tendency to exhibit caution in the early stages of social 
and technological change.  Although the Conservatives had been experimenting with 
television, the impact of the new medium had been most observed in the party’s 
organisation and internal culture – a place where experimentation was contained.  The 
heightened media interests in the Conservatives and the advances by their political 
rivals in their on-screen prominence was beginning to exert pressure on the party-elites.  
This in turn forced change in the party – to do what was necessary in order to compete 
on the small screen with the rise of ‘Socialist’ personalities.  Therefore, in this manner 
television began to be assimilated pragmatically into the party hierarchy. 
 A greater concern for the CCO in relation to party agents and television, was not 
their training in the use of the medium, but their availability to watch political 
programming.  For example:  
 
I think the Chairman was a bit shaken at the Central Office Agents’ Conference to hear that 
Central Office Agents rarely saw TV. I am sure it is becoming increasingly important that both 
they and Area Publicity Officers should regularly watch political and controversial programmes 
if they are to appreciate intelligently the growing importance of this medium.
387
 
 
The Conservatives’ reaction to this revelation was to produce, within the following 
three months, a document in draft which aimed to (a) ‘enable CCO Agents to make a 
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close study of the political aspects of TV’; and (b) ‘promote the study of the art of 
television broadcasting with a view to establishing the party’s ascendency in the 
field’.388  The party proposed to achieve this in the purchase of TV sets for loan to CCO 
Agents and specific members of the CCO-elite.  The use of the term ‘ascendency in the 
field’ indicates to the early beginnings of the desire at CCO to master the medium for 
political gain.  However, the reality of that prospect would not be realised for a number 
of years to come. 
The advent of television was also impacting on the everyday role of the party-
workers at the grassroots in the ways in which they conducted their activism in support 
of their local association and the wider Conservative cause.  The first televised Party 
Political Broadcast to be shown on both the BBC and ITV (Independent Television) 
simultaneously was the Conservative election broadcast, 9 May 1956. Using the TV and 
Radio Newsgram
389
 to communicate with the constituency associations the CCO TV 
department requested canvassers to collect the names and addresses of TV set owners of 
all political persuasions in order that they could be sent a ‘Viewers View’ survey prior 
to the broadcast.  Therefore, television was impacting on the ordinary supporter in terms 
of activist processes, which was largely at the command of the central-party. 
The advent of commercial television had a significant impact at CCO.  Although 
the Television Act 1954 was enacted under Churchill’s Conservatives, the relationship 
between the Conservatives and ITV was initiated under Eden.  ITV launched in the 
September, shortly after the General Election, May 1955.  Churchill’s Conservatives’ 
aim for ITV to be a more favourable Conservative platform for political programming 
looked likely to be realised.  Eden’s Conservatives considered ITV to be seeking to do 
business with the party.
390
  However, by November 1956, CCO had begun to be 
concerned that ITV’s representation of the Conservative Party was becoming 
unfavourable.
391
  For example, the Granada Network Company, an ITV franchise, was 
accused by the Conservatives of making unjustified attacks on Eden’s government 
during one of their programmes, named ‘What the Papers Say’, which opened with: 
‘This week has been dominated by trouble in the Tory Party’.392  The programme was 
also transmitted in London by another ITV franchise, Associated Rediffusion.  
Therefore, the Granada programme was distributed to wider ITV audiences than some 
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of its other productions, which enhanced the Conservatives’ concerns.  Eden’s 
Conservatives were not simply interested in experimenting with television as a new 
form of mass communication.  They were also acutely aware of its potential for 
influencing mass public opinion.   
When comparing the party’s concerns for BBC bias, at the time of Churchill’s 
Conservatives, to Eden’s Conservatives’ concerns about ITV programming, the latter 
reacted rather more promptly.  The party made a complaint to the Postmaster General, 
who subsequently replied to the Conservatives to inform them that the ITA itself ‘had 
been seriously concerned about this programme and that, on their own initiative, they 
had already sent a letter to the programme company concerned drawing their attention 
to Section 3(f) of the Television Act - the need to preserve a due impartiality’.393 The 
speed with which the party reacted in this instance shows an increase in their sensitivity 
to the role of television in their interests.  It demonstrates that, as television was 
developing, the party’s awareness of the medium also expanded.  In turn, this led to the 
party machine’s reaction to be quicker to act on matters relating to the major 
broadcasters.  The party was beginning to mature in its relationship with the medium. 
As the collective at the top of Eden’s Conservatives became more confident to 
challenge the broadcasters, the less the party feared the potential consequences of those 
in control of television programming. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Churchill’s Conservatives 
When comparing the Conservative Party’s attitude, behaviour and culture in relation to 
television at the beginning of the 1950s to those at the end of Churchill’s premiership 
there are significant contrasts.  Within a five year period, Churchill’s Conservatives 
transitioned from being a political party which seldom recognised the importance of TV 
to incorporating opportunities, for active engagement in television as a mode of 
supporting the Conservative cause, at virtually all levels of the party’s diverse 
hierarchy.
394
  Along the continuum between elections there were undulations of internal 
opinion on the matter of which media were deemed best for political use (and which 
were not), e.g. there were fluctuations in opinions and the use of film and television at 
different stages of Churchill’s post-war premiership. 
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These undulations were often affected by a collective mood which in turn was 
influenced by a diverse range of internal factors.  Through the deferential hierarchy, 
which was in keeping with the party’s traditions, it was largely the elite decision-makers 
at CCO who held the power to influence the actions and directions of the wider-party, in 
which coercive methods were employed, rather than a dictatorial approach.  However, 
the collective mood, which included the major groups within the party organisation and 
wider external-factors like social trends, required general consensus in order for the 
party’s internal stasis to remain.  In assessing the changing moods of the party and the 
public through surveys and analysis of correspondence, the party took an introspective 
approach to itself awareness in order to understand what changing external social 
factors meant for its internal organisational and technological operations.   
The perceived poor performances by Conservative-broadcasters on television 
eroded the confidence the party-elites had in its performers, which in turn led to the 
party taking a cautious and tentative approach to the use of television at the early part of 
the decade.  Repeated suspicion of BBC bias against the Conservatives, and confusion 
among party members and politicians over the rules and allocation of opportunities for 
speakers, impacted further on the propaganda choices of the party-elite.  This ultimately 
led to television playing a relatively minor role in the early part of Churchill’s 
Conservatives, whose propaganda was characterised by a mix of publicity techniques. 
The party’s distrust of the effectiveness of the new medium meant that it continued to 
focus on growing its membership, as a workforce to mobilise its propaganda with the 
aim of reaching the electorate.  Its reliance on its membership meant that the party 
maintained its traditional approach to embracing a mass-party culture.  
Generally, Churchill’s Conservatives’ external communications and publicity 
developed through steady and incremental change.  However, 1954 was a prominent 
year in terms of the observable sudden and dramatic change within the party’s 
organisation and culture. The significance being that the following year was a known 
election year and the party had looked closely at the trends in political television in the 
United States.  The party furnished its election preparations with the symbolic 
establishment of a separate Radio and Television Section at CCO; and in turn there 
were significant cultural, behavioural and attitudinal changes towards the incorporation 
of television in the party’s affairs at virtually all levels of its organisation.  The general 
interest in developments in political television meant that CCO had to process new 
levels of correspondence.  It became a hub for communication and interaction within the 
party on matters of television, thus acting as a type of Conservative information-
104 
 
exchange.  Television had begun occupying the minds of individuals at virtually all 
levels.  This had begun to impact on the party in terms of driving practical change in the 
behaviour of activists at the grassroots and the daily work of CCO staff by the time 
Eden succeeded to the premiership. 
 
Eden’s Conservatives 
There were a number of continuing characteristics mutually evident in both the 
Churchill and Eden periods in relation to the role of television.  An unbroken seven 
years of Conservative governance, with an increased parliamentary majority for Eden, 
meant that the party continued to hold a strong mandate on which to steer the course of 
television in Britain.  Broadcasting regulations continued to impact on the bureaucratic 
organisation and daily processes for the top-tier party-elites.  Time and other CCO 
resources were taken-up with committee meetings in order to frequently deliberate over 
TV rules and broadcasting ratios.  Furthermore, a lack of understanding remained 
throughout much of the party hierarchy over how political TV culture was constituted 
and what that meant for Conservative individuals and collective groups, from the 
ordinary supporter to MPs.   
Television played a minor role in the General Election of 1955.  It was 
significantly more dramatic in its impact as a driver of change in party organisation than 
it was in terms of the party’s communications with the electorate.  Eden’s Conservatives 
had an acute awareness of the influence that TV could have on the public.  The internal 
use of the TV and Radio Newsgram shows that the party was preparing for, what many 
considered to be, an inevitable cultural-shift towards the use of television for political 
gain.  This was shown by the steps that the party had begun to take in training its 
participants at all levels of the hierarchy.  However, although Eden’s Conservatives 
better understood the political relevance of television than their predecessors and 
embraced a new-found confidence in it, like in Churchill’s time, there remained a 
cautious and tentative approach to using innovative television techniques in its external 
communications.  In the early to mid-1950s, it was not a case of anticipating television 
trends and then acting to innovate and lead the propaganda battle, but rather the party 
maintained what appears to have been a process of anticipating; and then observing to 
see whether their theories were proven through the party’s research.  Then, if they found 
themselves to have anticipated correctly, the party would think further about whether or 
not to take any action in relation to the innovation of its external uses of television. 
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The party’s motivation to understand the medium through extensive opinion 
surveys and analysis was another symbolic milestone.  This was accompanied by 
increased debate about the party’s use of television as a political medium.  Internal 
interactions using paper-based communications between different Conservative groups 
increased also during Eden’s premiership, especially over matters of broadcasting 
controversy, like Gaitskell’s Suez broadcast.  The emotional responses to the Suez 
broadcasts demonstrate the potential that television had to catalyse chain-reactions 
within the party’s internal-dynamics.  Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the 
advent and development of television was impacting on the party’s culture throughout 
its hierarchy in that it catalysed greater interactions between individuals.  The collective 
realisation that broadcasting was an important medium in the party’s objectives meant 
that it was catalysing change in the ways in which supporters assisted the party in their 
activism, like the use of listening panels to monitor broadcasts at the regional level. 
It is clear that although the party between 1951 and 1957 was in the process of 
transitional change towards a television-centric CCO it maintained a mass-based 
culture.  As such, its internal processes and culture, although adapting to technological 
changes in television, reflected that which one would expect of a mass-based party.  In 
addition to the traditional deference and mutual respect that was evident in the party at 
the time of Churchill, Eden’s Conservatives at CCO demonstrated an added trust for the 
wider-party.  In opening-up opportunities for ‘anyone’ to become involved with certain 
aspects of television, the party’s culture was becoming more fluid in its approach to its 
interaction with the new medium. Therefore, wider television-culture was beginning to 
synthesise with aspects of the party’s organisational culture.  This was symbolic when 
one considers the otherwise cautious approach taken by the party towards television.  
Furthermore, it would suggest that Eden’s party-elites held a genuine respect and trust 
for the wider-party, which was evident in a type of cultural-symbiosis in the wider-party 
organisation. 
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FOUR 
Television in Macmillan’s and Douglas-Home’s Conservatives 
1957-1964 
 
 
The circumstances under which Harold Macmillan succeeded Anthony Eden’s 
premiership were a torrid affair in the wake of the Suez Crisis.
395
  Eden’s resignation on 
health grounds, 9 January 1957, led to Macmillan being appointed by cabinet ministers 
of the incumbent Conservative Government.  During his time as the former Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Macmillan had utilised his American connections and political 
prowess in order to rise in the eyes of his contemporaries as the right man to take 
forward the Conservative Party.  In the 1959 General Election, 8 October, 20 months 
after Macmillan formed a government, the British electorate got their opportunity to 
endorse the Conservatives’ choice of leader, who had been dubbed ‘Supermac’.  
Macmillan’s Conservatives defeated Gaitskell’s Labour Party with an increase from a 
59 to 99 seat majority in the House of Commons.
396
  The new prime minister, aged 63, 
became known for his approach to a mixed economy,
397
 and for his use of the political 
media of his time.
398
   
In the last chapter, Churchill’s and Eden’s Conservatives’ transitional approach 
to the new medium of television was presented.  Therefore, this chapter continues the 
chronology, beginning with a section on Macmillan’s Conservatives, 1957-1963.  This 
is followed by a brief, but pertinent, section on Douglas-Home’s Conservatives, 1963-
1964.  The chapter argues that the party’s organisational culture continued to adapt in 
line with advances in wider television-culture and that the party underwent rapid 
evolution between the 1959 and 1964 elections in taking a more professionalised 
television-centric approach and attitude towards television and its mass-membership. 
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Macmillan’s Conservatives 1957-1963 
 
Macmillan’s historic television appearance in 1953, in the first political broadcast 
outside of an election, was described by D. R. Thorpe as ‘a tightly controlled and 
rehearsed operation’.399  This style of broadcasting was emblematic of the on-screen 
political communication of the time.  The Conservative Party distributed praise for 
Macmillan’s performance through the dissemination of a ‘TV and Radio Newsgram’ to 
all levels of party hierarchy.  It included a quote from a headline in the Sunday Express, 
which read: ‘The Tories Find a New Star’.400  Macmillan’s early embrace of the new 
medium of television was emblematic of the recognition in the party that Britain needed 
to modernise.
401
  For example, research and development ‘was high on the Conservative 
political agenda, especially from the late 1950s, and was a central part of the 
“modernising Britain” rhetoric’.402  This modernising agenda extended also to changes 
in party organisation.  Charmley suggests ‘that under Macmillan the Conservative Party 
had successfully adapted itself to the new age of affluence.’403  
Throughout his career Macmillan embraced the use of political television as a 
publicity tool from its earliest developments.  However, like his predecessors, 
Macmillan was suspicious of, and at times concerned about, the potential negative 
impact that television, and particularly the BBC, could have on British affairs.  In 
relation to the Suez Crisis, Thorpe suggests that a  
 
...worry for Macmillan was the information the BBC might broadcast, no wartime censorship 
being in place.  On 3 August [1956] ... Macmillan saw Sir Ian Jacob, Director-General of the BBC, 
to argue for restraint.  Jacob was sympathetic to his concerns; but Macmillan was convinced 
that the BBC and the press could only be managed through a reimposition of wartime 
controls.
404
 
 
Macmillan was practiced in using his influence in attempts to manage broadcasters, in 
advance of him becoming the Premier.  However, whereas Churchill’s and Eden’s 
Conservatives took a tentative approach to the medium, Macmillan’s suspicion of 
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television led him and his party’s organisation to make attempts to, firstly, control and, 
secondly, master it.  However, Colin Seymour-Ure tempers this in arguing that, 
although Eden and Macmillan were ‘sensitive’ to the potentials of political television, 
Labour’s ‘Harold Wilson was the first TV prime minister’.405 
 
Party Organisation and Macmillan’s Conservatives  
In the months following Eden’s resignation, there were a number of changes in the 
operations and key personnel at CCO.
406
  Guy Schofield resigned as Chief Publicity 
Officer in order to return to his former career in journalism, thus making way for his 
deputy, Ronald Simms, to succeed him.
407
  In August 1957, Stephen Pierssene resigned 
due to ill health
408
 from his position as general director and was replaced by W. Urton.  
Less than a month later, Viscount Hailsham became the Chairman of Party Organisation 
after Oliver Poole submitted his resignation to Macmillan.
409
  Furthermore, expenditure 
cuts led to the general staff being asked to help save the office resources.
410
  Financial 
concerns had been expressed already at the ‘General Meeting of the South Eastern 
Branch of the National Society of Agents on 29 May 1956’.411  The party was 
experiencing difficulties in fundraising both at the constituency and national levels.   
One of Poole’s final acts as party chairman was to appoint a ‘committee under 
Lord Colyton’s chairmanship’412 in order to examine the structures and functions of 
party organisation at the branch and constituency levels; and to understand the roles of 
individuals at those the levels.  At the constituency level, there was a mood for change 
towards a simpler and more streamlined organisation for the associations.  The West 
Midlands Union of Conservative Associations at the Conservative Central Council, 
 
...noting the difficulties in finding suitable men and women to undertake the duties as officers 
and committee workers in the constituency and branch organisations, and recognising that 
people today are often not able to give unlimited time to politics, [called] upon the Executive 
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Committee of the National Union to consult with the Chairman of Party Organisation with a 
view to setting up a committee to examine the structure of the party organisation so as to bring 
it into line with present day requirements.
413
 
 
This demonstrates a clear desire and willingness at the grassroots levels of the party for 
an organisational change in the Conservative Party that would ease the responsibility of 
individuals at local levels and modernise the party’s national operations.414  
A subsequent report assessed the roles of committees, at all levels of the party, 
including advisory committees and those in the provincial areas, cities, boroughs and 
the National Union, with the exception of organisation matters at Parliament, Downing 
Street and CCO.  The committee used the Bexley Conservatives as an example to model 
the structure and functions of a Conservative association.  The role of activists at the 
grassroots was described as 
 
...being responsible for basic election activities such as the distribution of literature, canvassing 
and the like, the Street System normally undertakes the distribution of the monthly 
“Conservative News” and other leaflets (confined if possible to one delivery per month), the 
collection of subscriptions and collection and distribution of books to all members in Divisional 
Draws.
415
 
 
The party’s agents held a collective awareness that post-war campaigning and 
fundraising had been intensified and that this change in the culture of activism was 
placing a great strain on the voluntary party, many of whom had been overloaded and 
consequently become disengaged from party activism ‘entirely’.416  Therefore, natural 
changes in the mass-based culture at the grassroots had begun around the time that the 
uses of political television had begun increasing.   
 In addition to street activism, the strain of expectation and responsibility on the 
voluntary committee member and the mass-based party culture was becoming evident in 
testimonies sourced for the Colyton Committee.  For example, 
 
Mr Tranter began by saying that in Birmingham they have been concerned by the number of 
people who were involved in more than one committee.  It seemed that there were two types 
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of person: the professional committee attenders to whom it has no burden at all but who were 
not a great help, and the people who were prepared to be on a committee but found two or 
three committees a burden.  This was too much for the right type of person to cope with under 
modern conditions, particularly in big cities...  In Birmingham they had decided that it would be 
better if a large number of people worked for a short time and concentrated on the activity in 
which they are interested, whether it the political, financial or social aspect.
417
 
 
However, the committee culture of the 1950s was not unique to the Conservative Party.  
The press had begun to recognise that there had been a change in the culture of wider 
civic society.  One article entitled ‘We’re All Committee Men Now’418 depicts how 
Napoleon’s earlier observation of Britain as a nation of shopkeepers would have been 
better expressed in the 1950s as a nation of ‘committee men’.  The article claimed that 
this proliferation of committees was spawning from the political culture at the House of 
Commons.  This committee culture was advancing simultaneously with developments 
in British broadcasting culture and TV regulation.  Therefore, television became a 
widely debated medium in the very committee meetings that were playing an integral 
role in the changing life of the party.  In turn, this array of factors had begun to integrate 
and form a new type of culture at the heart of the party’s bureaucratic organisation.419 
 The party’s awareness of and sensitivity to the influence of bureaucratic trends 
in its organisational culture is shown in the Colyton Committee Report, which was 
disseminated to constituency chairmen.  It sought to strike a balance between the role of 
committee work and political activism in the lives of party supporters.  The report was 
accompanied with a letter from Oliver Poole,
420
 in which he urged Conservative 
associations to focus on ‘doorstep’ activities and interaction with the electorate rather 
than wasting the time of party-workers in unnecessary committee meetings.  For 
example, in underlined text, the report stated that: ‘We cannot emphasise too strongly 
our opinion that...chairmen should cancel or postpone any meeting for which there is no 
reasonably important business.’421  The party was demonstrating its consciousness for 
the need to streamline its resources across its organisation from the budgetary-cuts at 
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CCO to the efficient use of manpower at the grassroots.
422
  This suggests that the 
party’s consciousness, led by CCO-elites, was realising that the party needed to 
modernise aspects of its organisational approach in the face of a declining mass-party 
culture.
423
  Although there was no mention of party publicity and TV in the report, 
television was presenting itself as a medium which, as a tool for reaching-out to the 
mass electorate, could emancipate the party from the old resource-intensive ways of the 
past.
424
 
 Nevertheless, the party was in the transition of change.  Therefore, it continued 
to act like a mass-based party in a number of ways.  For example, CCO led initiatives to 
expand the party’s dominance at a local level through a national membership 
campaign.
425
  It was executed in tandem with the party’s ‘Roll-Call for Victory’, which 
Macmillan urged party supporters to sign in order to ‘affirm their belief in Freedom and 
Opportunity and their opposition to the creation of a Socialist State in Britain.’426  
Furthermore, following the events surrounding Suez, the membership drive acted as a 
mechanism for boosting the party’s self-confidence, which had been less surefooted in 
the wake of the crisis:  
 
It was claimed at Conservative Central Office yesterday that the membership recruiting 
campaign launched on 16 September 1958 has been “remarkably successful”... The object was 
not only to recruit new members but to give existing members an opportunity to “confirm their 
faith” in the party.
427
 
 
This highlights how external events that influenced the public opinion of the party 
contributed to an impact on the internal nature of the party’s organisation.  Suez not 
only knocked the party’s confidence, but led to the party responding with the use of 
pragmatic tactics in order to strengthen and boost its belief in itself.
428
  The party’s 
collective self-belief was symbolic for the party-elites, because, although the party was 
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transitioning towards a wider use of political television to meet its electoral aims, it was 
yet to understand how to fully manage the medium; or to experience the extent to which 
television could be used as a tool for mass political communication.
429
  Conversely, 
reaching the voter through the mobilisation of traditional mass-activism, to which it had 
become accustomed, was, in the run-up to the 1959 General Election, a known and 
reliable resource that the party had become proficient in controlling in order to achieve 
electoral success.  Colin Seymour-Ure argues that 1959 was a ‘watershed’ year for 
British political television because of advances in the approaches of the broadcasters.
430
  
This suggests that the Conservative Party’s organisational approach to political 
television was lagging behind wider developments in the medium, even though it ‘had 
always been positive about the political influence of television on the electorate’.431 
 
Television and Transition under Macmillan’s Conservatives 
In the transition from Eden to Macmillan, CCO used a television broadcast to attract 
young people to membership of the party.  The political broadcast, called ‘Come Our 
Way’, was developed by Eden’s Conservatives and, after significant delay, finally aired, 
7 February 1957, 7:05-7:30pm, on BBC television – a month after Macmillan became 
Prime Minister.  The party-elites, especially those at CCO and 12 Downing Street, were 
becoming increasingly interested in viewing figures and appreciation indices.  For 
example, the BBC viewing figures for ‘Come Our Way’, 7 February, reached almost 4 
million, and the broadcast received a strong audience appreciation rating.
432
  The power 
of television was also becoming apparent to CCO by the hundreds of written requests 
from young people wishing to join the YCs.
433
  In order to manage the interaction 
between the young viewers and the party, CCO organised a structured process that 
involved incoming letters being passed to the Organisation Department for reply by the 
Chief Organisation Officer to the sender.
434
  The enquiries were also forwarded to the 
respective constituency agent with a covering letter that outlined the course of action to 
be taken.  CCO kept a record of the names and constituency of the individuals in the 
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Organisation Department.
435
  This case shows how the impact of television broadcasts 
had begun filtering-down from CCO to the day-to-day role of the constituency agent. 
Furthermore it demonstrates how a number of factors influencing party 
organisation were beginning to conflate.  Firstly, television was being used by the party 
in ways that actually enhanced the mass-based party culture.  The Conservatives may 
have begun to understand the uses for television in relation to reaching the voter, but, 
before that realisation had any significant impact in reality, television was being used as 
a tool to develop the party’s traditional organisation of a significant mass-membership 
managed by a type of bureaucratic process of control from central and constituency 
offices.  However, the advent of television and its use in this way had begun to mean 
that the structure of the party required internal cooperation between the different 
bureaus at CCO.  ‘Come Our Way’ grew from collaboration between the Publicity 
Department’s Radio and TV Section and the Organisation Department, which ultimately 
resulted in some integration of their bureaucratic functions.   
 The audience figures of another political broadcast ‘House to Let’, 14 March 
1957, which featured the Conservative MP Henry Brooke, a founder of the CRD, 
presented a significant development for Macmillan’s Conservatives.  The party had 
begun to compare the efficacy of the two broadcasters, the BBC and ITV,
436
 to their 
needs and aims, which, in this particular case, showed that just over half a million 
viewers watched the broadcast on the BBC compared to over 4 million on ITV.
437
  The 
party-elite was beginning to understand why this might be the case and how it could 
work to their advantage.  In a letter to Edward Heath, the ITA explained that 
 
...ITA audiences per home are larger than the BBC audiences per home.  Broadly, this has been 
the case from the beginning, and applies more or less to all types of programme, the average 
ITA audience being 2.9 people per set and the BBC figure being 2.6 people per set.
438
 
 
The party was developing a significant appreciation for the understanding of television.  
In turn, this influence is evident in its perception of the impact of television.  A ‘Report 
on Party Political Television Broadcasts’439 claimed that the role of the press was 
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diminishing because political television was ‘no longer news’440 and therefore the press 
was no longer a resource for the party to use in their pursuit to elucidate itself on the 
impact of television in society.  Moreover, the report claims that there had ‘been a 
marked improvement in the interest taken in programmes by party- workers, 
professionals and volunteers.’441  Therefore, the party in general was beginning to 
develop a wider interest in the role of TV. 
The party’s greater understanding of television meant that CCO could improve 
its assessment of television broadcasts.  It considered its own weaknesses and devised 
practical ‘remedies’.442  The main weakness was deemed to be the pressures on any 
given government minister to perform in the moment for a broadcast, thus resulting in 
an unconvincing performance because of little preparation time and lack of confidence 
using the medium.  The party’s solution to this problem was to focus on consulting with 
the minister prior to broadcast in order that he may be aware of the central message of 
the broadcast with an appreciation for the target audience.  Also, the party was 
beginning to understand the need for their politicians to be brief, and thus speaking in 
bullet points (later known as sound bites).  Some of the self-identified weaknesses in 
Tory television culture were unique to the Conservatives, because of their status as the 
governing party.  Therefore, it had become incumbent upon Macmillan’s Conservatives 
to master the medium and set the precedent for future governmental broadcasting in 
Britain. 
By mid-1957, CCO attentions had turned significantly towards television.  The 
Conservatives had devised integrated methods for assessing the impact of political 
television on audiences.  It was considered that: ‘While measuring the size of the TV 
audience is a mathematical problem, measuring impact is more complex and largely a 
matter of judgement.’443  The party had taken resource intensive steps in order to 
understand such ‘impact’, which included analysis of the ‘BBC Audience Research’ 
(that came to the party by covert informants working at the BBC); ‘Viewers View of 
[political] Personalities’ and ‘Viewers View of Programmes’ (both used surveys on 
political broadcasts); ‘Press Cuttings’ (although it was noted that the ‘novelty’ of 
reporting about television was wearing-off); ‘Gallup Poll’ and ‘Daily Express Poll’ data 
(that covered election periods only); and views of the ‘Party Workers’ (this was 
encouraged through the Radio and TV Newsgrams.  Party-workers fed-back their views 
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on broadcasts to association agents and Area Publicity Officers who subsequently 
relayed the information and their own thoughts to CCO).  The party used seven 
questions for analysis in order to devise their conclusions, but noted that in all cases 
more evidence was desirable.  The findings of these analyses were significant in the 
organisation of the party and in the educational development of the party, because the 
Conservatives used them as ‘the basis of everything’ they taught in their ‘Radio and TV 
courses’.444  Furthermore, the party used pamphlets entitled ‘How to Utilize Radio and 
Television Effectively.’445  This shows how, like film previously, television was 
becoming integrated significantly into political education agendas and party TV 
programmes.
446
 
The medium also gained growing interest from the party outside of CCO.  
Conservative MPs continued to take a keen interest in how the party was being 
perceived on television.  One example was Robert Allen MP, who wrote a long and 
detailed letter to Donald Kaberry MP, of CCO, stating that the subject of Conservative-
speakers on television arose during a dinner.  Allen argued that there were too few 
Conservative TV-personalities and that the best known were ‘Socialists’.  He believed 
that: 
 
It was therefore highly desirable that the Conservatives should build-up expendable TV-
personalities, i.e. people who might become well known to the public for non political 
broadcasts, but who would be prepared to sacrifice their reputation in the interests of the 
Conservative Party at the time of a general election.
447
 
 
Allen proceeded to argue a case in which he encouraged CCO to consider training him 
to become a Conservative TV personality and admitted that it sounded ‘rather vain’,448 
but that his self-promotion was on the advice of anonymous sources.  This case would 
suggest that Allen’s ego was being enticed by the medium and that he would have liked 
to have received special treatment.  However, this was tempered by a policy at CCO 
that gave equal opportunities to MPs for interaction with television and training.  
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Kaberry’s reply acknowledged the dominance of ‘Socialist’ broadcasters, but argued 
that some TV personalities were indeed Conservatives.
449 
 
 Concerns about the domination of ‘Socialist’ TV-personalities had been 
developing for some time and was related to the ongoing debate within the party-elite 
about allowing junior ministers to participate in television broadcasts.  This is illustrated 
by the dialogue surrounding a letter to Lord Hailsham from Sir Toby Low MP. 
 
I have been worried for sometime about some of the TV programmes in which MPs are asked 
to appear.  Last Friday I was cajoled and bullied into appearing in the Granada “Under Fire” half 
hour on unemployment and neglect in Wales.  Alan Green was with me and did as well as 
anyone who is not immersed in the problems could do.  I did not do well: I was unhappy before 
the programme and unhappier after.  But that is not the point I wanted to make.  The real point 
is this – why do ministers, junior or senior, not take the opportunity of these programmes to 
stand up for their policies and explain them thoroughly and also to get themselves known? I 
know the risks, and can well understand why Sir Winston Churchill made rules about Ministerial 
TV performances four or five years ago.  But though the risks may not have decreased the 
advantages of ministers appearing on TV – indeed the vital importance of it – have increased 
enormously. Front bench Labour men do not miss these opportunities.
450
 
 
Sir Toby’s narrative describes the contrast between the Conservative frontbench’s 
cultural approaches to television when compared to that of Labour.  Prominent Labour 
politicians, while in opposition, had experienced a freedom to explore the exploitation 
of television.  However, most Conservative political-elites had not because of the 
culture that had been instigated under the Churchillian rules that restricted Ministerial 
Broadcasts.  This is another example of how television played a uniquely different role 
in the Conservative Party, as the governing party 1951-1964, when compared to other 
British political parties at that time.  Seymour-Ure identifies this as an ‘historic tension’ 
that has been evident between broadcasters and governments, both Conservative and 
Labour, since the advent of political television.
451
  But television was at its newest as a 
political medium throughout this continuous 13 year period of Conservative 
governance.  Therefore, throughout 1951-1964, the suspicions surrounding broadcasters 
in the psyche of the Conservatives, as the governing party, is, naturally, incomparable 
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with Labour’s experience, because by the time Labour were in government in the 1960s, 
political television, and the parties’ understanding of it, had matured considerably. 
Deeper comparison of Allen’s and Sir Toby’s discourse reveals that the advent 
of television had the potential to both enhance and diminish the egos and confidence of 
politicians.  Both MPs used colourful language like ‘expendable’ and ‘sacrifice’; and 
‘worried’ and ‘bullied’ in order to express their very different attitudes towards the role 
of television in the party and how it was impacting on the life of a Conservative MP.  
This vivid and symbolic language illustrates how television remained, for some 
Conservative politicians, a very new medium.  
The dialogue on the matter of ministers appearing on TV was continued within 
CCO: 
 
I understand that there is quite a lot of feeling among Members of Parliament in agreement 
with what [Sir Toby] says.  In this particular programme it had been hoped that Robert Carr 
would put the Government’s case, but he was either unable to do so or not allowed to take 
part in the programme.  The feeling is that it is a pity that junior ministers are sometimes 
denied the opportunity of appearing on the programmes because they are considered 
unsuitable either by Dr Hill, the minister or the Chief Whip, and their places have to be taken by 
backbench Members of Parliament who are not really in a position to know all the answers.
452
 
 
In an effort to maintain control of output and in order to protect their own interests, the 
Conservative governing-elite were cautious not to take ‘risks’ in using ministers 
liberally on television.  However, it was becoming apparent that their approach might 
not be in the best interest of the party.  
 As Lindsay and Harrington write, the Conservatives were appearing to fall 
behind Labour in adapting to wider social-trends and the changing political and media 
culture of the time.
453
  Consequently, the status quo of the hierarchy, organisation and 
structure of the Parliamentary Conservative Party was being challenged by the 
developments in political television.  The top-elites in the parliamentary party appeared 
to be out of touch on matters of political television.  Many of those below them in the 
parliamentary hierarchy, and the CCO-elites, had been contemplating the modernisation 
of the party’s approach to political broadcasting for a number of years.  In this case, 
there was discord between the position of top government-elites and a collective of 
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individuals within the parliamentary party, which demonstrates that issues relating to 
how political television was constituted at the government level had the potential to 
unsettle relations between different party groups.   
In addition to MPs, Conservative supporters continued to write to CCO in 
relation to political television, as was the trend in the earlier parts of the period.  For 
example, Chief Publicity Officer, Ronald Simms, wrote to Charles Hill MP, March 
1958, to report that the party had received ‘two spontaneous reactions to’ a Party 
Political Broadcast by Sir David Eccles.
454
  Simms explained that ‘the first came from 
the Women’s Chairman of East Grinstead, who felt she had to tell someone how good 
Sir David Eccles was last night, and added that she thought it the best thing since Iain 
Macleod on Skipton.’455  This illustrates what appears to have been an inherent impulse 
for some party members and officers within the mass-based culture to communicate 
with CCO and express their views on matters of interest. 
Although it was changing, the mass-party culture of the 1950s remained 
characterised largely by its tradition as a party of activism.
456
  A nature of action was 
imbedded deeply in the party’s norms and customs.  Individual members and supporters 
were inclined and encouraged to engage in aspects of the political life of the party.  The 
visual nature of political television brought the day-to-day politics of political leaders 
into the living rooms of the ordinary party supporter, and thus provided a novel reality 
that sound radio and printed media had not.
457
  It made the party leadership feel tangibly 
close to those at the grassroots who watched political TV.  Therefore, this new found 
tangibility of television held the potential to act as a catalyst for party supporter 
engagement.  In the 1950s, it was the cultural default-setting of party supporters to 
interact in the political process.  In the grassroots’ transitional phase, from a face-to-face 
politics to one of armchair politics, in which political television impacted on a 
redundancy of mass-campaign activism,
458
 some of the TV-viewing party membership 
were prompted, by what they saw on TV, to engage in written discourse, as a method of 
showing support to their new on-screen party personalities.  Therefore, the act of letter 
writing became a symbolic gesture of active party support in the transitional 
complexities of culture-change in the party. 
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This ritual of paper-based communication-exchange was a two-way affair.  By 
the end of 1957, Macmillan’s Conservatives were recognising the significance of the 
role of television in politics and the incremental impact that it had had on its party’s 
organisation overtime.  The Radio and Television Section at CCO continued to use the 
TV and Radio Newsgram as a medium to disseminate such matters to the wider-party 
organisation. 
 
TV and Radio Newsgram was started in April 1953, six days after the political parties agreed 
with the BBC that television should be used for party political broadcasts.  The impact of 
television on politics and the effect on political organisation was even then considerable.  It has 
grown daily ever since.  This short Newsgram has been a means of enlisting the interests and 
help of constituency agents throughout England, Wales and Scotland in the new responsibility 
assumed by the Central Office since entering the field of television production.  At the same 
time, sound radio remains an equally important factor in politics.  The Newsgram – as its name 
implies – covers both.  Because television is comparatively new and sound is something which 
has become an accepted part of normal communication since the 1920’s, it is very easy to 
neglect sound.  It is worthwhile to put the relative importance in perspective.  The number of 
licences taken out by October 1957 is 14,677,612. This includes 7,524,071 TV licences.  That 
means that 7,153,541 receive sound but not TV.
459
 
 
This extract shows how the Radio and Television Section intended to present the party 
as an organisation which had submitted to the continual changes that it believed had 
been brought about by the impacts of and developments in television. 
Therefore, CCO was signalling to its party the importance of the sustained 
adaptation to television culture for both the central and regional organisations.  The 
party was no longer resisting the inevitable, and thus realised that television culture was 
bigger than its own.  However, the party was clear to place the role of television in 
perspective.  Shown in the extract, CCO tempered its own embrace of television.  It did 
this by assessing the medium in terms of its popularity, which the party based on a 
comparison of the public’s uptake of television, and radio, licences.  Therefore, 
Macmillan’s Conservatives in 1957, like the party of the earlier 1950s period, had not 
quite reached a point at which television had become an omnipotent medium with 
precedence over all-others.  This placed significant pressure on organisation at CCO, 
because, while in transition, it maintained the old-methods of propaganda output while 
embracing newer approaches to communicating with the electorate through TV.  The 
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party had remained in a state of steady transition and change since the early 1950s, but 
by 1957 the party was engaging with radio and television on a relatively equal 
footing.
460
 
 The above Newsgram extract mentions how the party had entered into ‘the field 
of television production.’461  The intensive processes involved in creating and amending 
broadcast scripts for programming is an example of how TV had begun impacting the 
daily life at CCO.
462
  Before television, the party had engaged with cinematic-film and 
radio broadcasts.  To some degree, the party was prepared for television, because film, 
as an audiovisual-medium, and radio, as a broadcast sound-medium, both held 
characteristics in their productions which were similar to some of the characteristics in 
the field of television production.  For instance, all three media required a political idea 
or theme; central message or information; creative planning; script; speaker/political 
personality; rehearsal; dissemination; and audience.  In order to remain politically 
competitive, CCO assigned specific tasks to professionals in those fields.
463
  Film and 
television shared the obvious characteristics of both using moving visual-images and 
sound, which involved the use of camera and microphone technology.
464
  Films could 
be, and were, used for broadcast on television, but not on radio.  Film and radio were 
relatively formal media in comparison to the conversational style of television.  As 
illustrated in Chapter Three, film was used to draw an audience at political social-
gatherings in the constituencies.  Television and radio were used in a similar manner in 
the form of the aforementioned Tory TV-meetings.  However, the nature of these were 
comparatively intimate when evaluated against the publically-open tradition of hustings 
and film gatherings, which further highlights the symbolic domesticity of television.
465
 
Radio as a broadcast medium shared many characteristics with television.  It 
usually required a studio setting, and broadcasting facilities.  Unlike film, political 
broadcasts were restricted by strict legislation and rules, which meant lawyers were 
used by the party to consult on legal aspects of broadcasting.  The party’s internal 
deliberations in preparation for inter-party meetings on political broadcasting grew-out 
of a custom which was first grounded in radio, and later evolved to incorporate the role 
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of television in political broadcasting.  The focus on voice for radio meant that the 
party’s presentation style had to be adapted for television broadcasts.466  Political 
television was often a visual broadcasting-medium that was transmitted live, which 
meant speakers needed to be well-trained in the art of television performance, and well- 
briefed and rehearsed.  Like radio, TV had the potential to reach large numbers of the 
electorate.  Therefore, the potential for impact was greater than the more limited 
dissemination of political films.  Furthermore, unlike film, live broadcasts could not be 
carefully edited.  Therefore, scripts and speeches required a great deal of attention.  
However, as the demands of political television grew over time, the party, in order to 
achieve the successful transition of its use of political television to reach the voter, 
underwent a process of observing, learning, understanding and executing the aspects of 
political television production.  This led to a more professionalised-party
467
 that in turn 
synthesised with the more intensive occupation and culture of television production. 
By 1958, it is observable that the Conservative Party had invested great time, 
thought, resources, energy and passion in the development of its television operations.  
The party’s significant investment in its broadcasting endeavours led to a sense of pride 
in its achievements.  Therefore, the CCO-elites, who had channelled much of their skills 
and ideas into developing the party’s television presence, could be sensitive to 
misrepresentations of it.  This is evident in a letter from the party’s Chief Publicity 
Officer to the Editor of the Observer: 
 
I was amused to see that Maurice Richardson expects the Conservative Party to follow the lead 
of the Labour Party in providing a studio with closed circuit for television training.  Some 200 
Conservative MPs as well as hundred or so candidates and others, will doubtless share my 
amusement, as, for the past two years, they have been enjoying precisely those facilities in the 
studio in the Conservative Central Office.  It is just over ten years since our first studio was 
equipped for sound radio training, and six years since we extended the service to cover 
television.  Your readers may be interested to know that it has taken the Labour Party quite a 
time to follow us.
468
 
 
Although the party initially took a cautious approach to political television, which, at 
times, meant it was slow to adapt and change to the new technology and its culture, it 
was naturally competitive and especially sensitive to advances by the Labour Party.  
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Not only did Macmillan’s Conservatives want to win the next election, they wanted to 
be seen as a modern and progressive party in terms of their organisation and publicity.  
Therefore, the party was balancing between (1) its caution in embracing change and (2) 
its competitiveness to be ahead of its opponents. 
 By mid-1958, the CCO-elite were paying greater attention to building stronger 
relationships with ITA broadcasters and the advancements in their broadcasting 
technologies.  The party-officials began taking opportunities to socialise more closely 
with ITA producers, which involved dinner parties and other ‘suitable social 
gatherings’.469 For example: 
 
Sir Wavell Wakefield arranged a dinner at the House of Commons ... The chief guest was Mr 
Adorian of Associated Rediffusion.  The latter is also going to a dinner given by the Labour Party 
in the near future.  He stressed that his political sympathies were with us although he has of 
course to give a fair amount of time and consideration to the other parties.
470
 
 
The party had held on to its belief that there was socialist bias in the BBC and other 
media, therefore the party began combating the phenomenon through an active 
hospitality of schmoozing with ITA broadcasters. In making the effort to build the 
relationships, the party found that it gained tangible benefits, especially in terms of 
information relating to advancements in broadcasting technologies that could be used 
for the benefit of the party.  Kaberry had been informed of the 
 
...development made recently in regard to the recording of sound and vision programmes on 
tape.  It will be possible to make a recording on a tape of the programme in question, which 
can then be played back on the air within a matter of minutes if necessary. ITA have got the 
first two camera recorders of this type in the country.  The BBC expect to get one at the end of 
September.  They are all imported from America.  This process completely overcomes the 
necessity of filming for TV purposes and enables complete editing to be done on any tape.  It 
would be an ideal process for use in Party Political Broadcasts particularly for the type we have 
in mind for the Prime Minister.  It means that quite a long shot can be taken of a free 
discussion.  This can be reasonably quickly edited and a fresh tape taken and put out on sound 
and vision.
471
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Officials at CCO were now immersed in the culture of television and the processes of 
television production had become an everyday aspect of their understanding. 
 
Macmillan’s Conservatives, Television and General Election1959 
An insight into one Conservative individual’s perspective of the role that ‘The Advent 
of Television’ was playing in British politics can be gleamed from, Councillor for 
Kensington, Robert S. Orme’s unsolicited memorandum on political propaganda 
entitled ‘A New Approach in the TV Age’.  This was followed by a similar 
memorandum on ‘Political Television’ from Richard Hornby MP.472  Orme sent his 
ideas to CCO and received a reply from Lord Hailsham,
473
 which declared that the 
party’s TV staff agreed with Orme’s perspective on television.  Orme’s document stated 
that 
 
...the lesson remains for any party that it must so revise its methods of approach to the 
electorate as to take full advantage of any new medium.  Considering that a TV audience for a 
popular programme can now number up to 10 million viewers, but writing that number down 
by three quarters because a political programme can never be “popular”, one could hope, with 
the right approach, to influence some two and a half million people.  Thus a thousand pounds, 
or a thousand hours, spent in preparation of such a programme are more worthwhile than ten 
times that money or time spent in preparing local events.  The full significance of these facts 
has not yet been appreciated by any party.  To us Conservatives, the significance should be 
doubly applicable, for we are handicapped against our principle opponents in that, through the 
influence of shop stewards and by the generally more intensive campaigning of the Socialist 
fanatic, they more easily penetrate to the inner ear of the electorate.
474
 
 
The act of Orme sending his memorandum to Hailsham demonstrates that there was an 
active awareness outside of CCO operations that the party could be doing more with the 
medium of television in the pursuit of connecting with the electorate – and using it to 
win Conservative votes.  Orme uses the word ‘influence’ which suggests that there was 
a belief that the medium could be used as an instrument of power.  He also indicates 
that he believes the Labour Party rhetoric of the time was more effective in reaching the 
voter than that of the Conservatives.  It is a belief consistent with that of earlier periods 
in 1950s Conservatism.  Views such as this may well have contributed to changes in 
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approaches to television in Macmillan’s Conservatives in the run-up to the 1959 
General Election.
475
 
 One aspect that influenced Macmillan’s Conservatives’ approach to political 
television, especially in the run-up to 1959, was the developments in their relationships 
with the BBC and ITA.  After many years of inter-party committee meetings that had 
formed an integral part of the behind-the-scenes political television culture in Britain, 
the relationships between the broadcasters and the Conservative Party elites were 
becoming less formal.  Rather than simply complying with the rules, ideas and acts of 
Parliament, which were laid down by the political parties of the past, the broadcasters, 
who had become empowered by the popular uptake and normalisation of television 
viewing in wider British culture, were developing confidence.  The broadcasters used 
this to exert influence on the direction of political television culture and the political 
parties were required to adapt.
476
  Naturally, this shifted the dynamics between 
broadcasters and political parties. 
Following Macmillan’s succession to the premiership, the inevitability of a 
general election was an opportunity for the broadcasters to begin putting their case to 
the Conservative-elite both at CCO and 12 Downing Street for changing the status quo 
of political TV coverage.  By mid-1958, serious, formal discourse on the matter had 
begun within the party-elite. Hailsham wrote to Heath: 
 
On 25 June, you wrote to Donald Kaberry with a memorandum prepared by the BBC and the 
ITA on broadcasting at elections.  I have had a small office meeting about this memorandum 
and what follows is partly the result of my own thinking and partly of their advice.  I will deal 
first with the proposal for the General Election.  I would think that the main objects of any 
programme of broadcasting for an election are three fold.  The first is that the election is news 
and needs to be covered by reporting.  The second is that the parties will legitimately require to 
use part of the broadcasting time for their election party political broadcasts.  The third is that 
the election being topical will give both to the Authority [ITA] and the Corporation [BBC] an 
opportunity to clarify and discuss some of the issues at the election in programmes of their 
devising and production.
477
 
 
Some Conservative-elites believed that the status quo of TV legislation was a 
disadvantage to the Conservative Party.  There was therefore some appetite within 
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Macmillan’s Conservatives to amend the legislation, but the party realised that the legal 
position meant that all parties would need to be in agreement before any change could 
be enacted in law.
478
  Hailsham, representing CCO, was beginning to bend to the 
‘advice’ from the broadcasters.  This demonstrates that the broadcasters had some 
impact on the thought patterns and broadcasting policies of the party-elites; and that 
Macmillan’s Conservatives were open to allowing the broadcasters more freedom in 
their coverage of elections.  Hailsham used written discourse as a tool to outline his 
arguments in order to persuasively convince Heath.  Heath played a mediatory role 
between both the party-elites and the broadcasting elites.  As Chief Whip his 
responsibility was to represent the best interests of the Government and, therefore, the 
Conservative leadership.  Heath’s incumbency in this unique mediatory role at that 
specific point in the history of political television meant that his inclinations and choices 
played a significant role in broadcasting events in the run-up to the 1959 General 
Election. 
 On 14 July 1958, Heath chaired a meeting on ‘Political Broadcasting’ at the 
House of Commons, which focused its discussion on the matters of regional political 
broadcasts for minor parties; broadcasting of general elections and by-elections; and 
election coverage involving comment and opinion.
479
  Heath was joined by other party-
elites including Hailsham, Kaberry, Urton and Simms, who debated external pressures 
in relation to political broadcasting. 
 
Mr Heath pointed out that the new factor with regard to Regional Broadcasts was that the BBC 
had now joined with the Scottish and Welsh national councils in pressing for regional party 
political broadcasts and had asked to bring the two national governors to a meeting with the 
parties.  While the Conservative and Labour parties had been united in their opposition to such 
broadcasts, the Labour Party were now beginning to waver, especially in regard to Wales.
480
  
 
Although television was becoming more familiar to the Conservative Party, and was, 
therefore, less of a new medium, the evolving nature of television in the 1950s and early 
1960s meant that the party was continually affronted with ‘new’ factors.  The changing 
dynamics of the party’s relationship and interactions with the broadcasters led to these 
factors being addressed through the party’s tradition of bureaucratic discourse and 
committee meetings, which included a process of thought, deliberation and potential 
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action.  Actually, regional broadcasts were not a new factor in terms of their concept.  
But the prospect of them becoming a reality was a new concept for the Conservative 
Party. Moreover, it was made all the more pertinent an issue as it was one that their 
opponents were beginning to favour.  This shows how the Conservatives filtered-out 
issues for attention on the broadcasting agenda, until the time came for it to engage fully 
with the subject matter.  Furthermore, it demonstrates how a once weak broadcasting-
elite, were beginning to gain greater powers of persuasion over the British political elite. 
 The ITA broadcasters demonstrate their new found confidence in a letter to Lord 
Hailsham: 
 
We have been discussing the most helpful and effective way of handling the next general 
election in our programmes.  We feel that it would not be sufficient for Independent Television 
just to relay official party political broadcasts.  I hope you agree that the millions of voters who 
will not go to meetings but will be ready to follow the election campaigns on TV should be 
given every incentive to do so, and that the programmes must therefore be as varied and 
stimulating as possible.
481
 
 
Macmillan’s Conservatives reacted to these external pressures from broadcasters by 
developing a paper ‘to enumerate and describe the different sorts of broadcasts which 
the BBC and the ITA may wish to make (i) at the time of an election and (ii) at the time 
of a by-election.’482  The paper suggests that the party’s understanding of the 
broadcasters’ motives behind the expansion of election coverage was ‘to inform the 
public.’483   
Macmillan’s Conservatives both at Downing Street and CCO proceeded to 
formally deliberate their position through written dialogue.  In January 1959, Simms, 
Chief Publicity Officer, wrote to Heath stating that the ‘question of regional broadcasts 
as proposed by the BBC and ITA will be difficult to oppose, and it seems to us that 
there is some danger of the public being satiated by political broadcasts during the 
election period.’484  CCO-elites had considered that the voting public may be 
overwhelmed by too much political broadcasting and, therefore, presented their 
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proposed allocation for ten television broadcasts to be shared among the Conservatives, 
Labour and Liberals: 5:4:1.  By April 1959, Macmillan’s Conservatives had submitted 
to the inevitability of regional broadcasts. The party prepared itself for this with a set of 
procedures:  
 
A list of persons suitable to appear in regional programmes produced by the BBC and ITV 
companies was circulated.  Mr Kaberry stressed the importance of selecting candidates with 
local connections in each area.  Guidance to MPs, candidates, Central Office Agents and 
constituency agents about consulting Central Office before accepting invitations to appear in 
regional broadcasts would be issued by the General Director when the date of the General 
Election was known.
485
 
 
Macmillan’s Conservatives’ approach to regional broadcasts was in keeping with the 
cautious approach evident in the party under Churchill and Eden.  However, the new 
found power of broadcasters forced the party to finally break with their traditional 
attitude towards political television and begin preparing for the new broadcasting 
challenges of the upcoming election. 
This attitudinal change within the party is evident in a number of other 
documents that addressed the matter of television from early 1958 onward.  For 
example, correspondence between party-elites at CCO and Downing Street were 
becoming more explicit in their understanding of the importance that television was 
expected to play in election proceedings.
486
  Furthermore, the party’s continued research 
on matters of television became more heavily focused on the matter of getting the best 
use out of the medium as a mass communication tool for reaching the voter.
487
  This 
was a significant shift in the party’s focus on television, which had been before largely 
centred on three organisational aspects: (1) the engagement of party individuals with 
television; (2) their interaction with the medium; and (3) the adaptation of the party 
organisation in line with developments in television culture.  As the election 
approached, the party also began to demonstrate a commitment to improving its 
collective television technique, in the belief that ‘every time our ministers appear on TV 
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and answer questions in a situation contrived by the programme companies they 
become better known to the public as great personalities and leaders.’488   
Party supporters had noticed improvements in the party’s small screen presence 
and praised, in particular, Macmillan for his broadcasting skill in a television 
programme. 
 
Several people have spoken both to Mr Hearn and to myself in the most glowing terms about 
the recent television programme in which the Prime Minister was interviewed by Ed Murrow.  
It undoubtedly seems to have given great encouragement to our own supporters.  The 
suggestion has already been put to me that we ought to use a similar technique in presenting 
the Prime Minister to the public in one of our own party programmes.
489
  
 
Television had become an important tool for party morale.  Improving the party’s 
broadcasting talent enhanced confidence in the political arm of the organisation.  The 
party’s self-perception of its broadcasting abilities had become of importance to the 
wider-party organisation - under the assumption that greater confidence in its leadership 
would produce a more dedicated workforce at the grassroots. 
 In February 1959, at the Area Publicity Officer’s Conference, it was highlighted 
that a list of marginal and non-marginal seat candidates with the potential to become 
‘TV personalities’ should be put forward for coaching.490  Subsequently, the party 
continued to encourage its candidates
491
 and MPs
492
 to partake in television training 
courses and regional television conferences for candidates.
493
  The party had become 
concerned about the imposition of travelling distance and time for candidates outside of 
London and the South East regions, and that it might hinder the attendance on the 
courses.  Therefore, a number of training courses were scheduled and held in the 
regions.  In April 1959,  
 
...a special television course was held in Manchester by the Television Department of Central 
Office under the auspices of the North West Area.  This took the form of a reproduction of the 
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studio, with complete closed circuit television, lights, sound etc., such as exists at Central 
Office.  This was considered to be a highly successful venture...
494
 
 
The party had begun to ‘strongly’ emphasise also the importance of attending these 
training sessions.
495
  When compared to the earlier periods, the language used by CCO 
to address the television matters was taking a more confident and coercive approach to 
the medium.  Furthermore, the focus of the training had changed to place more 
emphasis on practice and giving good performances on camera.  The courses lasted for 
two hours and consisted of ‘instruction, with opportunity for individual practice in the 
three principle aspects of television appearances – talking to the camera, interviews, and 
question-and-answer programmes.’496  As well as innovation in the manner in which it 
administered it training, the party maintained its approach to networking selected MPs 
with TV officials. 
 
I have arranged with Donald Kaberry to hold a cocktail party, 6 pm to 8 pm at St Stephen’s Club, 
on Thursday 4 June, so that a selected number of Members of Parliament may have an 
opportunity to meet informally some radio and television producers of current affairs, news 
and feature programmes.  I am sure this will be of great value and interest to both sides and 
will serve to create a happy relationship between Members and the production side of radio 
and television.
497
 
 
These examples suggest that in the run-up to 1959 CCO was beginning to take a more 
assertive approach to leading the party’s involvement with television.  1959 is 
considered to have been the party’s most sophisticated campaign in terms of strategy 
and marketing techniques when compared to those elections before it.
498
  The focus had 
moved from educating the party on matters of political television and introducing the 
organisation to the culture of the new medium; to equipping the party with the 
necessary skills and opportunities to win-over the voters in the impending general 
election.  Furthermore, there was an active intention for the party’s collective face to be 
improved on the small screen. 
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 The party’s advancements in preparing, coaching and training its politicians to 
perform effectively on television were beginning to receive praise from those to whom 
it had given support.  For example: 
 
Last Friday, I was on the television programme, “Who Goes Home?”.  I do just want to write 
and tell you how helpful and efficient Central Office were in briefing and preparing me for this 
frightening ordeal.  Hinchcliffe’s coaching was quite invaluable, and Michael Fraser and his staff 
produced for me with incredible speed all the information I could possibly need.  I think you, as 
Chairman of the Party, and the rest of us as party members, can be very proud of our 
organisation at Smith Square and Old Queen Street.
499
  
  
It would appear that CCO-operations had reached a confident stage in preparing 
politicians for interaction with the new medium.  But its approach to offering its 
resources to ‘anyone’ was changing.   
CCO had a relatively liberal and open policy towards access for staff and 
visitors to view its television studios in the run-up to 1959.  However, evidently due to 
the party’s increased and sustained proud advertisement of its television facilities, 
demand by the ordinary individual had begun to overwhelm the Television Section’s 
operations.  This led to the General Director restricting access to the studio
500
 and 
indicates that the television culture of the party was reaching another phase.  This is also 
evident in CCO’s decision to cease informing Area Publicity Officers of the political 
programmes that were expected to be monitored, ‘...we should now have reached the 
stage where you are well aware of the various programmes upon which it is necessary to 
keep a watch.’501  The television culture of Macmillan’s Conservatives had reached a 
point of relative maturity. 
As TV was beginning to rise significantly to challenge the party’s mass-party 
culture, film was certainly in its final decent.  In January 1959, the chairman of the 
Conservative Film Association wrote to notify the party that the Film Association was 
going to cease its operations due to the increase in television.
502
  During the 1959 
General Election, a campaign memorandum suggested that canvassing of homes should 
be discontinued during television hours.
503
  Therefore, political television was being 
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given priority over the traditional grassroots’ activity of canvassing.  Television’s 
precedence over traditional face-to-face activism signalled the beginnings of the decline 
for the mass-party and the proliferation of TV-centricity in the party’s organisational 
culture.  However, there is evidence to suggest that although television was maturing in 
the party’s strategy, radio remained on equal terms.  As early as April 1958, the party 
was using the TV and Radio Newsgram for advertising internally to its supporters the 
upcoming broadcasts of political programming.  But both radio and television continued 
to be portrayed as equals in the Newsgrams until at least November 1961.
504
   
Macmillan himself took a keen interest in the developments in television 
broadcasting and its uses as a party propaganda tool in the run-up to the 1959 General 
Election.
505
  In May 1959, five months before the election, Macmillan wrote a personal 
note to his chief whip, stating: ‘I would like to have a word with you before we leave 
for our holiday about television broadcasts at the General Election.  They ought to be 
carefully tied in with the pamphlets and general propaganda.’506  He also suggested 
content for televised party political broadcasts
507
 and personally ‘approved the choice of 
speakers...to represent the party in BBC Hustings programmes’, i.e. regional 
broadcasts.
508
  This shows that Macmillan was engaged in the propaganda process and 
that he had some understanding of the place of television amid a number of other 
political media in the election.  It also indicates Macmillan’s desire to be in control of 
the medium. 
The Prime Minister took the time to write personally to Lord Hailsham on 
television matters. 
 
I have read with great interest your minute of 30 December.  I altogether approve of the line on 
which the programme should be prepared.  In the “2. Standard of Living”, I hope a good deal of 
emphasis will be put on housing – it is a good story and has a certain opportunity, as I shall try 
to prove in my speech in Newcastle next week.  I would only observe that none of these 
programmes is related to the Commonwealth or Foreign Affairs.  It might perhaps be 
worthwhile having a Commonwealth programme.  I think some material on these subjects 
ought to be got ready in case it is of vital importance to use it.  With regard to speakers, I agree 
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that you could take decisions nearer the time.  The important thing is that they should be lively, 
modern, up-to-date people.
509
  
 
Macmillan understood that in order for political television to be successful, the choice 
of performers or ‘speakers’ was an essential aspect of the party’s broadcast strategy.510  
He made attempts to ensure that there was consistency in both his public messages and 
party broadcast on television.  Furthermore, he held a meeting ‘in order to consider how 
the provisional broadcasting arrangements [fitted] in with the manifesto.’511  In contrast 
to Churchill and Eden, Macmillan took an interactive hands-on approach to the party’s 
TV output.  This divergence from his predecessor is described by Jon Lawrence as 
‘Macmillan’s slick “makeover” for the television age’.512 
  
Macmillan’s Conservatives and Mastering Television 
In the aftermath of Macmillan’s Conservatives’ win at the 1959 General Election, the 
central-party understood that it would not be able to ‘control the production’513 of 
political programming, but that it could ‘do a great deal to ensure that the right type of 
person represents the Conservative Party, and that he or she is adequately coached.’514  
In the run-up to the election, the Tories had already begun to submit to the reality that 
they could no longer exert control over the broadcasters.  The North West Area Agents 
reported
515
 that, after the General Election, the BBC and Granada ITV made ‘very high’ 
demands ‘often at short notice’.516  The 1959 election had demonstrated to Britain that 
the prominence of political TV-culture was on the rise.  There was now general 
acceptance that the time had arrived for greater use of television as a tool for reaching 
the mass electorate; and that used effectively the medium could yield significant 
electoral advantages.  The broadcasters became empowered by this and the dominance 
of the political elite over political broadcasting began to be diminished.
517
  Those who 
were involved in politics were beginning to find themselves being more shepherded by 
the broadcasters than in previous elections.  This transition and change was an irritant 
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for some individuals in the Conservative Party and meant that, at times, tensions built 
between the local party-professionals and regional broadcasting-officials during the 
election campaign.  
An example of this was when the North West Area Conservatives were asked to 
provide Granada’s ‘Last Debate’, which was held two nights before polling day, with 
120 Conservative audience members.  It was the agents’ responsibility to organise the 
speakers, questioners, commentators, audience members and questions for the regional 
broadcasts.  These types of broadcasts were a new and extra responsibility in the role of 
a Conservative agent at election time. Furthermore, ‘all the Area Publicity Officers 
agreed that during the general election the arranging of audiences, questioners and 
questions for television had taken-up more than half their time.’518  This placed added 
pressures on the party-professionals.  The testimony of the North West Area Agents, 
demonstrates their realisation that the behind-the-scenes election time TV-culture was a 
cumbersome process with high demands on the resources of those who were expected to 
engage with it. The nature of the election game was changing and the ordinary 
association members and officers were ill-equipped to manage the broadcasting process. 
Regional Broadcasts were new and, therefore, had not been factored into the party’s 
pre-election TV training.  The responsibility for regional broadcasts was placed within 
the remit of the professionalised-party staff at the local level.  However, many of them 
had little or no experience of managing broadcasts of this nature during an election.   
The advent of regional broadcasts played some role in integrating further the 
two cultures of television broadcasting and Conservative organisation.  How this 
transpired is evident in the following extract: 
 
As arranged between the parties and the BBC these names have been submitted direct to 
Broadcasting House, London, who will in turn notify the regional producers.  So as to ensure 
that no party takes advantage of the knowledge, the parties’ nominations will be kept in 
confidence by the BBC and ourselves until late on Nomination Day... With regard to ITV, details 
of party speakers approved will be notified as soon as possible, and arrangements left to the 
relative Central Office Agent.  In the meantime Central Office should be advised of approaches 
received and arrangements made.
519
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Although Macmillan’s Conservatives realised that it was a futile activity to attempt to 
control the broadcasters of political television, it would appear that the central-party 
understood that its hierarchical deference remained and, therefore, it was better 
equipped to control the collective individuals who made-up the party and, in particular, 
those who represented the party on television.   
The party had reached the realisation that, if the medium of TV could not be 
controlled, then, the party should make every attempt to master it through controlling 
output and training its speakers and audiences.  Therefore, a centralisation process of 
control was beginning.  In January 1960, learning from the election of the previous year, 
CCO decided to resume ‘Television Training’ and made direct contact with Members of 
Parliament on the matter.
520
  Provision for the training of candidates in general was 
made also, but, unlike MPs, the party did not plan to contact the candidates 
individually.
521
  Television sessions for ordinary association members now became 
limited to training in audience participation.  This shows a clear hierarchical pattern 
with correlation between the levels of seniority and the provisions for television 
training.  Furthermore, CCO’s steps to further centralise party broadcasting operations 
resulted in the attempt to influence the performances of Conservative participants in 
political television audiences.  
By 1961, the term for television training had changed to the more casual ‘TV 
Practice’,522 indicating that developing one’s political broadcasting technique was 
becoming an established feature of the life at CCO for middle-tier Conservatives.  The 
process of mastering the medium had been in early development from the time of Eden, 
with the repeated drive to train its members, staff and politicians in the ways of 
television culture.
523
  However, there became distinct differences between the party’s 
interaction with television culture before and after the 1959 election period.  Under 
Eden, the party presented to all levels of the party hierarchy opportunities to interact 
with political television.  Engagement at all levels of the party in the earlier periods of 
the 1950s was openly encouraged by CCO and the associations.  However, towards the 
end of the decade, the opportunities for the ordinary member to actively engage with 
television on behalf of the party became fewer and fewer.  Activities that fed into the 
production and broadcasts of political television programmes, on which Conservative-
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speakers were featured, largely became the preserve of professionalised CCO-staff and 
organisational and political elites.
524
 
The change in attitude towards the views of the party membership on political 
broadcasts is evident in a reply from the party to William Boven, an ordinary 
Conservative supporter from Stafford.  Boven wrote to CCO to suggest a topic for 
broadcast.  Simms replied stating that there was a structure in place for the election 
broadcasts and that it was ‘impossible’ for Boven’s idea to be considered.525  Boven 
may very well have received a response with a similar conclusion had he written a letter 
of this nature in the run-up to the 1955 General Election.  However, what is quite 
different is the tone of the reply.  Under Eden the party officials welcomed, if not 
encouraged, discursive correspondence, creativity, and innovation, from its membership 
on the use of television - and the language used in written correspondence often 
reflected that intent.  But by 1959, in signalling that a contribution by a supporter was 
‘impossible’, the party had begun to block from its membership the creative flow of 
ideas for political broadcasts.  
By 1963, the General Director of the party was signalling to the wider 
membership that the CCO was no longer interested in receiving correspondence from 
individuals in the constituencies on the matter of perceived broadcaster bias – whether it 
indicated bias for or against the Conservatives.  In a letter to association and CCO 
agents, the General Director notes that writing to the party is not the most effective 
method, because broadcasters ‘are generally most sensitive to public criticism’.526  The 
role of CCO was changing to a more centralised organisation under the influence of 
wider television-culture. Therefore, its resources were better invested in broadcast 
production rather than handling general correspondence on political programming.  No 
longer would its focus be to serve the interests of its mass-membership as a hub for 
information exchange.  In the new TV age, the medium of political television was 
substituting much of the traditional methods that the party used to communicate with 
the public.
527
  Therefore the party membership, which had been the party’s traditional 
medium to connect with the voter, was becoming less valuable to the needs of the 
Conservative Party. Consequently, some of the focus shifted from engaging the 
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membership to centralising and professionalising the party’s television output and 
operations.   
 Throughout the 1950s, CCO had attempted to develop better relations with the 
BBC.  By 1960, it seems the relationship was developing positively.  
 
I had lunch today with Carleton Green and Harman Grisewood.  Carleton was kind enough to 
say that they have never known a time when relations between the BBC and the Central Office 
were smoother and more friendly.  However, he felt that since the resignation of Mr Heath as 
Chief Whip there was a vacuum in the relationship between the BBC and Government circles.  
His feeling is that they used to have very close relations with Mr Heath, and that they would 
like to have equally close relations, either with the present Chief Whip or Dr Charles Hill, 
whichever you would prefer.
528
 
 
This extract suggests that the relationship between the party and the broadcasters was 
dynamic in that it changed over time.  Furthermore, the party’s relationship with the 
broadcasters could be simultaneously close or distant dependent on the individual 
relations between specific party groups.  In this case, and at that specific point in time, 
there was a dichotomy between the BBC’s relationship with CCO, and Downing 
Street.
529
  The good relations the party held with the BBC were largely dependent on 
specific individual-elites in mediatory/liaison roles.  The BBC’s claim, that it had a 
strong relationship with Heath as Chief Whip supports the aforementioned assertion that 
Heath’s mediatory role was pivotal in the party’s relationships with the numerous actors 
which together constituted British political television.  Again, in this case, it is evident 
that the same could be claimed for Downing Street’s direct relationship with the 
broadcasters. 
Another example showing the range of Conservative Party attitudes towards TV 
in the 1960s is illustrated in a pamphlet, by the Conservative Political Centre, which 
was published and sold for two shillings: 
 
Television is the domestic symbol of the decade, and it may be making the greatest impact on 
human thought since Caxton’s printing press.  It has grown in the last ten years from a luxury 
which gave a modest performance to a comparative few to an accepted service which brings a 
remarkable range of programmes into about two-thirds of the homes in Britain. In June 1950, 
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there were only about 400,000 television licences, but by the middle of 1960 the number had 
reached the 11 million mark.  Television has a powerful impact on the family.
530
 
  
This endorsement of the medium from proponents within the Conservative Party was 
significant.  The publication aimed to influence British television policy.  It called for a 
more aggressive approach to the exportation of British TV in line with what was being 
witnessed in the United States at that time.  But as Tim Bale writes, this perspective was 
rather more favoured by Conservative backbenchers than the party’s political-elites.531  
For some Tories, television was the future and required significant investment to ensure 
that Britain was competitive in a developing global market.  Therefore, although some 
political-elites remained cautious, television had begun entering the imaginations of 
other Conservative Party members and, in this case, it led to a collective group of 
Conservatives forming in the attempt to influence the direction of the medium outside 
of the party’s organisation. 
 
Selwyn Lloyd’s Report on Party Organisation 
In 1962, Selwyn Lloyd was asked by the Party Chairman, Iain MacLeod MP, to conduct 
a report on the state of party organisation akin to the 1948 Maxwell-Fyfe Report.
532
 
There was some concern that there had become disconnect between the upper-ranks of 
the party and the ordinary members at the grassroots.   
 
I have been very impressed wherever I have been so far, by the feeling that the loyal party 
workers never get near senior ministers.  It is certainly not a case of one or two isolated 
grumblers putting this view.  I have heard it from almost everyone.  They feel that ministers are 
remote, out of contact, they never hear what the officers in the constituencies think, and are 
completely under the thumbs of their permanent officials.
533
 
 
By the 1960s, the newly professionalised-ranks in the party were embracing change.  
The wider-party had noticed this change and was feeling a sense of redundancy from 
traditional political action.  Therefore, MacLeod, in discussion with Macmillan, thought 
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it timely that the party undergo an assessment in order that it may become more self-
aware of its efficacy as a political organisation in the modern world. 
 Political television was a one-way method of communicating with the masses 
and its embrace by the central-party had an impact on party organisation.  While 
television had been part of a mix of communications that the party used in the early to 
late 1950s, it did not have much impact until the 1959 General Election.  Political 
television was becoming a substitute for meeting ‘the people’ in person.  Therefore, 
with the increasing focus on the party’s political elites, like senior ministers, and their 
appearances on television, the CCO officials were slow to realise that the workers at the 
grassroots had become disconnected from the traditional organisation.
534
  Therefore, 
Lloyd came to the opinion from his meetings with ordinary Conservative members that 
they were beginning to feel forgotten and silenced.   
 Lloyd’s final report535 provided a clear and concise one-man’s insider 
perspective on the state of party organisation in the early 1960s.  His comprehensive 
plan, which was informed by extensive interviews of party individuals at all levels of 
the hierarchy and in many roles within the party organisation, included a number of 
criticisms and corresponding recommendations that had direct relevance to the role of 
television in the party.  Lloyd criticised that ‘the Conservative Party broadcasts should 
be much more hard hitting’ and with ‘more facilities for training of potential 
contributors to political programmes.  More Conservative women should appear on 
them.’536  He recommended that ‘there should be more contact between ministers and 
leading party-workers’ and ‘more training in television techniques.’537  He worded these 
examples in terms of organisational functionality. 
 Additional unpublished memoranda show that the final report was in fact 
sanitised from Lloyd’s full opinion on television and the Conservative Party.  The final 
report, published by CCO, was intended for open distribution, for the price of one 
shilling.  Lloyd’s act of sanitising the public version of the report demonstrates that the 
party’s cautionary approach to output was not necessarily limited to new media.538  In a 
draft copy, he suggested that the party should be investing in more (1) TV advertising 
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than traditional literature; (2) women speakers on TV; (3) broadcasts aimed at women; 
(4) and broadcasts referring to ‘Tory trade unionism’.539   
It is important to place these in context, because Lloyd’s ideas for television 
were amid a range of other improvements in the party’s communications strategy.  
However, the arrangement of his contributing notes demonstrates that he considered 
‘Press and Television’540 to be distinctly separate from ‘General Communications’,541 
suggesting that he believed the former deserved special attention.  MacLeod charged 
Lloyd with the task of investigating the party in terms of its organisation.  It is 
interesting that Lloyd’s approach was holistic when compared with the traditional view 
of party organisation at that time, as, unlike the earlier Colyton Report, it did not simply 
identify the structures and functions within the party.  It assessed the testimony of 
individuals which contributed to analysis of the working and living culture of the Tory 
Party.  Moreover, Lloyd incorporated into his assessment the role of party publicity to a 
significant degree, showing that, although there was great affection for the loyalty of 
party members, the role of the traditional mass-party organisation was declining, and a 
Conservative Party of mass communication was rising.
542
   
 
Television and Douglas-Home’s Conservatives 1963-1964 
 
In the early 1960s, the Tories were plagued by a new type of scandal that was broadcast 
across the nation in a manner that had not been experienced before in Britain.  The 1963 
‘Profumo Affair’ broke at the same time as the release of the Selwyn Lloyd Report, thus 
resulting in the coverage of the report being dropped by broadcasters.
543
  Moreover, the 
Profumo scandal, which followed a handful of additional political challenges for 
Macmillan, contributed to a decline in public confidence in the party.
544
  Subsequently, 
Macmillan resigned due to ill health, on 13 October 1963, and was succeeded by Alec 
Douglas-Home, 18 October 1963.
545
  Douglas-Home served as Prime Minister for one 
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year and, at the 1964 General Election, on 15 October, was defeated by the Labour’s 
Harold Wilson, who held a small majority of five seats in the House of Commons.
546
  
This marked the end of thirteen years of continuous Conservative Party governance, 
during which time Britain had experienced significant economic, social, political, 
technological and cultural changes.   
Consequently, the Conservative Party that Douglas-Home inherited was 
markedly different to the party under Churchill.  In terms of television culture alone 
there was a stark difference in the focus of the party’s communications.  In 1952, c. 1.5 
million homes held television licences. By 1963, the number of television licences in 
the UK had reached 12, 290, 173,
547
 which was an increase of c. 5 million since 1957.  
This is compared to a significant decline in radio licences holders from c. 7 million in 
1957 to 3, 304, 098 in 1963.
548
  The even balance between the number of radio licence 
and television licence holders in 1957, which had so influenced the organisation of 
Conservative publicity in the early days of Macmillan’s premiership, had changed 
significantly within a six year period.  Therefore, the Conservative Party was required to 
undergo continual changes in order to keep pace with the developments in wider 
television trends.   
 In the run-up to the 1964 General Election, one of the party’s three vice 
chairman, Paul Bryman, sent a memorandum to all MPs and candidates noting that 
‘television coverage of the coming election is expected to be more intense and more 
regional than it was in 1959’.549  Therefore, members and candidates were encouraged 
to use the TV coaching facilities at CCO for refresher courses.  They we expected to 
make early appointments with the studio director, John Lindsey, in order to avoid the 
same type of congestion which was considered to have spoilt the TV training in the run-
up to the 1959 election.  The party politicians were coached in ‘straight-to-the-camera 
talk’ and ‘interview’ technique.  Television training was a top priority for Douglas-
Home’s Conservatives, who increased their training operations significantly when 
compared with earlier elections.
550
 CCO continued to take pride in their television 
operations and believed that their training provided ‘opportunities for people to acquire 
some knowledge of the medium and to practice and rehearse for possible and probable 
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appearances.’551  Therefore, they invested resources in sending-out repeated reminders 
for TV coaching to party politicians whom they expected to gain from the training. 
Furthermore, in learning from the party’s television experiences at the previous 
election, the party adapted their procedures.  An insight into the CCO-elite’s thoughts 
on the matter is given in a confidential document from Lord Poole, another of the 
party’s vice chairman, to the Chairman, Viscount Blakenham, in relation to election 
tactics in post-1959 elections. 
 
Our first TV must be a surprise and a complete success. It must be flexible and put together in 
the last few days.  This can only be done by careful preparation and many trials at which 
ministers and others must take part. Certain selected ministers must be asked now to be ready 
to cooperate over this.  It will take much time and effort.  The Prime Minister must take much 
more part in the conduct of the campaign than has been the practice in the past.  It will not be 
enough for him just to make a tour of the country, leaving the control of the campaign in 
Central Office. A small “Tactical Headquarters” ... should accompany him everywhere, leaving 
Central Office as a sort of “Main Headquarters”... The Prime Minster should do the last 
broadcast himself – if possible alone – but should be prepared to take part in at least one other 
as circumstances demand.  The manifesto must be launched with a major press conference 
which should be taken by the Prime Minister at which there should be a number of other 
cabinet ministers to answer questions on their own subjects.  This should be on TV if this is 
possible and must of course be at the beginning of the campaign.  The details of this press 
conference must be carefully worked out... You will see that what I am recommending is that 
we fight the campaign on the exact opposite lines that we did in 1955 and 1959.
 552
 
 
The most striking aspect of this extract is the sense of confidence and knowingness that 
radiates from the language.  The party appears to have matured in its approach to its 
publicity and television techniques to the extent that members of the now experienced 
CCO-elite began addressing these matters with greater authority than in previous 
elections.  Furthermore, the party hierarchy appears to have changed to some extent.  
No longer did the party-elites pay absolute deference to their leader and prime minister.  
In fact, the CCO-elites were beginning to assume greater control over the process of 
mastering TV and publicity techniques.  At almost every level of the party hierarchy, 
including the highest ministerial-elite, the maturation of political television culture was 
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being experienced.   Political participants were now required to fall in line under these 
developments, which in turn influenced significantly the Tories’ organisational culture. 
 
Conclusions 
The Conservative Party underwent a significant process of change 1957-1964.  Its 
culture and organisation developed gradually and continuously during the period, 
through which it assimilated aspects of wider-changes in political culture and television 
culture.  However, the party experienced periods of rapid change prior to and after the 
1959 General Election.
553
  In the early part of Macmillan’s Conservatives, the party 
maintained much of its attitudes, approaches and traditions toward television and 
publicity, as observed in Eden’s Conservatives.  The party in the run-up to the 1959 
General Election invested much of its time and resources in understanding the role of 
political television in both its internal and external interests.  However, it maintained a 
competitive but cautious attitude to the use of television as a mass communication tool 
for reaching the voter.  This led to an evenly balanced approach to the organisation of 
the party’s publicity; and a continued investment in the party-workers at the grassroots.  
The party largely continued to behave like a mass-based party, using methods to 
motivate its membership.  The impact of TV regulation and wider committee culture in 
Parliament continued to contribute to the culture of the Conservative-elites. The Tories, 
as a dominant partner in the processes of broadcaster regulation maintained an 
observable degree of control over the direction of political television in Britain. 
 As Macmillan’s Conservatives approached the 1959 General Election, the status 
quo of the party’s hierarchy and organisation was being challenged. There was a 
realisation that the party needed to do more to integrate itself in the growing dominance 
of wider television-culture.  This led CCO to implement some significant changes that 
required the party to make observable adaptations. These developments had the 
potential to cause tensions between main groupings within the party organisation, e.g. 
the divisions between Downing Street and the Parliamentary Party over Ministerial 
Broadcasts. At all levels of the party organisation, an understanding and appreciation 
for the role of television was maturing to a degree that the party began addressing and 
investing in (1) improving its broadcasting weaknesses; (2) adapting its publicity 
procedures; (3) managing its messages specifically for television broadcast; and (4) 
training its speakers in line with its richer understanding of the medium and developing 
                                                     
553
 See, Schein’s theory for the impact of leadership in speeding-up change in organisational culture in 
Chapter Two. 
143 
 
on-screen Conservative personalities.  These steps contributed to a trend towards a 
tighter and more pronounced professionalised-culture at CCO.  MPs in particular 
displayed a keen interest in how the political class appeared on TV, which manifested 
itself in new avenues for debate, interaction and training with individuals at CCO.  As 
the party leadership, the Parliamentary Party, CCO and the regional and local party-
professionals adapted to new advances in political television, e.g. Regional Broadcasts, 
the party’s focus and thinly stretched resources began to shift from engaging its 
membership for campaign activism at the grassroots; to the elite political activity of 
television production and election broadcasts.   
Furthermore, amid these organisational adaptations there was a change in the 
relationship between the broadcasters and Macmillan’s Conservatives, which 
manifested itself in significant changes in the working-life of the party.  Party-
professionals were required to devote more time during general elections to satisfy the 
needs of the broadcasters.  This contributed to a shift in the power relationships between 
the central-party and the BBC and ITA, which came with the realisation that the party 
could no longer exert control over television or the broadcasters.  However, the 
increasingly professionalised-operations at CCO and Downing Street took steps to 
master the medium of television through implementing greater centralised autonomy 
and control over the wider-party operations relating to television publicity output.  The 
centralisation of the party’s television broadcasting reached new heights in Macmillan’s 
act of personally approving speakers for Regional Broadcasts.  However, Heath, as 
Chief Whip, played what would seem the most pivotal mediatory role in the dynamics 
of the party’s internal and external relationships with television.  His personality, 
experience, connections and skill in tandem with his leadership role – mediating 
between the media, the Government, the Parliamentary Party and CCO – was a 
powerful position in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  At that time, he was one of the 
most influential individuals in steering Tory television culture.  His decisions greatly 
contributed to the course of Eden’s Conservatives’ relationship with political 
broadcasting and its role in the party’s organisation and culture.554 
As the party’s TV-culture continued to mature in the early 1960s, the 
organisational focus gradually moved from Eden’s Conservatives’ approach to 
educating the wider-party on matters of political television; to equipping specific 
individuals in the party with the necessary skills to use television for assisting the 
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party’s aim of winning voters in elections.  The party learnt from its experiences in the 
1959 General Election on which it structured its TV practice.  Moreover, the realisation 
that television had become the dominant method for mass communication at election 
times led to the administering of its training being ranked in order of political seniority, 
which was quite different when compared with the party’s open-to-all policy that was 
generally characteristic of the party in the first half of the 1950s decade.  This further 
demonstrates the observed trend of the progressive tightening of the central-party’s 
attitude to the party hierarchy.  CCO became less interested in the views and ideas of 
the party membership in relation to political television.  As television grew in its social 
omnipotence, its role as a tool for reaching-out to the public grew also in the 
Conservative Party.  Therefore, in that transition, a degree of redundancy was 
experienced by the party’s traditional activists.  The newly professionalised-operations 
at CCO focused on serving the aims of the party through television.  Therefore, the need 
for a mass-membership became less important.  TV became an increasingly greater 
substitute for the traditional methods of communicating with the voter and the party 
became more grounded and defined as a TV-based party, rather than a mass-based 
party. 
Under Douglas-Home’s Conservatives, the pace at which the party moved 
toward greater centralisation intensified significantly.  Party publicity in general was 
carefully managed and sanitised, and integrated with its television operations.  The 
training of MPs and candidates in relation to performing on political television became 
a priority at CCO, which in turn impacted significantly on the nature of the life of 
middle-tier Conservative politicians.  The CCO-elites reached a new peak in their 
understanding of the developments in wider political culture and television culture.  It 
appears that in turn this manifested itself in a confident command of political strategies, 
in which television had taken centre stage.  Douglas-Home was a new and relatively 
inexperienced party leader in terms of his command of political publicity techniques in 
the television age.  Therefore, the power-relationship between the new premier and 
CCO-elites was weighted favourably towards the role of party-professionals.  It 
manifested itself in some erosion of the traditional deference given to the party leader 
by CCO-elites.  This significant development meant that Douglas-Home’s CCO-elite 
assumed greater authoritative control over the prime minister’s role in TV and publicity 
output in the run-up to the 1964 election. 
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Richard Fenno suggests that while there is academic interest in the study of political 
parties and politicians ‘some of us will want to collect data through repeated interaction 
with these politicians in their natural habitats.’555  In Part II of this thesis, archival 
research informed an examination of the role of the advent of the new medium of 
television in the Conservative Party 1951-1964.  Now in Part III, the thesis takes a four 
decade leap toward contemporary times in order to examine the role of the advent of 
specific internet technologies in the Conservative Party 2005-2012.  The following two 
chapters present evidence collected in the natural habitats of the Conservative Party 
using an approach inspired by ethnographic methods and, although Part III is a 
continuation of the comparative history, it is written with an increased ethnographic 
sensibility, which was permitted by the virtue of my privileged access to the object of 
interest; and my unique roles as an active participant and researcher in the field with 
Cameron’s Conservatives.   
The case studies presented in this chapter are focused on the role of the internet 
from the insider’s perspective and is influenced by ‘autoethnography’, in which the 
autobiographical narrative of the researcher’s memoirs, of more subjective experiences, 
are embraced in addition to the observation of others.
556
  My role as a Conservative 
candidate is featured along with additional testimony from the oral history of interview 
respondents.  The chapter includes some key findings based on my firsthand 
observations as a Conservative participant in the cohorts and clusters of the 
Runnymede, Weybridge & Spelthorne Conservative Group (RWSCG) and in 
Conservative Future (CF).  In later sections of this chapter, I detail descriptively richer 
                                                     
555
 Richard Fenno, Watching Politicians: Essays on Participant Observation (Institute of Governmental 
Studies, Berkeley, 1990), p. 56. 
556
 See, for example, Carolyn Ellis and Arthur Bochner, ‘Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, 
Reflexivity: Researcher as Subject’, in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds.), The Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Sage, London, 2000), pp. 733-768; Stacy Holman Jones, ‘Autoethnography: Making 
the Personal Political’, in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds.), The Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (Sage, London, 2005), pp. 763-792; Leon Anderson, ‘Analytic Autoethnography’, Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2006), pp. 373-395; Heewon Chang, Autoethnography as 
Method (Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, 2008); and Salma Siddique, ‘Being in-between: The relevance 
of ethnography and auto-ethnography for psychotherapy research’, Counselling and Psychotherapy 
Research, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2011), pp. 310-316. 
147 
 
accounts of specific observations that I made during Conservative campaigns.  It 
includes a firsthand account of my experience as the candidate for the Virginia Water 
Ward for the Runnymede Borough Council local by-election in 2009.  This is followed 
by a more focused analysis of my experience as a parliamentary candidate in the 
Anglesey Conservatives’ general election campaign, 2010.   
The aim of these accounts is to take a critical stance while embracing my 
personal and emotional experiences within Cameron’s Conservatives; insofar that the 
accounts seek to unearth what is ‘anthropologically strange’557 about the Conservative 
Party’s contemporary new media culture.  The narratives are often formed out of 
combined perspectives that include both ‘self’ and ‘other’.  In the process of presenting 
these narratives together, this chapter becomes more closely related to the ethnographic 
methodology that has been described as the ‘observation of participation’, in which the 
ethnographer both experiences and observes ‘their own and others’ coparticipation 
within the ethnographic encounter’.558  This emerged as a type of proto-
autoethnographic method and is in contrast to the more dispassionate approaches to 
observing ‘others’ in participant observation, like, for example, the political 
ethnographies of Lorraine Baynard de Volo,
559
 and Alexander Smith.
560
  The case 
studies below are written with the aim of communicating to the reader some 
ethnographic realism.  In this sense, they are similar to Smith’s ethnographic account of 
the Scottish Conservatives. 
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The Contemporary Case Studies 
 
As identified in Part I, the role of individual leadership is significant in relation to the 
trajectories of political and organisational culture.
561
  In this thesis, the role of 
leadership is especially pertinent in terms of explaining the directions taken by local 
associations and campaign teams in their use of the internet as a political tool.  
Furthermore, this ethnography has been fortunate to gain privileged access to the culture 
of interest; and develop close relationships with informants.  Therefore, it is important 
to recognise that, as a candidate in leadership roles during the ethnographic process, my 
personal choices and leanings will have had some impact on the nature of the outcomes.  
However, without being in these positions of leadership, I would not have gained such 
rich access to artefacts and informants.  Any trade-off in this scenario is outweighed by 
the significant benefits of deeply infiltrating Tory culture.  Ultimately, the 
autoethnographic accounts are specific historical perspectives that are generated from 
my personal experiences that will have been undoubtedly influenced, to some extent, by 
my own interpretation of the sources and data.  The specific case perspectives that are 
given in the remainder of this chapter provide dense foundations on which to place the 
more generalised analysis of the national Conservative Party that is presented in 
Chapter Six. 
 
Anglesey and Surrey: The Geographic Case Studies    
Comparing Conservative culture in Anglesey and Surrey reveals some differences.  
Surrey is largely a location that serves as a commuter belt for employment in London 
and the surrounding areas.  Anglesey is, traditionally, an agricultural island community, 
which, due to its remote location, has struggled to maintain buoyant alternative 
industries and employment for the islanders.  Surrey is known as one of the most 
affluent counties in the UK, and Anglesey one of the poorest.
562
  The RWSCG had 
significantly greater pooled-resources and facilities than Anglesey Conservatives in 
terms of membership figures; fundraising potential; the number of hours worked by 
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employed staff; the number of volunteers; value, condition and size of property assets; 
and the age of and access to computer-mediated technologies.  The RWSCG had a 
relatively large and inviting two storey, four bedroom, detached property, which housed 
their joint association operations and was valued at £375,000 (shared equally between 
the two associations) in December 2010.
563
  
Until 2009, the Anglesey Association office had been located for a number of 
months in a domestic village-residence belonging to one of the association officers.  
However, by 2010, a property that was owned by Anglesey Conservatives was opened 
in Llangefni town centre for use by the Conservative PPC.  According to an informant 
on the association executive, the property was valued at approximately £50,000 in 2010.  
The ‘two-up-two-down’ mid-terrace was in poor decorative and structural order and had 
a number of visible areas of damp.  In comparison with RWSCG, the office was poorly 
maintained and uninviting.  The computer and printing facilities of Anglesey 
Conservatives were aging and significantly inferior to those shared among the RWSCG.  
The upper-floor of the Anglesey property was rented to a live-in tenant.  The public 
entrance-door opened on to the Llangefni high street.  The office-users and the 
domestic-tenant shared the main access-way.   The one-room ground floor Anglesey 
office was used for administration; a campaign headquarters; and the advertised location 
for surgeries in which constituents were invited to meet with the Conservative PPC.  
However, during my 117 days as the candidate, no more than four members of the 
public visited the office during surgery hours, despite regular advertisements in the local 
newspaper.  A greater number of individuals called the office landline, which was 
manned by a part-time employed office-administrator and an ageing answering 
machine.  In contrast, the RWSCG shared both a part-time agent and a part-time 
administrator, in addition to the group’s two MPs’ parliamentary staff.  It appears that 
my experience of the Anglesey association is similar to Alexander Smith’s view of the 
Conservatives’ local office on Castle Street, Dumfries, c. 2003, which he reports as 
suffering ‘from a lack of modern equipment and resources.’564 
In 2009, in terms of membership and voluntary support, individual Surrey 
Conservative associations had significantly greater numbers of paid-up members than 
Anglesey.  RWCA had 678 registered members, and Spelthorne 403.  The Surrey 
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Conservative association with the largest membership was South West Surrey.  Its 
1,382 registered members represented 13.5% of the total 10,223 Conservative Party 
members in Surrey.
565
  Out of 11 Surrey associations, Spelthorne was ranked lowest in 
terms of membership numbers, with 4% of the total Surrey membership.  RWCA 
ranked two places higher with 6.7%.  According to an informant with access to 
Anglesey Conservatives’ membership data, Anglesey’s association had 134 paying 
members.  This indicator alone demonstrates how the lowest ranking Surrey association 
in terms of membership had considerably more members than the Anglesey association.  
Moreover, the Anglesey membership total was less than a tenth of Surrey’s highest 
ranking association.  This illustrates the wide-ranging scale of membership figures from 
the higher performing associations like Surrey to the lower-performing associations like 
Anglesey.  The membership figures in a Conservative association indicate the 
fundraising potential and therefore the financial strength of an association.  Stuart Ball 
relates the strength and weakness of associations, and their degree of ‘autonomy’ from 
the central-party, to the financial independence of the local party.  He suggests that 
these factors can have a significant impact on the culture in which an association 
operates and the nature of its relationship with CCO/CCHQ.
566
  However, it is important 
to note that in 2010, the financial health of an association was not necessarily an 
indication of how much support a candidate had in terms of grassroots-workers during a 
campaign.  Anglesey was a relatively poor Conservative association, but the campaign 
drew activists on action days in excess of 25 participants.  This was reasonably high in 
comparison with other local campaigns, such as the Conservative target seat of 
Aberconwy. 
Each individual campaign illustrated in this chapter is unique.  They are 
constituted by a range of variables which include, but are not limited to, the candidate; 
the geographical location; the election type; the individuals within the campaign team 
and the Conservative association; and the point in history in which the campaign is 
being fought - which in turn influences the technologies used, the pertinent policy issues 
of the campaign and the economic backdrop for funding the campaign.  Whiteley et al. 
describe influences on campaign outcomes as ‘controls’.  Their generic controls include 
constituency: ‘social characteristics’, ‘percentage of owner-occupiers’, ‘incumbency’, 
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‘marginality’, and national and local socio-economic and political events.567  These 
factors have a dynamic relationship with the macro-level culture of the national 
Conservative Party organisation; and also the sub- and micro- cultures of regional and 
local specifics both inside and outside the Conservative Party.  For example, the 
conditions under which my personal campaigns in Virginia Water and Anglesey were 
fought were in some respects similar and in other respects quite different.  Whiteley et 
al. describe the ‘fragmentary nature of the Conservative’ Party’s associations and relate 
this to each being historically autonomous.
568
  Therefore, naturally, being a 
Conservative local government candidate in Surrey is different in many respects to 
being a Conservative Parliamentary Candidate in Anglesey.  This is especially the case 
in terms of public profile; the local impact of the candidate; the daily role of the 
candidate; and the candidate’s relationship in relation to the organisational and 
hierarchical aspects of the Conservative Party.  Therefore, one could argue that the two 
examples do not make a logical or appropriate comparison.  However, in terms of the 
cultural basics of campaigning in the two locations, in many respects, the approaches 
and traditions of the two associations were found to be remarkably similar.  There were 
both cultural and organisational characteristics of my campaign as the Conservative 
PPC in Anglesey which felt very familiar because of my prior experiences campaigning 
as a Conservative candidate for a seat on Runnymede Borough Council, e.g. canvassing 
door-to-door and delivering leaflets in groups of Conservative participants, and the 
rituals and customs these entailed. 
 
Becoming an Initiated Member of Cameron’s Conservatives569 
Before becoming actively involved in the Conservative Party, I joined the party 
membership for a number of consecutive years using the party’s online sign-up function 
on its website at Conservatives.com. On each occasion, I was sent a national 
membership card attached to a welcome letter.  In 2006, the membership welcome letter 
read: 
 
I warmly welcome you as a member of David Cameron’s team, as we take forward David’s 
message of change, optimism and hope... By joining us nationally you also become a member 
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of your local party.  I am forwarding your details to them and expect they will be in touch with 
you shortly. If you need details about your local party you can go to the home page of the party 
website www.conservatives.com and enter your postcode.  Many of our members feel they 
want to do a little more to help us to win elections, even if it’s just by delivering a few leaflets 
from time to time.  It would be great if you could help in anyway.
570
  
 
At that time, I resided in Devon and Worcestershire and, although my membership had 
declared me as being a member of ‘Cameron’s team’, I was not contacted by any 
member of a local Conservative association.  Therefore, my affiliation with the 
Conservative Party remained tenuous in that, for a number of years, I had no physical 
face-to-face contact with any individual actively involved in the party.  Between 
September 2007 and August 2008, I became a resident of the Spelthorne Borough.  
Subsequently, I updated my address details using Conservatives.com.  However, as a 
Spelthorne Borough resident, I was not automatically reassigned to the Spelthorne 
association by CCHQ.  The association had no record of my party membership and 
were not informed by CCHQ in good time that I had moved to Spelthorne.  The 
convenience of using the internet for membership subscription meant there was a degree 
of trade-off in which my expectations of being a party member were not being met. 
 The view of one Conservative association chairman offers a deeper perspective 
on the impact of changing social trends and internet technologies within the 
membership organisation of the party. 
 
I think one of the many reasons why the party has had a membership crisis over the last 10 to 
15 years is that the whole nature of politics and membership, and people’s attitudes to parties, 
have changed.  One of the things that used to happen before membership was computerised 
was that the branches had responsibility for, and ownership for membership, so that every 
October they would go out and knock on the doors.  They knew the people.  They said, “Hello 
Doris, how’s the dog, are you going to renew?”  This kept the branches in a healthy state of 
mind.  Once the membership was computerised, we moved to a situation where the 
association would send out standard mail-merge letters, that’s an impersonal form of 
communication, and it may not be followed up in a timely way.  That probably was the only 
way to do it because this army of volunteers that we had in the 90s was gradually disappearing, 
so I don’t think there was any option about that change.
571
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This suggests that these changes in the party’s approach to organising party membership 
were inevitable and that the party has followed a wider-trend due to changing attitudes 
towards political parties.  It indicates that individuals ranging from central party-elites 
to local association-elites hold the view that this shift in the party’s culture, away from 
face-to-face relationships between party and member, are ‘impersonal’, but a necessary 
organisational evolution. 
Two years after becoming a ‘paid-up’ member of Cameron’s Conservatives, and 
before beginning this research in October 2008, I made the personal decision to become 
more actively involved in Conservative Party activism and events.  Therefore, in 
October 2007, I took the step to contact by email an officer of Spelthorne 
Conservatives.  However, the process of being recognised as a paid-up Conservative 
member was challenging.  In a reply to the initial email I received from the Spelthorne 
officer, I wrote:  
 
I am a little confused by the process of joining Spelthorne Conservatives. I recently paid my 
party membership online, which will take me through to November 2008.  I am not sure what 
you mean by my joining in January.  Will I have to pay another subscription then?  Should I be 
returning the membership form that you attached even though I am already a party 
member?
572
 
 
As a Conservative member who had not yet been initiated in the particulars of active 
Conservative Party membership, I did not understand at that time that the party was 
running two different membership systems that were out-of-sync.  Online membership 
was renewable 12 months from the date it was purchased.  As a national membership, it 
was indirectly associated with the local Conservative association.  Although the system 
did automatically assign national members to their local association, it was for officers 
of that association to act in terms of making contact with the member.  However, if a 
member paid their membership subscription directly to an association, there was greater 
likelihood that the association would make some contact with the member.  Association 
membership ran on an annual basis and was collected in January every year, but, as an 
internet member who had not yet been involved with an association directly, I did not 
realise it.   
This example demonstrates how at that time the party’s online-membership 
operations had not been smoothly integrated within the wider organisation of party 
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membership.  Therefore, relatively new and peripatetic members, especially those who 
had joined the party online only, and had no previous formal contact with a 
Conservative association, were at a significant disadvantage if they were interested in 
becoming actively involved in the party.  Internet membership appeared, on the surface, 
to be representative of Cameron’s Conservatives’ approach – that all were ‘warmly 
welcome’ in the Conservative Party.  However, the reality was that becoming involved 
with some local Conservative associations was more in-keeping with joining a closed 
social club.
573
  Already initiated individuals with prior experience of the cultural 
workings of the Conservative association were at an advantage for active entry into any 
newly approached association.  As an internet member, I had to actively seek out ways 
of making contact with the party at the grassroots.  Therefore, although the party’s 
website was a convenient tool for attracting new members and donations to the 
Conservative Party, its role had not been expanded within the organisational processes 
to a point at which it fully facilitated active engagement for online members.
574
  
Now that I am a fully-initiated party member, in retrospect, I would suggest that 
the party’s lack of integration of its two types of membership organisation in the early 
run-up to the 2010 General Election was a significant hindrance to it integrating new 
members and potential activists into its workforce at the grassroots.  Therefore, this 
suggests that CCHQ’s strategy and interest, in terms of membership subscriptions, were 
focused on raising central funds via the internet, thus leaving the associations to their 
own initiatives in terms of nurturing a local support base.  The extent to which this was 
achieved was largely dependent on the approach and leadership style of each 
association.  In 2010, the membership welcome letter read:  
 
I hope you will get involved in your local Conservative association.  Whether it’s volunteering to 
deliver leaflets, taking part in one of our Social Action projects, assisting with fundraising 
activities, or encouraging your friends to join, you can help build our movement for change.’
575
   
 
However, unlike in 2006, the letter lacked any indication of, firstly, whether an 
association would be in touch with the member and, secondly, how the member could 
research the location of their association or where the information could be found. 
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 Although the central-party and many Conservative associations had their own 
websites in the run-up to the 2010 General Election, it appears that there was the 
assumption that potential supporters of the party would intrinsically understand the 
complex organisational intricacies of British Conservatism; and, therefore, that the 
individuals interested in joining the party via the internet in the pursuit of grassroots 
activism would eventually find their own way to active engagement from a generic 
online national party application process.  In a society which had become increasingly 
fragmented by technologies, with hundreds of channels of communication through the 
ever-evolving internet, television, radio and mobile technologies, it would seem that it 
had become incumbent on the individual political-neophyte to journey their way 
through a process of discovery in order to make first contact with their local association.  
I experienced this process firsthand on four different occasions in locations within the 
counties of Devon, Worcestershire and Surrey.  It is not plausible to claim with any 
certainty that such experiences of becoming actively involved with local associations 
were, at that time, widespread.  However, it does indicate that the Conservative Party’s 
approach to internet subscriptions fits a changing political culture away from one that is 
rooted in traditional mass-based characteristics.  Conversely, survey research by Ana 
Cardenal on party activism in Catalonian parties suggests that other parties elsewhere 
have used effectively party websites to engage members in offline political activity.
576
 
Before I became initiated into the Conservative-fold, I interacted regularly via 
email with an association officer of Spelthorne Conservatives, which eventually 
developed from a more distant exchange of electronic text, in the form of an email, to a 
more personable mobile telephone conversation in which we began to develop some 
trust and rapport.
577
  It is important to note that, at that time, I was an unknown entity 
for the Conservative Party, both nationally and in the individual locations around 
Britain in which I had lived.  In this case, the Spelthorne Conservatives officer was 
cautious of embracing a new aspirant activist and politician who, at least seemed to 
have, appeared from nowhere into an email inbox.   This is an example of how email 
and other electronic-exchanges are an inferior substitute for initial face-to-face 
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interaction for a Conservative participant with the aim of becoming engaged to some 
degree within the party’s organisation.578 
In the New Year of 2008, the Spelthorne officer began advising me of how I 
could engage in the association on matters of activism and how I could develop my 
personal political aspirations.  Once trust and rapport had been established mutually 
through telephone conversations and face-to-face contact, my progress in the process of 
developing my standing within the party accelerated considerably.  Later, I was 
interviewed by the association and placed on the Surrey County Council Candidates 
List, 30 April 2008.
579
  However, I made the personal decision not stand for selection at 
the Conservative branch level of Spelthorne Conservatives. 
In August 2008, I became a resident in the Runnymede & Weybridge 
Constituency and subsequently joined RWCA.  As both the RWCA and Spelthorne 
associations were operated in the same building, using the same staff and technology, I 
had made already the inside connections with the relevant administrators who 
subsequently made easier my transfer of membership to RWCA.  I was by that point an 
initiated member of the Conservative association class and, therefore, had a greater 
understanding of the culture in which it operated.  Therefore, my transition of 
integration to the somewhat different culture of RWCA was smoother and more 
welcoming.  However, it is important to note that personalities were a factor in that 
transition.  For whatever reason, I felt more naturally-aligned with the approach and 
culture of the RWCA.  In Spelthorne, I felt like an outsider and responsible for 
integrating myself.  In RWCA, perhaps by the virtue of the fact that through my 
interaction with Spelthorne I had become a known entity to the party, I felt more at 
home with the officers running the association and within my local branch of Virginia 
Water & Thorpe. 
 
Runnymede, Spelthorne & Weybridge Conservative Group 
In early 2008, I was an under 30s member of Spelthorne Conservative Association.  
Subsequently, via email, I was put in touch with, and invited by, another ‘young/er 
member’580 of Spelthorne Conservatives to attend a CF event in London, 5 March.  The 
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event by its very nature was social and hosted in a public London bar.  It quickly 
became apparent to me that the central interest for most of the individuals at the event 
was to network socially within a Tory cohort.  Therefore, I participated in the customs 
that I was observing.  I met a large number of ‘CFers’,581 many of whom were young 
professionals who freely disseminated their business cards to individuals with whom 
they had developed a rapport.  By the end of the evening, I had collected 12 business 
cards.  Likewise, I reciprocated by giving-out a personal card that I had had 
professionally-printed with my name and email address.   
A number of individuals suggested that we should ‘find each other on 
Facebook’.  This phrase was used as a social cue, in order to indicate a mutual interest 
in connecting with other young Conservatives.  Therefore, the advent of Facebook, as a 
networking tool used by the CFers, had begun to facilitate social interactions in both 
off- and on- line Tory social gatherings.  Alexander Smith describes his first networking 
interactions in Dumfries c. 2003, before the advent of Facebook, as a challenge, because 
the most enthusiastic individuals he encountered were those whom created barriers to 
him ‘meeting local Tories’.582  In contrast, I found connecting with CF networks 
through the use of Facebook comparatively fruitful and immediate. 
I had been a member of the social networking website ‘Facebook’ 
(Facebook.com) since 2005.  Therefore, on my return home to Spelthorne from the 
London event, I checked my Facebook account online, via a personal laptop-computer.  
In the two hours it took for me to travel home, I had received nine Facebook ‘Friend 
Requests’583 from individuals I had met at the event.  I subsequently reciprocated by 
‘accepting their friend requests’584 via my personal computer, and sending friend 
requests to a number of other individuals whom I had met at the event.  Unlike Smith’s 
Scotland experience, Tories seemed, unsurprisingly, abundant in South East England.  
Following my first networking event, I was invited to a number of Facebook groups that 
were used by young Conservatives.  In the following two months, the number of CF 
Facebook events and CF friend requests I gained grew significantly.  Through that 
process, I made an influential contact in Surrey CF.  The Surrey CF Area Chairman, 
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Alexandra Swann,
585
 had been appointed to oversee the organisation of the CF branches 
in the county.  In mid-2008, I was invited by Swann to join her team on the Surrey CF 
Area committee as the branch development officer.  I accepted the position and became 
involved in a number of Surrey CF events.  However, my role in Surrey CF did not 
mature until I moved residence and switched my membership to RWCA in August 
2008.  This indicates how, although Facebook was a useful tool for the organisational 
aspects of CF, my growth as a Conservative participant was reliant on having roots 
imbedded within a fertile Conservative association. 
I had developed already face-to-face relationships with the chairmen of both 
RWCA and Spelthorne Conservative associations by the time Swann and I had decided 
to develop a new CF branch to serve the geographical area covered by the RWSCG.  
Therefore, I announced the proposal of the branch to the chairmen in an email and was 
subsequently invited to the home of the RWCA Chairman, Hugh Meares, in order to 
discuss founding a CF branch.  Then, via email, I proceeded to announce the following 
to a number of Surrey Conservative officials: 
 
When I met with Hugh Meares (RWCA Chairman) at his home on 3 September 2008, I bumped 
into Nick Wood-Dow (Surrey Chairman) who said he would like to connect with Surrey 
Conservative Future.  As Surrey CF Branch Development Officer, I said I would put Nick in touch 
with Alexandra Swann (Surrey CF Chairman).  Alex [Swann] has suggested meeting before she 
returns to university.  I have also discussed branch development in Virginia Water & Thorpe 
with Hugh [Meares] and Geoff Woodger (Virginia Water and Thorpe Branch Chairman (of which 
I am now a member)) and Alex would also like to meet to discuss the CF plan...
586
   
 
After the meeting took place on 23 September, I sent to the same recipients an email 
stating: 
 
I wish to thank Nick Wood-Dow (Surrey Chairman), Alexandra Swann (Surrey CF Chairman), 
Hugh Meares (Runnymede Chairman), Geoff Woodger (Virginia Water & Thorpe Chairman) and 
Joshua Burge (Runnymede & Spelthorne CF Deputy Chairman) for their attendance and 
contribution to yesterday's meeting in Runnymede.  I am sure we all agree it was a worthwhile 
meeting and a productive one at that.  In summary, we have formed a new Conservative Future 
branch of which I am chairman.  “Runnymede & Spelthorne Conservative Future” (RSCF) will 
serve young Conservatives with strong links to the area.  This branch will run independently of 
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the collegiate branch of Royal Holloway, University of London.  Although, we hope, the two will 
run in a complementary capacity.  We are planning a membership drive over the coming 
months which will culminate in a drinks reception for prospective members.  This is likely to be 
held on the evening of Thursday 22nd January, 2009, at the Runnymede Hotel with a 
prominent Tory politician as speaker ... We intend that invitations will be sent out two weeks 
prior to the event.  The event will be free to attend... This event has been modelled on the 
recent success of the Elmbridge CF membership drive in which 29 new members were 
recruited... I will soon produce a Facebook group for members to join.
587
 
 
As Smith notes, organising something along these lines using the internet in Dumfries, 
in the run-up to the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections, would have been virtually 
impossible, because ‘the communications infrastructure that was needed to support 
broadband and internet connections was very poor’.588  In fact, broadband was a 
generally absent medium in much of the area at the time.
589
 
In the Surrey case, the discourses and interactions that surrounded events 
noticeably differed in terms of the preferred methods of communications used by the 
individuals involved.  My dialogues with the younger members occurred almost 
exclusively using some form of internet application like email or Facebook.  However, 
the older members preferred to be either called via telephone or to have a face-to-face 
meeting.  This indicates that there was some division in the communication cultures 
between the younger and older members.  There is further evidence for this in the 
response that the RWCA chairman gave in an interview: 
 
The internet means different things to different people.  There is an age divide here and there 
is a digital divide.  The internet started off as a means of sending email messages, and to the 
younger generation now it’s an enormously powerful communication device using new media 
tools, such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter and so forth. The difficulty that we have in the 
Conservative associations is that they tend to be populated by two sorts of people.  There are 
the young and enthusiastic political volunteers, who join in their twenties, they work hard and 
they pass through.  We then have a cadre of people who are there always.  These are people in 
their fifties and sixties and seventies.  The difficulty that many of these people face is that they 
may struggle when it comes to putting a new cartridge in their laser printer.  So, they’re 
perhaps not entirely hands-on.  The internet, to an association that is run by this older cadre, is 
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probably going to make less effective use of what the internet offers than might be the case, 
for example, in a young business or with some of the younger volunteers.
590
 
 
Generally, this would suggest that the use of internet in the wider-membership of the 
RWCA was, at that time, relatively generation specific.  Similarly, in his ethnography 
Smith notes that ‘elderly’ volunteers’ were less willing to canvass urban areas.591  The 
‘cadre’ of older members in Runnymede, who are suggested to have been the 
controlling body of the association in the run-up to the 2010 General Election, had an 
already established tradition and culture in terms of their uses of communication 
technologies.
592
  Therefore, the use of new internet media by younger members was a 
divergence from the already established organisational culture of their associations.
593
 
 However, in the case of RWCA, there is evidence to suggest that, although the 
cadre of the party were less inclined to adapt their behaviours and practices in line with 
technological advances, the roles of organisational-elites, like the chairman himself, 
benefitted when useful internet technologies were embraced. 
 
As far as Cherry Orchard is concerned, which is our association office in Staines, I do work on 
the Cherry Orchard computers, probably one to two hours every day, but I probably only visit 
Cherry Orchard, apart from meetings, about four or five times a year, so almost all my work is 
done remotely and I suspect that this will be the model going forward which will have a series 
of agents who travel around the patch hot-desking from where they go. The internet has been 
such an enormously powerful force over the last ten years and what fast broadband links, or 
relatively fast broadband links, both where I live in Englefield Green and in Staines, mean is that 
I can sit at my desk in Englefield Green, I can use something like ‘Remote Desktop’ or ‘LogMeIn’ 
to log straight on to the Cherry Orchard computers.  I can print material out on the Cherry 
Orchard printers or I can print it out at home.  I just don’t have to travel every day down to 
Cherry Orchard.
594
 
 
This suggests that the role of internet technology in the daily working-life of an 
association chairman is dependent upon personal choice; technical knowledge; access to 
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the relevant technologies; and inclination towards the use of technology.  These 
leadership qualities and choices are likely to impact on the manner in which the 
association and local campaigns are organised.   
In comparison with my observations of the Anglesey association chairman the 
approaches of Conservative chairmen can vary significantly.  For example, the 
Anglesey chairman did not use the internet whatsoever; delegated all administrative 
activities to association officers; and answered a mobile telephone only on rare 
occasions.  Furthermore, Meares’ testimony suggests that, during his chairmanship, his 
grasp for technological knowhow enhanced and changed his personal working 
experience within the party in a practical way.  The use of internet applications had 
reduced considerably the frequency of his journeys to the association office.  Stuart Ball 
writes that in Conservative associations, historically, ‘the crucial position has always 
been that of the chairman: he or she effectively ran the association on a day-to-day 
basis.’595  A lack of current scholarly perspectives on contemporary local organisations 
means that this traditional view of local leadership is possibly dated.
596
  However, the 
RWCA case does suggests that there are, at least, characteristic remnants of the 
traditional role of the chairman extant in present day associations, which can be the 
deciding factor for the impact of the uses of new technologies in some local settings. 
The use of internet by the RWCA for campaigning in the run-up to the 2010 
General Election remained limited in the early stages of development as a 
communication tool for reaching the voter. 
 
We made very little use of email.  We only have around 1,000 email addresses.  We did try to 
work up some quite thoughtful email letters but it was early days for us.  It’s a full-scale 
endeavour communicating in this way, as it’s also a full-scale endeavour in maintaining a web 
presence.  It’s easy enough to create a web presence but you then have to maintain it and that 
requires continuing effort, which you are not necessarily going to get from a voluntary party.
597
  
 
The applications of internet technologies vary significantly in terms of the level of 
specialist knowledge needed to integrate them into the needs of an organisation like a 
Conservative association.  The RWCA chairman was indicating that, unless an 
                                                     
595
 Stuart Ball, ‘Local Conservatism and the Evolution of the Party Organisation’, in Anthony Seldon and 
Stuart Ball (eds.), The Conservative Century: The Conservative Party Since 1900 (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1994), p. 268. 
596
 Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, and Jeremy Richardson, True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party 
Membership (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 40. 
597
 RNA Meares Interview, p. 67. 
162 
 
association could have afforded to pay an internet specialist or had a willing volunteer 
with the technological knowhow and creative abilities to maintain the local party 
website, the use of a website at the association level for campaigning becomes 
significantly limited.  Furthermore, his testimony suggests that, in order to have made 
direct contact with voters in the Runnymede & Weybridge Constituency via email, the 
association would have had to have taken a more innovative approach in order to have 
harvested email addresses from electors.  
There were limits to the services, like website initiatives, provided to 
associations by the central-party in the run-up to 2010.  Meares claimed that: 
 
The party has quite an effective central website and they have put a lot of energy into this over 
the last two years.  They have improved it considerably.  Central Office made a content 
management website product available to the associations.  It was pretty clunky, it looked 
pretty old-fashioned, it was just about adequate for putting up factual material. I think that the 
Conservative product that we had last year was a very old-fashioned, passive, fact-based 
website.  It’s going to be difficult for associations because everyone enjoys setting up websites, 
but they do not enjoy maintaining them so much.  I think the energy for this will come from 
Central Office.
598
 
 
My observations of RWCA noted how Meares made at least four attempts to secure 
voluntary assistance of younger members for the running of the website at Cherry 
Orchard; and that turnover of the volunteers was high due to individuals being unable to 
commit the time required to the frequent demands of the role.  This and Meares’ 
testimony suggests that unless an association had an able and committed webmaster 
within the local organisation, it would have had to invest significant funds into website 
development, and ongoing maintenance, or make use of the limited facilities provided 
by the central-party in the run-up to 2010.  Moreover, the digital and age divides 
contributed to attitudinal barriers within the local party organisation that were likely to 
have slowed the developmental progress of RWCA’s online presence.  Research by 
Whiteley et al. indicates that ‘age’ and ‘attitudes’ of Conservative Party members have 
been longstanding variables that impact on the nature of local associations.
599
 
Meares’ testimony suggests that campaigning via websites at the local level was 
not a significant concern for investment by the central-party in the 2010 election.  
Although CCHQ had invested in a sophisticated parent website at Conservatives.com, 
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the aspiration to have a contemporary web-presence at the association level had to be 
initiated and developed by the associations themselves.  However, in the case of the 
RWCA, the likelihood of that occurring was low due to its traditional and ageing cadre. 
Furthermore, with Runnymede & Weybridge being seen as a Conservative ‘safe seat’600 
in the 2010 election, investing in a website was not such a priority as it was for other 
Conservative associations and their PPCs in more ‘marginal seats’,601 like, for example, 
Laura Sandys
602
 who contested and won the South Thanet Constituency from Labour; 
and Robin Walker,
603
 who did the same in Worcester.  Unlike safe seats and ‘non-
marginal seats’,604 marginal seat candidates were likely to be the recipients of Lord 
Ashcroft’s £3 million marginal seat fund.  This enabled Conservative PPCs in marginal 
seats the opportunity to invest greater resources in a more sophisticated campaign. 
 When asked about the role of the internet in party organisation, Meares claimed 
that the association ‘used it extensively’.605  This is in contrast to his response on the use 
of the internet in terms of reaching the voter in the 2010 campaign.  Meares described 
how internet technologies impacted in changing the association’s campaign procedures.  
He began by outlining the association’s traditional approach before the use of the 
internet in 2010: 
 
During the course of an election, the branches will collect canvass information that has to 
somehow get onto the central Merlin
606
 system.  Fresh canvass cards have to be handed back 
to the branches and then, on Election Day, this information has to be married up with the 
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telling results coming from the polling stations, so that in the evenings we can identify the 
people who are our supporters and who have not voted.  This is a classic ‘get-out the vote’ 
campaigning technique.  In the past, this has all been paper-based.  The branch would fill in the 
canvass card, it would then motor the canvass card over to the association office and this was 
the reason why you wanted an association office that was relatively nearby and relatively 
accessible.  Volunteers would then put this into the computers and that information would 
then go out to branches.
607
   
 
 Meares went on to describe how this was different in 2010 and how the 
association utilised an innovative internet-facilitated application in their campaign 
organisation. 
 
We built an internet application that sat on top of Blue Chip, so that our branches were able to 
enter in their canvass information directly from their branch office, which was usually a 
bedroom or an office in somebody’s home.  They were able to pick up the results immediately, 
they could enter the telling results in immediately and they could then see who the people 
were who needed to be knocked up.  Because this was all networked into the servers at Cherry 
Orchard, the telephone team at Cherry Orchard was able to see the same information in real 
time.  We were able then to direct the telephone team at Cherry Orchard to back up the key 
stress points in our constituency and in the neighbouring constituencies that we were 
supporting.
608
 
 
This demonstrates the heterogeneity of Conservative associations, which traditionally 
has been attributed to their ‘autonomy’.609  Furthermore, Meares’ testimony shows how 
individuals can impact on the direction and culture of each campaign.  The system 
described above was unique to RWCA because it invested the highly-developed 
computer-programming skills of the chairman.  In doing so, Meares used the internet as 
a platform to assist in innovations over and above that which had been supplied to the 
association in the form of the centralised Merlin database.    
Unlike Merlin, its predecessor ‘Blue Chip’ was not designed with the potential 
for internet networking capabilities.  Both databases were designed primarily for 
managing canvass information.
610
  In turn, this data is used to ‘get-out the vote’, 
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specifically Conservative voters, on election days through a process called ‘knocking-
up’, whereby Conservative activist from local associations and branches target declared 
Conservative voters to ensure they have used their vote at their local polling station.  
Alexander Smith notes that in Dumfries, c. 2003, ‘Blue Chip could only be accessed 
through one machine ... this computer often crashed while volunteers were inputting 
Blue Chip data’.611  Merlin was different to its predecessor in that it allowed the 
potential for the data to be used also centrally through a national Merlin network which 
fed directly to a central database at CCHQ via the internet.   
The extent to which the advent of political internet technologies had shifted the 
canvassing culture of RWCA is illustrated in the following narrative: 
 
The traditional approach from about 1997, when Blue Chip was first issued to associations, was 
that each branch would have its own little committee room on campaign day.  There would be 
one PC operating there, the telling results would be coming in to the committee room and then 
that computer in the committee room would be printing out lists for people to go out and 
actually bang on doors to get out their vote.  In some ways it is the same but in the pre-internet 
days every branch committee room was its own little silo of information.  In the 2010 context 
everybody’s connected, which means there’s mutual sharing of support and support can be 
directed to the point at which it is most needed.
612
 
 
This shows how for RWCA the internet loosened to some extent the otherwise isolated 
approach to the sharing of campaign information.  However, Meares’ experience in 
2010 was in stark contrast to the organisation and campaign techniques I witnessed in 
the Anglesey association as their candidate on election day.  Anglesey Conservatives 
did not have the political-will, resources, volunteers or organisation to conduct even the 
simplest telling/get-out the vote operations and, therefore, there was comparatively very 
little use of internet technologies by Anglesey Conservatives in election day procedures.  
The comparison of the Anglesey and RWCA cases demonstrates further the extent of 
the heterogeneous nature of each Conservative association. 
 An example of how individual associations can be different in their use of 
internet technologies is demonstrated by the approach of the Spelthorne association, 
which constitutes the other half of the RWSCG.  Unlike RWCA, the chairman of the 
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Spelthorne Conservatives sent out 40 ‘eNewsletters’ between 3 November 2008 and 5 
May 2010.
613
  My analysis of the contents of these emails suggests that their intended 
purpose was to inform the party supporters in the association’s email database of news, 
information and events that pertained to the elections and organisation of Spelthorne 
Conservatives.  The emails were sent also to some non paid-up members.  I know this 
because I continued to receive these emails long after my membership with the 
Spelthorne association lapsed.  In the run-up to 2010, I regularly received eNewsletter-
style emails sporadically from Kingston & Surbiton Conservatives; regularly from PPC 
Shaun Bailey and Hammersmith Conservatives; regularly from Cities of London & 
Westminster Conservatives; and a prolific range of emails from PPC Zac Goldsmith and 
Richmond Park Conservatives.
614
  Goldsmith’s campaign was the local Conservative 
target seat that was assigned to the RWCA in a relationship which the party calls 
‘mutual aid’.   
Another association of which I had been a member was Cities of London & 
Westminster.  I had joined as a CF member, paying £10, at a CF event in London.  
Subsequently, I began receiving email communications from the association about 
Conservative social events.  I continued to receive communications of this nature long 
after my membership lapsed.  However, in November 2010, all email communications 
from the association ceased.  Richmond Park collected my email address on a number 
of occasions, including at their social events and on the days that I campaigned for their 
candidate.  Subsequently, I received duplicate emails from them, which as a recipient 
became an irritant.  The other associations mentioned above added my email address to 
their email list after I emailed them to offer my time to their campaigning activities.  All 
these associations, except Spelthorne and Richmond Park, ceased all communications 
with me soon after the 2010 General Election. 
These cases collectively demonstrate significant heterogeneity and autonomy in 
the manner in which the observed Conservative associations collected email addresses 
and disseminated internal-news via email.  This would suggest that Cameron’s 
Conservatives in the associations were free, to some extent, to decide upon their own 
style of email strategies and use.  Furthermore, individuals in leading positions within 
the association played a key role in how email was used and disseminated.  Based on 
these observed cases, the frequency of emails sent would appear to have had some 
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correlation with the desires of the candidate, the association, and the wider-party for that 
particular seat, to win at the general election.  Richmond Park, as a key target seat for 
the Conservatives, was more aggressive in its approach to email distribution than the 
nearby safe seats of Runnymede & Weybridge, and Spelthorne.  Richmond Park 
Conservatives rallied extensively its supporters through the use of email and Facebook.  
Interestingly, when compared with Kingston & Surbiton Conservatives, and 
Hammersmith Conservatives, whose approach to using email to organise their 
supporters was milder, Richmond Park had the greatest electoral success in the 2010 
election.
615
 
 Where the target seat of Richmond Park used innovative techniques in internet 
campaigning through active methods for collecting email data, the safe seat of 
Runnymede & Weybridge campaigned in a traditional way and admitted that it did not 
make a significant attempt to use email.  Therefore, it would appear that at the 
association level, the likelihood of innovative use of internet applications was 
dependent on the technological ability and/or inclinations of leading figures within the 
association, e.g. the candidate or the chairman, and the status of the seat, e.g. whether or 
not the seat was a Conservative target seat.  However, both associations significantly 
used internet applications to organise their supporters.   
 
Virginia Water By-Election Campaign: 4 June 2009 
In the RWCA, campaigning in the run-up to the 2009 European and local elections 
began in March 2009.  In early 2009, I had entered into an informal dialogue with Hugh 
Meares, RWCA Chairman, and the chairman of the Virginia Water & Thorpe Branch, 
about the possibility of my standing as a Runnymede Borough Council candidate.  
There was an opening for a new Conservative candidate in the Virginia Water Ward, 
because an incumbent councillor in the Ward had intended to resign. The candidate’s 
resignation was managed and timed by the association cadre in order that it triggered a 
by-election to coincide with the dates of the other local elections scheduled for 4 June 
2009.  My eligibility and suitability to fill the role was discussed by the more senior 
cadre of the association.   
The process of candidate selection began with a letter of notification for a face-
to-face interview, which was sent in the post.  The interview panel was comprised of 
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senior association officers and representatives who were assembled by the association 
chairman.  Before I could be fully approved by the Conservative association, I was 
instructed by an email from the association chairman, sent 7 March 2009, to arrange a 
meeting with the Conservative leader of Runnymede Borough Council, John Furey.  
Through this process, I became aware that there were two separate but equally 
important hierarchical structures at work in Runnymede in terms of party organisation.  
I noted above the significance and influence that leadership figures can have at the local 
level.  In Runnymede, there were noticeable factions of Conservative participants who 
had subtle inclinations to side either with the association chairman or the leader of 
Runnymede Council.  According to Stuart Ball, ‘there was always the danger of cliques 
and factions forming, leading to intrigue and even internal warfare.’616   This 
phenomenon was accentuated in Runnymede because of the large number of 
Conservative members on the Borough Council being Conservatives,
617
 thus giving 
greater weight to the political arm of the local party.  
 Once approved by the Conservative leader of the council, the branch members 
of the safe seat of the Virginia Water Ward agreed to my candidature in consultation 
with the branch chairman.  In the process of becoming a local candidate in Runnymede, 
the internet, in the form of occasional email exchanges between the candidate and local 
Conservative leaders, played only a minor role.  Email was used as a tool for 
communication, which, in turn, facilitated minor organisational aspects of the process, 
like introductions, meetings and interviews.  However, this was no revolution for the 
Conservative participants involved in the process.  Email attributed no more to the 
process than what could have been achieved by a telephone call or text message.  
Therefore, the selection of a local candidate remained relatively traditional in its 
approach.  The selection was a stepwise process with checks and balances in place that 
distributed the power for the adoption of the candidate between a number of key 
Conservative leaders and the collective approval of their respective cadres.  These 
cadres together collectively formed a wider local-cadre with factions forming around 
the key leaders in the local organisation.  Email as an additional tool for communication 
oiled the processes of interaction between these individuals and groups in the process of 
candidate selection in that it assisted the flow of the internal procedural mechanisms.  
However, where local candidate selection remains within the hierarchical control of the 
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local political and organisational-elites, the scope for the use of internet technologies in 
that process is likely to continue to be limited.  
Being a prospective local candidate, I became elevated in the hierarchical ranks 
of the local Conservative Party and, subsequently, found that the active members of the 
local party conveyed a greater sense of trust towards me.  As research by Dirks and 
Ferrin suggests, ‘trust’ plays a significant and beneficial role in organisations.618  
However, in the Conservative Party case, this is balanced by its hierarchical tendencies 
in which one’s behaviour is tempered by a sense of watching-eyes in the higher ranks of 
the party.  A latent culture of deference to those in higher authority is a traditional 
characteristic of the party.
619
  This phenomenon is inherently cultural to the 
Conservative Party and one I observed throughout the ethnographic experience at the 
local, devolved and national levels.  It is a principle which is passed-on to newly 
initiated members.  Often these members are eager to please the party collective and, 
therefore, subsequently fall-in-line.  There is an unspoken but tangible understanding 
among party office-holders of order and compliance which emanates through the day-
to-day actions and interactions observed within the party collective.  These phenomena 
had repercussions in both the on- and off- line world. 
 At the association level, I observed and experienced a significant distrust for the 
use of email to engage with unknown entities/individuals on matters that were 
potentially sensitive in nature.  However, as my time within the party accumulated, I 
journeyed closer towards becoming a figure within the association cadre who was 
accepted as someone to be ‘copied-in’ on certain emails in relation to the organisation 
of the party and its campaign strategies.  It was an unspoken and informal process 
which evolved over time.  It appeared to be led by the local leaders like the association 
chairman and the leader of the council.  When a local party leader signalled in an email 
to a staff member, officer, councillor or activist, through the action of copying me into 
the email, or introducing me via email, I found that my email interaction with party 
participants was exchanged more freely and less guarded in its content.   
The prominence of a traditional cadre within RWCA means that new individuals 
have to learn the cultural ways of the association; and invest time and other resources in 
order to, firstly, become initiated and, secondly, develop trust relationships. It is the 
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leadership of specific individuals within the cadre who can use the simple gesture of 
openly including a new Conservative participant on the email distribution list of an 
internal email.  Once that action is commenced by the individual in the leadership role, 
others in the cadre receive this as an affirming signal to follow suit by cautiously 
accepting email interaction with the new individual.  However, that point is not likely to 
be reached unless the new participant has regularly interacted with key individuals 
within the association or political cadres at local Conservative Party social and political 
events.  Therefore, an introductory email, or the appearance of a newly trusted name on 
a distribution list, acts as an electronic symbol of acceptance and trust, which is likely to 
have been earned first in the offline world.  Whitty and Joinson state that the internet is 
often perceived as an ‘untrustworthy space’.620  As Tanis and Postmes suggest, this 
results in face-to-face interaction being ‘superior’ in comparison to less personalised 
mediation on the internet.
621
  Based on my observations, these factors were integral to 
the customary behaviours, of the older cohorts in RWCA, which were behind the 
processes of initiation through which newer members learnt the ways of the association. 
 I found that ‘trust’, to some degree, was extended to my campaign team – as 
though they were an extension of me.  As I had contributed significantly to the founding 
of RSCF, I had a number of young Conservatives from the branch who formed my 
Virginia Water campaign team.  Therefore, because these party-workers were an 
extension of my contribution to the party, they became relatively trusted and embraced 
by the chairman of RWCA.  The trust and rapport I had worked to develop was 
inherited by my team members on an individual basis.  For example, on 13 March 2009, 
my campaign manager, an 18 year old Conservative, found himself being copied-in on 
emails from the association chairman on matters of telephone canvassing at Cherry 
Orchard.  The chairman of the association entrusted the younger member with the 
responsibility of managing the telephone canvass and recruiting other local CFers for 
the activity over the medium of Facebook.  In this case, the internet was used in a liberal 
manner by the chairman because a relationship of trust, albeit secondary, had been 
established already between him and the candidate.  Therefore, the candidate’s selection 
acted as a validation of the candidate’s judgement in others.  Those individuals that the 
candidate brought into the Conservative-fold, as campaign team members, were 
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automatically given a degree of trust to manage campaign matters using internet 
technologies by the virtue of the candidate’s discernment. 
 While Facebook was used regularly by the younger members of my campaign 
team to organise individuals and groups of CFers for activism in campaign events, like 
door-to-door and telephone canvasses, the older members of the Virginia Water 
campaign team used email.  As a relatively new member of the RWCA, I was meeting 
members and councillors on a continual basis.  Some of these introductions were made 
in person and others using email.  On 1 April 2009, a fellow candidate introduced 
himself to me via email.  My email address had been provided to him by a senior 
official in the local party.  This was a relatively common practice among the established 
and trusted local-elites in the association.  Therefore, in this manner, email was acting 
as a medium that facilitated more fluid network-interactions between local-elites, as 
they rose to positions of relative seniority within the association.  Moreover, this is 
further evidence for the digital segregation or ‘divide’ between the younger and older 
Conservative participants, to which Meares has testified.   
Trends in the choices and uses of internet technologies in the RWCA appear to 
have been dependent on the two distinct age groups in the association.  In terms of 
activism, there was a small but keen group of younger Conservatives who leant towards 
the use of Facebook to organise their involvement within the local party.  However, 
they also used regularly email and mobile telephones.  Often, their mobile phones were 
used as devices with which internet connections were made in order to access email and 
Facebook.  Some young Conservatives used their phones to update their Twitter status 
with short microblogs, within 140 characters, detailing their activities on the campaign 
and other political messages.  The CFers created a Facebook group for paid-up members 
of RSCF, which was also extended to unofficial supporters from outside the local area 
who could request to join the ‘Closed Group’.622  The Facebook group was typical of 
those administered by other CF branches, which utilised Facebook groups in order to 
grow a network of supportive and active Conservative participants; share organisational, 
campaign and other political information on the group’s ‘Facebook Wall’.  Often, this 
would encourage debate through online activity involving group members interacting 
with one another and the medium by posting comments in public conversational 
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threads.  Facebook was used to organise also campaign events, social events and other 
organisational and political activities.  A study by Rachel Gibson suggests that this type 
of online activity, using social media in political parties, emerged across the political 
spectrum in the 2010 General Election.
623
  She argues that this presents a new model of 
grassroots campaigning that has led to the devolution of power from the professional 
centres of party organisation, because of the low financial cost of engagement in social 
media. 
The freedom from financial burden in using Facebook as a marketing-tool 
certainly enhanced the Virginia Water campaign.  The administrators of the Facebook 
group were able to send ‘Facebook Messages’ to the entire group, which acted as an 
instantaneous and targeted promotion device during the campaign period.  The chairman 
of RSCF regularly sent messages to the members of the Facebook group in order to 
encourage them to attend specific campaign days.  Individuals were invited to attend 
political, social or campaign events through the creation of Facebook event pages.  The 
event page would give information about the time, date and location of the event in 
addition to further information and a list of those who intended to attend the event.  The 
members of the RSCF Facebook group were subsequently digitally-invited to the 
campaign event using simple Facebook functions.  Members of the group were 
encouraged to ‘RSVP’, thus showing whether they were attending/not attending/maybe 
attending.  On 9 May 2009, 12 members of CF, including local members and members 
from outside the local area, came to a Virginia Water ‘action day’.  Most of these 
individuals had interacted with the group and the event information on Facebook. 
In addition to the CFers, there were other, more senior, activists who attended 
the action day in Virginia Water, however they were fewer in number and their 
participation in the campaign day was organised via other media, namely email and 
telephone.  None of the senior activists were members of the Facebook group.  
Therefore, they did not receive notification of the campaign day via any Facebook 
interaction.  It is not possible to know who, and to what extent, the senior members had 
interacted already with Facebook in their personal lives, but as an administrator and 
observer of the Facebook group, I was aware of who the group members were.  Both 
chairmen of the RWSCG joined the RSCF Facebook Group in the run-up to 2010, and 
sometime after the Virginia Water campaign.   
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During the Virginia Water Action Day, Meares and other senior local 
Conservatives expressed how impressed they were with the turnout of younger people 
and acknowledged the role that Facebook had played in the successful organisation of 
the event.  However, one senior local Conservative, who assisted in the organisation of 
the canvassing part of the action day, made disparaging remarks about the young people 
who ‘turned-out’ to help in his ‘patch’.  His concerns were centred on the lack of 
control he had over the organisation of the campaign day, which was a new and 
uncomfortable change to the manner in which the branch had executed its campaigns in 
the past.  In a campaign day debrief on 11 May 2009, the same Conservative, who at 
that time was a septuagenarian, said that the best way to contact him was by telephone 
and that he was not of the generation who felt the need to communicate regularly by 
email.  This account suggests that the digital divide in the culture of the RWCA could 
cause, at times, a clash between the generations.  Perhaps the digital divide in RWCA 
might have been narrowed if there had been a wider-understanding of the benefits of 
internet-use in political organisation at that time.   
The political networking capabilities of Facebook were demonstrated when 
Therese Coffey
624
 searched for my name on Facebook, found my personal profile, and 
sent me a Facebook message offering to help me canvass the Virginia Water Ward.  At 
that time, I had not had any previous contact with Coffey whatsoever.  Therefore, 
through having a presence on Facebook, as a local election candidate, I made myself 
and my campaign accessible for assistance from Conservative participants outside of 
my local area.  Furthermore, through having a basic but informative campaign website 
which included my email address, I received an email from an assistant to Nirj Deva
625
 
who offered me access to his campaign team.  Subsequently, Deva and his large team of 
young supporters arrived in Virginia Water to assist with door-to-door canvassing on 
what they called Nirj Deva’s ‘Battlebus’.  These examples demonstrate how in 2009 a 
relatively unknown council candidate’s online presence was converted into tangible 
offline interaction through the power of the internet.  In this case, the internet acted to 
significantly enhance Conservative campaign activity in Virginia Water while investing 
only minimal financial resources in the technology.
626
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Ynys Môn Parliamentary Election Campaign: 6 May 2010 
In summer 2009, I applied to the Conservative Party to become a member of the 
approved list of parliamentary candidates.  I was invited to attend a Parliamentary 
Assessment Board (‘the PAB’) and, in the August, I was told that I had been approved 
to become a member of ‘the Candidates List’.  I applied to a number of Conservative 
associations with a vacancy for a PPC in their constituency.  In early January 2010, I 
received an email from Ynys Môn | Anglesey Conservative Association inviting me to a 
selection meeting on 9 January 2010.  At the meeting, I was elected by the association’s 
‘paid-up’ party members as their candidate to represent the Conservative Party in the 
impending General Election, 6 May 2010.  The following month, I moved to the 
constituency fulltime and resided in Trearddur Bay, near Holyhead.  There, I 
coordinated my parliamentary campaign and ethnographic field work in a simultaneous 
and complementary capacity. 
 Culturally, Anglesey was different to the life I had experienced in Surrey.  
Anglesey being an island meant that it had a distinct identity, culture and community of 
its own.  I had to adapt considerably my approach to people and politics in order to be 
accepted within, what was to me, a new culture.  I spent some time as both a politician 
and ethnographer observing and learning the culture, customs and everyday lifestyle of 
the islanders and the association.  I began learning the local language of Welsh and 
adopting the ways of the ‘Anglesonian’.  During that process, I developed a stronger 
sense of what it meant to be a Conservative PPC.  It was clear to all concerned that I 
was not a ‘true local’.  However, I found that, in general, the local people of Anglesey 
accepted my candidature in a welcoming and hospitable manner.  Many members of the 
Anglesey association gave me a very warm welcome.  After my selection, I was 
immediately invited by some of the association members to a country cottage for ‘bacon 
butties’.  My first impressions of Anglesey life was its remoteness and its areas of 
relative poverty in comparison with Surrey.  Some islanders prided themselves on 
Anglesey being undeveloped, while others blamed local and national politicians for a 
lack of opportunity on the island.  Anglesey’s simplistic infrastructure led many locals 
to claim that the island was an aesthetic and cultural remnant of 1950s Britain.   
 In 2010, one cultural symbol of contemporary life which had been noticeably 
slow to evolve on Anglesey was high speed internet, with the island’s high number of 
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‘not-spots’ and ‘slow-spots’.627  As the Conservative candidate, I received a number of 
complaints from constituents and local entrepreneurs who perceived Anglesey to be a 
place that had been neglected in terms of the development of the island’s internet 
infrastructure.  The poor access to broadband was considered to be hindering the 
development of businesses on the island.
628
  Rather than using email, the relatively 
aging population of the island, including the local Conservative association which had 
no more than five members under the age of 40, preferred to communicate by telephone, 
and occasionally by letter.  Therefore, in terms of my parliamentary campaign, the use 
of internet technologies to reach the Anglesey electorate was, relatively, a low priority.  
According to research by Southern and Ward, this is in keeping with general trends 
observed across the UK in the 2010 General Election.
629
  Furthermore, Andy 
Williamson found that there was no significant correlation between candidates’ use of e-
campaigning and electoral success in 2010.
630
 
I focused much of my attention on devising and delivering traditional door-to-
door leaflets; writing letters to the local newspapers; and achieving media and press 
attention like my appearance on the BBC Politics Show and interview with BBC Radio 
Wales.  This approach to campaigning is similar to Alexander Smith’s account of the 
Scottish Conservatives’ campaign in 2003.631  I spent the largest portion of my time 
canvassing door-to-door with members of my small, but dedicated, campaign team with 
the strategic aim of meeting as many people face-to-face as possible.  This aim grew-out 
of what was considered to be, by Anglesey Conservatives, an historical Conservative 
tradition on the island, which had been passed down in Conservative folklore since the 
time of the Conservative MP Keith Best.
632
  Keith Best was the most electorally 
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successful Conservative candidate on Anglesey.  Therefore, I made the strategic choice 
to emulate his mythological campaigning-style.   
I advertised a weekly surgery held at the association office in Llangefni, the 
island’s county town, and made attempts to attract attention using local newspapers.  I 
submitted press releases on stories about campaigns that I had organised in the various 
towns around the island, which included Amlwch, Beaumaris, Benllech, Holyhead, 
Llanfairpwllgwyngyll, Llangefni, Menai Bridge, Newborough, Rhosneigr and Valley.  
We placed half-page adverts in the local newspaper.  The adverts invited constituents to 
attend public meetings that were held in eight of the island’s main towns.  According to 
Jon Lawrence, attendance at election meetings has been in decline since the mid-
1950s.
633
  Anglesey Conservative were aware of this trend and it came as no surprise 
that the numbers at each meeting were between 5-28 individuals.  Interestingly, 
however, informants in the Anglesey association reported that attendance in 2010 was 
higher than the previous two general elections.   
In the three weeks prior to polling day, I attended a number of official hustings, 
most of which drew audiences in excess of 100 people.  These included Mencap Cymru; 
the Federation of Small Business; the Farmers Union of Wales and the Nation Farmers 
Union; and Churches Together.  I organised a campaign weekend with 20 participants 
who travelled from across the UK to join an ‘Around Island Rally’.  We spent four days 
touring the island using a ‘loudhailer’ to expound the Conservative-message that it was 
‘Time for Change on Ynys Môn’.  The loudhailer was especially useful in the small 
villages that we had not been able to canvass.  The teams of supporters arrived in each 
village and posted through the door of each home a letter from the Conservative 
candidate and a short leaflet that detailed both local and national issues.  As soon as the 
Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, called the election, on 6 April 2010, a team of 
party-workers spent a week erecting Conservative ‘Ridge-Newman’ posters/boards on 
private property across Anglesey.  
Although the majority of my time was given to traditional campaigning, a 
significant amount of my day as a fulltime candidate was spent using computers and the 
internet from either my home or the association office.  In the early days, soon after my 
selection as a candidate, I spent between 10 and 18 hours per day in front of a computer 
planning, organising, managing, communicating, writing and designing aspects of my 
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work as a candidate.  Each candidate can have a unique experience, because of the 
dynamic variables which influence each parliamentary campaign.  These include: the 
candidate’s style, skills, leadership abilities, experience, autonomy and creativity; 
access to political staff, funds and campaign support; and private and personal 
influences (like family support, external stressors, accommodation concerns and 
personal wealth).  Others variables include: geographical factors; travel concerns; 
temporal factors; local cultures; interpersonal dynamics between local activists, 
association officers, Conservative Party professionals and the media; and the mood of 
the electorate.  These variables were observed in the field 2008-2010 and correlate with 
the archival evidence for the 1951-1964 period.  It is interesting that, although the 
technologies used in the political environment have changed significantly over time, the 
general variables influencing a Conservative candidate’s campaign were remarkably 
similar in 2010 and the 1950s.  The remainder of this chapter focuses on the role of 
newer-technologies in the campaigning-life of the Conservative PPC for Ynys Môn. 
  
PPC for Ynys Môn and Internet Technologies 
On becoming a Conservative PPC, I received a comprehensive ‘Campaign Pack’634 in 
the form of a large A4 ring binder with accompanying digital files stored on a CD-
ROM.  The pack was compiled and issued by CCHQ Wales and supplied to all 
candidates and agents in the region.  A similar pack was distributed to candidates and 
agents in the other regions.  The Welsh Conservative campaign pack differed to the 
English pack because some candidates in Wales chose to incorporate Welsh Language 
considerations in their campaign.  For example, I stipulated that all literature in the 
Anglesey campaign would be bi-lingual.  The packs predominantly gave advice and 
guidance to constituency campaign teams on traditional methods of campaigning, with 
the majority of the pack being focused on canvassing and traditional political literature.  
The pack did offer some advice on ‘E-campaigning’, which included an outline of the 
role of an e-campaign director within a campaign team; how to campaign online; and 
how to get-out the vote using email.  Supplementary information on ‘E-campaigning in 
an election’635 was later provided by CCHQ London in the form of an election 
memorandum.  The information was contained in a PDF attachment to an email.  
However, in contrast with the information in the campaign pack, the memorandum 
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focused on the rules and legalities of e-campaigning rather than how to use e-
campaigning techniques to win votes. 
The Welsh Conservatives campaign pack stated that: ‘Online campaigning is the 
use of text messaging, emails, websites and social networking sites to communicate our 
message.’636  The party’s rationale for using online techniques stated that ‘Modern 
communication channels are important tools which, when used alongside traditional 
campaigning methods, will help you to get your message across to a wider audience.’637  
The guidance outlines also the benefits of using the internet.  It stated that the benefit of 
email is its speed for disseminating information and its low cost for use.  The pack 
encourages campaign teams to write emails with bold attention grabbing subjects and in 
a manner that expounds the central messages of the campaign.  Websites are described 
as being ‘essential elements of a modern campaign, enabling residents to find out more 
about’638 the candidate and wider campaign activities.   
In terms of social media, the pack encourages the use of social networks like 
Facebook and Twitter, stating that they ‘are a great way to keep people who might not 
read ‘InTouch’ leaflets informed about your campaign and identify the people willing to 
help.’  The online section of the pack ended with a warning about the use of the internet 
and the pitfalls of publishing text online at speed and that without the traditional process 
of ‘sign-off’ being in place.  Checks and balances online had to be made by the 
individual through self-regulation and self-censorship.  This demonstrates that by late 
2009 the central-party was aware of both the pros and cons of online campaigning.  
However, the party took a relatively passive approach to managing the electronic-output 
of campaign teams in comparison to the more structured and rigid approach of the sign-
off process for traditional campaign literature.  As Fisher et al. write, the central-party 
was particularly sensitive to erroneous ‘spending commitments’, and, although there 
was no sign-off process for web-based publication, the central-party did monitor 
grassroots social media activity.
639
 
When selected as the Conservative PPC for Ynys Môn, I resided over 280 miles 
away in Surrey for one month before relocating to the island.  I travelled twice to 
Anglesey on constituency business during my first month of being the PPC.  Although 
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these geographic limitations prevented me from having a daily presence in the 
constituency, in the early stage, the internet facilitated my role as a long distance 
candidate.  During the first weeks as PPC, I worked up to 18 hours per day using 
internet technologies and applications via a laptop computer.  I had 117 days between 
my selection and the election day, which was a greatly shorter period than many 
candidates.  I was provided far fewer resources than target seat candidates in terms of 
funds, manpower and general support from CCHQ.  Therefore, I invested heavily my 
own time, resources and skills to make-up the shortfall.  Initially, I focused on bringing-
together my political supporters to form a remote-campaign team
640
 from all corners of 
the UK, many of whom were young Conservatives who had been displaced out of 
London and the South East because of either work or university commitments. Their 
geographic distances away from the island meant that they would not be able to travel to 
Anglesey regularly, but many agreed to take-on campaign team duties from afar.  I 
communicated with these individuals through Facebook and email, but also using SMS 
or ‘text messages’ on my mobile phone.  I held two face-to-face meetings at the Carlton 
Club with a political communications expert.  These meetings were organised using 
Facebook and SMS. 
 Using internet-based discussions with members of my remote-campaign team, I 
was provided with technical and creative advice on aspects relating to social media and 
website design, in addition to other offline aspects of the campaign, like strategy and 
fundraising.  Each member of the team was assigned tasks using textual instructions 
either via email or Facebook messaging.  Web-posters for my personal campaign 
website were developed with discursive exchanges over email in order to discuss 
amendments to the design.  I personally designed and built a basic website, using a free 
website building application at Webs.com.   Members of the remote-campaign team 
contributed to the website in designing and submitting to me, via email, photographic-
based posters, banners and logos.  These were designed using Adobe software and sent 
to me in image or PDF format, which I uploaded to the website.  
 The internet facilitated a virtual campaign-office in which I was able to conduct 
campaign team meetings, relatively in real-time, across geographical distances.  Despite 
living a significant distance away from the constituency, the internet facilitated my role 
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as a candidate, allowing me to comprehensively plan and organise my campaign 
strategy in advance of my move to the constituency.  To some extent, my early role 
could be described as a virtual-candidate insofar that I conducted my first month as the 
candidate remotely from Surrey.  I used internet technologies to help me campaign, 
communicate and organise as if I were already resident in Anglesey.  Facebook and 
email acted as both private and open meetings in which I could invite one individual or 
a number of individuals to engage in discourse in relation to specific campaign ideas 
and practical tasks.  The internet-based processes were not substitutes entirely for face-
to-face interaction, through which, as a candidate, I could have more effectively 
expressed emotions using expressions, gestures and social cues in relation to tasks, e.g. 
conveying a degree of enthusiasm and passion for the campaign.
641
   
Such interpersonal interaction would have had the potential to stimulate 
camaraderie between campaign team members, which was an ingredient to a successful 
campaign that lacked in the remote campaign team.  Instead, members of the team 
worked in isolation, which, rather than building stronger interpersonal relationships 
between the involved individuals, led to a focus solely on a task-completion-mentality, 
which, although efficient, was not conducive to the sustainability of the remote 
campaign team.  Therefore, in the run-up to my relocation to Anglesey, one-by-one the 
once committed members of the campaign team began to drift out of regular contact.  
This body of virtual campaign-assistants was gradually replaced by a denser 
concentration of face-to-face interactions with a constituency-centric campaign team 
constituted by members of the local Conservative association and supporters whom I 
drew-in through my interactions within the constituency. 
The nature of the daily role of the Conservative PPC in 2010, which involved a 
heavy reliance on bureaucratic-exchange and communication via internet technologies, 
namely email, meant that the isolation described above was exacerbated by the volume 
of internet-based candidate responsibilities.  A Conservative candidate in 2010 who did 
not possess at least basic email skills would have been limited in their ability to fulfil 
the expectations that the central-party at CCHQ London had placed on its candidates.  
Over my 117 days as PPC, the frequency of emails received in my campaign inbox, via 
my ant@politician.com, Mail.com, email address, increased significantly as time 
progressed.  Between 6 March 2008 and 28 May 2010, I received in total 4425 emails in 
relation to my various roles within Cameron’s Conservatives.  The average frequency of 
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emails received per day (inclusive of weekends) during that period was 5.44. In 
comparison, the emails received in direct relation to my parliamentary campaign in 
Anglesey, between 9
 
January 2010 and 25 May 2010, averaged a frequency of 20.81 per 
day.
642
  On busy days, my inbox received up to 90 emails within a 16 hour period. 
Many additional emails could be archived immediately.  However, an average of 21 
emails per day needed time and specific attention.  Emails from the CRD, the Welsh 
Conservative Press Office and the regional and national campaign headquarters often 
required intensive reading of attached PDFs.  Robin Walker testifies that as a PPC he 
did not have the time to read daily all of the emails sent by CCHQ.
643
 
As the Anglesey PPC, approximately 36 paper-based letters were received from 
constituents compared to a significantly greater 186 emails.  This was perhaps because 
of the relative speed and ease in sending an email when compared to traditional mail.  
However, one notable challenge for any candidate or MP is identifying the authenticity 
of the sender’s of email.  In 2010, unlike traditional letters, it was not customary to 
include a verifiable handwritten signature or physical address in emails.  Therefore, 
identifying whether the sender of an email is a legitimate resident of a politician’s 
constituency was challenging.  Some candidates and MPs chose to reply with 
instructions on automatic emails in the attempt to ensure an address was given.  For 
example, the parliamentary email account of, Conservative, Douglas Carswell MP sent 
automated receipts stating: ‘Please make sure your full postal address was included in 
your original email.  If not, please resend your message with your postal address.’644  
This demonstrates how some Conservative participants have engaged in a process of 
rethinking their approach to correspondence with constituents, since the advent of the 
use of internet communications in politics. 
 Second to emails, leaflet production was the most time-insensitive bureaucratic 
activity of the campaign.  By 2010, it relied almost exclusively on communication 
exchange via email.  As a candidate without a professional agent, I was reliant on one 
part-time administrator in the association office, a team of 16 part-time volunteers, and 
occasional digital assistance from my remote-campaign team.  Therefore, in relation to 
my printed communications, I took much of the responsibility for photographs, text, 
organisation, communication, liaison and printing.  My leaflets consisted of an 
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‘Introductory Leaflet’; ‘Election Address’; generic ‘Dear Elector’ letter; and small 
glossy leaflet.  I also advertised public meetings using a home-printed leaflet and 
adverts in local newspapers.
645
  The process of leaflet production included: writing the 
text; having it translated into the Welsh language using a professional translation 
company; sending the English and translated text to the printers by email in Microsoft 
Word in order for them to insert it into a generic template provided by the 
Conservatives’ literature pack; receiving the returned design proof from the printers; 
relaying back and forth between the printers in order to amend errors; emailing the final 
proof to a chain of Conservative-officials including the CCHQ directors in both Wales 
and London, and Cheryl Gillan MP for final sign-off; having the literature printed; 
having the prints delivered to the association office; driving by car the 40,000 printed 
leaflets to a Royal Mail Depot; and, finally, having the leaflets delivered by Royal Mail 
to almost every domestic dwelling in the constituency.  Therefore, leaflet delivery and 
production when multiplied by 650 Conservative candidates was a very time intensive 
process for each candidate, campaign team, CCHQ office and Conservative-official 
involved. 
In the Anglesey case, the efficiency of the process was significantly impeded by 
CCHQ email accounts having inadequate data storage capacities to cope with the sign-
off traffic and file transfer, especially at the times when large numbers of candidates 
sent digital proofs simultaneously.  In Anglesey, the process described above was 
delayed by, at least, one week because emails containing digital leaflet-proofs for sign-
off were not being received by the intended recipients in the sign-off hierarchy.  
Alexander Smith describes the bureaucratic culture of the Scottish Conservatives as 
‘banal activism’ in which ‘discursive artefacts’ like leaflets and press releases provided 
a distraction for activists from the reality of the electoral ‘crisis’ of the Conservative 
Party in Scotland.
646
  Similarly, the checks-and-balances in place to monitor traditional 
campaign literature, and the bombardment of digital internal-communications in the 
party in 2010, were so cumbersome a process that candidates without significant 
administrative support could become buried-beneath processes and bureaucratic 
distractions.  Ultimately, these distractions significantly limited temporal resources and 
detracted from the face-to-face campaign out-and-about in the constituency. 
Even though, at times, the limitations of CCHQ’s email systems led the process 
to collapse, in 2010, without the use of email whatsoever the bureaucratic intensity of 
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the sign-off process would have been impractical and relatively unworkable.  Email as a 
medium had been embraced by Cameron’s Conservatives in a manner in which, like TV 
in Macmillan’s Conservatives, the medium was assimilated into the party’s hierarchal 
structure.  Therefore, as an organisational tool, email facilitated the party’s hierarchical 
tendencies in the offline world without the need for face-to-face interaction or oral 
communication among the individuals in the chain of command.  The intensively 
cautious approach taken towards the release of paper-based printed media into the 
public domain was not applied with the same scrutiny to candidates’ online publications 
like blogs and social media.
647
  Therefore, this would suggest that Cameron’s 
Conservatives considered traditional media to be of greater importance to their overall 
election objectives than new media, but that some internet technologies like email had 
become essential organisational-tools in order for the party to effectively facilitate the 
scrutiny of its printed media in a hierarchical fashion. 
 
PPC for Ynys Môn and Social Media 
In my experience, candidates had relative freedom and autonomy in terms of their 
campaign’s internet presence in the respect that, other than the brief guidance in the 
campaign pack, there were no formal written rules or procedures distributed by the 
central-party to Conservative candidates.  This is supported further by responses given 
by Iain Dale.
648
  He claims that he ‘offered to write a candidates guide on the best 
practices for the use of blogs and Twitter.  The party initially thought it was a good idea, 
but nothing happened.’649  Dale believed that ‘candidates seemed too afraid to actively 
use blogs and Twitter.  They were often worried they would say something wrong and 
there would be consequences if they deviated from the party-line.’650  Dale testifies that 
he did not witness any attempts to manage the Conservative-blogosphere by CCHQ 
London, or communications professionals like Andy Coulson.  ‘Conversely, Labour did 
try to manage their blogging community.  But, as you would expect, they did it with the 
typical top-down approach.’651  This typifies a Conservative-belief that the Tories took a 
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different approach to the management of new media in the 2010 General Election when 
compared to Labour.  
I invested little time in blogs and social media during the Anglesey campaign 
when compared to other campaign methods.  Nevertheless, as a relatively young 
candidate, I felt it important to invest at least a minimal amount of time in social media 
in order to make potential political contact with, what I assumed would be, younger 
voters.  I carefully controlled my Facebook profile privacy settings and consciously 
sanitised my online postings.  For security reasons, I chose to limit what could be 
viewed and interacted with on my Facebook profile, and developed a more publically 
viewable and interactive ‘Facebook Page’.  Therefore, I existed on Facebook as one 
individual with two linked, but ultimately separate, digital personas – the personal and 
the political.  The second page was listed as a politician page on Facebook, which gave 
Facebook users the option to search my name and follow my campaign in their News 
Feeds by clicking ‘Like’ on my page.  Subsequently, the user became linked in 
interactive terms to my page.  The number of users that ‘liked’ the page accumulated 
over time.  I observed a number of other candidates using the page function in Facebook 
during their campaigns and expand on this in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
In terms of the Anglesey campaign, I used a simple blog application on my 
personal website in conjunction with Facebook and Twitter (@RidgeNewman) pages in 
an integrated manner.  Using an online application, I linked my political Facebook page 
to my Twitter page in order to duplicate my Facebook postings automatically onto my 
Twitter feed.  I had taken the time to compare both my Facebook fans and my 
‘Followers’ on Twitter.  I noted that the audiences of each comprised of significantly 
different individuals.  Therefore, the duplication of my Facebook postings on Twitter 
expanded my audience by almost double.  This enabled me to save the amount of time I 
spent using internet applications in order to focus my time on the offline campaign.  
Facebook, and subsequently Twitter, acted like a notice board for the advertisement of 
my blog posts.  Most blog posts were created in order to communicate the work I was 
doing in the constituency and to publish my views on carefully selected local and 
national issues.  I held the distinct belief that these posting would not lead to 
significantly greater numbers of votes, but rather to motivate my supporters and 
campaign team.  Therefore, the use of social media in the Anglesey campaign was 
primarily a tool for activist-mobilisation.
652
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PPC for Ynys Môn and Email 
Email was used regularly within the campaign team itself in order to organise canvass 
teams and locations.  My campaign coordinator and agent shared a Gmail email-account 
with me (anthonyforynysmon@gmail.com) in order to organise the internal and external 
campaign team contacts more effectively than the functions provided by my public 
email on Mail.com (ant@politician.com). The Gmail account had a calendar function 
which was used by the campaign coordinator to input my daily appointments and 
weekly campaign/canvassing schedule. Email in the Anglesey Conservatives’ campaign 
was used primarily as an internal communication-tool rather than a marketing device.  
Information that included instructions for campaign days was regularly emailed to the 
appropriate supporters and members of the campaign team.  This process worked 
effectively and had greater impact than social media.  The campaign team’s ages ranged 
between 20 and 70, with the majority being c. 60.  Therefore, email had become an 
established and effective medium for communication in the older cohorts of Anglesey 
Conservatives. 
I made requests to the same individuals to collect constituents’ email addresses 
while canvassing.  However, the Anglesey-based campaign team generally neglected to 
ask electors for their email addresses.  The common response to my request from 
members of the campaign team was that they did not understand why the collection of 
email addresses was necessary.  After repeated explanations of why I believed it to be 
important to collect as many voters’ emails addresses as possible during the campaign – 
for direct-marketing and campaigning purposes – the activists continued to neglect 
asking for email addresses on the doorstep.  Instead, they held a distinct preference for 
canvassing in line with their experience in previous campaigns.  For the Anglesey 
Conservatives, this meant not collecting traditional canvass data, but instead distributing 
leaflets and getting the candidate to ‘shake-hands with as many voters as possible’ 
before election day.  This shows how changing campaigning activities within the party 
at the constituency level can exhibit a form of inertia and resistance to change if the 
experienced individuals of the campaign team believe the changes to be unnecessary. 
 
PPC for Ynys Môn and Campaign Websites 
I managed a very primitive form of a candidate’s blog while campaigning for the 
general election.  I wrote a number of letters to the Holyhead & Anglesey Mail, and 
posted the text of any letters written into a webpage on my personal campaign website.  
I posted, usually after the event, notifications of where I had been on the island and 
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details of my campaigning activity with the aim of informing constituents of my 
activities.  My personal campaign website averaged 62.5 hits per day during my 117 
days on the campaign as candidate, with an approximate range of variation between 32-
94 hits per day.  The peaks and troughs of website hits appeared to have some 
correlation with campaign events, like major deliveries of literature and my appearances 
on radio or television; and periods when my profile as a candidate was less publically 
visible.  Using an online-tracking facility, I was able to identify the general 
geographical locations from which my website was being accessed.  Less than 10% of 
the hits were from the North Wales region.  The majority were from within the UK, but 
there were a significant number of hits from worldwide locations.   
On one occasion, during the final week of the campaign, I spoke to a constituent 
on his doorstep.  He had received my election literature through the Royal Mail postal 
service, but complained that there was not enough personal information about me on my 
election leaflets.  I explained that the address for my campaign website was printed on 
the leaflet and that there was more information about me on the website.  However, he 
replied saying that he should not have to go to a website and that he should have 
received the information about me in leaflet form.  Although this was an isolated case, it 
is typical of the kind of disregard for internet technology, especially in terms of political 
campaigning, that I found on Anglesey in 2010.  Therefore, I would suggest that my 
website had minimal impact on the Anglesey electorate in campaigning terms.  The 
11.5% increase in vote share which the Conservatives achieved on Anglesey
653
 was 
most likely due to the traditional campaigning techniques used like door-to-door 
canvassing and printed literature, and a highly visible and energetic campaign presence 
across the constituency. 
Albert Owen, the incumbent Labour MP, did not have a live website until the 
final weeks of the campaign.  His website was basic in terms of its content, features and 
aesthetic.  Ynys Môn was also the seat of Ieuan Wyn Jones AM, the then incumbent 
leader of Plaid Cymru at the Welsh Assembly.  Therefore, like Labour, Plaid Cymru 
had a buoyant and established support base and activist presence across the island.  
Dylan Rees, the Plaid Cymru PPC in 2010, required an extra 1243 votes in order to win 
the seat from Labour’s Owen.  Therefore, Anglesey was the number three target seat for 
Plaid Cymru in Wales.  Plaid Cymru invested visibly significant resources into their 
campaign.  Rees had the most sophisticated website of all the main party candidates on 
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Anglesey.  However, on election day, the Plaid Cymru vote share decreased by 4.9%, 
and although the Labour candidate was returned as the island’s MP his vote share 
decreased also by 1.2%.
654
  Therefore, there was no observable correlation between 
electoral success and investment in campaign websites on Anglesey in 2010.
655
 
                                                     
654
 Ibid., p534. 
655
 Williamson, ‘Inside’. 
188 
 
SIX 
Cameron’s Conservatives and Cyber Toryism 
2005-2012 
 
 
Since the 1960s, the gradual decline of the mass-based party in Britain has meant a 
decline in activity at the grassroots.
656
  However, by 2005, the power of the internet was 
beginning to be harnessed in political activism and meant that there was a developing 
realisation about the potential for activist empowerment.
657
  New innovations in the use 
of internet technologies led to the opinions of a new type of Conservative grassroots 
being catapulted firmly into the gaze of the central-party and its party-elites.  As Tim 
Bale has identified, ‘the website ConservativeHome provided an institutionalised forum 
for complaints – and one that could be easily accessed by the media’.658  This acted to 
peel-back the curtains of the Conservative Party and provide a transparent window 
through which the public could gaze on the party’s views and mechanisms, like never 
before.   
A number of snapshots of the grassroots-culture 2008-2010 were presented in 
Chapter Five.  These case studies, at the local association level of the Conservatives, 
were focused on narratives developed from candidate and association-executive 
perspectives.  Therefore, in order to place these very specific observational accounts 
within a more panoramic view of Cameron’s Conservatives, this chapter presents a 
wider-range of testimonies from across the national party.  It addresses how the advent 
of specific internet applications has impacted to change the party’s culture and 
organisation.  The respondents include activists, bloggers, candidates/MPs and a CCHQ 
employee.  Additional quotes are included from speakers who debated publically the 
role of social media in Conservative Party change at the party’s 2012 conference in 
Birmingham.  These provide a greater degree of multivocality and thus provide diverse 
Conservative Party insider perspectives.  Subsequently, the cases that were presented in 
Chapter Five can be understood more deeply in relation to the wider context.
659
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However, rather than presenting the narratives in a campaign-specific context, as was 
the case in last chapter, the following sections are focused on the technologies 
themselves as case studies for comparison.   
The first section of this chapter identifies the role of WebCameron in the daily 
life of the party leader and CCHQ staff, some of whom were actively involved in an 
ideas culture that led to the development of the online application.  The second section 
is an in depth analysis of the role of Facebook in Conservative Party organisation and 
includes also some quantitative data that were sampled while I was in the field in the 
run-up to 2010.  The section introduces the argument that a new type of Conservative 
organisational culture, which I call ‘Cyber Toryism’, emerged and evolved from the 
party’s young-participants engaged in grassroots-activism leading-up to 2010.  The third 
section examines the role of ConservativeHome and other blogs in Cyber Toryism, and 
suggests that the Conservative-blogosphere has impacted in both positive and negative 
ways in Conservative Party organisation.  The fourth section is an analysis of two 
centrally-controlled Conservative technologies, MyConservatives and Merlin.  The 
section discusses how in comparison with the non-centrally controlled media, like 
Facebook and the ConservativeHome blog, the CCHQ projects did not impact 
significantly on the organisational culture of the party’s 2010 campaign.  The final 
section is used to draw together my conclusions for the chapters in Part III.  It argues 
that the advent of the internet has led to a degree of decentralisation of CCHQ control at 
the top of the party with a loosening of power that has shifted to, and is shared 
collectively by, individuals closer to the grassroots of the party’s hierarchy. 
 
WebCameron: Watching the Leader 
 
David Cameron, as the new leader of the Conservative Party, launched his online 
campaign in the form of WebCameron at www.webcameron.org.uk on 30 September 
2006.
660
  The event marked the beginning of a new type of campaigning activity for the 
leadership of the Conservative Party.  Moreover, it was the first use of a video blog by a 
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prominent political leader.
661
  Tim Bale suggests that Cameron’s first WebCameron 
video, which showed the Conservative leader washing-up dishes, and being a dad at 
home with the kids, was symbolic in that it encapsulated ‘the new man’ ideal of the 
time.
662
  I would suggest that the strategic use of WebCameron conveyed a number of 
additional messages to the electorate.  It portrayed the Tory leader, who was best known 
for his privileged Etonian-background,
663
 as a man in-touch with the busy work-life 
balance of contemporary Britain.  It suggests that Cameron, as a son of the British elite, 
realised the importance of conveying an image of normalcy in a time when television 
viewing was dominated by a viewer demand for ‘reality’.   
British television and other media in the 2000s had become dominated by a 
public fascination for observing the mundane nature of everyday lives.
664
  
WebCameron, was the Conservative Party’s attempt at a web-based Do-It-Yourself 
Tory ‘Big Brother’.665  The advent of new internet video technologies, and the growth 
in new media uses, had enabled the party-elite to effectively broadcast their leader via 
his own personal online-channel, for the first time.  The use of this new medium gave 
Cameron and his team complete editorial control over output.  It placed the control of 
this type of media back in the hands of the Conservative Party, the likes of which had 
not been seen since the early days of political television in the 1950s.  Furthermore, 
WebCameron was symbolic also in party leadership terms, because, like those 
prominent new media-using Conservative leaders before him, e.g. Stanley Baldwin and 
Harold Macmillan, Cameron was attempting to master the new medium of this age. 
 According to Craig Elder’s firsthand testimony, Cameron and his close Tory 
allies played a significant role in the party’s use of new media, like WebCameron.  
Elder describes how Francis Maude, as party chairman, enthusiastically oversaw the 
party’s developments in the use of internet technologies for campaigns, and that George 
Osborne had the best understanding of, and talent for, the technological uses of internet 
applications in Conservative politics.  According to Elder, Osborne ‘was obsessed with 
                                                     
661
 J. Downey and S. Davidson, ‘The Internet and the UK General Election’, in D. Wring, J. Green, R. 
Mortimer and S. Atkinson (eds.), Political Communications: The Election Campaign of 2005 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005), p. 95. 
662
 Bale, Cameron, p. 314. 
663
 Michael Hill, ‘Arrogant Posh Boys? The Social Composition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 
and the Effect of Cameron's “A” List’, The Political Quarterly [online:] DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
923X.2013.02430.x (2013). 
664 See, for example, Annette Hill, Lennart Weibull and Åsa Nilsson, ‘Public and Popular: British and 
Swedish Audience Trends in Factual and Reality Television’, Cultural Trends, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2007),  pp. 
17-41. 
665
 Big Brother is a worldwide reality television show produced by Endemol, online: 
http://www.endemol.com/programme/big-brother. 
191 
 
getting the iPad, which at that point had not been released in the UK.’666  Elder claims 
that Osborne took a hands-on approach to driving forward the central-party’s use of the 
internet.  Therefore, both Osborne and Maude worked closely with Cameron in order to 
provide the support at the top of the party hierarchy that was needed to secure 
successful investment in the use of digital media for applications like WebCameron.  
 
David Cameron and particularly George Osborne were instrumental in empowering our team 
and giving us the backing that we needed at the top level.  Another key person to mention in 
the 2006 period was Francis Maude.  He was absolutely instrumental as party chairman.  So, in 
terms of organisational structure, Francis was absolutely key particularly with the launch of 
WebCameron, which in 2006 was the first of its kind – as a political party leader’s video blog.  It 
did a very good job in terms of humanising David, because David was obviously a massive, 
massive asset.  He was certainly unlike what had come before him in that he was able to 
connect with the British people in a way that a Conservative leader had not since the early days 
of Major.  So, for us, we needed to be able to use that asset, and David was very keen, and in 
particular Steve Hilton, who was Cameron’s Director of Strategy, was very keen that we used 
the internet as much as possible.  Firstly, because the internet is quite useful in a branding 
sense – we needed to be portrayed to be a younger fresher party that was more in touch with 
the kind of needs and values in modern Britain.  Heavy use of new technology was seen as a 
way to do that.  But more importantly it was seen that we could reach a key demographic, a 
younger demographic – an internet demographic if you like.  There was also a real focus on the 
idea that the mainstream media was forcing us always to unhelpfully aim for that five second 
clip on the Six O’clock News.  New Media allowed us to make our statement, not at length, 
because apparently nobody wants to listen to a politician talk at length, but it would allow us to 
have our say on our terms.
667
 
 
This perspective from inside the central-party and the team behind the branding 
of Cameron’s Conservatives shows that the use of the internet for the party in 2006 was 
a strategic choice at the very top-level, with the explicit intention to reach-out to a 
younger generation of Conservative voters and supporters.  Furthermore, Elder’s 
perspective of WebCameron being a tool for communicating the Cameron-brand on 
their own ‘terms’ was a view also held by a grassroots-party activist in 2010, who 
suggested that ‘WebCameron was obviously a way for David Cameron to choose the 
moments that he wanted to share with the rest of the world.’668  Therefore, Cameron’s 
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team made an early attempt to control the national party brand through the use of the 
internet, the process of which impacted on the manner in which the Conservative-elite 
around Cameron organised their weekly duties. 
 
You could not have WebCameron without Cameron.  He was always really, really committed to 
it.  The early days were interesting because it was a very amateur production, but that actually 
gave it a lot of its charm.  Four years on, after we made many strides forward in terms of video 
production quality, we hired a professional camerawoman to come in and work very closely 
with David – with him, in many cases, for a lot of the time during the day - and people still 
remember the video that was shot on the tiny handycam, dimly lit in his kitchen.  David was 
always very accessible.  He was always very interested in it.  He was always challenging us to 
make it better and make it more interesting.  I had many jobs when I first arrived at the party, 
so David did not always appreciate quite how busy I was, along with the rest of the team.  But 
quite often I would be in the back of the car with David going to various places and just chatting 
away with him and he would ask why I could not be with him all the time.
669
   
 
The advent of the internet was changing significantly the traditional roles of 
some CCHQ workers.  The incorporation of new media in the roles of communications 
staff was impacting in a way that it demanded more versatility and on-the-road duties 
than the traditional communications staff.  Elder’s role as a CCHQ worker now 
included being a pseudo-journalist and cameraman.  Essentially, as campaign and new 
media trends developed over time, Elder’s role evolved simultaneously and led him to 
become Cameron’s personal in-house broadcast journalist.  According to a study by 
Rachel Gibson, by 2010, this type of internet-based democratic activity, which she 
refers to as ‘citizen-initiated campaigning’, had further developed into an emerging 
trend in British politics.
670
  The advent of the use of new media in this way interrupted 
Elder’s bureaucratic duties and placed him into a position in which he acted as a media 
professional.  This is reminiscent of the way CCO staff in the late 1950s adapted their 
roles to incorporate the use of new broadcast technologies in their new TV studio.
671
  
Therefore, it is evident that, like television in the 1950s, internet new media in the run-
up to the 2010 General Election began blurring some of the roles, activities and 
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responsibilities of individuals within the Conservative Party’s CCHQ organisation.  
Conservatives at CCHQ were restructured to incorporate a growing digital media team, 
which in addition to Elder included the likes of Rishi Saha, CCHQ head of new media, 
Rohan Silva, communications special adviser, and Samuel Coates, who had previously 
worked for the ConservativeHome blog.  These were in addition to the senior 
communications strategists like Steve Hilton, the creator of WebCameron, and Andy 
Coulson, former editor of the News of the World, both of whom had significant 
influence over the Conservative Party message.
672
 
Elder’s testimony suggests that without the enthusiasm of the key political 
leaders at the top of the party, the organisation of the party towards new media would 
have been slower to develop. 
 
Cameron took a really keen interest in WebCameron which enabled us to do a lot of things.  
David gave us two things.  He looked at the videos and said, “Well why would anybody want to 
watch this?”  He gave us an unprecedented level of access and trust and he also gave us the 
backing we needed essentially to go off and get CCHQ budget to hire someone with a broadcast 
background to follow him with a professional quality camera and produce a broadcast quality 
film – which took WebCameron up to the next level.  The reason why that was incredibly 
important for us was that come the election, and really in the year leading up to the election, 
Sky and the BBC would call us and say “We have just seen the WebCameron video; can we have 
the tape of that, we want to play that out on TV.”  I do not need to tell you the quality of having 
footage controlled by us, put together by us and broadcast by us on the Six O’clock News.  That 
was pretty incredible for us.
673
 
 
Cameron’s approach to the inner workings of the use of new media in his campaign 
would suggest that when the party leadership takes ownership of a new medium, the 
medium has a significant chance of gaining some prominence amid competing 
traditional media platforms, which, again, is reminiscent of the late 1950s and the 
party’s approach to television under Macmillan.674  In the case of WebCameron, it 
would seem that Cameron himself understood the public mood of the time: that the 
people wanted access to the real politician, rather than the gloss and ‘spin’ that had 
become characteristic of the New Labour years.
675
  Therefore, the advent of these new 
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media trends allowed Cameron the opportunity to portray himself as a grounded 
politician in-touch with the real lives of real people through reality footage.  This 
demonstrates that Cameron held some personal confidence in the medium; and had a 
relaxed attitude towards the recording and broadcasting of the more mundane aspects of 
his life as a political leader.  Essentially, this confidence came from the control that the 
Conservatives held over the production of the footage and the manner in which it was 
broadcast via the internet.   
However, although the controlled nature of WebCameron was seen as a positive 
victory for the Conservative political and organisational elites in the political media 
battle of the 2010 campaign period, it was not long before the Cameron machine had to 
adapt again its ideas of how to use effectively the internet as a tool for campaigning.  As 
Therese Coffey testifies, the approach to brand-Cameron loosened overtime as the party 
began experimenting with the inclusion of more interactive-forms of new media, like 
live interactive-chats on Mumsnet, a medium over which Cameron had no control.
676
  
This suggests that Cameron’s Conservatives were observing changing trends in new 
media uses and incorporated some plasticity into their digital strategies in order for the 
plans to adapt and change over short time scales in line with the rapid development of 
new internet applications.  Tim Bale suggests that Cameron’s Mumsnet webchat was 
one of a string of publicity stunts which the party stage-managed in order to present a 
cuddlier-Conservative-face to the public.
677
 
Prior to 2006, the use of the internet in Britain had been largely limited to 
personal and private use.  However, the party leader’s act of using WebCameron, 
signalled to the wider Conservative Party that it was ‘okay’ to integrate the use of new 
internet applications in communicating the Conservative message.  Elder believes that 
WebCameron was the beginning of a change in political use of internet technologies in 
Britain and that it ‘kick started more innovative use of web-technology’.678  This 
suggests that the use of WebCameron by the party leader acted as a catalyst for further 
participation in e-political communication and organisation within the party.  Elder 
suggests that WebCameron was the finest hour of the Conservative new media 
                                                                                                                                                           
Journal of Communication, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2000), pp. 209-239; and Raymond Kuhn, ‘Media 
management’, in Anthony Seldon (eds.), Blair’s Britain 1997-2007 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
pp. 123-142.  
676
 RNA Therese Coffey, 1 April 2011, Appendix 9, p. 178. 
677
 Bale, Cameron, pp. 291-292. 
678
 RNA Elder Interview, p. 41. 
195 
 
campaign, because it made a positive story on the front page of the Guardian during the 
Conservative Party Conference 2006. 
 
...this new era of engagement where politicians were appearing at the hand of a tiny handycam 
on tiny little YouTube videos.  I think that WebCameron probably did play its role in changing 
the way politics is done online.  I would not be so grandiose to suggest that it played as much of 
a role as anything that happened in the Obama campaign, but I would probably say that it was 
not far off it.
679
 
 
Elder criticises the WebCameron project for being more costly to the party than 
necessary,  believing that the same result for the project could have been achieved 
‘using a free blog platform on a YouTube channel’680 and questions why the party did 
not simply broadcast Cameron from YouTube.  However, Elder suggests that 
WebCameron as a platform allowed the party to do more than what YouTube could 
offer in that the party was able to encourage interaction through the ‘Ask David’ 
application.  The public could vote for questions which were proposed to Cameron for 
his response, and thus this placed some control of the agenda in the hands of the voter.   
Elder claims that the hits WebCameron received in the initial launch period averaged 
approximately 150,000 per day.  However, these numbers eventually settled to between 
5000 and 6000 hits per day,
681
 which, according to Elder, was greatly fewer than the 
hits for the party’s central website Conservatives.com.  Eventually, in the run-up to the 
2010, WebCameron was migrated to the Conservatives.com website where it became 
integrated with the party’s corporate web-presence.  This helped drive web-traffic to 
both platforms through search-engine optimisation techniques; and build a diversified 
audience for the Cameron-Conservative brand.
682
  Cooper claims that a number of 
Conservative Party campaign videos ‘went viral’, and that WebCameron was ‘an 
invaluable resource to show people what David Cameron thought’.683 
The WebCameron narrative tells us something about the relationships between 
the Cameron’s Conservatives leadership team and the CCHQ digital team at that time.  
It demonstrates the elite ideas-culture at the top of the party hierarchy from which the 
trajectory for the use of new technologies in Tory politics has stemmed.  WebCameron 
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had its genesis in the mind of a party adviser Steve Hilton.
684
  The idea was fertilised by 
the enthusiasm of the party’s most influential leaders for embracing new technologies.  
The WebCameron project evolved over time and the work of CCHQ staff like that of 
Craig Elder began to adapt and change in order to accommodate the demands for the 
party’s use of this new technological application.  Ultimately, the WebCameron project 
facilitated a direct channel for David Cameron as leader of the opposition to not simply 
connect, but, also, interact with the electorate in a manner that had not been seen before.  
Most significantly for the Conservative Party, WebCameron acted as both a symbol and 
a visual signal, validating the use of the internet in Tory politics for the wider-party 
collective.  Subsequently, in the years which followed, the wider-party’s use of internet 
technologies increased significantly. 
 
Facebook: The New Face of Conservative Party Organisation 
 
While the advancements in Tory web-applications and technologies like WebCameron 
had their developmental stages rooted in a CCHQ ideas-culture in the central-elite; and 
once the publically visible symbols of WebCameron and Ask David signalled to the 
wider-party that the use of internet technologies in the Conservative Party was 
acceptable, the party’s social media culture began to evolve organically at the party’s 
grassroots.  Rachel Gibson argues ‘that digital media are introducing a new grassroots-
based mode of “citizen-initiated campaigning” that challenges the dominant 
professionalised-model of campaign management by devolving power over core tasks 
to the grassroots.’685  Although Cameron’s Conservative-elite first led the way with 
WebCameron, the remainder of this chapter will present data that suggests that Gibson’s 
new type of digital campaigning was exhibited at the Conservative-grassroots in the 
run-up to 2010.  However, I argue that, in the case of the Conservative Party, these uses 
of new media were most affective in party and campaign organisation, rather than for 
connecting and communicating with the electorate.  There is little evidence in the 
documentary, ethnographic or interview data of this research to suggest that CCHQ 
actively encouraged and/or discouraged activists, candidates and/or associations to use 
email or social media in their local campaigns or party organisation.  In fact, the 
evidence presented in Chapter Five and in the remainder of this chapter suggests that the 
central-party gave relative freedom to its participants in terms of their use of internet-
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based political applications in the run-up to 2010.  This is supported also by Fisher et 
al.’s study of campaign activity in the general election.686   
This suggests that the historic Conservative Party tradition of autonomy for each 
Conservative association allowed each group of local Conservatives to take decisively 
their own approach towards the use of email, social media and websites for political 
communication.  It suggest also that prior to 2010, the assimilation of new media into 
Conservative Party culture had not yet been fully realised and/or understood by the 
central-party’s operations.  Evidence collected at the Conservative Party Conference in 
October 2012 would suggest that the party’s understanding of the role of new media in 
its political aspirations and party organisation has matured since 2010; and that CCHQ 
is now beginning to actively engage in the dissemination of educational information on 
social media and online campaigning in order to school Conservative participants in 
‘best practice’ for the use of new media in political campaigns and organisation.687  This 
is similar to the party’s approach to TV education in the 1950s. 
By 2008, in the run-up to the London Mayoral Election campaign, Facebook had 
begun being used as an organisational tool for political mobilisation in the 
Conservatives’ ‘Back Boris’688 campaign.689  The wider trends in the use of 
Facebook,
690
 in which individuals and collectives were employing its social networking 
capabilities for personal communication and socialisation, had begun being embraced 
within the organisational culture of Conservative Party campaigns.  According to Ben 
Howlett, the turning point for the assimilation of Facebook within the party was when 
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Boris Johnson released a Facebook ‘App’ for the campaign.691  Oliver Cooper explained 
how Facebook was used to organise teams of young Conservative activists to mobilise 
the Conservative vote in the 2008, 2009 and 2010 elections. 
 
In terms of Conservative Future (CF), the first thing you do is start on Facebook. You would say, 
“I want to have a campaign day”, because my agent in this constituency, or my chairman, or my 
candidate has said, “I want to have this many activists out.”  You would talk to them and either 
get money for refreshments or a lunch or so on.  We could then pledge that to our activists and 
put that on Facebook and you get more people turning up.  If you have done your job in getting 
money from the association for refreshments or lunch, then it is a much easier sell.  I organised 
council by-election campaigns in the local area, in Hampstead and Kilburn, leading up to 2008 
and 2009, and we managed to get a lot of local campaigners from UCL [University College 
London], King’s College London [KCL], LSE [London School of Economics] and so on.  We did, 
explicitly, go out saying that we need to get young people involved, because, frankly, the old 
people are going to campaign in their backyard. The young people are the added bonus that 
are going to push you across the finishing line.  So, we did use Facebook very heavily.  I think I 
set up probably 10 campaign day events for every by-election going, and it is tried and tested - 
and it seemed to work.
692
 
 
This testimony offers a perspective of a young Conservative activist at the sharp 
end of Conservative Party campaigns in London in the run-up to 2010.  It suggests that 
younger Conservative activists are more likely than older activists to use Facebook and 
travel outside their local geographical and political boundaries in order to assist 
campaigns advertised on the social networking site.  It reveals that Facebook was used 
at the local level as an in-house marketing-tool in order for key Conservative 
participants, who were in activist mobilisation roles, to sell campaign activities to 
younger members of the party through an interactive digital medium of their generation.  
The selling mechanisms used were made more effective when Facebook’s direct 
targeting was combined with the traditional incentives of complimentary refreshment, 
thus resulting in a quid pro quo campaigning culture at the heart of the Facebook-
facilitated activism.  Nils Gustafsson conducted a study in Sweden which used 
interviews of focus groups to assess the role of social networks in political participation.  
The findings correlate with this thesis, in that already politically active individuals were 
more likely to be proponents of the use of social networks for political mobilisation.  
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However, those who were politically inactive were unlikely to be spurred into political 
activity through social media alone.
693
  
In the Conservative Party case, Facebook was used as a tool to persuade and 
mobilise Conservatives to participate in campaigns to which they would not have 
contributed traditionally due to geographical barriers.  Campaign organisation was taken 
to the hub of communication that was being used already on a daily basis for general 
socialisation by the younger generation. 
 
People log onto their Facebook every single day and, if you do pester them, then, in effect, they 
will cave in, which is why, if you do organise 10 campaign day events and only 10 of your 
activists in your group of 300 friends on Facebook turn-up, that is still 10 activists more than 
you would have otherwise – and 10 times your 10 campaign days is probably more activists 
than you will be able to put on the street than the association will itself.
694
   
 
The use of Facebook in this way helped to make participation in Conservative activism 
a more fluid and decentralised process.
695
  At a fringe event during Conservative Party 
Conference 2012, one activist commented that they believed that social media had 
brought the party closer together, suggesting that ‘from a party organisation and 
campaign point of view’ it encourages activists to give mutual-aid in other geographical 
locations.
696
  Therefore, this would suggest that there is now at the grassroots some 
realisation of how internet technologies have impacted on the party’s organisational 
culture and understanding of its benefits in aspects of political campaigning.  
Furthermore, since 2010, the application of social media in campaigns is being 
discussed and debated with interest from both inside and outside the party.  Therefore, 
social media has become assimilated into the party’s inter- and intra- cultural discursive 
behaviour. 
By 2008, the Conservative Party had begun using online venues as a place to 
meet the next generation of British Conservatism.  Once connected through Facebook, 
from the comfort of a personal laptop or desktop computer, prominent individuals with 
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skill in using online social networking tools were able to effectively impact on the 
numbers of activists attending campaign days in the offline world.  Cooper’s personal 
narrative gives some cultural insight into the discovery and development of Facebook 
within young Conservative circles around that time. 
 
I joined Facebook in 2006, when I first went to university.  I had never heard of it before the 
day I signed up for it and there were very few people at university that were on it at that time.  
One person that used it very effectively was the president of my conservative society at UCL - 
Richard Jackson.  He was very effective, and still is very effective in organising events and 
organising complete campaigns for CF and for otherwise on Facebook.  He did not teach me - 
he did not sit me down and lecture me on exactly how to do it, but it is good best practice to 
copy, and it is pretty simple best practice to copy.
697
 
 
This evidence supports one of the central arguments on which this thesis is based: that 
Facebook, as an organisational tool for the Conservative Party, developed organically at 
the grassroots of the party.  The use of the social network to mobilise support for 
Conservative events and campaigns grew-out of the leadership of individual innovation.  
In this specific case, it was the leadership of a university Conservative society president, 
which was then observed and copied by other Conservative participants in other parts of 
the party organisation.  Therefore, as this learning and copying culture was passed-on 
from one group or individual to the next, both the on- and off- line activist behaviour 
and activity proliferated to provide significant impact for the party’s grassroots 
operations.  The use of digital technologies by Cameron and Johnson, the face of the 
Conservative-elite, had signalled to the party’s grassroots that innovative use of new 
media for the party’s gain was an appropriate activity in which to engage.  Young 
activists at the Conservative grassroots then responded accordingly within on- and off- 
line environments, which provided relative freedom for a culture of digital 
experimentation and innovation that was tempered only by the party’s traditional 
organisational cultures.  
 Like many social phenomena which evolve rather than become founded in some 
act or constitution it is challenging, if not impossible, to outline with any certainty the 
moment of genesis when Facebook became a significant part of Conservative Party 
organisational culture.  However, Cooper’s personal observations offer his perspective 
on how it may have come about: 
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Within Facebook we have had groups and pages and then new groups have come along, and 
these different architectures are used by different people.  I guess there is a bit of an 
evolutionary aspect to it, in that the people that cannot use Facebook particularly well are kind 
of nudged aside by other people in the organisation in Conservative Future and told to follow 
the UCL Conservative Society group’s structure.  They get 400 people a year going to their 
event, so they obviously know what they’re doing.  And, I guess, best practice spreads that way.  
Because there’s certainly no training days or courses that I’ve been to on how to use Facebook 
to get people to campaign.
698
 
 
The 2006-2007 UCL Conservative Society president, Richard Jackson,
699
 was a close 
personal friend of, and worked closely with, the 2008-2010 CF national chairman, 
Michael Rock.  During that period, the role of the UCL Conservative Society was one 
of national prominence in the CF movement.  UCL Conservatives’ close proximity to 
CCHQ London; the London Mayoral Campaign 2008; and their influential position and 
relationship with other prominent University of London colleges which had CF 
societies, meant that the society wielded a significant influence on the manner in which 
CF and its use of internet technologies developed in the run-up to 2010.  Furthermore, 
the observations and interviews which inform this research show that, prior to 2010, 
Facebook was largely used by the younger demographic of the Conservative Party.  
Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the evolution of widespread use of Facebook 
within the Conservative Party had its roots in the CF movement, and, perhaps, more 
specifically in UCL Conservatives. 
Richard Jackson’s role as a leading figure in the use of Facebook and his 
position of leadership and interconnectedness between influential networks at CCHQ, 
the Carlton Club, the Back Boris campaign, the University of London colleges, Cities of 
London and Westminster Conservative Association and the CF movement meant that he 
was a key figure on Facebook who utilised his connections to a significant quantity of 
quality Conservative ‘Facebook Friends’ interested in activism.  Therefore, Jackson’s 
early role in the passive dissemination of the use of Facebook in CF, and subsequently 
the wider-Conservative Party, may have been an additional significant factor in the 
development of Facebook being used as a tool for Conservative organisation in 
                                                     
698
 Ibid., p. 108. 
699
 Richard Jackson is now a CCHQ London press officer and was contacted informally to verify some of 
the facts detailed in this section.   
202 
 
campaigns in London and, later, nationally.  Jackson played a mediatory-leadership role 
in Tory new media culture in the 2000s, similar to that of Edward Heath c. 1960. 
By the 2010 General Election, the use of Facebook as a political organisation 
tool had become an accepted application for use by many Conservative parliamentary 
candidates.  René Kinzett offers his perspective on the political communication process 
that a candidate was likely to take when selected for a parliamentary seat. 
 
One of the first things they did almost straight after they put out the press release or even 
before they put out the press release was that they set up a Facebook group.  You wanted to 
make sure that you had enough people to join it straight away.  You monitored what other 
political parties were doing in your area on Facebook and you used it as a way of not just 
signing up existing members. The age profile of constituency association members/officers 
means that perhaps they were not the most switched on in terms of e-access, and certainly the 
use of social media.  It was a good way of reaching out...
700
   
 
Kinzett is claiming that, in some cases, a Facebook presence for a newly selected 
candidate took priority over the traditional press release.  If so, this would indicate that 
there has been a significant change in the political communication culture of 
Conservative candidates since the advent of social media.   
Through social media, candidates were beginning to be able to take charge to 
some extent of the dissemination of their own communications through their own 
channels on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and/or in using a blog.  WebCameron had 
claimed-back from the broadcasters some control and power over output for the central-
party.  Similarly, Facebook shifted some of the power from CCHQ to the local 
candidate at the party-grassroots.
701
  As Kinzett suggests, a further benefit of Facebook 
was that it allowed Conservatives to group together individuals, who were supporters of 
that specific candidate’s campaign, in digital venues within the social network.  These 
venues were called Facebook ‘groups’ and/or ‘pages’.  Facebook, therefore, provided 
some power to the candidate as an organisational tool for political mobilisation of non-
geographically bound supporters, which in turn enhanced the candidate’s experiences in 
a local campaign context. 
 Kinzett identifies the importance of having a number of Facebook users showing 
their support on a candidate’s group and/or page, and Howlett goes further in explaining 
his view: 
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Facebook is very good from the PR [public relations] perspective: “Great I am more popular 
than you are.”  Facebook is literally a popularity contest.  The more people that “Like” your 
page, the more popular you are - as a rule of thumb.  In terms of being able to transfer those 
into votes, I would be very interested to see what the hit rate would be - I don’t think it is going 
to be huge, but it helps.
702
 
 
Howlett believes that, for some politicians, Facebook was a competitive tool used to 
demonstrate political popularity.  However, he recognises that if there were a link 
between Facebook popularity and gaining votes, in 2010, it was tenuous.  What is 
clearer is that some Conservative politicians and their teams believed it to be politically 
and organisationally advantageous for them to develop a presence and audience on 
Facebook in the run-up to 2010 – even though there was little explicit direction from the 
central-party on the matter.  The extent to which Facebook was used by politicians and 
political groups, and its efficacy for building an audience and/or campaign support, 
varied significantly. 
 
Facebook: The Political Shopping Mall? 
It is important to appreciate the dynamic nature of social media, but especially in the 
case of Facebook.  Facebook’s coding architects make regular changes to its functions 
and how the site operates.
703
  This means that retrospective historical research that uses 
Facebook activity to assess Facebook-culture is virtually impossible unless the 
Facebook data has been permanently recorded in some way at the specific moment of 
interest.  The quality and validity of Facebook data as a record for historical inquiry 
degrades progressively the further away from the period of interest one begins 
sampling.  This research attempted to restrict such limitations to a minimum in using the 
relative immediacy of the ethnographic approach.   
As presented in Tables 1 and 2 below, between 1 December 2009 and 31 May 
2010, I sampled, using online chain-referral, collected and recorded Facebook data from 
a number of political Facebook (1) groups and (2) pages.  I followed them over the 26 
week period, which covered the run-up to the 2010 General Election and beyond for an 
additional 25 days.  Some data, including Facebook Wall and Facebook email 
messaging activity, was collected and counted cumulatively over the 26 week period. 
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Other data, including textual information; the quantities of group ‘Members’ or page 
‘Fans’/’Likes’; and privacy settings, were recorded once, 7 May 2010.  It is important to 
note that the data recorded on 7 May were only true at the point they were recorded and 
may have changed or been changed at any point during the 26 week observation period.  
The dynamic real-time nature of Facebook means that information and values presented 
in its groups and on its pages could have changed from moment to moment.  Therefore, 
whereas the cumulative data provides a relatively true reflection of the activity over the 
26 weeks in the run-up to the election, the static data give only an indication. 
I counted and recorded the data in a spreadsheet in order to compare a number of 
basic activity indicators for Facebook pages and Facebook groups.  The indicators 
observed during the 26 week period for the Conservative Facebook groups include the 
number of: group members; Facebook emails sent by the group’s administrators to 
group members; textual posts on the group’s Facebook Wall; textual comments added 
to Wall posts by group members; group social events posted by the group; political 
campaign events posted by the group; photos posted by the group on its Facebook Wall; 
videos posted by the group on its Wall; ‘Likes’ added by group participants to its Wall 
posts; hyperlinks added by group participants to the group’s Facebook Wall; and the 
privacy setting - whether the group was open, closed or secret.  Throughout my 
experience within the Conservative Party as both a political activist and as an 
ethnographer, a number of Conservative Party-affiliated Facebook groups were brought 
to my attention through the networking nature of the Facebook application.  
Subsequently, I joined and monitored the groups I deemed most pertinent to this 
research.  I personally selected a sample of 14 in order to present a cross-section of 
types of Conservative Party-affiliated Facebook groups.  These are outlined in the 
‘Archives and Sources’ section in the Introduction of this thesis and presented below in 
Table 1.  
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         Table 1. Conservative Party-affiliated Facebook groups activity indicators 01/12/2009 - 31/05/2010 
 
I intended to monitor also 14 political Facebook pages.  However, the sample 
was reduced to 13 pages for observation due to Gordon Brown, Leader of the Labour 
Party 2007-2010, not having an official political Facebook page.  Brown was the only 
leader of the three main British political parties to not have an official public and 
political presence on Facebook.  On searching the name ‘Gordon Brown’, a number of 
pages and groups relating to Brown appeared in the Facebook search results.  The 
themes of these groups were significantly weighted toward calls for him to resign as 
Prime Minister.  As potential substitutes, I searched for two alternative leading Labour 
Party figures, Harriet Harman and David Milliband.  Like Brown, they did not have any 
official public or political presence on Facebook, other than the official Labour Party 
page which represented the general central-party collective.  This would suggest that in 
2010 the Labour Party’s central operations took a different approach to the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, whose leadership teams were well represented by 
official political pages on Facebook.  These findings reflect those of Fisher et al., who 
found that ‘Labour’s level of e-campaigning was lower than that of both the 
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Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, suggesting that the latter did indeed make 
particular efforts in this area.’704   
 
Table 2. Political party-affiliated Facebook page activity indicators 01/12/2009 - 31/05/2010 
 
Diverse political pages for both individuals and collectives were selected in 
order to represent a range of types of political interaction on Facebook.  Again, the 
sampled pages are outlined in the ‘Archives and Sources’ section in the Introduction 
and presented here in Table 2.  The activity indicators used to represent the digital 
social-interaction on any given Facebook page refer to actions that were performed by 
either the page ‘Facebook Administrator(s)’ (FA) or public interaction(s) (PI).705  These 
are presented for comparison as numerical data and are intended to show the 
frequencies of activity types and interactions of a range of political individuals and 
groups that had a Facebook presence 2009-2010.   
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Table 1 shows that the 14 Conservative Party-affiliated Facebook groups’ 
membership figures ranged from 47 for Aberconwy CF to 641 for Conservative Way 
Forward.  All of the groups had the status of their privacy settings operating as ‘Open’, 
which suggest that the information viewable on the groups’ pages were deemed by the 
group’s administrators to be non-sensitive.  The university groups demonstrate some 
correlation in the number of members and the frequency at which the group sent 
Facebook email messages to the group.  UCL CF with its 250 members sent an average 
of three emails per month.  This is compared with KCL CF’s 154 members to 0.83 
emails per month, and Aberystwyth CF’s 74 members to 0.17 emails per month.  It 
would appear that the greater the membership of a group, the more frequently Facebook 
messages were sent to the group members by the group’s administrators.  A similar 
trend is observable when comparing the association-based CF groups.  Cities of London 
& Westminster CF had the largest membership of any of the CF groups and sent an 
average of 2.67 Facebook email messages per month.  Richmond Park CF with its 173 
members sent 0.83 emails per month, and Aberconwy CF with its 47 members sent 0.50 
per month.  The trend continues further when comparing the candidate groups.  Nigel 
Huddleson had the largest number of members at 261 and sent 0.67 emails per month.  
Michelle Tempest with 161 members sent 0.33 emails per month.  A similar trend is 
shown in the Tory-affiliate groups.  The Bow Group with 609 members sent on average 
1 email per month.  Progressive Conservatives had 423 members and sent 0.67 emails.  
The Tory Reform Group had 394 and sent 0.33 emails per month.   
The three outliers, Runnymede & Weybridge CF, Anthony Ridge-Newman, and 
Conservative Way Forward, did not follow the trends within their categories and were 
subsequently not used in the comparison.  This suggests that, although there appears to 
be a trend in the relationship between the number of members of a Conservative 
Facebook group and the number of email messages they sent per month in the run-up to 
2010, there were those groups that were more active and others that were less active 
than similar types of groups in their categories.  For example, unlike the other Tory-
affiliate groups, Conservative Way Forward sent no Facebook emails to its members in 
the 26 week period.  However, during the same period, Conservative Way Forward used 
traditional-email eight times to communicate with their members, which they addressed 
as ‘Colleagues’.706  This compares to no emails being received from The Bow Group,707 
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of which I was an active member.  Therefore, some Tory-affiliate groups used 
Facebook-email to substitute communicating with their members by traditional email; 
and others, like CWF, used exclusively traditional email while maintaining also a 
Facebook presence. 
Furthermore, Conservative Way Forward had a lower Wall posting activity than 
the other Tory-affiliate groups, whereas the Progressive Conservatives were 
significantly more active in the number of items posted to their Wall.  Therefore, a 
diverse range of activity was observed between the groups.  However, there were some 
observable trends in terms of Wall activity.  The Facebook groups with the largest 
memberships in the university CFs (UCL CF), association-based CFs (Cities of London 
& Westminster CF) and candidate group (Nigel Huddleson) categories show the highest 
activity in terms of administrator Wall posts.  These same groups show significantly 
higher event posting activity.  Therefore, this would suggest that the most popular 
Conservative Facebook groups were those which were more social and more active both 
on and off Facebook.  Moreover, it would suggest that there was a direct and mutually 
dependent relationship between on- and off- line political activity; and that, in 2010, 
having a strong presence in both the on- and off- line domains assisted the growth of 
Conservative support both on and off Facebook. 
Table 1 shows data specific to Facebook groups. The functionality of Facebook 
groups in 2010 leant towards use for organisational aspects in Conservative culture.  
Facebook group function enabled administrators to organise, promote and communicate 
easily for both social and campaign event purposes.  The captured audience within a 
Facebook group received information from automated event notifications and Facebook 
email messages when group administrators published event information.  This meant 
that event organisation was targeted, simpler and faster.  Its application on Facebook 
was also more dynamic than other electronic alternatives like email technologies.  The 
administrator could monitor guest/RSVP lists in real time as members actively 
responded with the click of a Facebook button to invitations via their Facebook profile.  
Therefore, Facebook groups played a significant role in changing and enhancing the 
organisational culture of those groups within the Conservative Party which actively 
used Facebook groups to develop their offline socialisation and campaign operations.   
Table 2 shows similar data for Facebook pages.  However, it is important to note 
that Facebook pages in 2010 functioned in a different way to Facebook groups.  One 
significant difference is that, unlike group members, there was no way of emailing 
Facebook page ‘Fans’ collectively.  Pages were public, and communication activity was 
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centred primarily on the page’s Facebook Wall.  Individuals with a Facebook profile 
could be invited to, or chose independently to, ‘Like’ a page and therefore become a fan 
of that page.  Pages were used to promote both individuals, e.g. David Cameron as a 
politician, as well as collectives, e.g. the Conservative Party as a political movement.   
Facebook pages acted like shop windows for both individuals and collectives 
within the Conservative Party.
708
  Websites also act like shop fronts, except they are 
accessed by a loosely organised global audience.  Facebook is populated by a body of 
individuals who make a choice to develop a personal presence within its password-
protected, and, therefore, more tightly organised, semi-closed, online community.  
Through their interests, Facebook users make additional choices to congregate online as 
members of Facebook groups or as supporters of a cause, an individual and/or a 
collective through expressing an electronic thumbs-up.  Therefore, in the case of 
politics, Facebook pages act like shop fronts situated in a distinct online community – 
rather like an online political-mall in which the political-consumer, first, makes the 
decision to go shop at the mall; and, second, tour and browse some political-shop fronts 
before publically buying into political-brands by becoming a ‘Facebook Fan’.  It is like 
carrying a branded-carrier bag and displaying to all at the mall that you have bought-in 
to a particular political product.  In the political popularity contest that is facilitated by 
Facebook pages, the idea is to encourage as many users to carry your political-carrier 
bag as possible.  According to research by Southern and Ward, the Conservatives, 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats had fairly equal levels of Facebook use in the 2010 
General Election.
709
  Therefore, Facebook in 2010 was a particularly useful tool across 
the political spectrum for those politicians who used it effectively. 
A simple comparison of the ‘Likes’ columns shown in Tables 1 and 2 show how 
the scale of interactive activity differed significantly from Facebook groups to Facebook 
pages.  The Facebook pages yielded a significantly greater level of interaction by non-
administrators than Facebook groups.  Therefore, where Facebook groups encouraged a 
shift in Conservative organisational culture both on- and off- line, it would appear that 
Facebook pages attracted significantly greater online activity in terms of the volume and 
frequency of interactions.  The number of ‘Likes’ or ‘Fans’ a political Facebook page 
had in 2010 could differ considerably.  The fan results in Table 2 can be split into two 
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distinctive groups.  Firstly, the lower profile politicians including Anthony Ridge-
Newman, David Jones, Kwasi Kwarteng and Robin Walker had quantities of page likes 
ranging from Walker’s 125 fans to Jones’s 346 fans.  Secondly, the higher profile 
politicians including Boris Johnson, David Cameron and Nick Clegg each had tens of 
thousands of fans, from Johnson’s 49,733 to Clegg’s 73,084.  In contrast to Southern 
and Ward’s generalised study, the specific Facebook cases here indicate some 
differences between the ways in which participants interacted with individual political 
party Facebook pages.  Comparing the Clegg and Liberal Democrat pages with the 
Labour and Conservative pages shows that the campaign events activity postings was 
low for Labour and the Conservatives, but higher for the Liberal Democrats.  Therefore, 
the Liberal Democrats were more inclined to advertise their campaign pursuits on their 
main Facebook page than the two other main parties.  This suggests that Labour and the 
Conservatives considered that their campaigns had strategically more to lose in doing so 
than the Liberal Democrats.   
However, there was greater posting activity by the Conservative leadership than 
the Liberal Democrat leadership in terms of photographs and videos.  There were 56 
photos and 34 videos posted by page administrators to Cameron’s page compared to 14 
photos and 32 videos posted by page administrators to Clegg’s page.  The 
Conservatives page, which had the most number of fans at 111,540, had also the 
greatest activity in posting 78 photos and 71 videos.  The Labour page, which had the 
lowest number of fans of the three main parties at 61,485, posted 0 photos and 21 
videos.  The Liberal Democrats, with 91,878 fans, posted 15 videos and 53 photos.  
These figures demonstrate how in the run-up to the 2010 election, the Conservative 
Party was the most popular party on Facebook, even though Clegg was the most popular 
political leader of the three main British parties.  The Labour Party was the least popular 
party and it had significantly lower activity in terms of integrating its publicity and 
media with its Facebook pages.   
The Conservative Party was the leader in terms of updating its centralised 
Facebook pages and integrating them with visual media.  There was also greater activity 
by both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in terms of posting links to 
external sites.  Therefore, the two parties used Facebook to actively promote their other 
online interests like blog postings and links to central-party website pages with greater 
intensity than Labour.  The average likes per Wall post is a good indicator of public 
interaction by non-administrators.  Table 2 shows that the higher profile politicians’ and 
the main political parties’ pages range from 78.31 average likes per administrator 
211 
 
posting for the Liberal Democrat page to 148.06 average likes per Conservative page 
administrator posting.  Overall, the Conservatives were consistently the party with the 
greater administrator and non-administrator public interactions on their Facebook pages.  
Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the Conservative Party had the greatest intensity 
of activity on Facebook in 2010.  The Liberal Democrats were not far behind the 
Conservatives in the levels of interaction with the new medium.  However, Labour were 
distinctly less engaged with the use of Facebook’s public pages.   
One notable difference between the Conservative Party pages in the sample and 
those of Labour and the Liberal Democrats is that most of the Conservatives allowed 
non-administrators to post on the Wall.  When I sampled the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat pages, any non-administrator posts were hidden.  Johnson’s page Wall had 
1189 postings by non-administrators and Cameron had many thousands, which I 
deemed too many for an ethnographer to count effectively and efficiently on Facebook.  
However, I did note that there was a considerable peak in the number of postings on 
Cameron’s page between 11-12 May 2010, during which time it was officially 
announced in the wider-media that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats had 
reached a coalition agreement and that Cameron would be the next prime minister.  The 
non-administrator postings on Cameron’s Facebook page Wall were both positive and 
negative in their content and tone.  I noted that the majority of negative postings and 
comments could be deemed to be of an offensive nature, because of the expletives and 
profanities used in them.  These results would suggest that the Conservative Party in 
2010 took a more laissez-faire approach to the sanitisation of its public interactions on 
its politician’s pages than Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
 
Facebook:  Dissolving Barriers 
Facebook was used effectively by the Conservatives to encourage participation within 
the party organisation by new and more established party supporters.  Facebook groups 
were used as a tool to organise events and campaigns.  Facebook pages became for 
some candidates a political shop front from which the administrator could furnish the 
page Wall, like a window display, with visual multimedia including text, photographs, 
videos and hyperlinks to market and sell the candidate and collective Conservative 
Party cause to captured and public audiences.  In using Facebook, candidates and 
activists at all levels of the Conservative Party had access to, for the first time, a 
medium which held the potential for relatively unknown politicians to develop an 
audience and demonstrate their popularity in a publically viewable manner.  Ordinary 
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candidates and activists had the potential to challenge the traditional party hierarchy in 
having the opportunity to engage with a medium in which both the grassroots 
participant and party leader had access to the same platform.  Therefore, Facebook’s 
role in the Conservative Party contributed to a cultural change in the daily practice and 
use of political technologies in an array of areas in the party’s organisation and for a 
significant number of individuals.   
By 2010, Facebook was acting as a venue that brought together like-minded 
individuals in locales within cyberspace which did not discriminate in terms of spatial 
limitations and geographical boundaries.  Facebook brought candidates and potential 
activists from across the country closer together than ever before insofar that, with the 
immediacy and localisation of Facebook through the internet, geographical boundaries 
were seen as much less limiting.  In doing so, it removed the reliance of candidates and 
activists on the traditional party structure which had been long dominated by CCHQ and 
the national party organisation.
710
  It would seem that this use of Facebook had begun to 
dissolve the traditional and historic barriers and boundaries for candidates and activists 
at the grassroots in terms of political communication, which, since the 1950s, had been 
largely dominated by television and the gradual centralisation of political profile and 
output.  Therefore, Facebook further empowered for the Conservatives a dynamic 
grassroots communication culture, which is in line with the theories about technological 
impacts on internal democracy that Gibson and Ward evaluate effectively.
711
  As the 
oral testimonies indicate, Facebook appears to have allowed and facilitated: easier 
organisation of offline socialisation; otherwise unknown participants to develop a 
profile, and a platform from which their voice was more readily heard; and the 
opportunity to promote messages outside of those dominated by the traditional 
centralised control.   
Most significantly, Facebook, as an internet application, facilitated a 
technology-centred innovation culture at the grassroots, which evolved and spread 
through a learning, adapting and copying behaviour by Conservatives who used the 
medium early on in the 2005-2010 election cycle.  However, it is important to be 
cautious about generalising about Facebook behaviour in this context, because of the 
demographic and leadership trends which played significant roles in the history of 
Facebook’s evolution as a political-organisation communication tool for the 
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Conservative Party.  A range of respondents have supported one of the key observations 
of this research that, in the run-up to 2010, the majority of Conservative-minded 
individuals interacting with politician pages on Facebook were representative of the 
younger-wing of the party.
712
  The testimonies above have provided narratives which 
are useful in understanding how unwitting leadership within prominent CF groups led to 
the passing down of Facebook best practice in an organic manner through observation 
and learning.  It was through this behaviour that a new and distinctive internet-based 
cyber-culture within CF began to proliferate.  I have named this Conservative Party 
organisational culture ‘Cyber Toryism’, which has much of its development and 
proliferation rooted in the population and behaviour of the groupings of younger-aged 
individuals within the party.  The culture of Cyber Toryism in turn led to a loosening of 
the control that the central-party had over party organisation, and its communication and 
campaign operations.
713
   
 
The Blogosphere: ‘A thorn in the side’ or the ConservativeHome? 
 
Cyber Toryism’s role as a powerful, sometimes subversive,714 force in the Conservative 
Party in the run-up to the 2010 General Election, and beyond, was perhaps most 
encapsulated in the Conservative-blogosphere.  In June 2010, there were approximately 
417 Conservative-affiliated blogs, compared with 245 Labour-affiliated blogs and 261 
Liberal Democrat-affiliated blogs.
715
  These figures support my observation that in the 
run-up to 2010 the Conservative-blogosphere was the most abundant and active in terms 
of the number of active Conservative-blogs and the frequency at which the bloggers 
published articles.  The results from Southern and Ward’s research support further these 
findings.  Their figures for the 2010 General Election show that 58% of Conservative 
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parliamentary candidates used blogs compared to significantly lower figures for Labour 
at 40.5% and the Liberal Democrats at 32.3%.
716
   
At a Conservative Party forum event, in early 2010, the Chairman of the Welsh 
Conservatives introduced Iain Dale as a speaker and suggested that very few active 
Conservative participants would go to bed at night without having read the ‘Iain Dale’s 
Diary’ blog.  Whether or not that statement was true, it demonstrates the Conservative 
Party’s appreciation for the role of blogging and that there was recognition in senior-
ranks that individual Conservative-bloggers could achieve prominence and influence in 
the daily lives and culture of Conservative participants.  Furthermore, it reiterates the 
significance of the role of leadership in Cyber Toryism.  In this case, an individual 
blogger, who was an actor in a position of leadership, influenced the behavioural 
patterns of some Conservative participants within the party. 
 The ConservativeHome blog was another blog of significance that played a role 
in Cyber Tory leadership in the run-up to 2010.  It was, and remains, the most illustrious 
example of Cyber Toryism in terms its role and impact in the party’s day-to-day 
organisational culture and the blog’s influential prominence, which reached the 
attentions of Conservative participants at virtually all levels of the party’s hierarchy.717  
Elder testifies that the CCHQ Press Department dealt with bloggers in the run-up to 
2010,
718
 but suggests that it is important not to ‘confuse blogging with journalism’.719  
He argues that bloggers, especially those involved with ConservativeHome behave 
rather more like lobbyists and pressure groups, even though they may come from a 
journalistic background.  However, a former employee of ConservativeHome and other 
respondents to this research would disagree.  Jonathan Isaby argued that: 
 
I am a journalist.  I worked for the BBC for four years.  I worked for the Daily Telegraph for five 
years.  I have worked for ConservativeHome for two and a half years.  As far as I am concerned, 
I am still pursuing a journalistic career by doing ConservativeHome.   I suppose a lot of bloggers 
would regard themselves as kind of individual citizen journalists.
720
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The newness, and evolution-in-progress,
721
 of the role of blogging as in interdisciplinary 
phenomenon, in the run-up to the 2010 election, meant that a clear consensus was and 
remains absent among the Conservative sophisticate on the definitions of what blogging 
is and what bloggers are, and how the blogosphere fits is the wider picture amid the 
traditional institutions of state like the press, the public, pressure groups and political 
parties.  Dan Burstein’s historical anthropology view of blogging argues that blogging 
has been in constant evolution because its precursors date-back to cave paintings and 
more recently the practice of writing a diary.  He argues that these are cultural 
communication artefacts and that ‘blog-like phenomena’ have been observed repeatedly 
throughout the ‘history of civilisation’.722   
Burstein suggest that ‘blogs are particularly interesting because they marry so 
much personality and attitude with this complex mix of software technologies.’723  
Perhaps the uniqueness of blogging in the Conservative context is that its versatility as 
an internet platform for use in policy and discourse meant that it was able to be moulded 
to be what individuals or groups wanted it to be in order to serve their own purpose - 
thus placing their personal stamp on it - rather than mirroring the identity of the central-
party.  I would suggest that it was for this reason that blogging meant different things to 
different actors in the party and the wider-democratic environment.  Even with the 
benefit of hindsight following the 2010 election, a degree of ambiguity in relation to 
blogging, and microblogging (e.g. Twitter), remained extant in the Conservative-
discourse as recently as October 2012. 
Peter Oborne, a Daily Telegraph columnist and ConservativeHome critic
724
 
suggested that ‘ConHome is a remarkable phenomenon, which has created a new force 
in politics that is not yet fully understood’.725  Oborne continued in claiming that the 
blog draws ‘sharp-suited’ lobbyists, but attracts the interest of only ‘0.0001 percent of 
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the population’.  He suggested that the online publication is to ‘the Right’ of Cameron’s 
Conservatives’ political ideology and policy, and likened it to the 1980’s ‘Leftist’ 
movements within the Labour Party.  Oborne argues that the blog is used to propagate 
the views of Lord Ashcroft and Tim Montgomerie, which ‘represents a narrow stroke of 
the sophisticate’.726  Tim Hames’ observational perspective indicated towards a strong 
belief in the prominence of the ConservativeHome blog in referring to the Conservative 
Party Conference 2012 as ‘The ConservativeHome Political Conference, to which the 
rest of the Conservative Party has come along’.727  These comments were made in a 
debating context in order to provoke thought and reaction, and the speakers were 
focused on identifying whether ConservativeHome is a help or hindrance to Cameron’s 
Conservatives.  However, their discourse reveals that those with influence and interest 
in the Conservative Party believe and perceive ConservativeHome to have made a 
significant impact on the party’s organisational structure, dynamics and process of 
policy development. 
 Montgomerie believes that ConservativeHome has been part of, and contributed 
to, an ‘internet revolution’, which has led to the ‘most radical decentralisation of power 
in modern times’.728  He likened it to the significance of the Industrial Revolution, from 
which time the, now, traditional media began assuming control of the public agenda.  
Montgomerie claims that ConservativeHome cost $15 per month in set-up cost, which 
he considered comparably cheap when the launch of a student magazine would cost in 
excess of £400, and that the blog achieves a daily online readership of 15,000 to 25,000 
individuals.  He believes that the ‘transfer of power is huge’,729 because a reader no 
longer has to wait for The Telegraph to deliver news to them and ‘the little guy can 
stand-up to these big organisations’730 using affordable and accessible internet 
technologies.  Furthermore, Montgomerie predicts that the ‘Fordist monopolies’ of the 
big political parties are likely to fall and when that occurs internet-based mechanisms 
through applications like the ConservativeHome blog will ‘fill the void’.731  As 
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discussed in Chapter Two, this prediction is in keeping with Helen Margetts’ ideas for 
the emergence in Britain of ‘the Cyber Party’.732 
 On initial assessment, Montgomerie’s claims might appear grandiose. However, 
an understanding of ConservativeHome’s genesis gives an insight into the mind behind 
the operation, which began to transition from an idea to a reality in 2005 while 
Montgomerie worked for The Telegraph newspaper.  Cooper explains that: 
 
ConservativeHome was set up explicitly to campaign on the issue of selection, because they 
were outraged at the fact that the Conservative Party membership did not really have that 
much of a choice over who the leader of the Conservative Party was and, as a result, they have 
always had this campaigning streak – in trying to reform the party and keep the party to a form 
of Conservatism that the editors and, therefore by extension, the readers share.
733
 
 
Tim Bale describes this as, ‘Montgomerie leading the campaign to maintain the 
democratic rights of ordinary members’ of the party.734  Therefore, Montgomerie’s 
longstanding objective for the blog has been to shift power from the party’s centre in 
order to influence and catalyse reform in the party’s organisational processes.  To some 
extent Montgomerie’s objectives have been realised already and the ConservativeHome 
blog is another example of where individual leadership in the use of Conservative-
affiliated internet media has encouraged a culture of Cyber Toryism at the grassroots of 
the party. 
 Both Howlett and Cooper claim that ConservativeHome has been viewed by 
CCHQ and the Conservative leadership as a ‘thorn in the side’ of the Conservative 
Party.
735
  Walker believes that in order for ConservativeHome to be credible, unlike the 
centrally controlled ‘Blue Blog’,736 it must remain independent of the central-party.  He 
believes also that ConservativeHome has a significant role to play in party policy and 
organisational discourse at the grassroots of the party – although at times it is a 
challenge to party unity.
737
  Coffey suggests that one of the risks for the party is that the 
lines can become crossed between ConservativeHome commentary and the official 
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Conservative Party standpoint in the public sphere.
738
  This would suggest that there are 
concerns within the party about the decentralising impact of ConservativeHome, and 
other internet applications, on the central-party’s level of control of its official 
communications and key messages.  The primary impact of these internet applications 
used by Cyber Tories at the party grassroots in 2010 is the blurring of the boundaries in 
the party’s organisation.  It reveals that the perceived ambiguity in relation to the 
understanding in the public consciousness of the dividing lines between the official and 
unofficial spokespersons is considered by some party officials to be a threat to the 
party’s public identity.739  
Coffey and Walker provide the 2010 candidate perspective and agree that the 
role of ConservativeHome at that time was to open greater channels for ‘conversation’ 
at the grassroots.  They believe it allowed the candidate selection process to be more 
transparent – rather than a closed affair hidden under the control of CCHQ and 
Conservative associations.
740
  This candidate perspective demonstrates how to some 
degree the party was being forced by ConservativeHome to loosen its grip on 
information and processes at the heart of its organisation and traditional process.  Isaby 
provides a ConservativeHome perspective on this: 
 
Historically, I suppose sometimes the party would officially not want to have internal 
[candidate] selection information out in the public domain. But I would say that the nature of 
the information filter is such that it gets to us anyway. So I think the party before the last 
election became resigned to the idea that, “Oh well, ConservativeHome will find out anyway – 
so we might as well just release it.” I suppose in that sense the medium of the internet has 
assisted with creating a bit more openness and transparency about how these things are 
done.
741
 
 
Therefore, some in the wider-party consider the internet to have had some 
impact on the central-party’s traditional culture of control and secrecy, believing it to 
have led to a greater openness, transparency and loosening of centralised processes.  
Subsequently, ConservativeHome had a good relationship with candidates.
742
  In fact, 
Coffey suggests that, used as a platform, ConservativeHome is an excellent ‘shop 
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window’ from which candidates are able to place themselves on display to the wider 
Conservative Party.
743
  Furthermore, she claims that ConservativeHome has an 
unparalleled position to mobilise activists to key by-election campaigns as it did in the 
Crewe and Nantwich By-Election in 2008.
744
  This evidence suggests that Gibson et al. 
could be incorrect in their claim that blogs ‘are not mobilizing tools’ for grassroots 
activity.
745
  It also demonstrates why academic caution should be taken when applying 
generalised claims across political parties and phenomena. 
  The oral testimonies indicate that the proliferation of Cyber Toryism, like 
ConservativeHome, has led to concerns about the impact of non-centralised internet 
applications on the party.  However, they indicate also that there was an understanding 
within the party of the benefits that this new-wave of internet-based political innovation 
was providing for the party organisation and its electoral performance prior to the 2010 
election.  Isaby suggests that ConservativeHome’s success was due to its ‘unique’ and 
‘niche’ role within the party.  He claims that the blog has excellent relationships, not 
only with candidates and grassroots Conservatives, but, also, with the traditional 
mainstream media.  He disagrees with Walker on the point that the blog is a challenge 
to party unity and believes that instead it is a democratising force that has become the 
primary source of information on the Conservative Party for many individuals inside 
and outside the party.  Isaby claims that without ConservativeHome the information 
would not be available publically on a real time daily basis.   He explains that the 
internet allows for a cross-fertilisation of ideas and media.  Through 
ConservativeHome’s integration with social media, like Twitter, it means that the 
conversation is wide-reaching and open to anyone.
746
  Therefore, ConservativeHome’s 
unique role in both lobby journalism and as an evolving organelle of contemporary 
Conservative Party organisation, which now functions and impacts in both the on- and 
off- line worlds, means that the blog is primarily impacting on the evolution of the 
party’s organisational culture from the grassroots up. 
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MyConservatives and Merlin: Campaign Magic? 
 
MyConservatives 
Where natural evolution and individual leadership fed the growing culture of Cyber 
Toryism at the Conservative Party’s grassroots, Cameron’s Conservatives at CCHQ, 
and the technologies they were developing in the run-up to 2010, had significantly less 
impact on the party’s organisational culture and dynamics.  Two of the most significant 
developments in the central-party’s aspiration for the use of new internet-based 
technologies in the Conservative Party campaign 2010 were the ‘MyConservatives’ 
application, Cameron’s Conservatives’ contribution to Web 2.0, and the Merlin 
database that was introduced in Chapter Five.  The Conservative Party’s corporate 
website best defines MyConservatives, and claims also that the application has evolved 
now since 2010: 
 
The original version of the site, launched in the build-up to the General Election, saw over 
10,000 people working together for change in 390 different campaigns across the country. It 
helped to support a number of candidates into seats by raising their profiles and 
communicating the key areas that they stood for. It also gave electors a new way to directly 
access their representatives and other members of the community with similar outlooks and 
aspirations - both of these areas generated significant amounts of funding that would not have 
been achievable via more traditional fundraising activities.  We learned a lot about how to 
campaign online as a result and we have used that knowledge to redevelop the website.  We'll 
be showcasing the new site at Conference and shortly after it will become one of the key 
permanent features in our online campaigning toolkit.
747
 
 
This application, which was controlled and produced by the Conservative Party, acted 
as an online venue in which Conservative officials and participants could meet and 
engage with other people interested in assisting Conservative campaigns from both 
inside and outside the traditional party.  To some extent, the application reformed the 
manner in which the party assimilated campaign support at the local level and, like 
Facebook, at the same time removed the geographical barriers which had traditionally 
hindered long-distance support of a particular candidate or campaign.  Many candidates 
had used already Facebook applications for that very purpose.  However, although 
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Facebook was a useful e-organisation tool, unlike MyConservatives, it did not allow 
individuals to donate easily to a specific candidate’s campaign fund. 
 The party raised approximately 25% of their online-fundraising via 
MyConservatives.com.
748
  Craig Elder testifies that the central purpose of 
MyConservatives was to encourage online-donations from individuals who would be 
willing to support a specific candidate but not necessarily the Conservative Party 
directly.  However, Elder suggests that the application would have been more successful 
if it had been launched a year earlier in September 2008.
749
  Iain Dale agrees on this 
point and argues that the application did not have enough time to mature.
750
  Unlike the 
more-established social media sites of Facebook and Twitter, MyConservatives did not 
deeply infiltrate the culture of Cameron’s Conservatives.  Therese Coffey made some 
use of MyConservatives.com raising approximately £450 for her campaign in the 
Suffolk Coastal Constituency.  She claims that it was an application that some of her 
friends used to donate easily online.  The amounts of the individual donations ranged 
generally between £10 and £50, with one person donating £150.  However, she 
criticises the application as frustrating her ‘because none of it really worked.’751  Coffey 
states that she used extensively Twitter, but that MyConservatives failed to improve the 
organisation of her campaign. 
 As a target seat candidate for Worcester in 2010, Robin Walker’s use and 
analysis of MyConservatives was similar to those of Coffey.  Walker testifies that he 
used the application to raise approximately £200 and to organise some elements of 
campaigning.  He argues that MyConservatives was an improvement on what the party 
had before it, but that it was not as streamlined in its functionality or as ‘effective’ as 
some online-charity fundraising applications like ‘JustGiving’.752  Both Coffey and 
Walker agree that MyConservatives was a work in progress for the party and that with 
development the application had the potential to significantly assist campaign 
fundraising and organisation.  Therefore, MyConservatives had only a minor impact in 
the party’s organisational culture in 2010.  It contributed to some extent in radiating-out 
the experimental ideas of the party’s technological-elite at CCHQ to the lower levels of 
the party hierarchy.  In that respect the application acted in a similar way to 
WebCameron.  Like WebCameron, MyConservatives mediated direct and controllable 
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access for Conservative politicians to their audience.  However, when compared to 
WebCameron, the MyConservatives branding was significantly inferior and launched 
too late to have an equivalent impact in changing significantly party organisation.  The 
oral testimonies provide a general consensus that MyConservatives, as a new medium, 
was a viable concept with potential for the future, but that it simply failed to mature in 
time for it to reach its full potential in the run-up to 2010. 
 
Merlin 
The Merlin database was another new Conservative Party-specific technology which 
was widely perceived within the party organisation to have failed to reach its potential 
prior to 2010.
753
  This was a topic of frustration across many types of individuals 
involved in the Conservative Party in the run-up to the 2010.
754
  Hugh Meares suggests 
that the central access to the Merlin database hindered the local association’s use of 
email in the election: 
 
Because all of the email addresses that are held on Merlin are available to the party centrally, 
what we have is the party involved in a communications programme in which the associations 
are not involved.  What I believe they’re doing is damaging our ability to use this 
communication.
755
 
 
Furthermore, according to Elder, it was the inadequacies of Merlin which hindered also 
the extent to which the potential uses were realised by Conservative participants in the 
MyConservatives application in the run-up to 2010. 
 
MyConservatives ended up being a standalone platform with data which needed to be 
manually inputted and extracted.  That should never have been the case.  In 2010, you should 
have been able to make any database speak to any database and we should have been able to 
make that work much more effectively than we were ultimately able to do.  Now we certainly 
lay the blame for that at the feet of the infrastructure problems that Merlin faced.  Could it be 
that it was a project too big? Could it be that we bit off more than we could chew?  For 
somebody else to answer, but it seems that way to me.
756
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Robin Walker claimed that his campaign team used effectively Merlin as a 
successor to Blue Blue Chip, but suggested future improvements to Merlin were needed 
in order to integrate successfully its uses with other new internet technologies used by 
the party, e.g. a personal digital assistant (PDA). 
 
Merlin is a much friendlier interface, it is much easier to use and it can provide you with much 
more relevant and targeted information than the Blue Chip system.  The Blue Chip system was 
getting on for twenty years old and it was beginning to show.  I think with Merlin it was a step 
forward, but it is still a pretty clunky piece of software and you could see the real difference 
between the business world in which you have a huge market, and therefore the software gets 
developed very quickly, and very effectively, and the political world in which the market is 
actually a lot smaller. Therefore the software is rather slower, more out of date and clunkier.
757
   
 
In comparison with Blue Chip, Merlin was viewed by these respondents as an advance 
in technology for the Conservative Party.  However, their testimonies suggest that as a 
technology with internet capabilities, Merlin did not significantly change or 
revolutionise the culture in which Conservative canvassers participated already in 
campaigns.   
Procedural customs around the uses of Blue Chip had developed already over a 
20 year period prior to the advent of Merlin. Therefore, in terms of its role in 
canvassing, Merlin inherited its user culture from Blue Chip.  The internet capabilities 
of Merlin in 2010 enhanced the central-party’s access to database information.  
However, Merlin’s interface with other Conservative internet-based technologies like 
MyConservatives was limited due to the infancy of both technologies and the lack of 
time available for them to mature prior to the run-up to 2010.  Had there been a speedier 
development and integration of these technologies then it is likely that their capabilities 
would have played a significantly greater role in the nature of the party’s campaigns and 
the organisational culture in which party participants used the technologies. Unlike, 
WebCameron and Facebook, the Merlin network and MyConservatives application had 
not been advanced to a stage in which they held any real revolutionary capacity to 
change the manner in which the party organised itself at the grassroots.  However, there 
is evidence to suggest that some database administrators, like association agents and 
chairmen, underwent a process of bureaucratic adaptation in order to successfully 
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interface with the user complexities and harness Merlin’s advanced capabilities in 
associations and CCHQ offices.    
 
Conclusions 
The main themes of Chapter Five, which include a digital and age divide; digital 
bureaucracy; digital campaign-enhancement; dissolution of geographical boundaries; 
heterogeneity of Conservative associations; integration of new technologies in 
traditional hierarchies; and rapport and digital trust signals, at the local level of the 
Conservative Party, set the context for Chapter Six which has argued the case for an 
observable technological sub-culture in the party’s wider organisational culture.  The 
two main national groups of collective participants in the official Conservative Party 
organisation – Conservative associations and CF branches – are primarily divided by 
age.  The age divide, in addition to secondary factors like the differences in the ways in 
which these two main groups are structured and organised, led to different responses to 
the use of internet technologies in the run-up to General Election 2010.  Both groups are 
social in nature.  However, CF participants embraced the uses of online social 
networking tools with greater enthusiasm and thus used them as devices for socialising 
without the traditional geographical limitations under which Conservative associations 
generally operate.  The use of the Facebook application by younger members of the 
party allowed for greater networking activity and socialisation both on- and off- line.   
There became two distinct organisational cultures within the party in the run-up 
to 2010.  Amid the general heterogeneity of Conservative associations nationally, there 
were those collectives of individuals who engaged primarily and sometimes exclusively 
in the traditional communication and structural processes of Conservative Party 
organisation; and those who transferred and assimilated much of their activity within 
the organisation of the Conservative Party to the internet – with the development of a 
mutually beneficial relationship between on- and off- line Conservative Party 
operations.  As the latter group of individuals grew, there was a proliferation of 
dynamic interactions between both collectives and individuals within the party that led 
to a distinctly different organisational behaviour and culture when compared to the more 
traditional view of Conservative Party interaction and organisation.  It would appear 
that the primary factor influencing these behavioural and cultural differences was the 
role of internet applications, primarily between 2008 and 2010.  Therefore, I have 
named the development of this distinct cultural phenomenon within the organisational 
culture of the British Conservative Party, which I apply exclusively to the run-up to the 
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2010 election period, as Cyber Toryism in order to distinguish it as a subculture from 
the party’s traditional and overarching meta-culture.758 
 It seems plausible to suggest that the visible use of internet technologies and 
applications by prominent Conservative leaders, like Cameron and Johnson, in a 
campaign context was a signal to those within the party organisation who were actively 
engaged in the use of the internet in both personal and political capacities that 
innovative use of the internet for the gain of Tory Party operations was appropriate.
759
  
This latent but symbolic message from the party leadership acted as an unwitting 
catalyst for subsequent growth in the use, experimentation and innovation of internet 
applications that assisted in the organisation of intra-party affairs in the run-up to the 
general election.
760
  Applications like Facebook acted as online venues for party 
participants to congregate and engage in the organisation of Conservative Party events, 
discussions, debates and campaigns.  This in turn led to well organised and well 
attended party events and operations in the offline world. 
Although the cultural dynamics of Cyber Toryism are likely to have been 
punctuated due to visible endorsements of the use of internet technologies by influential 
figures at the top of the party hierarchy, which itself was a result of wider techno-
cultural evolutions in wider society, it is evident that the evolution of the phenomenon 
perpetuated firmly from within the ranks of the party’s grassroots.  Prominent Tory 
activists, candidates and lobbyists, like Richard Jackson, Iain Dale and Tim 
Montgomerie, respectively, took innovative steps to embrace the first uses of Facebook 
and blogs in effective ways, which in turn helped to enthuse a new generation of 
Conservatives for whom the internet was already part of their daily lives.  The 
proliferation of Cyber Toryism developed with the transfer of the behaviours and 
practices of the traditional political culture of the younger members of the Conservative 
Party on to a new mode of internet-based participation within the party.  This resulted in 
a co-existence of both on- and off- line cultural phenomena, which were observable and 
learnable by other Cyber Tory neophytes.  A culture of copying, adapting and enacting 
the use of new media in Conservative Party organisation and campaigns meant that the 
phenomenological significance of Cyber Toryism continued its growth and proliferation 
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from a London-centric base prior to and during the 2008 elections to wider national 
reaches in the run-up to 2010.   
By 2012, the veil of latency of Cyber Toryism had begun to lift from the party’s 
consciousness.  Although the party did not use the tag of ‘Cyber Toryism’ to describe 
the observable behavioural changes in its organisation, the identification of a cultural 
change had begun nevertheless to receive some cognitive analysis by members of the 
party’s sophisticate and grassroots participants.  This realisation and enlightenment in 
the party’s consciousness of the role of social media as a powerful force for change 
within the Conservative Party further impacted in the dialogue, discourses and agenda 
of party debates, operations and campaign literature.   In 2010, there was little 
centralised best practice or guidance on the use of internet-based media in Conservative 
campaigns and organisation.  Whereas, by 2012, the central-party operations had 
submitted to the arrival of wide-spread usage of internet applications by individual 
participants in the party in the form of publishing an extensive guide on e-campaigning 
that was largely set apart from literature and guidance pertaining to traditional media 
and campaign techniques.  This was a step towards assuming some central control of the 
relatively uncontrollable nature of social media. 
Through the widespread uptake of Cyber Toryism at the grassroots by 2010, the 
role of social media had impacted on the traditional structure and organisation of the 
Conservative Party in the form of shifting some of the traditionally centralised and 
controlled power, over party communications, message and operations, to Conservative 
participants at the grassroots for whom the traditional structure of centralised control 
through hierarchy and deference had previously limited their engagement.  Therefore, 
the advent of the internet and internet-based applications, like social media, impacted on 
the organisation of the Conservative Party in providing a new environment and social 
tools with which users were able to claim greater control of party functions through 
innovation and imitation.
761
 
The lack of top-down control and guidance on matters relating to the internet 
meant that the traditional autonomy of the association was extant in terms of their 
approach to the use of new technology and media.  Therefore, each local association 
took an autonomous approach to the internet.  Some associations, like Richmond Park, 
highly embraced technological change and young people in respect to their campaign 
operations.  Through the extensive use of online technologies, like Facebook groups, 
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those campaigns which resourced young activists, through social media, demonstrated a 
significantly greater engagement and participation in specific campaigns than those 
which took a more traditional approach.  In the successful cases, Facebook and email 
were used actively as tools to sell participation in campaigns.  These internet 
technologies were used to sell incentives to potential activists, like drinks and 
refreshments, in order to encourage participants to take the step from weak online 
interactions to full offline active campaign support.  Young people campaigned less for 
party deference and tribal allegiances and more on a quid pro quo basis. 
Facebook specifically helped remove the traditional geographical constraints 
over communication in the way in which traditional associations operated.  Therefore, 
Facebook acted as a virtual association/participant which oiled organisational processes 
thus making party operations more fluid and bringing closer the national party into more 
intimate spaces within online venues.  Facebook was also, for many associations and 
political figures, a shop front or window in which they were able to display a national 
gauge of popularity through the numbers of fans and supporters they had in any given 
Facebook page.  Facebook’s prominence is perhaps demonstrated mostly in the 
perception of one Conservative-insider that, for a newly selected candidate, a presence 
on Facebook had become a priority in line with the traditional press release as a mode to 
announce selection.  Facebook was also a political leveller in that for the first time the 
leadership of a party and a candidate were presented on an equal playing field.  In turn, 
Facebook helped facilitate a technology-centred culture at the party’s grassroots. 
The resultant impact on the party’s traditional constitution was that the en masse 
use of these media at the party’s grassroots shifted some of the power previously held 
by a few individuals in the party’s elite-centres of power, like CCHQ and the party 
leadership, to a wider-collective of Conservative participants at lower levels of the 
party’s traditional hierarchical structure.  There were two major manifestations of this in 
the party’s organisation.  Firstly, the use of internet applications oiled the party’s 
operational processes meaning that aspects of the party’s organisation, like mobilising 
campaign activism among young people, was more fluid in its execution than it would 
have been otherwise.  Secondly, the observed widespread Cyber Toryism elevated the 
impact of blogs like ConservativeHome and Iain Dale’s Diary thus giving some 
participants at the party’s grassroots a prominence and power they would have not had 
otherwise, thus loosening the grip that the centralised-elites had over what was viewed 
in the public sphere as Conservative Party output and organisational aspects which 
traditionally would have been kept secret in the immediate term.   Therefore, it is 
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plausible to suggest that the advent of the internet and subsequent applications played 
roles which have resulted in a democratisation of the Conservative Party’s organisation; 
and a loosening of the more CCHQ-centric culture in which the party had traditionally 
operated since the 1960s. 
Those technologies which grew from organic uses at the grassroots upward, like 
blogs and social media, had a greater impact on the wider-party’s organisational culture 
than those technologies, like MyConservatives and Merlin, which were developed and 
managed by central-party operations.  Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that it was the 
behaviour of younger participants at the party’s grassroots, in the run-up to 2010, which 
made the most significant impact on the party’s organisational culture in terms of 
technological use, behaviour and innovation.  As the history of these events unfolded in 
the dynamic environment of a high profile long-campaign, the central-party was 
engaged-in observing, understanding and learning these changes, and was thus a step 
behind those engaged in the real-time use of Cyber Toryism at the grassroots.  The 
central-party was not in a prime position of control over its individual participants and 
the media in which they were engaged, on a mass scale, for the first time since the mid-
1950s.  Therefore, how this phenomenon has impacted on the approach of the central-
party, for example the extent to which the central-party has understood, embraced and 
adapted to these changes in its declining mass-party structure, will become more evident 
if/when work in line with this research is performed in a comparative context in the run-
up to General Election 2015 and beyond. 
The use of internet technologies impacted on the party’s organisational culture 
significantly less in processes over which the central-party maintained greater 
traditional control, like e.g. WebCameron.  The process of candidate selection is another 
example of a process in which CCHQ and association cadres maintained their 
traditional control in terms of the process’s execution.  However, candidate selection is 
also an example of how members of the party’s affiliated blogging-community broke 
the party’s traditional protocol in releasing otherwise secret internal-affairs into the 
public domain.  This forced the party into a position of revealing more of its inner-
workings than it would have traditionally. Therefore, in this case, the advent of the use 
of specific internet applications led to a greater transparency in central-party operations.  
Furthermore, the visible and public nature of blogs and social media meant that any acts 
by party participants could be viewed by individuals and collectives both inside and 
outside the Conservative Party.  This behaviour, which to some could have been 
believed to be impertinent and defiant, and a demonstration of a rejection of the party’s 
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traditional deferential-behaviour, was viewed by some inside observers as a challenge to 
Conservative Party unity and the party’s official messages.   
ConservativeHome’s development, as a postmodern techno-cultural symbol and 
force within the party’s organisational culture, was less like the organic evolution of the 
technological uses observed in other internet applications, like social media and other 
Conservative blogs.  Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that Cyber Toryism was co-
evolutionary in its expansion.  Montgomerie’s early objective was to use the blog to 
shift power from the central-party to the grassroots.  Although some power was 
distributed to ConservativeHome participants at the grassroots of the Conservative 
Party, much of the power that was yielded by the blog application was channelled into 
the hands of Montgomerie himself, thus elevating him to a position of elite-status in the 
party, and beyond, in his own right.  In this case, the power and the impact of the 
internet is most apparent, where the innovative use of internet applications through the 
vision of one individual was able to challenge Conservative Party hierarchy through that 
individual’s rise in prominence in the party’s unofficial ranks.762  The manifestation of 
the unofficial prominence of specific individuals in the party through the medium of the 
internet is in itself a new phenomenon to which the Conservative Party is yet to adapt 
entirely.
763
  The Montgomerie case is an outlier when his extraordinary achievement is 
compared with the collective mass of Cyber Toryism elsewhere in the party.  However, 
in view of the evolving, observing, learning, copying and adapting cyber culture at the 
grassroots, the party could indeed see a number of Montgomerie-types grow-out of the 
future of Cyber Toryism – unless the party adapts significantly its organisation to regain 
the tight central-control that began to be eroded by the impact of specific internet 
technologies in 2010. 
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Part IV 
The Comparative History 
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SEVEN 
Tory Television Culture and Cyber Toryism 
1951-1964 and 2005-2012 
 
 
This final part of the thesis is used to compare the two research periods represented in 
parts II and III.  This chapter compares the Conservative parties under the leaderships of 
the four premiers 1951-1964 and Cameron’s Conservatives 2005-2012.  It argues that 
the advent of internet technologies has contributed to the facilitation of a loosening of 
the grip that the central Conservative Party had held traditionally over the organisation 
of its communications since the late 1950s; and that between 2005 and 2010 there was 
some redistribution of power away from central-elites to those Conservative participants 
at the grassroots who embraced innovative uses of specific internet technologies.  A 
final chapter follows with the concluding thoughts of this thesis in relation to the impact 
of new media upon the Conservative Party’s evolving organisational culture.  It 
concludes that, since the late 1950s, the impacts of the advents of new political mass 
communication technologies on the Conservative Party’s organisational culture have 
been to further contribute to an evolution away from a mass-party culture to a more 
technologically-centric culture, in which television 1951-1964 played a role in 
demanding further professionalisation of central-party culture; and internet technologies 
2005-2012 most notably synthesised with the party in subcultures at the grassroots.   
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Comparing Conservatives: 1951-1955 and 2005-2012 
 
In their respective periods, both Churchill’s and Cameron’s Conservatives were 
presented with significant technological advances in new media.  Television in the 
1950s and the internet in the 2000s were the new mass communication technologies 
which sociologically redefined their respective periods.  The roles of both technologies 
in the British political environment were evolving at times when both political leaders 
and their respective Conservative parties were grappling with understanding and 
assimilating changing technological trends in Britain and, consequently, their parties’ 
operations and organisations.  The Conservatives in both periods looked to the United 
States to understand changes in American political culture in the wake of developments 
in new media, but forged relatively their own paths in their attitudes towards the use of 
new media in the British Conservative Party context.  This demonstrates how the party 
in both periods learnt from and observed external change, but chose to adapt in its own 
way and in its own time. 
 When attitudes, behaviours and cultures are compared from the early parts of 
their respective periods to the latter, Churchill’s Conservatives, 1951-1955, and 
Cameron’s Conservatives, 2005-2012, both underwent significant changes in their 
responses to the advent of the political uses of their respective new media. For 
Churchill’s Conservatives, Television transitioned from having relatively no importance 
or recognition in the party to there being a significant change in 1954, in the run-up to 
General Election 1955, at which time the party first established a separate Radio and 
Television Section at CCO.
764
  Prior to Cameron’s Conservative leadership election in 
2005, the use of the internet in the Conservative Party context was relatively 
insignificant.
765
  However, in the run-up to 2010, innovation in the use of internet 
technologies had proliferated at both CCHQ and grassroots levels of party 
organisation.
766
  This demonstrates how in these cases the party adapted significantly to 
the new technologies of the times in order to prepare for campaigns in potentially new 
political communication climates.   
After significant undulations in opinion in relation to the role of television in 
political culture, Churchill’s Conservatives came to view television as a tool for 
supporting the Conservative cause.  However, a lack of general technological 
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understanding and appreciation for how television broadcasting was constituted in 
British legal statutes led to a general suspicion surrounding television at all levels of the 
party.  This was in contrast to the observations of the party in the run-up to the 2010 
election.  The comparatively unregulated nature of the internet was one which gave to 
the individual a more personal and interactive user-experience.  Television in the 1950s 
was a distant and unobtainable medium for direct broadcast by the average Conservative 
participant.  In contrast, in the late 2000s, young Conservatives were likely to have had 
daily interaction with internet technologies, like social media, in their personal lives.  
Therefore, when compared with older Conservatives, they were less suspicious about 
transferring their daily technological practices to the context of Conservative activism in 
the run-up to 2010. 
Unlike the more uniform attitude towards television throughout Churchill’s 
Conservatives, Cameron’s Conservatives were split by an age divide which largely 
impacted on attitudes towards the use of internet technologies by older party 
participants prior to 2010.  It would be incorrect therefore to suggest that there was no 
suspicion in Cameron’s Conservatives towards use of the internet in the party’s 
operations.  In fact, it was this dichotomy in attitudes and behaviours, between the 
younger and older demographic in Cameron’s Conservatives, which led to the distinct 
subculture of Cyber Toryism being observable.  No such dichotomous phenomenon was 
evident in Churchill’s Conservative organisation in relation to television culture in the 
early 1950s.  This would suggest that Churchill’s Conservatives exhibited a deferential 
culture that was more unified in nature and characteristic of a mass-party, when 
compared to Cameron’s Conservatives.  Unlike early 1950s political television, internet 
applications helped facilitate a greater voice for Conservative participants in the 2000s.  
Coupled with Cyber Toryism’s shift away from the party’s traditional structure, internet 
technologies allowed for greater power to be harnessed by the individual at lower tiers 
of the hierarchy.
767
  Television in the 1950s, as a comparatively passive medium, did 
not generally facilitate for the ordinary activist such an empowerment through 
interaction. 
 However, television’s arrival in early 1950s political culture was in the 
consciousness of the Tory collective greatly more than the internet in the mid-2000s.  In 
terms of interactivity, influence and political output, broadcasting oneself was primarily 
a medium available to the party-elite, which meant its development as a political 
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medium for the Conservative Party largely centred on CCO operations.  When 
television raised the party’s general interest, the grassroots appear to have looked 
upward to party-elites for guidance.  Therefore, Churchill’s Conservatives’ interaction 
with political TV at the grassroots was primarily led by the central-party.  Conversely, 
the gradual, stepwise and evolutionary nature of the internet in Cameron’s 
Conservatives meant that, other than the isolated catalysing cases of (1) WebCameron, 
as a symbolic statement of new Conservatism through Cameron’s arrival on the internet 
in 2006; and (2) Johnson’s Mayoral Campaign Facebook App in 2008, the wider 
developments of internet use within the changing organisational culture at the party’s 
grassroots went relatively unnoticed by the wider-party until after the 2010 election.   
In the early 1950s, the advent of television’s arrival in British political culture in 
itself catalysed a significant increase in correspondence at all levels of the party on 
matters pertaining to propaganda through broadcasting media.  CCO became a 
bureaucratic-hub for intra-party information exchange on those matters.
768
  This 
behaviour significantly increased as television’s prominence in the party grew 
throughout the 1950s.  In the 2000s, blogs and social media replaced the role of CCHQ 
in this manner, acting as cyber-places for information exchange of intra-party 
communications.  Therefore, CCHQ in the internet age lost some of its control over 
processing and facilitating communications between the various individuals and 
collectives within the party hierarchy.
769
  Social media and email exchange in the 2000s 
began to substitute letter writing, and, therefore, the speed, extensiveness and intensity 
of information exchange in the Conservative-sphere was unprecedented.  Furthermore, 
the publically accessible media, like blogs, Facebook and Twitter, through which 
ordinary Conservative participants were able to develop significant intra- and extra- 
party audiences, acted as platforms for participants to exchange and propagate 
information and messages, and thus have a greater voice than any ordinary member 
could have achieved through television in the early 1950s.  
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Comparing Conservatives: 1955-1957 and 2005-2012 
 
In 1955, Eden’s Conservatives held a greater mandate than Churchill’s Conservatives 
on which to steer the regulation of broadcasting.  Therefore, the party’s cautious 
approach dominated the proceedings surrounding television’s use as a political medium 
between 1955 and 1957.  Eden and his party-elite understood that television was going 
to impact significantly on political culture and that it was simply a matter of time.  
However, the party-elite was in no hurry to speed-up the inevitable and wanted to 
maintain control of its use in their own way and in their own time.  In the 1950s, the 
nature of television and Conservative Party hierarchy meant that the grassroots’ 
influence on actively changing the role of television in the party was slight.  However, 
the deference given by the wider-party to the party-elite was responded to by Eden’s 
central operations with a mutual respect that manifested itself in a considerable trust-
relationship between the top and bottom of the party.  This was demonstrated in the 
party-elite’s encouragement for ‘anyone’ to become involved with aspects of the growth 
of television culture in the party’s organisation.  The party-elite began converting some 
ordinary activists to become members of TV listening panels and encouraged Young 
Conservatives to undergo broadcasting training.  Therefore, unlike the relatively organic 
growth of political internet use by the grassroots 2008-2010, groups within Eden’s 
grassroots were actively groomed through central-party operations.  
The relatively unknown nature of television in mid-1950s culture meant that the 
central-party considered it of importance to conduct significant public opinion surveys 
and analytical assessments of the role of television in the party’s operations.  Therefore, 
television in Britain involved considerable interactions outside of the party.  These 
involved primarily institutional-elites, inside and outside of intra-party affairs, which 
included CCO, Downing Street, the BBC, the ITA and Parliament.  The process of 
cognitively assessing TV regulation and the impact of television in wider-society 
symbolised a cautious, but keen, approach towards greater use of political television.  
The caution was rooted also in the party’s inherent suspicion of change which the party-
elite had held towards the use of television in politics since the previous Labour 
administration relaunched the post-war BBC.  Therefore, there remained at the heart of 
Eden’s Conservatives an elite control that was governed by cautious attitudes towards 
the role of television in political culture.  
In contrast, the internet in 2010 was relatively an unknown phenomenon in the 
political context for Cameron’s Conservatives, because its development was greatly 
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more rapid, dynamic and diverse than anything observed in the development of 1950s 
television.  The internet is a more disparate and fragmented medium, which influences 
the evolution of latent cultures and, therefore, presents greater challenges for policy 
makers to control its uses in politics.  Rather than CCHQ employing guidance or control 
tactics, the use of internet applications in Cameron’s Conservatives was characterised 
by a culture of freedom under a process of self-regulation in which the average online 
Conservative participant was expected to control and oversee their own internet-based 
output.
770
  This idea falls in line with classical liberal ideology that ‘with freedom 
comes responsibility’, and is a perspective espoused by a number of CF activist, 
including Oliver Cooper, in the late 2000s.
771
  This younger demographic of Cameron’s 
Conservatives thus embodied freedom ideals in their uses of social media and held 
significantly less suspicion towards the uses of new media in the Conservative Party 
than older participants, whose suspicions were often characteristic of the type of 
Conservative paternalism evident in Eden’s Conservatives’ attitude towards political 
television.  Therefore, in their respective periods, both Conservative parties had 
dominant groups of participants who were inherently suspicious of change in terms of 
the use of new media.  However, the latter 2000s were unique in that they saw also the 
party’s culture diverge in terms of the co-evolution of Cyber Toryism.  Subsequently, 
Tory campaign participation in the 2010 election was characterised by a new-type of 
Conservative activism that was constituted by a growing collective of free-minded 
Conservative participants who could be identified by their age-profile and behavioural 
use of internet technologies. 
While the elite-groups of Eden’s Conservatives were gearing-up to take greater 
control over the new medium of their time, Cameron’s elites at CCHQ were losing the 
intensity of their grip over the party’s communication culture due to the organic 
proliferation of Cyber Toryism at the grassroots.  Cyber Tory participants appear to 
have demonstrated significantly greater enthusiasm towards use of new media activity 
than the grassroots of the early to mid-1950s.  Furthermore, unlike the role played by 
Eden’s CCO staff in the 1950s, general Cyber Tory activity was characterised by the 
general absence of any discernible direct guidance, instruction and/or control from 
Cameron’s central-party.  Therefore, as Eden’s Conservatives were undergoing the 
beginnings of a process of top-down adaptation and change in a transition towards a 
more television-centric organisational approach; Cameron’s Conservatives organisation 
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of communications was being changed most significantly at the grassroots with an 
internet-fuelled shift in culture. 
It would seem that Eden’s and Cameron’s Conservatives share some common 
ground in that both television and the internet were more influential in changing the 
party’s organisational culture in 1951-1957 and 2005-2010, respectively, than the two 
media played in the process of connecting with the electorate in the general elections of 
1955 and 2010.  Eden’s Conservatives made relatively dramatic changes to the 
structure, organisation and processes in the ways in which it managed the growing 
developments in television.  Between 1955 and 1957, this was beginning to be felt at 
virtually all levels of the party through training, increased roles in broadcasting for Area 
Publicity Officers, and the intense intra-party dialogues in relation to television, which 
manifested themselves as greater interaction and fluidity between participants across the 
party’s hierarchy.  CCO was reasonably cognisant in relation to these steady changes, 
which were also well understood.   
For Cameron’s Conservatives at CCHQ, the nature of rapid evolutionary change 
at the party’s grassroots, during an intense and fragmented election cycle, meant that 
many of these phenomenological changes, which were already out of the traditional 
remit of control for the central-party, were slow to be realised, understood and identified 
by CCHQ mechanisms, which were more focused on centralised projects like 
WebCameron.  This naivety is reminiscent of the confusion that many Conservative 
MPs experienced in the mid-1950s over the process of selection of Conservative 
speakers for television programmes.   
Although Eden’s elites and central-staff understood the impact of television and 
the processes in which the party’s culture was being influenced and changed, some sub-
groups within the party, like MPs, remained relatively naive to the ways of political 
television culture.  Eden’s CCO, used the medium of the ‘TV & Radio Newsgram’ in 
order to actively disseminate information to its participants, and in doing so educate 
them in the ways of television culture.  The central-party was therefore actively 
managing, and, thus, controlling the process of transitional change in the party’s 
organisation in anticipation of there being a significant shift in political culture in terms 
of the impact of television on the party.   
Although the use of WebCameron has been considered by scholars as the first 
significant use of e-campaigning in Britain,
772
 prior to 2010, Cameron’s central-elite 
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appear to have been in a state of relative naivety to the implications of internet-use on 
grassroots activity and behaviour.  In fairness to Cameron’s central-operations, 
anticipating evolutions in new internet-based media-uses was perhaps implausible in 
view of the frenetic digital-dynamics characteristic of the late 2000s.  This is especially 
evident when the rate of technological evolution and diversity in internet applications is 
compared to the relatively sluggish-developments in British television 1936-1989. 
In both cases, each new medium had begun the process of synthesis with their 
respective Conservative parties and in turn influenced evolutions in the parties’ 
organisations.  Both parties’ deeper involvements and interactions with new media 
meant that the two-way relationship between the technologies and parties became more 
fluid for both Eden’s and Cameron’s Conservatives.  This was likely because the 
attitudes and behaviours of collectives of individual participants within the parties had 
begun to shift in line with wider socio-technological changes.
773
  In the Eden case, this 
appears to have been planned, orchestrated and executed by the central-party; but in 
Cameron’s case, although his use of WebCameron appears to have catalysed the initial 
use of new media, it seems to have been leadership and innovation at the grassroots, 
followed by a relatively natural snowball-effect in uptake at the party’s grassroots, that 
impacted on the most significant shift in the party’s culture.  In both periods, the parties’ 
organisations and cultures were integrating and forming irreversible bonds with the new 
technologies.  The advent of these new media had led to changing dynamics between 
the centralised party-elites and those operating at other levels of the party hierarchy. 
  
Comparing Conservatives: 1957-1964 and 2005-2012 
 
During Macmillan’s early premiership, 1957-1958, the general status quo in 
Conservative Party organisation appears to have been largely maintained in terms of its 
attitudes, traditions and approaches.  These seem to have manifested themselves in 
some practical outcomes insofar that early Macmillan’s Conservatives at CCO, as under 
Eden, continued (1) to invest considerable time and resources in researching and 
understanding the role of the growing television culture in political culture, in order to 
assess the impending impact on its own culture; (2) a cautious and competitive approach 
to adaptation, making tentative changes to party operations; and (3) adherence to its 
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mass-party culture in prioritising methods of motivating and mobilising extensive 
grassroots participation.
774
   
From Cameron’s election as leader, in 2005, to the launch of WebCameron, in 
late 2006, CCHQ took a relatively tentative approach to change and engagement with 
internet-based political communication techniques.  Although the party leadership, 
which included George Osborne and Francis Maude, had begun implementing some 
organisational and staffing changes at CCHQ, in the process of gearing-up to embrace 
new media in its operations, this remained relatively hidden from those outside of 
CCHQ and, therefore, had a relatively minor impact on wider-party organisation.  
Furthermore, in the run-up to 2010, the party’s central communications operations were 
distracted by another important milestone in political communication history: the advent 
of the first televised leader debates during a British general election.  This historic 
spotlight on the broadcast of party leaders seemed to act to bury further already latent 
internet-based activity in Conservative Party culture, meaning that changing cultural 
phenomena were hidden from general view inside and outside of the party. 
By late 2006, the new social media of Facebook and Twitter were on the rise in 
wider Western culture.  These phenomena were emerging in Britain, but appear to have 
remained on the periphery of the party’s organisation until the London Mayoral 
Election in 2008.
775
  Like Macmillan’s Conservatives prior to 1958, Cameron’s 
Conservatives prior to 2006 were under mounting external pressures to adapt to new 
media.  And then, in a punctuated manner, the party in both periods exhibited rapid 
change.
776
  Firstly, the dynamics between Macmillan’s Conservatives and the 
broadcasters changed significantly in the final run-up to the 1959 General Election.  The 
once significant power held by the main political parties over the broadcasters declined 
as the omnipotence of television rose in wider British culture.  Therefore, Macmillan, 
Downing Street and CCO realised that they would need to master the medium in order 
to remain electorally competitive.
777
  The party’s focus shifted from relations with its 
membership to increased interactions with broadcasters.  Similarly, the act by Cameron 
and his team at CCHQ to first use the internet to broadcast the centrally-controlled 
WebCameron application in 2006 demonstrates a comparable desire within ‘Team 
Cameron’ to claim and master the new medium of their time.  It would appear that in 
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developing WebCameron, Cameron’s Conservatives, like Macmillan’s Conservatives c. 
47 years earlier, were reacting to trends in wider media-culture, which in the 2000s was 
dominated by reality television.  However, WebCameron was particularly significant in 
the party’s changing approach, to the new media of the time, because in the 
development and use of WebCameron it claimed back for CCHQ some power over the 
control of the party’s audio-visual output, which had been lost increasingly to the 
television broadcasters since Macmillan’s premiership.  In this single technological 
innovation, Cameron’s communications team symbolically-interrupted what had been a 
half century trend in political communication. 
Macmillan’s Conservatives’ response to prominent advances in their 
relationship with the new medium of their time was to preside over a sea-change in the 
party’s approach to the role of television in wider political culture.  In turn this impacted 
somewhat on the manner in which the party organised it operations at CCO and beyond.  
Change and adaptation were manifested in a significant and timely assimilation of 
television culture in the party’s general organisation.  The new advances in political 
television impacted in the daily lives of individuals in the party leadership, 
Parliamentary Party, CCO, and local party-professionals.  The party learnt from its 
experiences at the 1959 election and, from the early 1960s, training in television 
participation accelerated and intensified; and party-professionals were increasingly 
required to dedicate significantly greater time to broadcasters in election periods.  The 
latter example chimes with Craig Elder’s testimony, which details how he was expected 
to give increasing amounts of his time to the filming of WebCameron video blogs.
778
  
However, unlike the wider-party changes in Macmillan’s Conservatives, this type of 
shift in the work-life of the digital team, 2006-2007, was largely contained within 
CCHQ. 
During much of the 1950s the party allowed relatively open-access to its 
television studio for participants at all levels of the hierarchy.  But in the early1960s, it 
made a sharp sea-change to a trend of centralised-use of these and other facilities.
779
  
This shows how the status quo of the party’s structure and hierarchy, in which a mass-
party culture played a significant role, was challenged to some extent by the central-
party’s assimilation of new technology.  In the 2000s, the party used the central-party 
website to generate funds through new national party-membership subscriptions.  
However, it made less of an attempt to convert these new digital-members into activists 
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in the offline world.  This would suggest that the party was continuing a greater shift 
away from the traditional mass-party culture, towards a party culture that was more 
embracing of technology as a substitute for a supposed decline in door-to-door type 
activism.  It would appear that the role of mobilising grassroots activism was becoming 
more of  a peripheral consideration for the central-party in the 2000s, which had 
seemingly focused its efforts into reaching the electorate through channelling its 
messages using all available, traditional and new, technologies, with a special focus on 
the TV debates and exporting the Cameron-brand. 
At the end of the 1950s, Macmillan’s party-elites reached some sort of epiphany 
about the manner in which the party should change in order to embrace the role of 
television in its organisation.  Subsequently, the party implemented observable 
adaptations which in turn influenced a trend towards the tightening of its control over 
television and publicity procedures with a greatly more professionalised workforce to 
manage and influence the party’s transition to becoming an increasingly television-
based party.
780
  In the late 2000s, within the elite ideas-culture at the top of Cameron’s 
Conservatives, it would appear that, in the journey to WebCameron’s inception, 
Cameron’s party-elite had a comparable epiphany, which led to them mirroring a return 
to the days when the party-professionals first exerted greater influence over the 
increasing centralisation of its television operations.  Except, however, Cameron’s 
Conservatives were dealing with a very different type of new medium.  Television in 
Britain in the early1960s was limited to just two channels which drew relatively large 
and captive audiences.  In the 2000s, the internet was a much more dynamic, interactive, 
diverse and adaptable medium with virtually unlimited applications and channels.  
However, audiences were smaller and fragmented.  E-marketing techniques for 
targeting the electorate were primitive and relatively unsophisticated when compared to 
those used in more commercial sectors.  Therefore, unlike television in the 1960s, the 
internet had not matured in terms of its use as a political tool for winning significant 
numbers of votes.
781
  However, Conservative Party user-led online interactions had 
evolved into an observable culture in which the medium naturally facilitated some 
organisational aspects for use within the party’s operations and internal discourse.   
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In the early 1960s, CCO’s development of a more professionalised-culture 
encouraged the tightening of centralised-operations and controls. The central-party 
began seeking less the views of the wider-party membership.  The party became 
increasingly controlled by top-elites and, thus, gradually less democratic.  The focus at 
CCO shifted away from a commitment to maintaining a mass-party culture to a 
publicity and television-centric party, which was a trend that appears to have endured 
for 45 years.  Advancing forward to the 2000s, greater erosion of the already declining 
mass-party culture was becoming increasingly apparent and interactions between the 
party-grassroots and the party-elite were diverging further.  In 1997, the grassroots saw 
the party power-balance shift towards the central-party under Hague’s ‘Fresh Future’ 
reforms.
782
  Subsequently, when developments in the internet in the run-up to 2010 
eventually empowered the grassroots, thus providing opportunities for greater 
democratisation at the grassroots, organic evolutions in the party’s internet user-culture 
developed into activity which contributed to more of an equalisation in the power-
balance between the party-elite and their activists.  This development of a new 
subculture in the party was rooted in the collective use of new technologies in Cyber 
Toryism.
783
  It was within that cultural backdrop that the internet facilitated the 
beginnings of another significant moment in the history and evolution of the party’s 
organisational culture.   
The first major act of Cyber Toryism grew out of Tim Montgomerie’s reaction, 
to what he believed to be the lack of power at the party grassroots in the election 
process of the party leader, and resulted in the creation of ConservativeHome.  As 
Cyber Toryism proliferated, in terms of the numbers of individuals engaged in Tory-
centric internet-based interaction and operations in the run-up to 2010, the nature of the 
ConservativeHome blog meant that it also contributed to a return of some of the lost 
power to the grassroots; and thus helped facilitate the loosening of the grip that the 
central-party had held traditionally over party communications and operations. 
Although a technological divide, like that which formed in Cameron’s 
Conservatives, did not form to such a magnitude in Macmillan’s Conservatives, 
Macmillan’s central-elite had in effect actively initiated a divide between themselves 
and the wider-party.  Macmillan’s role as the respected and continuing party leader 
during this process of technological adaptation meant that his traditional relationship 
                                                     
782
 Bale, Drivers, p. 1.  
783
 See, Joshua Meyrowitz, No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behaviour 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1985), for theory on the role of electronic media in influencing new 
cultural phenomena. 
243 
 
with the party, as the figurehead, escaped notable challenge from the grassroots.  This 
occurred even though Macmillan’s central-party elites had assumed greater powers that 
in turn shifted power away from the traditional vehicle for reaching the voter - the mass-
engagement of activists.  This led to a sense of redundancy and disenfranchisement at 
the ordinary levels of the party.  However, it would appear that their traditional 
deference ensured that there was minimal impact on those who assumed greater control 
at the centre.  This symbolic creation of an organisational dividing line between amateur 
and professional was therefore a pragmatic act by the party in response to wider social-
changes that it had observed and understood in the 1950s.  
In the late 2000s, any deference that remained in the party’s culture was being 
challenged by the changes in the party’s youth movement at the grassroots.  In addition 
to the act of leadership through Montgomerie’s ConservativeHome blog, the party 
grassroots had begun integrating their use of social media within the social nature of 
their offline Tory-communities.  Like Montgomerie’s response to the selection of 
Cameron as leader in the form of ConservativeHome, the proliferation of the grassroots’ 
use of Facebook was likely in response to symbolic aspects of Cameron’s leadership.  
However, unlike Montgomerie, the collective acts of innovative use of social media at 
the party grassroots appear to have been initiated out of early admiration and deference 
for Cameron’s and Johnson’s first public uses of internet applications.  Although 
ConservativeHome was designed to challenge the status quo, the initial interaction with 
Facebook by the Cyber Tories was largely used to organise and support the aim of 
installing Cameron to Downing Street.  Therefore, Cyber Toryism had two main 
strands: (1) Cyber Tory-followers: those who were catalysed into digital-action by the 
party leadership’s use of WebCameron and Facebook; and (2) Cyber Tory-leaders: 
those, like ConservativeHome and Iain Dale, with their own agendas and/or axes-to-
grind, and, therefore, profiles to elevate.
784
  As Cyber Toryism evolved and proliferated, 
the early deferential respect held by many Cyber Tories was exchanged for a new 
empowerment and individualised identity, which, to some degree, acted to fragment 
traditional unity and discipline at the grassroots.  Cyber Toryism became a cultural 
vehicle that drove engagement in social media, sometimes in dichotomous directions, 
which both supported and challenged the status quo of Cameron’s Conservatives.785  
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Unlike Macmillan’s grassroots, comparatively, Cameron’s grassroots used innovation in 
new media to equip themselves with tools that gave them a platform from which the 
ordinary individual could be elevated and have, together, a collective voice with 
potential power to influence the direction of party message and operations.   
Therefore, the internet, for Cameron’s Conservatives, had the opposite impact in 
the party culture when compared to television, for Macmillan’s Conservatives.  
Television was a significant driver of change in the party, which, along with additional 
drivers, encouraged to some extent the tightening of centralised control from the 1960s 
onward.  However, Cyber Toryism, which was largely facilitated by the internet, acted 
in a manner that encouraged a loosening of the grip that CCO had begun to assume c. 
50 years earlier, thus acting to decentralise organisational aspects of party engagement.  
These two ‘sublimated’ civil wars for power within the Tory Party, separated by half a 
century, are reminiscent of the ‘culture wars’ which are said to occur when the status 
quo of a wider-culture is challenged.
786
  Cyber Toryism ultimately challenged the status 
quo in facilitating a shift of some central-party power to the grassroots.  Unlike the 
party in the 1950s and 1960s, until post-2010, CCHQ appear to have been a step behind 
in their understanding of how the grassroots was evolving in its uses of new media.  By 
late 2012, like Macmillan’s Conservatives at CCO in the 1960s, CCHQ had taken steps 
to master and assume some control of the use of the relatively uncontrollable media of 
internet-based applications in the form of publishing and distributing best practice 
guidance and literature at party conference.   
By 1963, after the role of the party leader was somewhat weakened by the 
notorious events surrounding Macmillan’s resignation, television and political culture 
had reached a new peak in the intensity of their relationship.  The role of television in 
the party’s culture had come to dominate significant aspects of its national operations.  
Therefore, when Douglas-Home became party leader,  a degree of the traditional 
deference for the party leader had become eroded at CCO.  The party-professionals held 
a greater recognition for the importance of using television as the primary tool in the 
party’s national campaign and took a muscular and pragmatic approach to managing the 
leader – opposed to the leader managing CCO professionals, as was the case before it.  
The professionals had a greater command of new technologies and thus their confidence 
increased for managing the media on behalf of the party.  In the late 2000s, Cameron’s 
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Conservatives were less prepared for the impact that the rapidly changing dynamics of 
internet technologies would have on the party at the grassroots.  Unlike 1951-1964, it 
appears that the party was observing, learning and understanding the impact at too slow 
a rate for the party to adapt and change significantly and assume control over grassroots 
activity.  However, this point is based on the assumption that the central-party of the 
late 2000s would have had (1) the desire to control Cyber Tory culture; and (2) the 
capability and tools to successfully control and manage the cyber-masses at the 
grassroots and their abundant output, operations and interactions of internet use.   
Therefore, unlike the CCO-professionals of the 1960s, Cameron’s CCHQ were 
less able to react to and control the developments in the use of internet technologies at 
the grassroots.  In terms of the power-balances in the two periods, this means that the 
party in the 1960s had a strengthened central-party and a weakened-party at the 
grassroots, to which the advent of political television contributed; and the party in the 
late 2000s had a weakening central-elite and a strengthening grassroots, to which the 
internet contributed.  Therefore, in terms of intra-party dynamics, the Conservative 
Party grassroots of the 1960s experienced television as an anti-democratic force in the 
organisational culture of the party; whereas Cameron’s Conservatives’ interaction with 
the internet was largely a democratising experience in that it provided a new, cost-
effective and relatively unregulated environment in which Cyber Tory participants 
could interact, socialise and innovate in order to assist the party’s local and national 
campaigns, with additional opportunities for developing their own voice and profile on 
internet platforms that placed the ordinary participant on relatively an equal footing with 
the more established political figures of the time. 
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EIGHT 
Conclusions 
 
 
Conservative Party and New Media Impact 
 
Impact: Tory Television Culture 
The evidence and analysis presented in chapters Three, Four and Seven suggest that the 
Conservative Party’s adaptation to the advent of the new medium of television occurred 
in two main phases of transition.  The first phase was 1951-1959.  During this period 
the party, under the leaderships of Churchill, Eden and the early leadership of 
Macmillan was characterised in its relationship with the medium of television by a 
culture of caution, tentative and incremental change, committee meetings, regulation, 
research, experimentation and a desire to understand the phenomenon.  The second 
phase was 1959-1964 under the leaderships of Macmillan and Douglas-Home.  During 
that period the Conservative Party underwent rapid change in the party’s attitude and 
organisational culture.  It focused on becoming masters of television in wider political 
culture.  By 1960, television was recognised largely as the primary new political 
communication tool in Britain.  Training in the use of the medium became ranked in 
order of party seniority and priority, which was a shift away from the earlier approach 
of an open-to-all attitude that the central-party exhibited in the first phase. 
Therefore, it appears that there was both an incremental and a punctuated 
tightening in the party’s hierarchy, which was driven in part by the significant 
developments externally in wider political television culture.  From 1951-1964, the 
party transitioned from being a party rooted in a more traditional mass-based culture to 
one that was less traditional, in that sense, and became progressively television-centric.  
The intensity of the bureaucratic management of party publicity increased to the point 
that it began to integrate its television operations with a carefully processed and 
sanitised output.  In terms of impact, the seemingly active and pragmatic management 
by central-party operations, towards tighter control of party television output, became 
an identifiable trait that was characteristic of the changes observed in Conservative 
Party organisational culture during the second phase of the party’s development, 1959-
1964.  When compared to the less centralised period, 1951-1959, from1960 onwards 
this trend meant that a significant and orchestrated divide in party-culture is observable 
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between the professionalised-elites, at the top of the party hierarchy, and the more 
emasculated participant, at the party grassroots. 
 
Impact: Cyber Toryism 
The Conservative Party’s apparent adaptation to the advent of new internet-based 
technologies seems to have been characterised by a digital and age divide; digital 
bureaucracy; digital campaign-enhancement; dissolution of geographical boundaries; 
heterogeneity of Conservative associations; integration of new technologies in 
traditional hierarchies; and rapport and digital trust signals, which was manifested in a 
dichotomy in the party’s organisational culture.  The digital divide was largely 
associated with generational demographics.  The older demographic group of the party 
generally maintained a commitment to traditional organisation and campaign 
techniques.  The younger demographic group of the party, which was largely 
represented by participants in the networks of CF and the Conservative-blogosphere, 
engaged in complementary activities and behaviours in both the on- and off- line 
worlds.  These individuals and collectives both supported Conservative Party campaigns 
and challenged the status quo of the party’s organisational culture.  Through a process 
of political socialisation
787
 and incentivised campaign participation, individuals learnt to 
synthesise their online activities with Conservative activism.  Between 2006 and 2010, 
the party’s relationship with the internet was most saliently symbolised in 
WebCameron, which appears to have acted as a catalyst that in turn contributed to a 
stimulation of an organic evolution of innovation in social media uses at the party’s 
grassroots, which seemingly proliferated through a culture of learning, copying and 
adapting to the uses of internet applications.  It marked the beginnings of a new 
subculture in Conservative Party’s organisation.   
In order to differentiate between the traditional culture and the new media 
culture of Cameron’s Conservatives, both of which have been observed through the 
ethnographic- and historical- based processes of inquiry in this research, I have 
attributed the latter group with the tag of ‘Cyber Toryism’.  The quid pro quo attitude 
and technologically-elevated status of these younger, more dynamic and less 
geographically constrained participants meant that they were of value to the party in 
terms of them being a campaigning resource.  However, they took also a less deferential 
approach to the party hierarchy in maintaining the cultural status quo in their 
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participation when compared to their more traditional counterparts.  In the run-up to 
2010, internet applications gave the ordinary Conservative participant a greater and 
more independent voice while simultaneously allowing the individual, and/or collective 
group the ability to support the party in traditional campaign and organisation roles; and 
yet in new and innovative ways through the use of alternative internet tools within the 
alternative environment of cyberspace, which had impact in both the on- and off- line 
culture of the party.   
Although popularity, in terms of ‘Fans’ and/or ‘Followers’, in social networks 
demonstrated the importance of the likeability of the party leadership, Cyber Toryism, 
as a culture, was an embodiment of an erosion of traditional party-deference and, thus, a 
shift away from the historic hierarchical control of the central-party’s operations.  It 
would seem that the party’s active engagement in the internet ultimately impacted on 
the central-party’s traditional control over these operations and output.  Therefore, the 
central-party’s tight professionalised-grip, which was strengthened in the 1960s in terms 
of a tightening in party operations and communications, was seemingly involuntarily 
loosened in the late 2000s through a culture of mass online-engagement at the 
Conservative Party grassroots – in the form of the organic evolution of Cyber Toryism.  
Moreover, the advent of Cyber Toryism within the dynamics of the party’s organisation 
meant that the widespread and pragmatic use of the internet at the party grassroots acted 
like a lubricant, which oiled party operations and campaigns, and in turn gave a greater 
fluidity and mobility to individual participants and organisational mechanisms. 
 
Role of New Media in the Conservative Party 
This comparative history has provided a perspective that would suggest that the impact 
of television in the 1960s was to play an opposite role in the Conservative Party when 
compared to that of the role played by the internet in the late 2000s.  Onward from the 
late 1950s, significant developments and growth in national television culture meant 
that much of the power over the role of political television in British society, which had 
been held traditionally by the political parties themselves, was transferred to the 
broadcasters.  Subsequently, central Conservative Party professionals assumed greater 
control over the party’s management of broadcasting and publicity.  It resulted in a 
drying-up of CCO-initiated opportunities for the ordinary Conservative participant to 
interact with the medium; and rendered greater numbers of grassroots participants as 
passive observers of political television.  The processes involving television and the 
Conservative Party became ranked in order of priority and thus the medium was 
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assimilated into the party’s traditional hierarchy.  This act was the first major shift away 
from the mass-based culture for the party, to a culture that was more television-centric.    
In the 2000s, although perhaps unintended, the advent of WebCameron was a 
symbolic demonstration by the central party, which displayed how the internet could 
provide innovative opportunities for the party to claim back some of the control over 
audiovisual output that the party had historically lost to the broadcasters in the 1960s.  
That said, the nature of Cyber Toryism meant that the central-party, at the heart of 
Cameron’s Conservatives, lost some power and control to the party grassroots through 
the advent of the internet and subsequent evolutions in the party’s organisational and 
technological culture.  This event acted to contribute to a reversal of the trend of 
professionalised-central control in the management of party communications that began 
in the early1960s.   
In terms of interaction with new media and that interaction’s subsequent role in 
the party, it would appear that to some extent the power balance was tipped in opposite 
directions from the 1960s to the 2000s.  In the 1960s, there was an observable 
strengthening in the central-party elite, which corresponded with a time of their 
increasing use of television; and a weakening in the prominence of the party grassroots.  
In contrast, the late 2000s transpired to reveal that the use of the internet by the party 
grassroots facilitated an observable  strengthening in the prominence of activism at the 
lower levels of the party organisation, which would suggest a weakening in the control 
that CCHQ had over its wider operations and communications.  Therefore, the advent of 
television appears to have contributed to the party’s organisational culture in the mid 
twentieth century in an anti-democratic manner; while, conversely, the evolution of the 
uses of specific new internet technologies in the early twenty-first century appear to 
have contributed to the party’s culture in a democratising manner.   
Over the 1950s decade, it would appear that Conservative Party elites actively 
groomed the wider-party in order to prepare the party’s organisation for the impending 
impact of shifts in political television culture.  Therefore, the role of the party’s uses of 
the medium, and its subsequent contribution to change within the Conservative Party, 
was rooted in active awareness.  However, in the late 2000s, the relatively natural 
evolution of the latent phenomena of Cyber Toryism meant that the central-party was 
seemingly unaware about the extent to which the organised cyber-culture of the younger 
demographic of the party was influencing change in its organisation until sometime 
after the 2010 election.  Therefore, the party of 1951-1964 was largely characterised by 
pragmatic top-down changes in line with the wider social implications of the new 
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medium of their time.  Conversely, changes to the organisational culture of Cameron’s 
Conservatives 2005-2012 have been largely characterised by an evolutionary 
assimilation of internet technologies from the grassroots-up.   
The early impacts of the roles of both television and the internet as new media in 
the party’s organisational culture seem to have first occurred in a London-centric 
manner and spread nationally over time.  1951-1964 television, as a symbol of 
modernity and mass-enfranchisement, was suited to a narrowcast and focused approach 
to political communication with the aim of connecting with the mass-electorate.
788
  
Therefore, the party naturally understood the need to reorganise.  The party behaved in 
an appropriate manner, which enabled it to master and control television and reach its 
electoral aims.  2005-2012’s internet evolutions have been suited to freer and more 
independent thought and engagement for the average participant, while presenting the 
individual with cost-effective malleable tools with which to innovate and support the 
party’s aims through a more fluid and interconnected network at the grassroots.  As 
Eran Fisher might argue, this evolution is symbolic of an increasingly globalised age in 
which ‘new technology enables a new society.’789   
In terms of this research, the primary difference between the roles of the two 
media is that the manifestation of television in the party’s culture was largely dependent 
on the choices of a few party-elites; and in contrast the internet facilitated the coming 
together of cohorts in the collective masses at the party grassroots, with an impact that 
contributed to changes in party-culture that were largely rooted in the manifestation of 
collective choices.  Therefore, where television in the 1960s contributed to splitting the 
party apart, the internet in the 2000s contributed to bringing the party closer together.  
These Conservative parties in both periods eventually began to adapt in line with wider 
technological changes and trends that were being observed in their respective societies, 
at their respective points in history.   
Lack of understanding of both new media in their respective periods resulted in 
pockets of suspicion in relation to the active uses of the two media.  The 1950s was a 
cautious time for the party while it learned the ways of television.  This was contrasted 
by a sharp turn to rapid change, or punctuated evolution, in the 1960s and a significant 
hierarchical tightening in the party’s structure and in the manner in which it controlled 
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its publicity output.  Unlike television in the 1960s, the nature of the internet meant the 
party was relatively unable to practically control the wider-party’s use of the internet, 
like it could other media, such as traditional print communications.  Therefore, the late 
2000s were a dynamic and innovative period for the party’s relationship with new 
media, which gave new freedoms to the ordinary participant and thus loosened the 
party’s organisational culture.   
In the 1960s, political television was used primarily to connect with the voter.  
In the late 2000s, the internet was used primarily as a party organisation tool in order to 
facilitate cost-effective mobilisation of party supporters and exchange political 
discourse.  The decline of the mass-party culture, which began in the 1960s, was 
followed by the beginnings of a technology-centric party culture in the lurch toward a 
television-centric culture in the party’s organisation.  In the case of the party in the late 
2000s, the party’s culture had begun evolving further in the sense of a technologically-
centric culture in that grassroots participant activity contributed to the natural 
assimilation of internet technologies in the party’s wider organisation, which meant 
there was an organic adaptation in the party that would suggest that Cameron’s 
Conservatives, in the run-up to 2010, functioned in a manner that would give some 
credence to Helen Margetts’ cyber party idea.790  However, rather than describing this 
as a prescriptive party model, I would suggest that Margetts’ ideas would gain greater 
traction, and indeed represent a subset of the Tories in 2010, if the theory were instead 
grounded in a cyber-cultural  and, therefore, more organic framework. 
It is important to note that a fuller historical picture is available in the 1951-1964 
case, because the period and the development of television, from a new political 
medium to a more mature medium, was relatively complete by 1964 - that is when 
compared to the newer role of the internet in Cameron’s Conservatives 2005-2012.  
Therefore, the internet will continue to be used as a new and evolving medium in the 
Conservative Party in the run-up to the 2015 General Election.  Cameron is likely to 
continue as party leader, at least, until then and, perhaps, well beyond that time.  
Therefore, more work needs to be done on the role of the internet in the rapidly 
changing intra-party dynamics of contemporary Conservative Party organisation and 
culture, because maturity in the use of the internet seems to be a distant thought in the 
party and wider society.  The user-led innovative nature of the internet means that the 
Conservative Party in the run-up to the next election will continue to adapt and evolve 
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in line with innovations in the party’s uses of new media.  How history looks upon its 
impact on the Conservative Party’s future organisational culture is for subsequent 
research to decide. 
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INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
 
 
1. Ben Howlett 
 
Role in 2010:   Key national Conservative Future activist 
Other Roles:     National Chairman of Conservative Future 2011-2013 
 
Interview Date:  23 March 2011 
Duration:   1:24:28 
 
START AUDIO 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  Anthony Ridge-Newman, interviewing Councillor Ben 
Howlett, National Chairman for Conservative Future.  Hello 
Ben, thank you for agreeing to do this interview.  How did you 
first become involved with the Conservative Party? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I got involved in 2006.  My local parliamentary candidate, 
Douglas Carswell, who’s now an MP for Harwich, well 
Clacton actually now because of the boundary changes.  He 
was running a campaign to save a local special needs school, 
against the local Conservative led educational authority.  And I 
thought, “Okay”, I was young, I was what 16?  No, I was 17 at 
the time and thought, “Okay let’s get involved in a really local 
action project”.  And met up with a lot of the school kids’ 
mums, they really sort of said, “Yes come on board, it’s really 
fun, really exciting” and really kind of got developed into that. 
 
 It was during my A levels and from thereon in, I have kind of 
got more involved. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  And what was it specifically that interested you in the 
Conservative Party over other Parties? 
 
Ben Howlett:  It wasn’t a particular sort of ideological, you know, I’ve got 
this beam of light shining from up above that says, “I need to 
go and join the Conservative Party”.  It just kind of happened 
to fall into place. 
 
 I suppose it was the views that I had heard whilst I was 
studying my A levels, that you know I thought, “Um okay 
market freedoms” you know, “liberal freedoms” these sort of 
ideals that the Conservative Party are embedded with were 
more to do with what I thought of.  It wasn’t sort of an 
overnight, “I will change to become a Conservative” and then 
happened to naturally kind of fall into position.   
 
And I can only say really now I’ve been involved for, what?  
Six years I would say, that I have really understood exactly 
what conservatism means to me.  And I think as a Conservative 
you build on those views pragmatically. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  How old were you when you first got involved? 
 
4 
 
Ben Howlett:    I was 17 when I first started out. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So that was during your teens, and is your view now different 
to the party now you’re in your early 20s? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Yes because to be honest with you, my first probably political 
memory was 1997 and I thought “Ooh” – this is when I think 
back of what on earth was I thinking in those days?  “Oh yes, 
no John Major, yes absolutely he’s going to win the next 
election” and then it was a bit of a shock to me.   
 
And like I can’t remember exactly what I was thinking at the 
time, but it was seeing Ken Clarke coming out of his old house 
in a van, rather than in his Jaguar.  And that’s one of the last 
things I remember, well one of the first things I remember back 
in those days. 
 
Then 2001, I can remember again I was thinking, “Okay yes, 
William Hague’s going to do really well as party leader” and 
realised that actually he didn’t at all.   
 
And then 2005 was the one I really sort of remember, because 
it was the first time.  And I’ll say this to anyone that wants to 
get involved in politics, it’s the first time that I actually saw 
what politics really meant by standing at the count watching 
Douglas sort of holding, clenching onto those handrails, 
looking over the votes that are being counted.  He only won by 
900 majority and him thinking, “Oh my God, am I going to win 
this or am I not?”  And that is what politics really meant, and 
that kind of inspired me to go off and become a councillor and 
get more involved into where I am today. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  In terms of the Conservative Party, it would be fair to say that 
you’re a relative young member, could you tell me a little bit 
more about what it’s like to be a young member in the 
Conservative Party? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I think it’s probably best to talk about the reputation of the 
Conservative Party, in that it has always been seen as an older 
persons’ party.  And in reality the votes mainly do come from 
older people.  And there was that whole Tory boy image in the 
1990’s, which I think we’ve spent a long, long time to dispel 
the myth.  It didn’t help that Harry Enfield kind of picked on 
this sort of clique, but to an extent it was kind of justified by 
the stuff that was coming out of young conservatism. 
 
 So over the last sort of 10 years, there’s been a bit of a 
detoxification of the brand as such, in that now young people 
are seen as integral and are actually the future of the party.   
 
 And over the last six months, I’ve kind of led on the good work 
that’s happened over the last two years, by the work that 
Michael Rock was doing as my predecessor, as CF National 
Chairman, in creating an image of an organisation which is 
there to represent young people.   
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 Just like Conservatives – sorry, young Conservatives back in 
the 80’s were seen as representing young people in general 
back in those days.  So it took a while, but now we’re getting 
there.  Sort of the build up of the Conservative Future policy 
forums and organisations like that, they kind of embed 
ourselves with what young people really want out of politics.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So in a nutshell, what is Conservative Future also known as 
CF? 
 
Ben Howlett:   In a nutshell, Conservative Future is a membership 
organisation that represents 23,000 members across the United 
Kingdom.  And it represents them on everything to do with 
young people’s issues, basically.   
 
 It’s a campaigning plus organisation in that it campaigns, it’s 
there to help win general elections, or elections in general for 
the Conservative Party.  But it does social events, it works on 
social action projects, it works on fundraising.  Everything that 
the mainstream Conservative Party does, in that we are training 
people up to become the next future leaders of the party, and 
replace those people that are getting towards the end of their 
careers within the party. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  What is CF’s relationship with the mainstream party? 
 
Ben Howlett:  It’s got better, to be honest with you.  It was an organisation 
which had a very, very poor reputation before I started out.   
 
 There was two options, as I found out, when I started out as 
Chairman.  It was either we put it behind, away in a box and we 
close it down and we don’t do anything with it, or we could 
actually create an organisation which is there to represent 
young people.  Become a real, proper, professional 
campaigning organisation, and that’s where we’re seeing it 
going today.   
 
 And it was sort of a bit of watershed moment last week, not 
that many people know about it because obviously it’s 
something that’s internal.  But it – saying that if the co-
Chairman of the Party is saying, “Oh my God, this 
organisation’s completely turned around in fortunes, I’m going 
to get you the Prime Minister to come along to an event for just 
CF”.  This is the first time in CF’s history that the Prime 
Minister will come along to a CF event, and represent young 
people’s views. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So in terms of CF’s relationship with the party, what is its 
raison d’etre its reason for being? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Its reason is to, as I said, the mantel of the organisation, the 
prospect of the relationship, is to be a campaigning plus 
organisation.  So it will go out there and campaign for 
parliamentary candidates, it will go out there and support local 
social action projects.  And do everything that the mainstream 
party is doing, but from a young person’s perspective.   
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 Without wanting to generalise, younger people have more 
energy, more time, more opportunity.  Apart from retired 
people, for example, that have a lot of time on their hands, to 
go out there and really sort of get out on the streets and spread 
the word, as such. 
 
 And, you know, look at comparable figures, you’ve got 
Conservative Future activists that can get 40 activists around 
for a London wide campaign day, and spend something like 
400 man hours in doing that.  Whereas say, for example, 40 
activists from the rest of the Conservative Party, the older 
generation, could spend sort of half that time with the same 
amount of people.  So it’s really sort of about productive 
campaigning. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  And you are now an elected Chairman on a national level of 
CF, what does your role within CF involve, and how do you 
integrate that role with CCHQ London? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Okay in terms of where I sit, I’ve got - I’ll talk to you about the 
structure of the organisation first, because that’s probably the 
easiest.  This is the first time we’ve kind of worked in practice 
on the new reforms that came out a couple of years ago.  And 
that I am the Chairman, I’ve got an executive of seven people 
under me, then I’ve got 11 regional Chairmen. 
 
So what I tend to do is sit more as a chief executive/Chairman 
of a private company, in that I will ask the executive to do 
something and then their work kind of filters down to the 
ground level.  So in reality, instead of there being one event, 
they’ll be 11 events across 11 regions.  Which is a remarkable 
change in comparison to what it used to be, in that they’ll be 
just one event and everyone used to come along to it, normally 
that was in London.  Now we’ve got Yorkshire doing their own 
thing and Wales doing their own thing and Cardiff – sorry and 
the south-east doing their own thing as well, great okay. 
 
And what I do is primarily ensure that the campaigning side of 
things work and that we are actually going out there fighting 
by-elections, working on campaigns such as “No to AV”.  
Helping out with the Boris elections, Welsh Assembly 
elections, Scottish Assembly elections.  I don’t, I should 
actually say I don’t cover Scotland, that’s the only one region I 
don’t do.  But Northern Ireland, again we’ve got Council 
Assembly.  Well we’ve got council elections coming up there, 
which we’re all fighting. 
 
I run social action projects, so community organisations that 
are looking to, I don’t know, do up their local community 
centre and refurbish it.  We send the activist there and we help 
out doing that, providing the manpower, I think that’s probably 
the best of way of saying it.   
 
7 
 
And then also we do the social events, which bring in the 
money in order to provide funding for training for young 
activists, and also for campaigning opportunities as well.   
 
In terms of how I sit within the wider CCHQ, well there’s two 
ways I kind of integrate myself into this.  One which is the 
Party Board itself, I sit on the main party Strategy Board which 
involves myself as head of Conservative Future, Conservative 
Women’s Organisation, social action organisations.  And every 
other regional Chairman of the mainstream Conservative Party, 
I represent those 23,000 people on that and in party convention 
as well.   
 
And also then I have two members of staff, three members of 
staff if you include the press officer that’s seconded to us every 
so often, working for just CF out of Conservative Party Central 
Office which basically manages our campaign allocation.  And 
we have a budget of around about £40,000 a year to work on 
that. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  And what was your role in the 2010 general election? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I wasn’t involved in terms of Conservative Future per se, I was 
working for London Member of European Parliaments, Syed 
Kamall.  And I was helping him with his campaigning 
activities, supporting 78 constituencies across London and in 
total we helped campaign in 56 of those constituencies.  And 
we spent the majority of our time working in marginal seats, so 
that we could help effectively in Tooting, in Westminster 
North,  Richmond, Enfield, wherever.  Anywhere else like that 
really.   
 
 And also I was a councillor as well, so I was helping out with 
my local ward up in Essex. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  Why did you get involved in the 2010 general election? 
 
Ben Howlett:  One, because it’s the combination of five years of hard effort 
and hard graft, in that we – I’d been out campaigning every 
weekend, I had friends standing in elections.  It was partly 
because I’ve always done it, so I wanted to do it.   
 
And this is – it is like when you’re going off to a football 
match, and you’re going to watch the finals of your favourite 
football team that your support.  Of course I will go along and 
help out my favourite team, which is the Conservative Party.  
I’m going to go out there and make sure as many people know 
as possible, to make sure that they vote in David Cameron as 
the next Prime Minister.   
 
And locally, your local MP or parliamentary candidate at that 
stage, and also of course I worked for Syed Kamall, so it’s all 
about helping campaigning for him.  And making sure that his 
message of helping local communities gets across to those that 
are actually going to be elected in the next few months, and 
those members that are supporting him. 
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Anthony Ridge-Newman:  Did you receive direct communication from central party 
during that period? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Yes to an extent, London has a regional director out of Central 
Office and they sent me emails saying where campaigning was 
going to be achieved.   
 
 I wasn’t involved in the strategy of that at all, it was just 
literally, “There’s a campaign day going on”, which obviously 
they have thought about and know what the target seats are.  I 
went there and helped out , and made sure my friends knew 
that that was happening as well.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  And how often would you receive emails from the party about 
campaigning events? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Up to the election, probably once a week.  In non-election time, 
it’s probably once a month. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  In terms of your daily campaigning schedule, I’m sure there’s 
probably not a typical day in terms of campaigning, but on the 
whole, in general, how often would you actively use the 
internet? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Actively use the internet, in terms of campaigning, every day, 
absolutely every day.  My role, in terms of CF Chairman, is 
integrally linked to the internet.  That’s because simply 
everyone who’s a member, every member of Conservative 
Future is on the net.  And is on Facebook in particular, or 
Twitter, so you have to use those means of technology. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So thinking about the 2010 general election in particular, and 
the run up to that, seeing the run up being the Parliament, the 
entire Parliament before.  So that three or four years in the run 
up to the election, did the role of the internet change at all over 
that period? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I would say yes it has, I would think the main turning point 
actually, from my memory, because I’ve been so integrally 
linked in London, because of the work I’ve done with the 
London MEP, was the initial Boris election.  Boris was the first 
person that I remember to create an app on Facebook and you 
could –  “I back Boris” App.  And it kind of came out with all 
these updates, loads of information about what Boris does, 
loads and loads of fans, hundreds and thousands of them.   
 
 And at that stage, I was one of the first initial people to sort of 
join up with Facebook when I was at Durham.  You looked at 
what Boris was doing, and you’re like, “Oh my God, this is 
amazing.  You know, he’s obviously going to go out there and 
do really fantastically well, because he’s got all these Facebook 
fans”.   
 
The difference between what Boris did, and what David 
Cameron did, with the his internet campaigns whether that was 
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WebCameron or whether that was sort of Conservative Party 
apps or whatever, which costs a lot of money, is that Cameron 
translated those people that clicked “Like” on Facebook into 
actual votes.  Which is a big, tough issue for me on a very 
small limited scale in Conservative Future, in that you can 
create a Facebook event but not necessarily do you have people 
turn up as a result.   
 
So what we spent a lot of time with doing is yes using it as a 
tool, but not making that the exclusive tool.  Because it’s a 
great platform, great area where you can go on and see what 
events are coming up, but unless they’re going out on the 
streets it’s pointless in sort of having that actually being – you 
setting up an event on Facebook. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: That’s a very interesting point, and I will come back to that in 
just a moment.  But can you be specific about when it was that 
you were spending time on ensuring these apps became votes? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Let’s think, my personal ability to try and translate that into 
votes is minimal, because I didn’t really have any sort of 
influence.  I was the man on the ground as such.  My personal 
link to it, I would say would probably be inviting my friends to, 
like Boris for example.   
 
 And, you know, you go along to a training day run by CF, 
when I wasn’t running it, and they said, “Oh, you know, invite 
all your friends to it”, which I did.  You know, it wasn’t 
massive but that’s as much influence I really have. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  You just said that David Cameron spent a lot of time in 
converting those “Likes” into votes, when exactly did that 
begin to happen? 
 
Ben Howlett:  You could see that happening as soon as the Cons… - 
WebCameron was in existence for a little while, and then they 
had the Conservative Party apps being created on the internet.  
And you had the Facebook politician pages, which you could 
link up to.   
 
 And you could see there was a sort of massive “Get out the 
vote” campaign being done, probably about two years before 
the general election itself.  And then you could see it 
happening, if you were politically astute, but then you could 
really see it happening as soon as the TV debates came out in 
that it was literally not just, “Oh David Cameron is doing this”.  
It was, “David Cameron is doing this to ensure you end up 
voting for him”.  And it was as explicit as that in saying that, 
“Okay if you like change, great, because we’ve already created 
that pattern of change, or that image of change, that David 
Cameron was trying to show.  But now is your time to vote for 
change as well”.   
 
And there was a rebranding policy that was going through the 
Conservative Party that happened online and offline as well, in 
that it was time for change, vote for change.  And you could 
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see that just – the big clincher was the November 2009, no 
October 2009 party conference, because all the banners 
changed and everything like that.  And you could see that quite 
clear, that that’s the way that they were going for. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  And you mentioned David Cameron specifically, when you’re 
talking about David Cameron and his use of Facebook in 
converting “Likes” into votes, are you suggesting that David 
Cameron himself was running the Facebook page?  Or his team 
behind it? 
 
Ben Howlett: Oh it’s always going to be the team behind it, because he 
simply doesn’t have that time to do that.  And part of good 
leadership is the team behind you, at the end of the day.   
 
 If you’re a parliamentary candidate and you’ve got a big team, 
ultimately if you’re an MP you’ve got a big team as well.  But 
the thing that sticks in the mindset of general public, as if you 
were doing some sort of brand marketing technique, isn’t the 
sort of, “Oh great, it might be”.  I don’t know, let’s think, 
“Diageo that is running a drinks campaign”.  In fact you’re 
thinking that it’s Smirnoff, the brand remains in the item itself, 
not the team around it.   
 
 So if you’re creating a campaign, you need to make sure that 
everyone is David Cameron and that they’re all striving for that 
same aim.  And that’s how he converted it into, converted it 
into votes by getting those people around him, that he trusted, 
to ensure that they were going to do exactly that. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  In your opinion, those people that would like a politician, like 
David Cameron, on Facebook, would they be intending to vote 
Conservative? 
 
Ben Howlett:  More than likely, yes, absolutely.  Those people that are not – 
those people that like him are either going to be Conservative 
Party members, Conservative Party voters.  Or they’re going to 
be people that are kind of swayed by what he’s saying on TV.  
It’s kind of like that core, core strategy technique as such.  I 
don’t think it’s very reflective, very reflective as sort of the 
floating voter as such.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  How effective do you consider Facebook pages, politician 
pages, as applications on that kind of national profile like what 
David Cameron has?  How effective do you think they are in 
getting out the vote? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Facebook is very good from the PR perspective: “Great I am 
more popular than you are.”  Facebook is literally a popularity 
contest.  The more people that “Like” your page, the more 
popular you are - as a rule of thumb.  In terms of being able to 
transfer those into votes, I would be very interested to see what 
the hit rate would be - I don’t think it is going to be huge, but it 
helps. 
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I don’t see the internet being the only way you can go out 
campaigning, it’s a tool, it’s a means to an end.  If there’s 
something –  if this a means of communication that you’re not 
utilising, there’s a problem there in that you are losing X 
amount of thousands of votes.   
 
 Just like if you forgot to go out and put a leaflet through the 
door, you’ve got serious problems.  You’ve got serious 
problems if you don’t use the internet, because it’s a whole 
different channel of communication you’re missing out on.  
The more channelled communication, the better you’re going 
to do. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  From what you perceived in your time campaigning for the 
Conservative Party in the run up to the 2010 general election, 
what kind of age category would be hitting like on a Facebook 
page? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Anyone below the age of 25 at that stage.  Before sort of early 
2010, you know, there wasn’t a massive ballooning of people 
in the sort of beyond the age of 30 category that were on 
Facebook.  And ever since then, in my perception anyway, I’ve 
seen a growth in the number of people above that age.  
Particularly local councillors that are now seeing the benefits, 
and reaping their rewards of that actually, in linking and 
communicating with younger communities as well. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  What are the benefits, and rewards, of being on Facebook?  
Why would a politician have a Facebook page? 
 
Ben Howlett:  As I said earlier on, it’s another mechanism of communication.  
When you’re looking at your electoral statistics, you’re 
thinking, “Okay I’ve got X amount of groups, X amount of 
demographics which I need to communicate effectively with”.  
If you’re going to communicate effectively, you’ve got to find 
the best model, or the best mode of communicating with them.   
 
 You know, if you’ve got a younger group population, you’re 
going to be thinking, “Okay Facebook’s the best way of 
communicating with those”.  However, you wouldn’t think 
necessarily if you’ve got loads of old people’s homes in your 
community, you’d go out and campaign with Facebook to those 
groups.  That’s why you’ve got to use a massive spread. 
 
 And the benefit ultimately would be that, and this is something 
I’ve been doing a lot of work on, and something that’s going to 
come out in terms of strategy in the next couple of months to a 
year, is looking at what younger people want from their 
politicians and what they can deliver.  And it’s not because 
there’s an assumption about it, it’s because they’re 
communicating effectively about that, with them, about that 
subject. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:   Going back to something you said earlier, and I said we’d come 
back to that, you mentioned how politicians use Facebook and 
build a relationship with the potential supporters that they have 
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and they use Facebook in order to do that.  Would you consider 
the association between a member on Facebook and a politician 
as a strong or weak association? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I think the perception would be of strong association.  If you 
weren’t involved in politics you would think, “Oh great, I could 
send a message anytime to my local politician”.  More so than 
you could by say sending a letter, I don’t think the connection 
would there as much.  Based on the perception of, as a young 
person myself, and also of what other young people have said 
to me.  The great thing about Facebook is that it’s a platform in 
that you can create a rallying atmosphere.   
 
Obama did it very well in that he would send out a message to 
the people that like him to go out and take the message away.  
Brilliant, okay, the question is how do you translate those 
people into getting them onto the ground, in knocking up the 
doors of those people that aren’t on Facebook?  Those older 
generations, for example, that actually are the core 
Conservative voters. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So if a politician has 100 members on a Facebook page, signed 
up to that page, how many of those individuals, in a crude 
percentage, would actually actively go out and campaign?   
 
Ben Howlett:  I would say probably less than about 20% of those people.  
Primarily because if I was to create, I don’t know, let’s think of 
a CF group.  Newark for example, up in Lincolnshire, has 
recently created a CF society.  I would invite all my friends to 
that group and ask them to join it and support it.  However, 
they come from across the country, so you’ve got probably 
about 50% of that number of coming from around the country 
that may happen one day to turn up to an event, if there was a 
national by-election there.   
 
 But to be honest with you, they don’t really want to do it.  They 
just associate themselves with the Conservative brand, so 
therefore they need to like as many different Conservative 
societies as possible.   
 
 The core activists won’t come from those people that like it, 
those core activists will come from the message you send out 
by saying, “Come along to an event afterwards in the pub”.  
You know go to a social event, and then ask them to come 
campaigning after that, that’s the way to get the people to go 
out on the ground and campaign for you. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So just to be clear, in a one word answer, the association 
between the people that are on the Facebook group and the 
politician, is that a weak or a strong association? 
 
Ben Howlett:    Weak. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  Is the party, or has the party, done anything during the period 
of the 2010 general election to encourage that weak association 
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to become a stronger one?  And has that changed since the 
general election? 
 
Ben Howlett:  It’s the age old saying of “resistance is futile”.  The more 
events you’re invited to, the more chances of somebody turning 
up.  The more interesting events you invite them along to, the 
more chances of them turning up.   
 
 The party started to realise that when they were putting out 
loads and loads of stuff on Facebook, put it out on Twitter etc.  
Great, okay.  Some people would re-tweet it, but there are sort 
of like the politicos anyway.  Fine, let’s talk about the 
mainstream, the party now has realised we need to engage 
better and in particular in CF terms, because CF just took it as 
granted.  You know they would send out a message saying, 
“Come along to an event, it’s the general election, of course 
you’re going to come out and campaign”.  You know, “You 
want to see the general election, you want to see it win, you 
want to see David Cameron win”.  Great, lovely, that was the 
buying power.   
 
Now the buying power has gone in that we’re in government, 
what do we do?  So we’ve worked out the things that we do are 
creating events, creating social events in particular.  Creating 
campaigning events, and campaigning training, that are of 
interest to the market you’re offering it to.   
 
The things that they are looking for out of Facebook are, I 
don’t know, networking events, social events, listening to big 
speakers.  Young professionals wanting to network, students 
wanting, I don’t know, a better fresher’s packs involving beer 
mats, or whatever.  Listen to what your market wants, let’s take 
it to a more kind of commercially driven astute way of 
organising a campaigning organisation.  And you’ll see a 
remarkable turnaround in results, and you’ve already seen this 
with massive amounts of new members coming into the 
Conservative Party at the moment, and particularly CF 
members as well. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  From your explanation, it sounds to me like the people that are 
based in a Facebook group are encouraged out via events to 
campaign, would you agree with that statement? 
 
Ben Howlett:   Yes to go out and campaign.  The other side of it, which is a bit 
of a failure in terms of my explanation, is that a lot of the key 
messaging is not just about the traditional campaigning 
knocking on doors.  It’s actually blogging, it’s about making 
sure the message is kept up, a positive message is kept up on 
the online communities.   
 
And the problem is with this, and the research states that, is that 
the people that blog don’t necessarily go out and campaign, 
which is my main thing.  You know, we need people out on the 
streets doing the door knocking, but they don’t turn out and 
vote.  That’s the problem, they don’t want to kind of tear 
themselves away from the online medium, which becomes 
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very, very addictive, out onto the sort of polling stations.  
That’s a great difficulty. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So you’re talking about here the difference between those that 
use the internet and those that go out and campaign on the 
ground. Is the application of Facebook the most effective way 
of getting young people in your organisation out to help the 
party?  Or does the party do other things? 
 
Ben Howlett:  At the moment yes it is, because there is not really another 
platform which has got as many members, has got as bigger 
market share as Facebook.  Until someone can create 
something that – I mean Twitter, it’s a very similar thing in that 
Twitter, now a lot of people are on it, not everyone is on it.  But 
I can see in a year’s time that thousands of CF activists will be 
on Twitter, but there’s nothing else. 
 
 You could email people, which we do email, we use all sorts of 
communication.  We use Twitter, we use Facebook, we use 
email, we use Instant Messenger, we use text messages.  We 
use all those communications to get people out and 
campaigning but, you know, there’s nothing better than 
Facebook. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Before we move onto Twitter, which you’ve just mentioned, 
could you tell me a little bit more about how someone 
managing a Facebook page, and creating events, would 
practically go about that? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Right okay, we realise that, let’s take a by-election as an 
example.  We realise that recently there was a by-election come 
up in Lewisham, what we did was that we said to my 
communications manager in Conservative Central Office, 
Richard Jackson, “Will you set up a Facebook event?  I will 
invite all my friends to it that I’ve categorised”.  I’m pretty sad 
like this in that I have them all in alphabetical order.   
 
 Richard has a massive list of about 5,000 people on Facebook 
as well that he invites to that.  Great, he invites them, as long as 
you know where they’re going, how to get there, and the 
incentive is, at the end, you go to the pub afterwards.  So there 
always needs to be an incentive in any type of marketing, and 
in this instance it was, “Let’s go the pub afterwards”.  You 
know, great, okay, fun.  Campaigning plus, campaigning plus 
also social afterwards.   
 
 And then on top of that, then it gets automatically sent out to 
Twitter, which I know you’re going to come onto in a minute.  
And then it kind of goes viral by text messages afterwards, 
which most of us have got free text messages now, so we send 
that out as well.  And just make sure their friends are told, 
“Okay guys, please send it out to your friends, please send it 
out to their friends” and then we get more people in as a result. 
 
 And in Lewisham, of all places, which isn’t very Conservative 
at all, we came second in the by-election as a result of having – 
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I think it worked out to be roughly 35, 40 CF activists which 
matched the number of activists from the rest of London that 
came down and helped out, which is a great help for them. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  One of the central points that you keep coming back to, is how 
when a group on Facebook is created there is, there seems to be 
some kind of online community within the younger party 
where friends are invited, and they invite their friends.  Is that a 
growing culture within Conservative Future? 
 
Ben Howlett:  Yes indeed, word of mouth and well, word of mouth and word 
of Facebook, I don’t know what the word is there, but the word 
of Facebook speaks bounds.  It’s all about networking.  If an 
organisation is to grow, it has a good reputation in that say for 
example you’re setting up a new branch.  I’ve been to one 
recently, which only had four members that turned up.  
However, the next event they invited their friends along, so that 
meant that they each brought a friend, that was eight people.   
 
 They then, at the next event, brought another, their friends as 
well so it’s 16.  It gets bigger and bigger and bigger.  If the 
events are fun, and their friends are going to be there, more 
people will turn up.   
 
 But the issue is when their friends leave, what happens?  Does 
the organisation continue, does it not?  We need a continual 
sort of process of people always being involved in the party, 
otherwise we end up with pigs and troughs and we’re trying to 
make it more of a stabilised organisation. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  Putting all this in the context of other political parties, is there 
anything that the Conservative Party is doing that differentiates 
it from Labour, the Liberal Democrats and other such parties? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I recently had, I was being interviewed by I think it was The 
Guardian, a couple of weeks ago, and the journalist was 
actually talking about new media.  And he said, “I was looking 
at your Facebook events, I was looking at your …”, sorry, “I 
was looking at your Facebook page or I was looking at your 
website, I was looking at your Twitter accounts.  They are 
active to the extreme, in fact sometimes a little too active, in 
that there’s so much information coming out that people are 
like, “Wow God, where do I get involved?”  But in terms of 
Labour Party, and this is their own critique, it was, you know, 
what are they doing?  There is no sort of online presence, there 
is no sort of major Twitter accounts.   
 
Look at the comparison between LabourList and ConHome, the 
amount of readers – the readership of ConHome outstrips 
LabourList to the extreme.   
 
Liberal Democrats, even though they’re quite a young, 
hippyish sort of organisation, should be using the internet a lot 
more, and they’re not.   
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You could see this with an event I’m running tomorrow, in that 
we’ve got 40 activists that are coming along to a debate, and 
we’ve got 80 people in reserve.  Liberal Democrats – and 
we’ve got two busloads coming down to London, and this is all 
via Facebook and via email communication, all via online 
communications, whereas Liberal Democrats could only get 10 
people along, 10 delegates.  Which says a lot about the use of 
our communication techniques in comparison to their use of 
communication techniques. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So what is it about the culture within the Conservative Party 
organisation that makes it different? 
 
Ben Howlett:  I don’t think there’s any secret recipe for what we’re doing.  
We’re just doing it and we’re actually just getting the 
communications out there, blow the reviews of what happens.  
You know if there’s a continued online presence, if people 
know what we’re doing and people know how to get involved, 
and we’re being active about it and proactive about it, sorry, 
we’re going to do well.   
 
 Liberal Democrats and Labour Party don’t do that, they don’t 
get their message online well enough.  They sort of – ironically 
a fear of the online community in those two organisations, in 
comparison to ours.  And I’ve had this conversation with 
leaders of the Liberal Democrats’ youth wing and Labour Party 
youth wing as well, they just don’t do it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  So what is attractive to the general Conservative Party, 
Conservative Future member about the internet that seems less 
attractive in other Parties? 
 
Ben Howlett:  It is literally the amount of communications we whack out.  
The more communications we do – if Labour and Liberal 
Democrats got onto the message, got onto the point and 
realised, “Okay the more stuff we put out, the more people turn 
up to our events, the more sort of – the bigger the brand image 
we create”.  Great, they’re going to get loads of people coming 
along.   
 
 We have completely, utterly, outstretched their abilities, well 
sorry, we’ve overstretched our abilities in comparison to them.  
They have no sort of online backing, really, in comparison to 
ourselves. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You’ve talked a lot, and repeatedly mentioned, that you use the 
internet to organise social events and campaigning events.  And 
that those campaigning events can also be social events, do you 
think that that is something that is core to the success of the use 
of Facebook, the kind of social nature of the Conservative 
Party? 
 
Ben Howlett: Yes, absolutely.  I mean if I go along to a CF event, that’s 
organised via the Internet, I don’t tend to talk about policy.  
You know, it’s not one of those things you really do, you just 
talk about things as normal friends would do.  You know, “Did 
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you see what happened on TV last night?”  Or, “Did you 
happen to see what happens in the House of Commons?”  
Rather than, “Did you see what happened?” in terms of a 
football match.  Those are the sort of things you talk about.   
 
 You don’t talk about, I don’t know, you don’t talk about, “Oh 
did you hear exactly what Gordon Brown …” oh sorry, 
“Michael Gove was talking about in terms of education policy 
the other day, and the changes that are being made?”  Well no 
you don’t, you don’t talk about that sort of thing.   
 
 And I don’t know whether I’ve got the - I don’t know whether 
I’ve got the strategy right.  My strategy when I first became 
elected, was campaigning plus, in that it’s campaigning plus 
social.  It seems to be working, and the proof is in the pudding 
and that you end up with loads of people that turn up to events.  
You know, one debate where you have 40 tickets, and you’ve 
got 120 people turning up. 
 
 And normally the biggest draw of things is coming along when 
there’s a bit of booze involved for CF members.  And there’s 
no booze involved in this one, and yet you’ve still got loads of 
people turning up.  So bingo, it’s the quality of the debate that’s 
being proposed.  And the quality of the people that want to get 
involved, so great. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Why would a candidate use Twitter? 
 
Ben Howlett: Candidates?  If we’re talking about parliamentary candidates 
here? 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Yes. 
 
Ben Howlett: Parliamentary candidates have got to be very careful about the 
use of Twitter, and in particular the use of Facebook as well, in 
photos and different messages that they’re using.  Twitter, I 
have always used as a campaigning method, as a use.  And 
other MPs have realised this as well, in that the message from 
Central Office is, “You either use Twitter for campaigning, or 
you don’t use it at all” because you can fall into a massive hole 
in that you end up putting something stupid on Twitter whilst 
drunk at some stage.  And you end up blowing up your career.   
 
 But it opens up a whole new type of communications in that 
younger people, what do they want to see out of their political 
message?  How many characters on a Twitter message?  140 
characters?  People don’t want to sort of listen any longer than 
140 characters, as a young person.  Great, use that as a use of 
communication.   
 
 But as I said earlier on, don’t use it as the only one.  Use 
Facebook, use email, use phone, leaflets, knocking on doors 
etc. as well as it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: What is the difference between Twitter and Facebook? 
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Ben Howlett: Well Twitter ultimately is about the slogan, and if you get the 
slogan right within 140 characters, and I’ve experimented a 
couple of times on this, in that I could put, “Tonight that I’m 
speaking to you about an academic research paper”.  Or I could 
go out there and say, “Good God, Gordon Brown is out there 
being an idiot again, and David Cameron’s marvellous”.  
You’ll end up with about 70 people liking it on Facebook, 
great. 
 
 You’ve got to make sure that what you say on Facebook, 
however, has some sort of different appeal.  Whether that’s on 
multimedia sort of terms or sort of something other than just 
text, that’s the way you get more people interested in 
Facebook.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So it sounds to me, from what you’ve said about Facebook and 
Twitter, that Facebook is used for events and social purposes 
and Twitter is used for a more of a conversational purpose? 
 
Ben Howlett: Yes, yes if you want to start a debate, you put it on Twitter, 
because you’ve got the trending, you’ve got the slogans, 
you’ve got the messages, you’ve got the quick, easy updates.  
Which Facebook does have to an extent, but Facebook has that 
as a part of the whole social networking thing.  Twitter isn’t 
about social networking, Twitter is about a message and your 
political message, if you are using it for political purposes.  Or 
some sort of social purpose, if you’re some sort of celebrity or 
something. 
 
 Whereas Facebook, you can use it for absolutely everything.  
So I twinned my Twitter to my Facebook, so it updates on my 
message as well as it updates people on events as well.  So I 
can use both platforms at the same time.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You mentioned CCHQ’s role in candidates using Twitter, and 
the advice that they give, does CCHQ monitor the use of 
Twitter? 
 
Ben Howlett: There’s social media managers in Central Office, and yes they 
do, they look at what goes out on Twitter pages, they follow 
people.  And in a way, it’s not sort of – it’s not some sort of 
style in this police method of campaigning, or monitoring as 
such.  But it’s there as a check and balance, and I think there 
always needs to be a check and balance.  It’s not sort of, “Good 
God you’ve just done this wrong, what the heck are you 
doing?”  It’s sort of giving advice where advice is needed. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Does the party in some way have concerns about the use of 
social media? 
 
Ben Howlett: I think the party has concerns over anything that it doesn’t 
necessarily, which it’s not able to necessarily, control.  I think 
everyone’s like that, if say for example something’s said about 
me by somebody else, and I can’t control it and it goes out 
there virally, then I get very annoyed about that.  Just like 
anybody would in terms of gossip, or whatever.  Twitter is a 
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gossips sphere in that it does need a check and balance from 
those people that are professionals in that way.   
 
 The party, however, recognises that – sorry party sounds like 
this sort of this style on this machine here, but it’s not.  The 
party recognises the use of Twitter as a communications 
method, as it does with Facebook, as it does with everything 
else.  And in fact whilst the Conservative Party has got this 
message, this image of being sort of backdated, or sort of slow 
on the uptake, in fact will be very quick at grasping a new 
technology.  Seizing it, seeing it as a sort of use of great ability 
and campaigning message and run with that. 
 
 Only recently you saw – you’ve got the things that crop up in 
the Metro the squares with sort of mosaic pattern in it and that 
you can put your Smartphone against it and pick up on that.  
The Conservative Party is the first party to have used the 
square mosaic, and use that as a campaigning tool out of all the 
other Parties in the country. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So what is it about the Conservative Party that means that 
they’re first off the mark on new technologies? 
 
Ben Howlett: Because the Conservative Party ultimately is a pragmatic party, 
it hasn’t got this ideology of it being sort of Conservative with 
a small “c” sort of thing.  It will realise that, “Oh great okay, 
there’s a new technology out there to get our message out there.  
It’s a good method, it’s tried and tested in the commercial 
world, let’s go out there and use it ourselves”. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: What was the role of Twitter in the 2010 general election? 
 
Ben Howlett: I wasn’t on Twitter at the time, so I don’t really know to be 
completely honest with you.  I can imagine it was growing, 
Twitter as a platform, that’s sort of grown over the last couple 
months from what I’ve seen.  But I’ve only really only been 
involved with it since May 2010.   
 
 I funnily enough hated the use of Twitter beforehand.  I was 
very kind of, “Oh do I have to use another form of 
communications?”  I’ve just used Facebook and I thought 
Facebook was good enough.  And then someone said, “Get 
involved in Twitter” and now I’ve got what?  790 odd 
followers on Twitter since May 2010, so it’s a good tool, 
people like it, people follow you and listen to you.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So there are some downsides to using social media? 
 
Ben Howlett: Yes there are, if it goes wrong, it goes horribly wrong.  When 
you think Charlie Sheen, for example, recently puts on the odd 
Twitter message and it just kind of blows up out in their faces. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So in what ways could using social media go wrong? 
 
Ben Howlett: You end up going to a – it has gone wrong in terms of 
Conservative Party over the last few years.  I’ve seen it in that 
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people go to bad taste parties, dress up as appalling figures, 
which you shouldn’t necessarily be dressed up as.  You know, 
you end up with an odd person that dresses up like Hitler.   
 
Someone only recently had a photo up on Facebook, God 
knows why, holding up a golliwog.  You know, these people 
are going to be clamped down upon and looked upon very, very 
seriously.  You know it’s the exactly the same as you would if 
you said it, or if you wrote it down.  Twitter however, 
unfortunately, or Facebook has got the opportunity to go across 
the entirety of the internet, and that goes to millions, if not 
billions, of users.  So not the best way of using campaigning 
techniques.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And is there something different about the role of the internet 
in terms of political life in the Conservative Party that is – 
gives potential for this kind of negative instants to happen? 
 
Ben Howlett: No I think, there is nothing intrinsic within the Conservative 
Party that makes this happen.  No, it’s up to the individuals to 
just … 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Sorry, just to clarify, I meant, “Is there anything about social 
media that is different to other technologies?” 
 
Ben Howlett: Right, sorry, I should say – sorry I thought you were talking 
about the Conservative Party there.  Is there anything different 
about it?  Yes because of the fact that click of a button, in 
comparison to writing out the letter or writing out the foul 
comment in pros, it goes everywhere.  And you’ve got to be 
very, very careful because you can’t get something back if it’s 
already gone out there viral.   
 
Someone will have a copy of it somewhere, and it doesn’t go 
down very well.  Especially in terms of the media because the 
media now realise that, “Oh great”, especially with the tabloid 
media, there’s a way of monitoring social media, in that they’ll 
get a screen grab and they can use that in the papers the next 
day.  Or almost immediately if they put something up on the 
internet about it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So are there any security risks in using the internet for political 
communication? 
 
Ben Howlett: Security?  That’s something probably more in terms of the 
Government side of things.  If a minister is putting something 
in terms of Twitter, their Twitter can be hacked into, that’s a 
security risk.   
  
 Therese Coffey ended up being hacked into recently as an MP, 
Twitter is very unsecure.  Even if it’s on your BlackBerry, and 
BlackBerry is one of the most secure uses of, most secure 
iPhone – most secure Smartphone, sorry,  in comparison to 
iPhones or HDC or anything like that. 
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 You could end up being hacked into that way as well, as soon 
as someone uses a password encryption key on your Twitter, 
then that’s it, Facebook exactly the same.   
 
The good thing is with Facebook in comparison to Twitter, is 
that the checks and the security on Facebook means that if 
anybody logs into your Facebook, remotely that looks a bit 
suspicious, bit like credit card technology, they will 
automatically freeze your account.  And you have to go 
through the security processes there and it’s all in the 
programming, which is brilliant. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: For a non-high profile candidate, can social media convert in – 
the use of social media, can that be converted into votes within 
the constituency for which they are standing? 
 
Ben Howlett: I don’t think it really matters if they’re a non-high profile or a 
profile candidate.  If you’re in a “no hoper seat”, no hoper seat 
in inverted commas, then you know you have to use every 
single tool possible in order to achieve your goal.  In exactly 
the same way as David Cameron has done that as an absolute 
potential Prime Minister, now is a Prime Minister, so. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: But earlier you mentioned that a lot of the people that are in the 
Facebook groups, for instance, or are followers on Twitter, they 
could be anywhere in the country.  So they do not necessarily 
geographically live in that constituency, so if a candidate is 
using Facebook, what is the primary objective? 
 
Ben Howlett: The primary objective of Facebook depends what your event is.  
So for example you’ve got 3,000 friends on Facebook, you 
know that they’re dotted all around the country, but they’re 
friends with you as a person you can use them as, as I said only 
10% of that sort of 300 people may turn up to your event.  
Those 10% of people are better than no percent of people, 
based on the fact they may not have even heard about the 
campaign that’s going on because there’s no way of 
communicating with them.   
 
 Or alternatively they may live somewhere else in the country, 
so you go off to them instead geographically.  Like what I do 
with CF, in that I don’t just spend all my time in London, I go 
round the rest of the country.  So I realised that, say for 
example, I’m looking for a fundraising, I’d go into London and 
invite all my friends from London to fundraise for us and put 
some money behind the campaign. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So is what you’re saying that social media can be used as a tool 
to gain votes by organising events that facilitates a body of 
people to go out and campaign and use that for gaining votes? 
 
Ben Howlett: You’ve got to look at what your market is wanting.  If your 
market is wanting to not go out campaigning, but is willing to 
put £10 in the pot to come along to a social event, that comes 
along for fundraising – that goes towards fundraising, brilliant, 
use it as that.  If your market is wanting campaigning, great use 
22 
 
it as that.  Look at the most appropriate level of what they’re 
wanting first, and then do something that they actually need.   
 
For example, CF Young Professional is just being launched as 
a part of the Conservative Future movement.  Young 
professionals want networking, they want drinking 
organisations, they want to hear high profile speakers.  Great, 
we can use them for gathering money in order for those people 
that are actually going out there campaigning, mainly students, 
to go out there and campaign and fundraise and push them to 
actually go out campaigning. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of campaigns, like the 2010 general election, in a 
political sense, on a day-to-day basis, what would be the most 
likely use of the internet for an activist?  Would it be social 
media or email? 
 
Ben Howlett: If you’re got a good database, and this is where it all kind of 
boils down to, is Facebook is a database.  And every candidate 
wants the best database as possible, because it’s their best way 
to know what data, sorry is the best way to know that you’ve 
got some sort of communication going out.   
 
 I would use both, Facebook has got an opportunity to get a few 
people out, great, and spread the message virally.  Emails has 
got the more sort of personalised approach.  Now it depends 
how you use email, if you’re using email as a mail merge, 
“Dear Anthony, Dear Ben” whatever, or, “Hi”.  You know that 
sort of stuff is personalised, it makes out as if I’ve actually 
emailed you directly.  If it is a put you on all a BCC, it’s not 
going to work at all.  So it’s really, it’s very difficult to say 
unless I know exactly what sort of campaigning you’re doing 
or how you’re going to use that sort of method. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So are you suggesting that if, from your last comment, you use 
Bcc on an email and send that out to 300 people, for example, 
you said it wouldn’t work at all.  So that would mean that not 
one of those individuals, of that 300, would come out if you 
used a Bcc email? 
 
Ben Howlett: You’d end up with probably about one or – probably, I’m 
generalising there.  You’d probably end up with about one or 
two people that would sort of come along to an event, because 
they see it.  But the reaction you get from an impersonalised 
spam email, in effect, wouldn’t be as strong as you would from 
a personalised email.   
 
And when I work in – I work in recruitment, so if I send out an 
email which is, “Hello all” you know you get no responses 
back.  If I put one saying, “Dear Bob, how are you?”  Or, “Hi 
Bob, how are you?” sorry, you end up with Bob automatically 
replying back saying, “Oh yes I’m brilliant thank you, how are 
you?” because they think I’ve emailed them directly.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So did the Conservative Party use personalisation techniques 
with emails in the run up to the 2010 general election? 
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Ben Howlett:  Yes it did, one in terms of donations and two from personal 
messages from David Cameron.  CameronDirect was you’ve 
got the sort of multimedia channels and stuff like that.  He also 
did the emailing out as well, and that came from him 
personally.  It wasn’t him personally, but you know it looked as 
if it was. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  You mentioned fundraising, what role did the internet, social 
media, party websites, email replay in terms of fundraising in 
the 2010 general election? 
 
Ben Howlett: Multimedia doesn’t work in terms of getting the big donations 
in, so you’re not going to get someone, it would be surprising if 
you did and I would love it if it ever happened, but you’re not 
going to get like £3,000,000 donation from somebody that 
happens to see a spam email come into their inbox.  Let alone 
would you get that from somebody receiving a leaflet through 
the door saying, “Will you please donate”.   
 
 But what you will do, however, is do the other side of 
fundraising which is instead of going for one big amount, go 
for 50 small amounts.  And the more small amounts you get in, 
equate to exactly the same as the big donation with probably 
less effort as well. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: I recall from the general election campaign, Eric Pickles 
placing a lot of notes on Facebook and Twitter sites.  One I 
recall was that he encouraged, or commended a candidate, for 
inviting supporters to donate just a £1 to the campaign.  In your 
experience, and opinion, how effective is that type of 
fundraising in terms of generating subsequent funds for a 
campaign? 
 
Ben Howlett: Very, if you look at what Oxfam or the other charities do, they 
say just £3 a month can keep, I don’t know, an African village 
in water for example.  Great, okay, brilliant that’s the way that 
they work, so we should be using that sort of technique as well.   
 
 But it depends on where you are, or what your demographics 
are.  So for example if you’re in Virginia Water, you would be 
thinking, “Okay well you should be looking at sort of putting 
about £100 behind that”.   
 
If you are in student land in the middle of Sheffield, for 
example, if you’re in Sheffield Hallam or something, then you 
should be thinking, “Okay, let’s get loads of students to put £1, 
£1 a year, in that pot”.  And you’d probably end up with what, 
100 odd members, so it’s about £100 you get back out of that, 
out of nothing you could get beforehand. 
 
 But you shouldn’t look at the two separately, you should do – 
like with a range of communication channels, you should be 
using a range of fundraising channels as well.  In that you 
should be doing a wide range of £1 donations, but also making 
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sure you’ve got someone out there picking off the sort of big 
donors from local businesses and things like that.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman:  Was blogging used as a campaign tool in the 2010 general 
election? 
 
Ben Howlett: Yes, I’ve always been very cynical of blogging, blogging you 
can’t necessarily control the message that’s going out.  And 
blogging, to me, is always, not always but in the majority 
critical of the organisation that’s trying to get its message out.   
 
 So you could end up putting out a message, for example, 
tuition fees and saying, “Facts on fees are this, this and this”.  
But you end up with hundreds of people blogging saying, “Oh 
it’s disgusting” etc.  And the message being completely 
watered down or changed or altered, so I’ve never been that 
supportive of it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Why then would an activist become a blogger? 
 
Ben Howlett: Activists become bloggers because they want their message to 
be heard, but don’t really know the way that that message is 
going to be heard.  I’m trying to work out a better of way 
saying this.  An activist doesn’t necessarily get listened to, for 
example, in terms of main party policy, so the people that they 
think that listen to them are other bloggers.   
 
In fact virtual people that sit behind their computers and don’t 
necessarily go out leafleting, that’s why I don’t necessarily 
agree with bloggers as such.  The Guido Fawkes of this world, 
you know, they’re there to make a quick buck tabloid story, 
they’re not there to sort of make a particular point.   
 
 And it also downgrades politics to an extent that that’s the way 
that, you know, journalism is going and the bloggers are sort of 
taking over and, you know, what’s the point of their story?  
You know, I don’t understand it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So are you saying that blogging, and the use of the internet, can 
give relatively unknown, low profile individuals a voice that 
they wouldn’t necessarily have?   
 
Ben Howlett: Yes, but not necessarily for the right reasons, or actually 
creating a positive dimension as a result.  Perhaps when people 
like Harry Cole started off blogging, and they thought, “Oh 
great I could blog about how great the Conservative Party is” 
realise that not very many people listen and sort of turn to the 
dark side as such.  And went off and started being more critical, 
being more opposition, creating more opposition to the 
Conservative Party, which ultimately he started out supporting.   
 
 And trying to create a story in that they are now becoming 
more like journalists in that - do young people get their news 
from TV?  They probably don’t, they get their news from 
Twitter, or they get the news from blogging, or they get the 
news from sort of ConHome as such.  And that’s probably 
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more of a story, rather than the strange death of politics, more 
the strange death of media.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Could you explain more about Harry Cole and his role as a 
blogger? 
 
Ben Howlett: Harry started off something called, “Tory Bear”, probably 
about three years ago now, and has closed it down over the last 
six months.  Probably about a month after I won the CF 
Chairman election race. 
 
 He started off on stories about Conservative Future, about you 
know what the Government was doing.  He’s always come 
from sort of like the more right wing sort of ideology of the 
party, which is absolutely fine, I’ve always worked with sort of 
right wing MPs in terms of those Tory Party. 
 
 And then sort of slowly changed himself to be a lot more 
critical of the Conservative Party, a lot more sort of journalist 
in orientation.  More sort of egotistical as such in its approach, 
that’s not a criticism, it’s just the way that his blog kind of 
changed.   
 
And we’ve seen sort of a slight – well he’s now working for 
Guido Fawkes, Paul Staines, in that he’s doing the sort of 
journalist sort of – it’s not dirty tactics, but it’s the sort of, “Get 
the interesting story out that kind of embarrasses an MP, or 
embarrasses a minister”.   
 
And you saw that with William Hague in the Chris Myers’ 
story.  You know, you’re just thinking, “Why?  What sort of 
vindictive purpose is this?  If you’re a Conservative, you 
shouldn’t be doing that”.  But he has now obviously changed to 
become more of a journalist, and you can see that change in 
ways he was operating over the last sort of six to 12 months 
really. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How would someone like Harry be viewed by the party? 
 
Ben Howlett: To begin with, I suppose it was literally, “Oh great” because 
we didn’t really know much about – when I say “we” I wasn’t 
really involved at that stage.  They didn’t really see blogging as 
a big issue, but ever since Harry’s day of sort of getting 
blogging up to sort of be the big thing.   
 
Iain Dale’s Diary, for example, a similar situation, you know 
more and more was it seen as sort of a bit of a sinister type of 
party activism.   And that it was always seen as, “Let’s get 
people out of their computer screens and out on the knocking 
on the door” because it causes a lot more problems for us if 
they’re blogging about stuff and creating their own opinions, 
which weren’t necessarily party policy.   
 
 Or they were embarrassing the party anyway and undoing all 
the hard work that the traditional campaigners were doing, so 
the Cabinet members were doing in trying to get the message 
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out positively in terms of the press.  So the party is not keen on 
blogging, and I think the reputation of Harry, and others 
involved, have reduced the – the image that Harry has created, 
and others have created, have reduced the positive things that 
blogging can actually do in getting the message out well and 
virally. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Has the party taken any steps to try and either control that, or 
have some influence? 
 
Ben Howlett: It can’t do either, it really can’t do either.  It can’t really have 
any influence over what they’re going to say, because they’re 
going to say it anyway.  If, of course, they’re going to put 
something as a – if you’re a party member, then yes they’re 
going to say, “What the heck are you doing here?” you know. 
 
 Recently it was “the golliwog-gate”, you know, they put up a 
photo on the campaign for political correctness saying that, you 
know, “We should have the right to stand here with the 
golliwog”.  And you’re thinking, “Well actually no, it’s racist 
and it’s just terribly unethical and very rude”.  You know, you 
just don’t’ do that sort of thing.   
 
 But the party can control in a traditional way, it can’t control in 
what people are going to say, because as I said earlier on 
technology becomes viral and they just send it out and people 
get hold of it quite quickly. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Who specifically was involved in “the golliwog-gate” incident? 
 
Ben Howlett: I think it was, I think it was Bill and Star Etheridge, if I 
remember correctly, up in Dudley in West Midlands.  Those 
two in particular, and there was a couple of others involved as 
well.  But they were suspended from the party for a number of 
weeks, I think it was about six weeks in the end.  And they 
went off on one saying, “Oh God it’s disgusting, the party are 
trying to control our views”.  Well no, it’s just completely 
offensive to other people. 
 
 You know you don’t wear a Hitler moustache and do a Nazi 
salute in the middle of a Jewish community.  You don’t go out 
and photograph yourself against a golliwog, it’s just not done.  
You know, you don’t go off and start chanting or beating up 
gay guys in the middle of Soho, you know these things you just 
don’t do. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How effective is this type of discipline from CCHQ in terms of 
the wider party, and encouraging them to not post things that 
the party would otherwise dislike? 
 
Ben Howlett: Well we should be quite careful in terms of CCHQ, it has no 
influence at all, because CCHQ does what the voluntary party 
tells it to do basically.  They are a mechanism to run an 
effective campaign, they are basically a bunch of agents.  
They’re not, they don’t sit on the Candidates Committee, they 
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don’t sit on the Disciplinary Committee, that is all run by 
volunteers of the Conservative Party. 
 
 Yes we get the support from CCHQ, because all the 
associations are put into the pot for CCHQ, but we need to 
make that one very, very clear and kind of keep CCHQ out of 
it. 
 
 But it’s probably a failure of the Conservative Party in that it 
doesn’t necessarily train people well enough in terms of 
damage limitation, in terms of its PR image.  In terms of 
getting a proactive, positive story out there, it’s a lot of fire 
brigading, damage limitation exercises which are very, very 
reactive.   
 
 And anyone in PR will say, “No, to get your message out there 
effectively, you need to do a lot of proactive PR”.  The party 
doesn’t train its activists in that, because they feel that it’s not 
necessarily an activist’s job to get that image out there as well.   
 
 There has been a remarkable turnaround in events recently, in 
that the party is now thinking of doing, or is doing exactly that, 
in that there are massive amounts of best practice that’s going 
out.  Massive amounts of training programmes that are going 
out, massive amounts of – even with CF training schemes that 
are coming out as well, that really sort of don’t see the activist 
as just activists.  But really enhance and embed them within the 
campaigning machinery itself.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So there is a new generation of Conservative activists and 
campaigner that is likely to be involved in the internet, in some 
capacity.  And the party has noted a change in types of 
campaigning, in terms of social media, email and blogging.  
And some of those media are considered by the party in a 
positive way, and some in a negative way.  Social media in a 
more positive way, blogging in a less positive way, would that 
be correct? 
 
Ben Howlett: Yes, yes absolutely. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You mentioned that the party is now starting to understand and 
develop ways of encouraging activists to use the internet in a 
positive way for the party, as opposed to the more negative 
ways that say blogging could be used - as you’ve described.  
Could you just give me a little bit more detail about how that 
works in practice? 
 
Ben Howlett: In practice, in practice you’ve seen a large amount of work, and 
I think the best example of this is “No to AV”.  “No to AV” is 
a campaign, isn’t being run as a traditional “We will shove as 
many leaflets through a door, we will knock on as many doors 
as possible”.  One, because of the national scale of it, and 
secondly because there’s not enough money in order to do that.   
 
It’s not a campaign that sort of attractive, to be honest with 
you.  I’m sure more people get involved if it’s an EU 
28 
 
referendum campaign, than on electoral reform, as you can see 
with the poll saying that turnout’s going to be appalling.   
 
The message that’s going out is using Facebook, in terms of 
getting activists out on the ground, it’s using a limited amount 
of resources but producing the maximum amount of gains for 
activist count.  And also for hit rate as well, in that more people 
will be – more people are engaged – the market is engaged on 
the electoral reform on the internet, than it is sort of in the 
mainstream press. 
  
So you need to make sure that message is targeting those 
people that are most interested.  And that is via blogging, is via 
sort of holding debates, we’re making sure those debates are 
advertised via online portal - via sort of online messages, via 
blogging in itself.  
 
I wasn’t saying earlier on that blogging is an absolute no, no 
because the party has now realised there is a benefit to 
blogging, because we need to train people to know how to 
blog.  And know how to blog effectively to promote the 
Conservative Party.  And they are now saying to people 
actively, in terms of the “No to AV” campaign, because they’re 
realised that there’s no money out there to sort of do the 
traditional leaflets.   
 
Go out there, blog as much possible, get yourself on as an 
activist on as many different radio stations, TV channels, print 
press as possible to spread that word.  And the way that the 
word is being spread cheaply, because it costs nothing to send 
an email, send an email. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So how exactly is the party doing this encouraging of people to 
blog in a specific way? 
 
Ben Howlett: It is literally saying, as black and white, “Go out there, blog, 
tell all your friends that “No to AV” is the right thing and that 
we don’t want an electoral reform.  We will give you as many 
tools as possible”.  And this is where the best practice side of 
things come in, that “We will give you as many tools, or as 
many messages as possible to put in your blog, as long as you 
blog for us”.   
 
 What I’m trying to get at is by what mechanism is the party 
saying this.  Are you saying it via email?  Emailing out its 
members saying, “Go out there”.  It’s saying it by word of 
mouth, it’s saying it via Facebook, to an extent.  Not massively 
Facebook, because we know that the “Yes to AV” monitor the 
Facebook counts of “No to AV”.  It’s literally saying to as 
many people as possible, as many contacts as we’ve got 
possible.   
 
 The Conservative Party has got thousands of email addresses 
that “No to AV” stuff goes out to.  “Go out there and spread the 
word”, that’s the way that it’s doing it, and it’s all online, it’s 
not sort of send a letter in the post. 
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Anthony Ridge-Newman: And going back to blogging, what role do you consider the 
ConservativeHome blog to have played in party organisation 
during the election period? 
 
Ben Howlett: ConHome can be seen as a thorn in the side of the Conservative 
Party, in that the party message at the moment, or the party 
ideology, is a lot more sort of centre, centre-right.  The 
ConHome readership is very much, as with any sort of 
newspaper, associated with its own readership.  Which in terms 
of ConHome readership, it’s very much further right that 
centre-right.   
 
 So there’s always sort of like criticism of the party message on 
ConHome as a platform.  If you put something up there now, 
you’ll realise that actually what the Labour Party have been 
doing, quite effectively I have to say, is infiltrating that site as 
commentators.  And commenting on blog posts, negatively, to 
sort of embarrass the Conservative Party really. 
 
 I’ve seen it with my own CF election campaigns, in that there 
was a heck of a lot of negative comments that were done by my 
opposition.  And that’s a very small thing, you know the 
Conservative Future is not the be all and end all.   
 
 Whereas sort of Conservative Party itself has got many more 
followers, thousands of followers in fact, and that negative sort 
of persistent campaign to embarrass the party as such.  On its 
own sort of what is perceived as the voice of the Conservative 
Party for members, for grassroots members, is quite persistent 
really. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Is there something about ConservativeHome that is in some 
way like the Government’s policy on transparency?  Is 
ConservativeHome the transparency for the organisation of the 
Conservative Party, that the internet is for the transparency of 
Government expenditure? 
 
Ben Howlett: No, I don’t think it is.  I would say probably ConHome is more 
of an experiment in Conservative Party newspapers, for 
example.  In that, you know, when you’re a local councillor 
you produce your own print press that’s sort of quite positive 
about the local council.  But it doesn’t want to be seen too 
positive about the local council, just in case it’s sort of seen as 
being complete propaganda.   
 
 ConHome is used by ministers as a voice for its grassroots 
members, for its grassroots members to find out what the party 
is doing and to rally support.  It’s not, I don’t agree that it’s sort 
of about sort of producing a sort of inside out view of what the 
Conservative Party is doing on a day-to-day basis.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And what is the central role of ConHome in terms of its role 
within the Conservative Party grassroots? 
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Ben Howlett: Centrally it’s a newspaper, so it’s there as a journalistic press, it 
just happens to be about the Conservative Party.  Like 
LabourList is literally just about the Labour Party and 
producing news about the Labour Party. 
 
 Its secondary objective, although they would like to consider it 
to be the primary objective, is that it represents the views of its 
grass … - of the Conservative Party grassroots members.  Yes 
to an extent, but the Conservative Party can do that internally, 
it doesn’t necessarily need to do that externally.   
 
Hence, probably, why they’re created something like the 
Conservative Party policy forums, in order to voice that 
opinion of grassroots members.  But internally and actually 
giving them an ability to actually change the decision making, 
and also the way that the manifesto is created in the future.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Well if the role of ConservativeHome is to disseminate 
information to party members, what is different between 
ConservativeHome and the party’s blog, the Blue Blog? 
 
Ben Howlett: Again, it’s about brand appeal.  The Blue Blog is seen as 
literally just a blog that talks just about the Conservative Party 
and how wonderful the Conservative Party is.  And it’s not 
really news at the end of the day, it’s just a voice piece for 
those people that want to blog on it and the readership on is 
ridiculously low.   
 
 I only found out about it about three months ago, I’d never 
even used it before until someone said, “Oh by the way, have 
you posted anything on Blue Blog?”  “Yes okay, I know what 
that is” and in fact I had no idea.   
 
 In comparison to the brand image of ConHome, ConHome is 
huge, everyone goes to it.  People from every walk of life, 
journalists, public affairs, managers whatever, they get their 
news from ConHome about the Conservative Party.  And what 
the Government’s doing from a “inside the tent” perspective, 
and that’s why they do very well.  They’re not annoying the 
Conservative Party, but they, because they’re obviously 
promoting what the Conservative Party’s doing, but they’re 
looking at it at a critical, from a critical angle.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And does the Conservative Party have any kind of relationship, 
direct relationship, with the people at ConservativeHome? 
 
Ben Howlett: I’m sure they always have meetings and the press office 
probably get on very, very well with ConHome, they absolutely 
have to really I think. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: What is different about ConHome to a traditional newspaper? 
 
Ben Howlett: A traditional newspaper with that broadsheet or tabloid, if 
you’re talking about national press, national press they talk 
about all issues.  And the press have a very specific job and 
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very, very good job in that they hold the Government to 
account.   
 
 The ConHome is there as a newspaper just on a particular 
issue.  I’d probably even call it a trade press, in that its view is 
just – its focus is just on the Conservative Party.  And will look 
at bashing Labour, or bashing the Liberal Democrats because 
they know that’s where their, one their money comes in from, 
which is the Conservative Party activists and Conservative 
Party readership or Conservative related advertisement.   
 
And secondly, also, it’s there to really hold the Conservative 
Party to account, it’s not there to hold the Government to 
account then.  That’s a different – it just happens to be now that 
we’re in Government. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Let’s assume that ConservativeHome is a platform for the 
grassroots of the party to have a voice, how would that be 
viewed by the Conservative Party? 
 
Ben Howlett: There is no other way that the party activists can have that 
voice other than through commenting on pieces.  Or on the 
Blue Blog, which again I’ve said no one really reads.  Or 
putting comments through to the policy forum, the national 
policy forum.  There’s no other way that it can happen, so the 
party realised that if this can be outsourced to an organisation 
such as ConHome, then great, let it happen.   
 
 But we have to take all the comments as the grassroots making 
comments on, I don’t know, Eric Pickles’ localism bill with a 
pinch of salt.  Because it’s not Conservative Party members 
necessarily that are putting those comments down.  Yes it 
might happen to be the majority of people are actually 
Conservative Party activists, but you know you’ve got other 
opposition people on there as well.  And people really aren’t 
involved in the Tory Party that comment on pieces. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You were recently elected as the National Chairman of 
Conservative Future, and you led a high profiled campaign 
within the Conservative Party in order to achieve that goal.  
What role did the internet play in your personal campaign? 
 
Ben Howlett: 100% of what I did was via – well 99% of the stuff I did was 
on the internet, so every single time I went somewhere I 
publicised it using internet via Facebook, via email address, of 
the email addresses I’d collected.   
 
Twitter, I hadn’t really used per se, I kind of got more active on 
Twitter as I went along.  More so now as Chairman, I’m 
involved with Twitter than I have been when I was 
campaigning. 
 
But yes, it was, I couldn’t do anything unless it involved 
Facebook as an event.  I did a big sort of tour of the UK and 
invited loads of people along to events and the way I advertise 
those events was via Facebook.   
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Anthony Ridge-Newman: And is there something unique about the internet that allowed 
you to campaign in a different way to your predecessors? 
 
Ben Howlett: Yes, Facebook at this stage had then massively kicked off in 
that every university member was a member of Facebook.  
There was ways of creating a database that was efficient use of 
database space, in that you knew where your activists were.  
Sorry, you knew where your supporters were, you knew how to 
categorise those supporters, you knew how to communicate 
effectively with them, and efficiently in particular.  And the 
most important thing is that Facebook is free.   
 
Obviously you can’t go around pissing off Facebook, because 
they’ll end up cutting you off and kicking you off of it and you 
lose that massive database.  But work it efficiently and work it 
effectively, you’ll end up with a very, very good supporter base 
as a result.   
 
And the big thing, as with any “Get out the vote” campaign, 
was translating – say for example a parliamentary candidate 
would translate those people that have said they were going to 
go and vote for you as pledges into actual votes.  I needed to 
make sure that those people that are following me, are fans of 
me on Facebook, translated into votes afterwards as well. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: If in your campaign, in the 2010 general election, internet did 
not exist, how would your role have been different? 
 
Ben Howlett: I would have had to look at totally different means.  I would 
probably had to look at post, which I did send out a letter to all 
associations across the country, fine.  I’d have send out postal 
addresses to other people and things, which is fine.  I don’t 
think there’s much of a take up on that to be honest with you, 
because they received a letter and thought, “Why do I bother?”  
You know, that gets posted out to all my members, but post 
costs something.   
 
 I’d have to use telephones and calling people and I’d have to 
get all their telephone numbers, which is ineffective and costs 
money by telephones etc.   
 
 If the internet hadn’t have been in place, it would have cost me 
a lot, lot more money and wouldn’t have been as effective, I 
don’t think. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So what was it that was most effective about using the internet? 
 
Ben Howlett: Well cheap and effective, sorry, free actually,  campaigning 
opportunities basically in that I can set up an event, invite loads 
of people along to it, and people would turn up, so that was 
quite effective.   
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: That concludes the interview, and I’d like to finish by saying 
thank you very much for your participation Ben. 
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Ben Howlett: And thank you very much Anthony. 
 
END AUDIO 
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Anthony Newman: Anthony Ridge-Newman interviewing Craig Elder from, previously, 
the Conservative Party.  If you could just start by telling me how you 
first got involved with the Conservative party. 
 
Craig Elder: Sure, I was I guess something ironically perhaps not given you know 
your background.  I was actually working towards a PhD at the 
University of Dundee in of all things, Post Modern American 
Literature.  I was supplementing this, supplementing my income in 
order to pay back extortionate fees by working as web editor for the 
university as well.  Got about maybe say half way through that PhD and 
I saw there was an opportunity to go and work with the Conservative 
Party. To be honest not a party I have ever been, previously, associated 
myself with but took a really, really keen interest in politics.  I was 
taking a very keen interest in the changes that had taken place in the 
Conservative Party after David had become leader.   
 
So, I applied for the job as a kind of speculative thing and thought well 
if this comes off then I would quite happily take a break from my 
research.  If it doesn’t come off then you know nothing ventured, 
nothing gained.  Went down was interviewed, met with a couple of key 
people in what was then a very young communications team.  I don’t 
mean young in terms of our ages, but just only been set up.  Previous to 
that research and press were the two main functions of the party and the 
idea that you would have a department which was involved in branding 
and another kind of marketing-led forms of communication was quite a 
new concept.   
 
So, within that team there was a digital communications team in to 
which I was the second hire.  So, that was September 2006 when I 
joined. 
 
Anthony Newman: You mentioned that you got interested in becoming involved in the 
party after David Cameron became leader and you mention the word 
“changes”. 
 
Craig Elder: Yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: In your opinion what changes were made to the organisational structure 
of the party and elements of new media when David Cameron came 
along? 
 
Craig Elder: The Conservative Party has always seen itself certainly as a pioneer 
when it comes to a use of new media.  I mean the first Prime 
Ministerial webpage was set up under a Conservative government.  We 
have always prided ourselves on that. And indeed the guys who were 
already there in terms of the IT side of things really took pride in the 
Conservatives.com element of the kind of new media side of things.  
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In 2005 it had been certainly as an impartial observer at that point far 
and away the best digital presence of any of the political parties.  So, in 
terms of getting the Conservative Party online, thankfully that wasn’t 
something we needed to do in 2005/2006 because it had already been 
done.  But making it work from a communications perspective and not 
just purely an organisational perspective was a real challenge for us.  I 
am sure you have heard this already but one of the main challenges of 
the Conservatives.com and indeed something which really took us two 
years to overcome was that as you will know one of the party’s greatest 
strengths is the degree to which it devolves responsibility out to its 
various member groups. 
 
Everybody had a presence on Conservatives.com which meant that in 
terms of keeping everybody in the party happy it was good.  In terms of 
actually communicating what the Conservative Party was for, what our 
policies were and who are people were we had an incredible challenge.  
Because getting on Conservatives.com is easy, finding what you 
wanted once you got there was practically impossible.  So, the situation 
we inherited was quite simple.  We had one website, it was 
Conservatives.com.  It didn’t really do what it was meant to do and one 
of the main reasons for that was nobody was quite sure what was meant 
to be done, nobody had really taken ownership of it.   
 
So, at arrival as the digital team within the communications team was 
to take ownership of the entire digital presence and to make it first 
decide what the job it should do would be and then make it do that job. 
 
Anthony Newman: And you mentioned David Cameron as being part of this change, did he 
play a direct role or was it his team around him that played that role? 
 
Craig Elder: I would love to pretend that I along with my colleagues came in and 
wrestled the control of the Conservative Party’s web presence away 
from you know all of the myriads of different organisations. We were 
kind of pulling it sometimes in, not unhelpful directions, but just many 
desperate directions.  David Cameron and particularly George Osborne 
were instrumental in empowering our team and giving us the backing 
that we needed at the top level.   
 
Another key person to mention in the 2006 period was Francis Maude.  
He was absolutely instrumental as party chairman. So, in terms of 
organisational structure, Francis was absolutely key particularly with 
the launch of WebCameron, which in 2006 was the first of its kind – as 
a political party leader’s video blog.  It did a very good job in terms of 
humanising David, because David was obviously a massive, massive 
asset.  He was certainly unlike what had come before him in that he 
was able to connect with the British people in a way that a 
Conservative leader had not since the early days of Major.   
 
So, for us, we needed to be able to use that asset, and David was very 
keen, and in particular Steve Hilton, who was Cameron’s Director of 
Strategy, was very keen that we used the internet as much as possible.  
Firstly, because the internet is quite useful in a branding sense – we 
needed to be portrayed to be a younger fresher party that was more in 
touch with the kind of needs and values in modern Britain.  Heavy use 
of new technology was seen as a way to do that.  But more importantly 
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it was seen that we could reach a key demographic, a younger 
demographic – an internet demographic if you like.   
 
There was also a real focus on the idea that the mainstream media was 
forcing us always to unhelpfully aim for that five second clip on the Six 
O’clock News.  New Media allowed us to make our statement, not at 
length because apparently nobody wants to listen to a politician talk at 
length, but it would allow us to have our say on our terms 
 
Anthony Newman: You mentioned that David Cameron, George Osborne and Francis 
Maude were pretty much the figures that we driving the show.  Did you 
have much one to one contact with those figures? 
 
Craig Elder: Yes, I mean Francis was the Party Chairman when I first joined and his 
office was as close to, if I was to say how close you are right now I 
wouldn’t be far off it probably.  As close as that sofa just over there, 
that’s where he was, he took a real keen interest in it.  He was 
fascinated by the whole thing.  I don’t know if you remember 18 
Doughty Street which was the internet TV station that was set up by 
Tim Montgomerie, Iain Dale amongst others.  Francis took a very keen 
interest in that right from there.  So, he thought it was you know it was 
incredibly interesting innovation.  So, he was very switched on very 
interested in that side of things and as Party Chairman he had a very 
hands on role.  So, he was very much involved.   
 
David obviously incredibly involved with the WebCameron project.  
That was his main involvement on our day to day business to start off 
with but as the election went on and we started to do more innovative 
things online, things that really started to touch with areas of policy, 
communication and ultimately manifesto publication, David took a 
very keen interest.  George, the thing about George is he is the most 
naturally adept at talking the language of technology.   
 
There was a very revealing moment during the election where he 
wanted an interesting way to present a manifesto to lots of journalists 
on the battle bus.  He was obsessed with getting the iPad, which at 
that point had not been released in the UK.  So, he had trailed off 
and spoken to friends at Apple and managed to get hold of this iPad and 
use it to show the manifesto to journalists.  One of the things for 
George was that he is just is naturally very good at this stuff.   
 
You know there was-, during the election and certainly also in the build 
up to the election George I think was the one who was most 
challenging to us in terms of our use of new media.  The one who is 
constantly saying, “What can we do here? How could we use this,” But 
also along with thinking about it in a campaigning sense was also 
thinking a very picture about how this could be used ultimately as part 
of public policy.  So, I mean we now started to see things like open data 
playing a massive role in terms of our transparency agenda for 
Whitehall.  This had been going back a long way for George Osborne 
and one of his key advisors, Rohan Silva - he really helped to drive that 
agenda as well. 
 
Anthony Newman: You use the word innovative in terms of the way you perceived the 
Conservative Party used digital media, could you unpack that a little bit 
and tell me what was innovative about that role? 
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Craig Elder: I mean I think the if you like the way that we used new media was split 
into three phases.  The first one I would unashamedly call the buzz 
phase in which was we leaned far more towards the branding benefits 
that could be found using new media.  Whether it was being to use new 
technology or whether like I say before it was being used to by-pass the 
mainstream media.  It wasn’t really until we came into the second 
phase that things started to get really interesting and a strategic focus 
started to come into play.   
 
The big challenge came in 2007 once WebCameron was an established 
brand was to say, “Well we have got this thing Conservatives.com, 
what’s it actually for we want to go back to basics with this thing.”  We 
were very, very nearly pushed into that project too early by the election 
that never was.  That forced us to kind of if you like panic, design a 
replacement general election website.   
 
I think I was standing at the back of a hall where Iain Duncan Smith 
was giving a fantastic speech on social justice and myself and Rishi 
Saha, the head of new media, were writing on the back of a bit of paper 
exactly what on an election website we would have to do.  Because we 
had just been told minutes before that Brown was definitely going to 
call an election, it was absolutely 100% sure that this was going to 
happen.   
 
Now once we had dodged that bullet we knew that we had to take the 
opportunity once the election that never was, never was to go off and 
really rebuild Conservatives.com and make it do that job.  We now 
knew what it had to do, we knew that when it came to May 2010 or 
whenever the election ended up being we knew we needed to be able to 
speak to floating voters in a very broad way about the two things that 
we knew from our search analytics data that they cared about which 
was policy and people.  We need to tell them who our candidates were 
and we need to tell them what we stood for, that’s all people are 
broadly speaking interested in.  Everything else was nice to have but 
not a must have.   
 
So, we build the entire website around that.  When I speak about 
innovation there are a lot of things that we did during the election that 
will go unnoticed.  I am not going to cry any tears over that but I guess 
it is times like this when the opportunities to speak about why things 
like Conservatives.com were pretty clever.  Search engine optimisation 
is becoming an incredibly, incredibly important thing.  80% of online 
journeys start with Google, therefore we want to make sure that when 
80% of the public are looking for stuff they are able to find our stuff.  
So, what we did was we rebuilt the entirety of Conservatives.com and 
every single database item for the purpose of search engine 
optimisation. 
 
Every single news item, every single video, every single persons 
biography was all linked back to an item of policy.  What that meant 
was that we basically had policy pages that explained our policies on 
health, on education, defence, our policies on green issues.  Because 
every page in the website basically linked back to those policy pages it 
meant that they weighed a tonne and Google knew that they were 
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important which meant that when people searched for stuff about our 
policies on issues it would finish right top of the list.   
 
We did a similar job with people which helped us ensure that when 
people wanted to read about our candidates and our MPs that would 
finish right top of the list.  But I think quite cleverly we were able to 
not hijack but take our place in the news agenda.  We hired a 
copywriter for our team who was specifically versed in search engine 
optimisation.  Who would write the headlines of stories, the copy of 
stories to make sure that when people were searching for big political 
issues of the day, yes of course you would see the Telegraphs take on it, 
the Guardians take on it, the Daily Mail’s take of it but you would also 
see our take on it.   
 
That for us that innovative use of what was very much accepted in the 
commercial sector as standard practice to make sure that your research 
results finished first.  For us it was first time it had been done in politics 
and was very, very effective and what we couldn’t earn we bought.  So, 
we have used Google AdWords before any other UK political party.  
Using it in terms of a long tail strategy to make sure that when people 
were searching on issues that we could never really optimise for 
because we didn’t have quite enough content on that, that we were able 
to buy up with a search term.   
 
So, if people were searching on the names of local hospitals and 
constituencies for example we would be able to drive them to candidate 
biographies.  Be able to drive them to constituency profiles, to be able 
to drive them to any relevant news stories about our policies on.  If it 
was a hospital, health, if it was school, education so on and so forth.   
Also using again sticking with Google, AdWords were used in a very, 
very tactical ways like budget day which we did in 2009 and indeed 
2010.   
 
When people were searching for I guess they are quite esoteric words 
that the Chancellor tends to use when standing at the Dispatch Box 
whether it is fair fuel stabiliser actually that’s a bad example that’s one 
of our policies. Whether they are speaking about car scrappage 
schemes, boiler scrappage schemes whether they are speaking about all 
the myriad different names that there are for all the different taxes that 
are rising and falling.  So users would search on those terms and find an 
advert for our take on the budget as it unfolded.   
 
So, you know Google for us was something we used in a very 
innovative manner.  But really used it around this-, you know this 
Conservatives.com main presence which was that second period for us.  
Which was the really establishing a proper corporate web presence and 
then the third period for us was working I guess in the social space.  
But when we speak about social media and I guess we will probably 
speak about this more at length later on so I will keep this brief, it was 
understanding that social media is not Facebook and Twitter.   
 
That just happens to be two places where people congregate and in 
huge numbers.  It was understanding the opportunity that social 
afforded us was to go and speak to people in the places they were 
having conversations.  Because users and their relationships with the 
internet has changed radically particularly over the past three years.  
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They no longer have 100 favourite websites that they will visit 
periodically.  What they have increasingly got is portals of which 
Twitter and Facebook are becoming.  They have places where they are 
absorbing all of their information but they have also got favoured 
websites that are relevant to their day to day interests.   
 
So, if they happen to be mums, they are interested in Mumsnet, if they 
happen to be in the armed forces, they are interested in Army Rumour 
Service, if they are businessmen they are probably using LinkedIn and 
it was about us learning how to use social platforms with our 
candidates, with our Members of Parliament and take them into spaces 
where they could have valuable conversations with specific audiences.  
So, that third phase for us was about clever communications and spaces 
where people were.   
 
Anthony Newman: In your opinion how does these innovations and uses of the internet 
compare to those that the other two main parties participated in? 
 
Craig Elder: I mean I have been fortunate to one, maintain very good relations with 
my counterparts at the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party.  
Secondly, I have been very fortunate enough to share a platform with 
them on a number of occasions where they have been very open, honest 
and forthright about what they did.  I think you know there is a lot of 
credit to be given to my counterparts at the other parties because you 
know our strategy was based around the fact that as you well know as a 
candidate in the 2010 election we had to win a lot of seats.  We had to 
win a lot of seats.  I mean we were looking for our best performance in 
70 years, possibly even as much as 100 and we were told it so many 
times by Eric Pickles I can’t quite believe I’ve forgotten. 
 
But we had a big old challenge on our hands and we needed to have 
this very broad brush communication with as many people as we 
possibly could which made targeting very, very difficult.  The Labour 
Party weren’t very such of much in the 2010 election, they weren’t 
even sure who they were going to go into it with as leader but if there 
was one thing they were sure about is they weren’t going to win it.  
They might get a hung parliament but they weren’t going to win it.  
They very quickly turned to targeting individual constituencies that 
they really wanted to hold onto and if we are totally honest they did not 
do too badly.  You know it is like they held onto some seats that they 
should never have been able to hold on to.   
 
In fact we did disproportionately well against the Lib Dems but did 
disproportionately quite badly against Labour in some seats that we 
really should have picked up.  So, for them their strategy was very 
much about giving supporters in key areas the tools that they needed to 
get them out on the doorstep, to help support the offline objective.  
Now, I would argue that the Labour Party you know I am very fulsome 
in praise in terms of that side of things but I don’t think they were 
particularly innovative, restrained by budget and I think to a certain 
degree by staffing resource.   
 
I think they quite often it looked like they had quite a dilapidated and 
tired corporate web presence.  It kind of looked like things were being 
done on a shoestring but it admirable to get things done at all under 
those sorts of situations but I would never really say that there was 
40 
 
anything that happened during the election when I went, “You know I 
wished I had done that.”   
 
In fact there was only one moment if you can forgive the elongated 
answer.  There is one moment I remember from very, very clearly 
during the election and it was a Tuesday or Wednesday morning and 
CCHQ is set up that you have a communications hub in the middle of it 
around which Steve Hilton, Andy Coulson, Oliver Dowden so on and 
so forth, they sat around daily, they were very much the hub of you 
know the most senior staff in the Conservative Party.  Somebody I 
can’t quite remember who it was probably Andy had said, “We have 
just found out that Brown’s going to announce this thing and he is 
going to announce it exclusively on the web, it is going to be something 
to do with MPs expenses.”   
 
I felt terrible because I had really, up until that point-, until this point in 
2008 we had always been there first.  We had been the first to do 
everything and it really made me sick to think that there was this 
massive issue where for one of the very rare occasions outside of the 
general election period everybody in the country was sitting up and 
taking notice of an issue and we hadn’t jumped on it.  You know 
Labour; well Number 10 had got there first.   
 
Now, as I am sure you probably know the punch line to this story is that 
what they were actually doing was the much derided Gordon Brown 
gurning video where he had stood in front of the YouTube, the camera 
for three minutes and did this horrendous video.  I can’t believe was 
ever signed off by his staff.  That was the only one occasion where I 
looked at it and said I wish we had thought of that but deep down I 
know if we had done it we would have done it a hell of a lot better.  I 
am really glad they did do it actually in retrospect because it was an 
absolute disaster but it was that one occasion where I thought, “You 
know that’s quite innovative, that’s quite clever you could have put him 
on TV but you are going to do this over the web and that is a great way 
to get people to look at your web stuff.”  As it happens they probably 
didn’t actually want people to look at that stuff.   
 
The Lib Dems I mean being totally honest and you know I have got to 
give a lot of-, a lot of praise to Mark Pack who was the former Head of 
Innovations at the Liberal Democrats.  When I arrived at the party in 
2006 the Lib Dems were ahead of the game in no uncertain terms, that 
was very much led by Mark who has got a real eye for an opportunity 
and a real knowhow in terms of how to do things.  Usually quite data 
heavy things without spending very much money, he’s a really, really 
clever guy and the party has been very lucky to hold on to him at least 
in an advisory capacity whilst he has gone off to work on the 
commercial side of things.   
 
But you know there was a number of things particularly, “Flock 
Together,” Which they had in 2006 which was that idea of just 
basically getting Liberal Democrat supporters, who were already quite 
good on the ground anyway to organise using a Google Maps powered 
system where you can search for things that are happening in your area.  
You know we all thought that was great and we all wanted that and we 
ultimately you know did build our own version of that.   
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But you know I would certainly be doing Mark a disservice if we didn’t 
give him you know a lot of praise for how innovative he was in that 
early period where the parties weren’t really doing anything in that 
2005/2006 period.  So, yes there you go that’s Labour and the Lib 
Dems from my point of view. 
 
Anthony Newman: A lot of academics have been interested in the role of the internet in 
British politics for some time.  They have talked about when the 
internet was going to arrive in British politics and after the Obama 
campaign people really thought this was the one in 2010.  Some 
academics have said that event happened when David Cameron used 
WebCameron, and they cite it as a very significant move forward in the 
use of the internet in political campaigning in Britain.  What is your 
prospective on that? 
 
Craig Elder: Let’s be honest about WebCameron’s finest hour if you like.  
WebCameron kick started more innovative use of web technology; I 
mean I would like to think that was the case.  Indeed you know I don’t 
in any way want this to appear to be saying that the Obama campaign 
wasn’t that good, that’s absolutely not what I am saying but I think 
when we look at the Obama campaign, I will come back to the kind of 
WebCameron thing in a second.  It is important for us to remember 
why the Obama campaign was so fascinating and so interesting and 
why so many people wanted to take part. 
 
Frankly that reason is because Barrack Obama was unlike anything that 
had come before him.  He was a very inspiring figure of change; young 
people really took Obama to their hearts and really wanted to work for 
this guy.  It is just so happened that Facebook was a platform where 
people could show their support for concepts or ideas or for people or 
for brands and therefore people congregated there.  So, to suggested 
that you know a lot of the innovation, a lot of the interesting web things 
that we apportion to Obama’s web team and web strategy are actually 
more things to do Barrack Obama in strength as a brand and how much 
he inspired people.   
 
But just kind of moving off that for a second and back to WebCameron.  
WebCameron’s finest hour for me was and probably always will 
remain the fact that we got a positive story about the Conservative 
Party on the front page of the Guardian on the first day of party 
conference.  Now you will well know how difficult that is to get a 
positive story about the Conservative Party on the front page of the 
Guardian.  WebCameron was always from the first instance and that for 
me is evidence of it, something which people went-, looked at and said, 
“Oh this is really interesting, this is a bit different David Cameron is a 
little bit different.”   
 
Did it change the new media landscape? I think to a certain it did, I 
mean I don’t know if you are familiar with Jeff Jarvis who is an 
academic and the author of the book, “What Would Google do?”  He 
was fascinated with it, he thought it was fantastic and interesting and 
you know he actually came across to the UK to speak to us about how 
we did it and why we were doing and how we thought it was going to 
work and kind of if you like this new era of engagement where 
politicians were appearing at the hand of a tiny handycam on tiny little 
YouTube videos. 
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I think that WebCameron probably did play its role in changing the way 
politics is done online.  I would not be so grandiose to suggest that it 
played as much of a role as anything that happened in the Obama 
campaign, but I would probably say that it was not far off it. 
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of putting something like that WebCameron into action.  
What’s the process and the organisation element? 
 
Craig Elder: WebCameron for me, if being entirely honest, I think we spent more 
time and more money on it than we should have.  It wasn’t a huge 
budget project by any means but the frustrating thing is that certainly I 
don’t think it was as obvious to the team.  I mean I arrived in the last 
month of the WebCameron project whereby agencies had been 
appointed, you know it had been scoped; it was well on its way to being 
built when I arrived.  We could have achieved WebCameron, whether it 
would have been as compelling I don’t know but we could have 
achieved WebCameron using a free blog platform on a YouTube 
channel.  
  
To a certain extent that still remains a frustration for me that we could 
have just put David on YouTube.  That would have been you know buy 
a camera, buy some cheap video editing software which is exactly what 
we did.  In WebCameron if you like it is kind of you know costs in 
terms of technology it was a couple of hundred quid and then my time 
because I used to be the video guy when it first started which was fun.  
But for me there was a lot of time that went into it.  A lot of technical 
build went into it.  That took us to quite interesting places.   
 
It got us to a position where we had a technical platform whereby 
people could ask questions and then vote on the questions they wanted 
to go to David in a kind of weekly thing that we called, “Ask David.”   
 
The idea of opening up the agenda, not asking the questions that we 
wanted to ask of David, but asking the questions users wanted to ask. 
WebCameron couldn’t just be David rambling on saying, “I am at some 
event today, I’m speaking to these people,” Because life is leader of the 
opposition in comparison to his life now is not very sexy, sometimes 
you are speaking to not by any means less interesting organisations, 
you know they are still incredibly worthy and interesting organisations 
but you are just not meeting with rock stars and Presidents and Prime 
Ministers all the time.   
 
So, for us we were able to do things with that platform that we 
wouldn’t have otherwise been able to do such as you know opening up 
the agenda, letting people ask the questions that they wanted of David.  
Allowing them to upload their own videos, but part of me thinks that it 
cost more money and it took more time than it should have.  We could 
have just used WordPress plus YouTube for channel.  But you know it 
was too late in the day after my arrival to make that case. 
 
Anthony Newman: How much time would David Cameron spend on this? 
 
Craig Elder: You could not have WebCameron without Cameron.  He was always 
really, really committed to it.  The early days were interesting because 
it was a very amateur production, but that actually gave it a lot of its 
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charm.  Four years on, after we made many strides forward in terms of 
video production quality, we hired a professional camerawoman to 
come in and work very closely with David – with him, in many cases, 
for a lot of the time during the day - and people still remember the 
video that was shot on the tiny handycam, dimly lit in his kitchen.  
David was always very accessible.  He was always very interested in it.  
He was always challenging us to make it better and make it more 
interesting.   
 
I had many jobs when I first arrived at the party, so David did not 
always appreciate quite how busy I was, along with the rest of the team.  
But quite often I would be in the back of the car with David going to 
various places and just chatting away with him and he would ask why I 
could not be with him all the time. “Like well because I have got 
another job to do, I am not just your camera guy I just happen to be the 
guy that runs up to parliament to meet you whenever you’re off to do 
something, films you for a bit and then runs back puts it on the web 
thing and then goes back to doing my normal job.”   
 
Cameron took a really keen interest in WebCameron which enabled us 
to do a lot of things.  David gave us two things.  He looked at the 
videos and said, “Well why would anybody want to watch this?”  He 
gave us an unprecedented level of access and trust and he also gave us 
the backing we needed essentially to go off and get CCHQ budget to 
hire someone with a broadcast background to follow him with a 
professional quality camera and produce a broadcast quality film – 
which took WebCameron up to the next level.   
 
The reason why that was incredibly important for us was that come the 
election, and really in the year leading up to the election, Sky and the 
BBC would call us and say “We have just seen the WebCameron video; 
can we have the tape of that, we want to play that out on TV.”  I do not 
need to tell you the quality of having footage controlled by us, put 
together by us and broadcast by us on the Six O’clock News.  That was 
pretty incredible for us. 
 
So, the web audience was incredibly important but those times when 
you had it on Sky News, those times when you had it on BBC News 24, 
those times when you had it on the Six O’clock News, they were the 
most valuable periods for WebCameron in that latter period.  Producing 
broadcast quality footage that the broadcasters wanted and we would 
show in place of you know a regular piece.  That was really the 
ultimate value of WebCameron at the tail end of its if you like its 
campaigning life. 
 
Anthony Newman: Two very quick questions on WebCameron, whose idea was it? 
 
Craig Elder: WebCameron was the idea was of Steve Hilton.  So, he was obviously-.  
You know Steve has always been fascinated with you know the whole 
web-side of things and indeed his wife is very high up in Google.  
That’s why Steve went to California for quite some time, she was 
working over there.  He very early on thought this would be a nice idea 
to do something innovative with David on the web using video.   
 
He used Google’s blogging technology and I think Google video as a 
prototype WebCameron for David’s visit to India.  I think maybe six or 
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seven months after he became a leader. That was just an experiment, 
Steve was on that trip with him, he said, “I’m going to buy a camera, 
I’m going to try this out,” and it was successful and it worked really 
well and then ultimately Steve said, “This is going to become 
something else, this is going to be another thing, another bigger thing,” 
and that’s where WebCameron was born.   
 
Anthony Newman: How many hits daily would WebCameron get? 
 
Craig Elder: This is the thing-, the thing about these videos is, and this is kind of 
why I make the point, why it is incredibly value for you to be able to 
reach that second audience through broadcast.  Because I think 
WebCameron viewing figures were really, really high when it first 
launched.  But then I think we were ourselves guilty of you could argue 
perhaps we didn’t have the access to the source material that we needed 
in those early days, that kind of that six month period where things took 
a bit of a lull.   
 
But you kick things off with you know kind of 150,000 people coming 
to visit this website and that’s great you know.  But then you quickly 
start to see it tail off to what a political party website can usually expect 
to receive daily which is usually kind of 5,000, 6,000 visits in a day, 
which is fine, it’s okay.  You know there is an argument to be made for, 
you know the importance of that small-scale interaction and changing 
people’s perceptions.  You know if you can change the perceptions of 
6,000 people as long as they are the right 6,000 that’s valuable.  But 
one of the keys things was to just role it into conservatives.com.  
Because Conservatives.com had a much, much bigger audience where 
it was consistently hitting very, very high figures because ultimately if 
you like MicroSites, websites that are set away from your main 
presence.   
 
You can never expect to sustain high traffic figures with that so it was 
important for us to start going-, bringing it back into our corporate 
presence where we knew people were looking anyway.  But, also 
moving it onto YouTube as well.  So, I mean if you look back at you 
know the videos from you know during the election you are seeing you 
know a couple hundred thousand views on the videos on YouTube.  
That was incredibly important for us as well to go where the audience 
was.   
 
So, yes I mean like I say you know WebCameron was early days, big 
early viewing figures, starts to tail off but then you adjust your strategy.  
You start to look how do we find our audience more effectively and it 
was our own corporate presence that was the future.   
 
Anthony Newman: With that in mind did you use any other internet applications to drive 
traffic to WebCameron and the website? 
 
Craig Elder: For us in that 2008 period onwards, search engine optimisation and 
Google AdWords are the two main ways to reach traffic.  But then 
there is the alternative which I think we have touched on briefly earlier 
on which is that it’s about going to where your audience is.  It is not 
just about putting videos on YouTube it is about when you are doing 
things like we did our policy consultation on the environment back in 
2009.  It’s about going to environmental websites and working with 
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them and saying you know this is a non-partisan thing we want to work 
with you, we want to reach out to your community.  We want to be able 
to then have an intelligent conversation with David and put him if you 
like on the rack.   
 
` Because one of David’s great strengths is the fact if you ask him a 
difficult question he shines, that’s when he is really great and we work 
with that a lot.  For us getting those viewer numbers was about going 
and finding the right audience.  So, if you had a piece of content about 
environment you went and worked with environmental blogs and 
websites, whether it is do the green thing or whether it is tree hugger.  
If you have got something on defence then you got and work with 
defence websites so on and so forth.  So, for us it was two-fold it was 
about making sure that when people might be looking for our content, 
they might not be saying, “I want to find out something from the 
Conservative Party,”  
 
But they might want to say, “Well I want something about taxation, I 
want to know something about why it is so bloody difficult for me to 
set up a business.  I want to know why it feels like our armed services 
are underfunded.  I want to know why it feels that the NHS is 
constantly being reorganised.”  We would help them to find their 
content using search, using page search but then also it was about going 
to communities where people are having these conversations anyway.  
That really helped us to get the engagement numbers that we were 
looking for. 
 
Anthony Newman: Did the party have an internal policy that determined the use of social 
media applications by the membership and the candidates for election 
campaigns? 
 
Craig Elder: It’s a great question I am really glad you ask it.  No we didn’t.  
Although, there was a period during the election that suggested that we 
did and one thing I have found out in politics is the disproving 
something that is not true, is one of the hardest things to achieve in 
politics.  We were told absolutely point blank, I think it was posted up 
on mischievous labour blog that we devised a strategy whereby we told 
local candidates that they couldn’t speak about policy issues without 
calling CCHQ first.   
 
Now, as I am sure you are well aware it is frankly impractical to call 
CCHQ every time you have got a question.  Basically it had been 
suggested that we wouldn’t allow people to Tweet anything or write 
anything on Facebook unless they checked it with us first.  Now we 
were only an eight strong team and with 650 candidates around the 
country it just wasn’t going to be possible for us to have those 
conversations.  So it was just very much mischief making.  
 
Now, when I say we didn’t have a policy, what I mean is we didn’t 
have a list of dos and don’ts.  You know we are the Conservative Party, 
like we believe in the kind of rights and responsibilities and ultimately 
the fact that people have got you know a head on their shoulders to 
make a decision for themselves.  Indeed we have lost a couple of 
candidates because they have said stupid things either on social media 
and otherwise.  What we did offer was guidance, if people came to us 
and said I want to build a website then you know we had a centralised 
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template where people could set up a website for £150, pretty 
reasonable.  If people wanted help setting up a Facebook page or a 
Twitter profile we would help them to do that.   
 
If people wanted to work with us on MyConservatives and try and raise 
money on a local basis we would help them to do that.  But what we 
absolutely were not doing is running around slapping people on the 
back of their hands.  Because one, we didn’t want to do that and two, 
even if we had wanted to do that it would not have been possible. 
 
Anthony Newman: What would constitute as a stupid thing for either a key activist or a 
candidate to publish on a social media site.   
 
Craig Elder: I think we have got a challenge like any other political party and that 
we have to maintain a national brand whilst at the same time 
campaigning locally.  The problem is campaigning locally there are 
some issues which are more important in local areas than they are in 
others.  There are some things that happen in local areas, there-, certain 
communities feel certain ways or say certain things that are inconsistent 
with the national brand.  Now you know I guess I am a bit of a 
Cameroon to be honest so quite often I think well you know what I 
think broadly is speaking the national brand but I can appreciate you 
know there is this kind of you know this activists and supporters of any 
party who say things that just don’t quite fit.   
 
So, I think the challenge for us is that we are party; the thing with the 
Conservative Party is you know the Conservative Party has constantly 
been a party of change.  You know we have always been very 
pragmatic; we govern in the national interests.  Sometimes the public 
don’t agree with us that we are in the national interest and that’s when 
we get booted out and then they realise we are and we come back in.   
 
But the challenge for us is that when you are undergoing a period of 
change, when you are speaking about issues like-, when you are 
prioritising issues like health.  Like the environment and you are if you 
are if you like suppressing issues that previously the party has been 
seen with obsessing about.  By suppressing I don’t mean telling people 
not to speak about it but we are just not-, we didn’t go to the electorate 
unlike in 2005 with the manifesto that said, “We don’t like 
immigration, we are not mad keen on Europe and by the way we won’t 
put your taxes down.”  We did that in 2005, we didn’t do that in 2010. 
 
We spoke about kind of warmer, friendlier, cuddlier issues if you like 
and the kind you know the new mean green kind of Cameron machine 
if you like.  For us the problem is that local candidates could 
occasionally contradict that.  You know the fact is that we are broad 
church in no uncertain terms and some of us are more old Tory than 
others.  Sometimes some of us say things that are inconsistent with the 
national brand.  That can cause a problem but I mean if we are being 
totally honest you know one of the reasons we lost a candidate during 
the election was and I can’t remember the exact wording of it but he 
had said something which could I guess be considered to be unhelpful.  
 
I think oh god it is some guy in Scotland, I completely forget his name 
and I completely forget exactly what he said but I am fairly sure he said 
something about gay marriage or something similar to that.  You are 
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just kind of like-, I mean frankly he should have known better when he 
was wading onto you know a difficult area.  You know I don’t know 
what he said but if it was deemed to be offensive then I am pretty sure 
it probably was.   
 
But yes candidates can sometimes say things on areas which they are 
either ill qualified to speak about or massively out of step with the 
national party and that can certainly have some bad effects.  But you 
know we weren’t the only ones I mean for god sake you know Labour 
had a candidate who unbelievably escaped censure after publishing the 
postal votes as she saw them being opened in front of her.  That’s 
outrageous and she was the new media spokesman for Labour.  I mean 
you know I met Kerry a little bit she is a nice woman but I wouldn’t 
hold back at all by saying that is a really, really foolish thing to do.   
 
I think it was astonishing that she didn’t face heavier censure than she 
did for that. 
 
Anthony Newman: What was her full name? 
 
Craig Elder: Kerry McCarthy she was the-, was and remains the MP for Bristol East.  
Like I say a nice woman, very enthusiastic about new media but you 
know I guess it is a lesson for candidates there that think a little bit 
before you Tweet and she certainly should have and she certainly 
should have faced harsher punishment than she did.  But you know we 
all suffered you know I am sure there was Lib Dem candidates had a 
problem to, we certainly lost one candidate.  I am sure other candidates 
also said quite foolish things but you know we certainly weren’t alone 
in that respect.   
 
Anthony Newman: From the perspective of the central party at CCHQ what approaches did 
the party take to manage its social media communications? 
 
Craig Elder: Yes, I mean basically the party started to take social media very 
seriously in 2008.  It wasn’t like we didn’t take it seriously prior to that 
but we started to see its emerging use as a campaigning and an 
organising platform.  Particularly Facebook -I think an undue amount 
of attention was given to Twitter during the election.  I think a lot of 
journalists got excited about it thought it was the big thing and it is a 
great place for discovering news and for me it will always be more of a 
news platform than it will be a social media platform.   
 
We use Twitter and we used it effectively.  Ultimately if we are 
speaking about effectiveness and effectiveness is mainly measured 
through numbers, we measure it through who had the biggest presence.  
Now, we had more than the other two parties combined in terms of our 
numbers, so that was good.  Now for us the party appointed me as if 
you like our social media spokesman in 2009 which is you know a lot 
of fun because people were taking a lot of interest in this side of things.  
  
In terms of organising it I mean it happened all quite organically, I 
remember being told in 2009 we launched a new membership drive 
which was based around; I don’t know if you remember it, six key 
policy areas.  There were like silhouette posters and we bought the 
Jimmy Cliff song,  “You Can Get It If You Really Want,” and the 
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notion was that Britain can be better you just you know join the 
Conservative Party we can do this thing together. 
 
We had been asked I think one or two nights before what can we do 
that is innovative with us using the web.  We had been given a video by 
I forget this is really shameful (Matthew Vaughn) but I forget the name 
of the guy who did it but he was the director of Layer Cake like the 
Hollywood film Layer Cake.  He was directing this film, “Well this is 
interesting you know you have got a Hollywood director making this 
film for you, how about we do what we have always said we were 
going to do, we go and get ourselves a presence on Facebook.  We 
become the first UK political party to do that and we say that you can 
watch this video but in order to do it you have got to join us on 
Facebook and we will do that for the first 24 hours and then after that 
we will send the video out and everyone else can have it.”  
 
Now it seemed like quite a nice idea and I remember Steve went for it, 
he kind of broadly said, “Craig I have got no idea what you are talking 
about, but it sounds quite nice - we’ll give it a go,” and we did it and I 
went to bed and woke up the next day and the Conservative Party had 
10,000 fans on Facebook.  I didn’t expect that, I would expect 100, 200 
and you know I work in the commercial sector and I have seen how 
brands can really struggle.  We just offered them an exclusive piece of 
content that they couldn’t have got anywhere else.   
 
So, that really gave us that insight we needed in order to continue to 
develop that to offer up exclusives to give the people that opportunity 
to interact with us on Facebook.  That is what ended up with us having 
over 100,000 fans come in the election.  You know it worked well for 
us, it was a good platform.  Twitter for us, like I say, I have fulsome 
praise for how Labour have done things on a local level but nationally 
they have spent far too much time just messing around on Twitter like 
it was ever going to win any votes.  They spent time speaking to 
themselves. 
 
I guess you are familiar with TweetMinster.  They did it on a 
measurement piece during the election which showed a huge volume of 
Labour MPs on Twitter.  The number of Tweets and you kind of think 
to what political end, who are you speaking to that you ordinarily 
wouldn’t have been speaking to anyway.   
 
You know Labour MP turning to Labour voter and saying, “Labour are 
great” and then Labour voter turning back around and going, “Yes they 
really are.”  It is completely unproductive and a waste of everybody’s 
time.  We kind of knew that about Twitter that it wasn’t really going to 
do that for us so we used Twitter as a news delivery mechanism to get 
you know to get news to our supporters as fast as possible.   
 
In fact I think the most innovative way that we used it was back in 2008 
when we first started to use it Twitter was still, you could still get it as 
text messages on our mobile phone for free.  I mean I know you can 
still get that done anyway but is not free anymore.  I think a couple of 
networks offer it but what we did is we said to people local electioneers 
are also coming in, we get them before they even arrive in the TV 
studios to sign up to our Twitter account, put in your mobile phone 
number we will give you the local election results first as they come in.  
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That worked really, really well for us, it is like 1,000 people went for 
that overnight.   
 
Now you know we have ended up with I think it is 50,000 Twitter 
followers but back then it was about that just using Twitter which is a 
new interesting emerging platform and using it for what it seemed like 
it was good for which is delivering the news really, really fast.  Not 
having a chat about how good we are. 
 
Anthony Newman: In a structural sense in terms of how CCHQ is organised what was the 
role of social media, emails and blogs in the departmental sense? 
 
Craig Elder: That’s a very good question.  I mean social media was you know I am 
really chuffed with this actually because one of the things for us is that 
you know became the social media guy in 2008.  That was interesting 
but you get asked a lot of policy questions and things that frankly had 
nothing to do with me.  I would go to the Press Officer and I’d say, 
“Somebody has asked this question about schools, what I need to say 
back,” and I would go and say it back.  But you are kind of like I’m not 
a policy guy one of these days I’m going to get found out.   
 
We worked with Henry McCrory who’s a fantastic character, the Head 
of Press at CCHQ, you know proper kind of old tabloid guy.  He said, 
“You know I have heard about this Twitter thing, I have seen how 
you’ve used it, I’m quite keen on doing it,” and he started to use it as 
you know the Conservatives Party’s press spokesman using Twitter. 
Then all the people who worked for him, you know all of the 
spokespeople on all the different issues they started to use it to.  We 
started to end up with our guys were putting out our view on various 
issues you know to a couple of thousand followers usually including 
huge amount of journalists on a regular basis.   
 
So, social media for us was a way to effect to-, and Henry was great 
you know because Henry is like a 60 year old guy you know.  It is like 
it -, it doesn’t meant that technology is not for him, it just means you 
know and the great thing about Henry was that he was like, “Hang on a 
minute so you mean that I can speak to the 20 journalists I need to 
speak to without having to text them all individually or calling them up.  
I can just kind of give them a little bit of gossip, like a little snippet.”  I 
was like, “Yes.”  “So where do I sign that sounds brilliant,” and that’s 
exactly how it worked for all the other members of the press 
department as well you know. 
 
So, social media was really, really effective and particularly Twitter 
was incredibly effective in that sense.  But you know like I said it had a 
couple of thousand followers but it was really a hundred that it really 
mattered because it was about speaking to journalists.  If anybody else 
wanted to come along for the ride then great but this is about targeted 
communication, time saving communication.  Blogging internally for 
CCHQ I mean not a massive thing.  I mean we use blogging technology 
for a couple of things like the Conservative Policy Forum.  So, we 
would post up things and people could comment with their views on it 
and so and so forth.  That was quite useful. 
 
Anthony Newman: Was that fed back into party policy? 
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Craig Elder: Yes it was yes.  I mean the CPF I think is-, I think it has undergone a 
bit of a renaissance recently, certainly since I have left.  I mean Adrian 
probably have given you a better view of this than I could because 
during my period it was very much the-, it was a kind of dwindling 
project.  One that was taken very seriously but you know the CPF you 
know when Steven Hilton first started in CCHQ his first job was going 
through the envelopes coming back from the CPF.  You know when 
Steve was Director of Strategy, CPF had been reduced to this thing that 
was kind of on a website somewhere and people weren’t participating 
as much at the local level.   
 
Now, as I understand it that has been energised but I am frankly having 
been away now for a year probably not the best place to speak about 
that so I won’t.  In terms of email, I mean email is obviously incredibly 
useful in terms of your know daily bulletins, in terms of policy, lines to 
take.  Things that you would have seen as a candidate were also 
whipping their way around CCHQ.  Because frankly even though I was 
you know working within the web team I was still a communications 
guy and frankly you know like how we first met you know you find 
yourself on Channel 4 platforms being asked questions.  You need to 
know what the big issues of the day are and you need to know what the 
Conservative Party position is on them.   
 
So, email still an incredibly effective tool in that respect.  In fact email 
was probably the most effective tool for us full stop in terms of digital 
communications. 
 
Anthony Newman: Who were the main individuals involved in the internet campaign at 
CCHQ? 
 
Craig Elder: Good question we started off with a two person team.  There was 
myself and Sam Roake who was hired from Google.  I think Sam 
decided it wasn’t really for him and he left in 2007 where Rishi came 
across and we started to build a much, much bigger team in which I 
ended up being Deputy Head of. 
 
Anthony Newman: If you could give both their first and last name that would be useful. 
 
Craig Elder: Yes, of course sorry yes.  So the way the team ended up was an eight 
strong team and it had Rishi Saha Head of New Media, myself Deputy 
Head of New Media, Sam Coates who worked on the campaigning side 
of things, Adrian Harris who was our Technology Manager and 
Anthony Griffiths who was our Fundraising Manager.  We had an 
absolutely fantastic intern, a young Texan girl called Brittany Greer she 
turned out to be such a fantastic intern that we hired her as a campaigns 
manger; she worked very closely on the MyConservatives side of 
things.   
 
We had Nicola Woodhouse who was hired from a broadcast 
background to be full time WebCameron producer, director and we had 
Tom Edmonds who is brought in from Zopa which is this fantastic 
social lending company where he had been copywriter and he had been 
brought in as a copywriter and if you like Content Manager.  
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of internet media did the central party have aspirations for its 
use in the run up to the 2010 general election that weren’t fulfilled?   
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Craig Elder: Yes, I think we did and I think this is where we kind of need to speak 
about the other side of things which is Merlin. For me the potential for 
parties to organise using the web is both incredibly encouraging and 
should be for us also incredibly frightening.  There is something that I 
don’t know if you have spoken to Tim Montgomerie at 
ConservativeHome but he has got a really great view on this, which is 
absolutely spot on.  Which is that a lot of the things we use to need 
political parties for, one of the main things being organisation.  The 
internet can now do that and the reason why the internet is scary for us 
you know the conservative party doesn’t agree with itself quite a lot.  
There are certainly possibilities for small parties to be able to organise 
much more effectively using the web to present a bigger challenge to us 
in the future. 
   
Also opportunities for single issue groups to organise themselves 
effectively outside of the Conservative Party a lot more.  So, I think it 
presents not just a challenge to the Conservative Party but presents a 
challenge to if you like the British Political orthodoxy.  The three party 
systems if you like could very quickly become a much, much bigger 
issue because people are now able to organise outside of the three big 
parties much more effectively using the web.   
 
But sticking to your specific question what my main frustration is that it 
should be able to organise more effectively using the internet than we 
achieved during the 2010 election.  I think one of the main frustrations 
for that was that right throughout the whole period I was told you know 
Merlin will be the thing, Merlin will one day be the backend of 
Conservatives.com but will power everything to the extent where you 
will come in as a voter in Anglesey and you will see information which 
is specifically relevant to you.  We will know thanks to Merlin you live 
in this street with this many kids, you are more likely to read this 
newspaper and drive this sort of car.  We will give you information 
based on that so you get and feel like a tailored experience.   
 
That should be possible in the near future but we should have got a 
couple of steps towards that.  You know and this and that if you like I 
guess is almost the big vision, you know could work incredibly 
effectively despite how kind of scary it seems on the surface.  We 
couldn’t have got there in 2010 but we could have got lot closer to it 
and I find that quite frustrating.  I think sometimes the more high in 
technology that the Conservative Party let us down a little bit; you 
know the web-side of things, the .com side of things great.  The 
campaigning side of things I think we are slightly hamstrung by an 
expensive, unwieldy piece of architecture which I understand is not a 
great deal better now than it was back then.   
 
Anthony Newman: The issues of Merlin have been raised quite regularly in these 
interviews.  One of the points that have come out of it are concerns 
about security and data protection with exchange of data over the 
internet and remote access to that data and the potential for that data to 
be accessed by other parties that would then gain an insight into the 
Conservative campaign.  Can you give more of a perspective on that? 
 
Craig Elder: Merlin was very much an IT owned project.  So, when it came to you 
know kind of boxes and constituencies and modems and kind of secure 
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access and VPNs all these kinds of things I am probably not the best 
placed person to speak about that.  I mean I think one of the-, for me 
the issues I saw with Merlin were just purely infrastructure.  They were 
the fact that it didn’t do what it was meant to do and you know that was 
certainly a challenge.   
 
As I understand it on a local level some candidates find it very useful, 
some candidates you know didn’t have access to it or didn’t find it 
useful at all.  I mean I can only speak from my own personal 
perspective which is the frustration I felt in terms of Merlin should 
surely be able to help us do campaigning things.  Things like 
MyConservatives for example could have been much more effective 
than they were able to do without Merlin. 
 
MyConservatives ended up being a standalone platform with data 
which needed to be manually inputted and extracted.  That should never 
have been the case.  In 2010, you should have been able to make any 
database speak to any database and we should have been able to make 
that work much more effectively than we were ultimately able to do.  
Now we certainly lay the blame for that at the feet of the infrastructure 
problems that Merlin faced.  Could it be that it was a project too big? 
Could it be that we bit off more than we could chew?  For somebody 
else to answer, but it seems that way to me. 
 
Anthony Newman: What did the central party use MyConservatives.com for? 
 
Craig Elder: MyConservatives.com is you know is interesting, it is a very interesting 
one.  Looking at pure metrics we I think we raised 25% of the money 
that we raised online using MyConservatives based largely on the 
insight that the fact that people are.  You know some people never give 
money to political parties but there are people who will give money to 
political parties but are uncomfortable with the notion of giving it to the 
central party that can be spent on frankly anything.   
 
We worked on the insight there if people were able to give money 
locally to the candidates that they cared about and the campaigns that 
they cared, that they would be more likely to give money.  I think the 
25% uplift in online takings was evidence of that you know we can’t 
argue with real hard cash.  The thing for us was that MyConservatives, 
my only regret with MyConservatives I think it was a very innovative 
platform, I think it was a very well used platform.  It took a lot of work, 
a lot of time and resource to get it built and then you know we had to 
hire Brittany specifically to run it and work with candidates.   
 
The frustration for me is that I would have liked it to have-, I think it 
launched in September 2009 I would have liked to have launched a year 
earlier.  I think it was asking a lot of candidates at that point in the 
electoral cycle and you notice that I don’t say asking too much or too 
late.  We were just-, we could have seen better results.  We got good 
results but we could have seen better and we I very much look forward 
to seeing how you know Sam and Adrian continue to develop that for 
the next election because I think MyConservatives could be an 
incredibly effective campaign tool.  But we were just a little bit late in 
the cycle and didn’t the potential fully realised but that doesn’t mean it 
won’t’ be. 
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Anthony Newman: Did the central party have a policy on best practice for use of social 
media by senior party officials? 
 
Craig Elder: There was never anything down on any foresheet of paper let’s put it 
that way.  Obviously, we spoke with people, we told them what they 
could and couldn’t do but to be perfectly honest senior party officials 
know that what you say is on the record, whatever you say.  They get 
that and this is just applying that common Westminster sense to what 
you say online.  If you wouldn’t say it in Parliament don’t say it online.  
You know these guys are experts they know what they are saying and 
they know what to say, when to say it and who to say it to.   
 
I didn’t need to sit them down and explain anything other than you 
have got 140 characters to play with and you press enter, it sends.  You 
know it is common sense for these guys, their communication as 
professionals. 
 
Anthony Newman: How does it compare to people outside the party elite? 
 
Craig Elder: I mean look you know, working as a professional in a political party, or 
a candidate in a political party, it leaves you with a  set of skills that 
probably never quite leave you not least you know rambling endlessly 
and avoiding questions.  It can get more interesting further down the 
chain, you know what I mean you can have party activists who say the 
wrong thing.  You can have occasionally have candidates that say the 
wrong thing but you know by and large we as a party trust people to 
use their common sense.  To engage their brain before they say 
something, sometimes that does go wrong.  But I mean you know you 
would see varying kind of levels of not ill advisedness if you like but 
you see varying levels of quality with senior staff in terms of how they 
use Twitter and how effectively you used it.  
  
You never saw them you know make any gaffs or anything like that but 
yes I mean obviously you know the aforementioned points about losing 
candidates.  I guess as you get further away from the centre a person 
are sometimes less constrained and sometimes less well understanding 
of quite how public what they are saying is. 
 
Anthony Newman: Did the central party have a policy on the websites of candidates and 
associations and if so how was this organised? 
 
Craig Elder: There certainly wasn’t any central policy, we didn’t tell people what 
they could and couldn’t do.  Certainly, when the Conservative Party 
came to rebrand in 2006 this was a massive source of frustration to the 
branding team because they wanted us all to be able to run around all 
300 or so websites and tell them to all to get the new party logo on 
there.  We were obviously unable to do that because their local 
association to local candidates and they are empowered to do as they 
see fit.   
 
As we mentioned earlier on our role was to provide a good technical 
platform whereby if they wanted to give us £150 we would give them a 
good well hosted solution which they could use at a local association 
website.  But there wasn’t a policy, there wasn’t, “You must do this, 
you can’t do that.”  There was, “We’re here to help if you want us to 
help we’ll help you for a very reasonable fee.”  The fee was basically 
54 
 
hosting costs, that was it £150 a year is just so you have got a space on 
a hard disk in a server which won’t go down. 
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of the role of the internet did the party take any steps to invest 
in training and education of party members? 
 
Craig Elder: The thing is you know for us party conferences is when they came into 
their own, so you would have your own kind of like your digital stands 
and you have people working, you know standing there constantly 
offering up advice.  Getting people on MyConservatives, you know 
encouraging candidates to update their profiles on Conservatives.com 
so on and so forth.  I mean if you talk about party members you know 
even in this age of declining party membership that is still a very, very 
expensive task and the Conservative Party despite what people may 
think of it and I know you will obviously know the reality of this we 
are not rich.  You know we are not cash rich.   
 
We are very fortunate that we are supported by very kind donors and 
you know large donations through to small but undertaking a large 
scale training project would be difficult.  I mean the view was to work 
with the candidates who needed that help.  If you like to allow 
knowledge down the way but undertaking a training programme with 
party members would have been I guess unwieldy and unaffordable. 
 
Anthony Newman: Did the party have a policy on collecting email address and if so how 
was it actioned? 
 
Craig Elder: Yes, the party certainly had a policy on collecting email addresses.  We 
inherited from our IT department in 2006 what we were assured was a 
60,000 strong email hymn list. And one of the things about email 
marketing which remains incredibly key in communications, not 
political but just in general because it is one of the best direct response 
mechanisms there are.  We very quickly found out that once we 
implemented a proper Ecommerce solution, once we had implemented 
a system that allowed us to see how many people had opened an email. 
 
How many people had clicked on a link within an email and all these 
other things a proper Ecommerce platforms allow you to do not only 
the numbers opening it quite small.  The numbers clicking things quite 
small but the list actually once it had been duped and dead email 
addresses been got rid off it was only 30,000 strong.   
 
We found out quite quickly that associations had lists if not of that size 
then certainly quite a few thousand.  We set about working with local 
associations to encourage them wherever possible to give us that data.  
If had been collected in the proper way and agreement had been given 
from constituents when they had signed up and given across email 
address and we were able to add them directly to our database.  Where 
it wasn’t possible to email those constituents one time and ask them, 
“We would like to sign you up to this list, would you like to?”  Then 
allow them to sign up and fill in their own accord.   
 
That activity combined with very heavy promotion of email signup on 
the front page of Conservatives.com and also working with affiliate 
schemes which I don’t know if you are familiar with but also on a Lead 
Generation Schemes.  Which are basically working with companies 
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who usually offer prizes if you sign up to, for example, Thomson 
holiday’s mailing list.  We did that with the conservative party and 
working with them was able to identify people who were most likely to 
be Conservative supports and therefore donors.   
 
By the time election rolled around our list was half a million strong.  
So, going from 30,000 to half a million no main fee and it was done 
through co-operation with associations, very heavy promotion of email 
signup and then also working with lead generation firms who are 
incentivising people financially to join our list. 
 
Anthony Newman: Did email play a role in the organisational process of CCHQ and if so 
how? 
 
Craig Elder: I mean email I guess we have touched on this earlier on but the 
organisational process of CCHQ emails rolling that was the 
dissemination of policy and what lines to take.  Just to make sure you 
had all the information you needed.  I mean BlackBerry was one of the 
most vital pieces of equipment you could have.  No matter where you 
were from the kind of you know the main lobby in parliament to 
wondering around some constituency the BlackBerry always meant that 
if something had just happened and somebody asked you about it you 
knew what to say or even in a TV studio. 
 
Anthony Newman: Do all or did all CCHQ professionals have supplied to them a 
BlackBerry? 
 
Craig Elder: Managers and above yes, managers and above. 
 
Anthony Newman: How was that used between one another in terms of the communication 
element? 
 
Craig Elder: I mean I can honestly say that I couldn’t have survived without my 
BlackBerry.  I mean your emails would be coming through so thick and 
fast and I mean you were just obviously… 
 
Anthony Newman: A better way to describe what I am asking is, could you give me an 
example of your a typical two hour period in your day where you are 
using and interacting with your BlackBerry and what you’re doing on 
that. 
 
Craig Elder: I did quite a lot of work on the road to be honest particularly when 
Cameron Direct launched and I took their idea to broadcast that live.  I 
found myself going on the road quite a lot to make that happen before 
we hired somebody else into come and do the job.  For me it was just 
an ability to be able to do your job on the move.  But one of the ways in 
which BlackBerry’s work in terms of CCHQ structure in organisation 
in ways that mobiles can’t is the ability to send around these lines to 
take.   
 
If you say for example on election night where you have got you know 
MPs, you know sitting at a desk.  Whilst the cameras are off them they 
can just flick through it see what is going on, see the information 
coming through.  That’s fundamentally changed the way that politicians 
receive information.  It not by getting texts, it is not about having to 
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take a phone call.  This way we will get you know full information in 
front of you a full brief, it can help to avoid quite awkward moments. 
 
Anthony Newman: Was there anything different in the way the internet was used at CCHQ 
when compared with other organisations in general?  You would be a 
good person to compare these because are now working in the more 
professionalised world. 
 
Craig Elder: I mean I guess.  I guess I would probably say to you we were always 
quite professional at CCHQ but I mean I think it is pretty much you 
know CCHQ is… 
 
Anthony Newman: I should say more commercialised world is what I was getting at. 
 
Craig Elder: Yes.  I don’t think there is a massive difference at all to be perfectly 
honest.   I think that, you know I speak about a lot of things we did in 
the Conservative party in quite commercial corporate terms.  I mean I 
speak about things like a corporate web presence for 
Conservatives.com because that is how you had to see it.  You would 
think well if we we’re the conservatives and we were AstraZeneca or 
we were Boots you know or we were British Airways how would we 
see our website and what’s the function of our website and it is to serve 
our customers.   
 
So, I think the web was you know one of the key things for us is to start 
using the web as successful people used the web.  Let’s stop speaking 
to the thousand people we already know use the web and support us, 
let’s start speaking to the million that use the web that don’t.  You 
know that is pretty much-, that’s the sea change if you like within 
CCHQ and the way that the web was used. 
 
Anthony Newman: Was there much interaction between you, as the CCHQ professional, 
and people outside that, party members, supporters, in terms of the way 
you were using the internet, was there a dialogue? 
 
Craig Elder: Yes I mean to be perfectly frank the dialogue between kind of senior 
members of staff and the wider party is usually quite limited purely 
because you are busy and you have kind of devolved that responsibility 
elsewhere in your team.  But more junior members of our team would 
be regularly fielding them calls from kind of your members and 
supporters who have you know either enthusiastic in their local 
constituency or wanting to set up a website or they want to use Twitter 
or they want to know how to get involved with this web initiative.  You 
know obviously you know at CCHQ you are available to any part of the 
Conservative Party that needs your attention. 
   
But my personal contact big in the early days, limited in the late days 
because it was you know deputy head of departments it was difficult to 
be sitting there fielding calls where you are also managing agencies.  
You know giving interviews to Radio 4 and all this kind of stuff, you 
know it is just not the sort of thing I had on a day to day basis 
ultimately in my role. 
 
Anthony Newman: Would that interaction come to you more as you just described it as a 
phone call or did you ever get letters and emails on subjects? 
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Craig Elder: A lot of emails, you would get a lot of emails.  I mean when you end 
up-, when you are merging here in the new media like was when I first 
started one of your main jobs is dealing consistently with emails.  That 
have either come via Conservatives.com or they would in to David 
Cameron’s office.  We would get a huge volume, a huge volume of 
information comes into David’s office and his correspondence team 
which I think was ultimately six or eight strong, their job is you know 
fish out the stuff and see who needs it.  So, we would get a lot of stuff 
sent to us, enquiries from the public, enquiries from supporters, 
enquiries from members asking us things about the website.  
Everybody got a reply. 
 
Anthony Newman: Looking at the other part of my research based in the 1950s when 
television first became a political communication tool it caused a lot of 
controversy within the party membership about how it was being used.  
There was a lot of interaction and feedback from party members with 
critique on the way the party was using television at the time.  How 
does that compare with what you experienced with replacing television 
with the internet in 2010? 
 
Craig Elder: Yes, it is a really good analogy to draw.  I mean TV still remains in 
prime spot; it might not even change in the next election.  You know 
like I have already told you the biggest audience we got with 
WebCameron was when WebCameron footage was on TV.  But kind of 
addressing your specific question.  Was there resistance?  Absolutely, 
absolutely and you know I have mentioned you know Francis and 
David and George and the backing they give us.  Steve Hilton and the 
backing he gave us, Andy Coulson and the backing that he gave us and 
without that we would have been all at sea because if we had started 
from the bottom up we would have really, really struggled.   
 
Now the thing that you know, the thing about the party is that you 
would sometimes find surprising examples of people who would make 
time for you.  Now, Ken Clark is a man of give or take 70 years of age.  
I am guessing he doesn’t spend a lot of time messing about on a 
MacBook or  looking at his favourite websites; but he always had a lot 
of time for us.  Always very keen to see what we were doing, always 
keen to get involved.   
 
I certainly won’t name any names in a negative sense but you would 
certainly see occasions where people didn’t fully grasp the 
communications potential of the web and didn’t quite understand why 
they should be making time in their diaries to  speak to you know 
WebCameron or the web guy.  That certainly wasn’t common but it did 
happen and there was a certain degree of resistance in that respect. 
 
Anthony Newman: Was there a particularly type of demographic? 
 
Craig Elder: Not really, I mean like you know I guess one of the reasons that I Ken 
up there is that being older didn’t necessarily make you less likely to 
want to interact something, you can be quite surprised.  Sometimes you 
would see people, you know as long as you didn’t work for candidates 
we were like, “Sorry I mean we would love to work with you but I am 
just really busy knocking on door, you know I have a got a job.”   
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Sometimes you work with junior MPs who you think would be dying to 
get the exposure and they would just say, “Sorry I don’t get this.”  Then 
other times you would be working with somebody like Ken whose you 
know former Home Secretary, Former Health Secretary, former 
Chancellor and you say, “Yes of course I have got the time.”   
 
` So, yes you would see surprising, surprising on occasion-.  You know 
guys like Boris Johnson who in their early days was a massive 
supporter and made mountains of time for us.  But then you know you 
would see the flip side occasionally and you would feel like, “Well you 
are apparently young and fresh and you should get this stuff but yet you 
are not doing any of it,” and that could certainly be frustrating.  But I 
certainly believe that my kinds of you know counterparts in the Labour 
Party and the Liberal Democrats would have faced exactly the same 
challenge.   
 
Anthony Newman: Was there much critique from people lower down the hierarchy, 
members, supporters, non-party members? 
 
Craig Elder: Not really, I think you know if things didn’t work properly you know if 
we provided a service or a tool and it didn’t work properly and then yes 
they would criticise and they would rightly criticise and we would work 
with them to make it work better for them.  But we didn’t see any 
resistance in that respect.  I mean when MyConservatives was first 
rolled out people said, “Well I don’t quite get what it is.”  I mean the 
solution for us was then to work with them on a one to one basis, you 
know pick up the phone and explain it.  Then once we had done that we 
always saw enthusiasm. 
 
Anthony Newman: We’ve touched on Facebook but I am interested on what the central 
party’s view would be on how Facebook was used within the local 
campaigns.  
 
Craig Elder: Facebook the way that it was used in the local campaigns was entirely 
to be decided upon by the local campaigns.  We saw some really, really 
effective uses of it.  You know we saw constituencies setting up groups, 
we saw existing MPs set up fan pages.  We saw candidates set up fan 
pages and some of them running into the hundreds and thousands of 
people.  The reason why Facebook is so useful is because it is kind of 
the viral nature.  You know one of the things for our party particularly a 
party that is undergoing a lot of change is that the most vital people for 
us in terms of communicating that change are our supporters.   
 
Now, you know during the election you know when I first joined the 
party I was 25 years old and Scottish which makes me an unlikely 
Conservative Party supporter.  A lot of my friends would say, “What 
the hell are you doing, you know the Tories aren’t for you,” and you 
would explain to them you know why you had got involved and what 
you thought.  They would then have a different view on the party based 
on the fact that one of their friends was a member.   
 
Now if you take that view and you extrapolate it out to Facebook, what 
happens when somebody goes and supports a candidate and goes and 
supports a local campaign, goes and supports the big central 
Conservative Party on Facebook, they are saying to their friends and 
the average number of friends that a Facebook person-, a Facebook 
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member has is 150.  They are saying on average to 150 people, “You 
know what I don’t mind that David Cameron and the Conservatives 
could be alright and I vote for them.”  For us incredibly incredible 
valuable took whether on a local level or whether on a national one.   
 
Anthony Newman: Is there something unique about Facebook in the sense that it is not 
geographically linked to a constituency.  I suppose that’s my question is 
there something unique about it in terms of the way that you can use it 
for political organisation and political campaigning? 
 
Craig Elder: I mean there is something unique about Facebook but it is not 
necessarily that.  I am going to come in very, very high on looking at 
this, I am obsessed with Facebook.  I don’t spend a great deal of time 
on it, probably not as much as people a bit younger than me, I am 
fascinated totally when I see younger colleagues kind of 21, 22 how 
much their life is organised around Facebook.  What Facebook does is 
it reflects broadly speaking the way that we behave in the real world.  It 
allows us to tell our stories online and politics has naturally become a 
part of that because we are complicated people.  We are you know we 
are the people that we are.  We have the friends that we have and the 
relationships that we are in.  We you know go to the things that we go 
to but we also support the parties that we support and politics is 
naturally seeped into Facebook in that respect.   
 
So, I would argue that Facebook’s success full stop and its success as a 
politic campaign platform is maybe not so much to do with the fact that 
it is not geographically linked we are just purely down to the fact that 
Mark Zuckerberg when he first invented it, first came up with the idea 
was looking to reflect real human behaviour. I think he has done that 
very, very effectively.   
 
Anthony Newman: How did the party view bloggers and blogging? 
 
Craig Elder: Bloggers and blogging - a very good question.  2006 when I first 
arrived the conservative party bloggers fear was in rid health in no 
uncertain terms and we started to see if you like the stars of the 
bloggers fear emerge.  Particularly, Tim Montgomerie at 
ConservativeHome, Iain Dale, there were some smaller things going on 
around that area, Tory Radio was also quite bi in that period.  Dizzy 
Thinks who almost unfeasibly married up technology in Tory politics - 
you know, really great bloggers.  We set up a, you know stand for them 
at Tory party conference in 2006 and really tried to encourage people to 
get involved.   
 
I mean the thing about blogging is let’s not confuse blogging with 
journalism.  The thing is Iain and Tim are proper journalists and 
actually to some extent Tim is now a lobbyist, not a lobbyist but almost 
like a Conservative who runs a pressure group.  I mean the 
ConservativeHome doesn’t represent the leadership of the Conservative 
Party nor should it.  It represents the views of a certain parts of the 
Conservative party.  So let’s you know stay off the technology, let’s 
celebrate the fact that what blogging does is gives a voice to people 
who otherwise wouldn’t have necessarily got themselves published.  
  
I mean would Tim be a regular Times columnist now, would Iain be a 
regular Telegraph columnist now were it not for the fact that they got 
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their start on blogging, probably not and that is a great thing.  But in 
real terms they are professional writers with a point of view and they 
can sometimes say things that are helpful to the party and sometimes 
say things that are maybe in some people’s view harmful to the party.  
The fact that they were included on kind of senior briefings, the fact 
that they were sent press releases along with other journalists I think to 
me is as indicative.   
 
You know if blogging was a like a weird kind of internet geeky thing 
our team would have dealt with them but our press team dealt with it 
because they are proper journalists.  So, yes blogging sometimes 
helpful, sometimes a hindrance but I think you know sometimes during 
that 2006 to 2010 period the Conservative party bloggers fear was 
incredibly, incredibly good health you know throwing up mischievous 
stories both for ourselves and for the opposition.  That’s a really, really 
great thing.  The only challenge for that group of people now is to 
continue that beyond the election.   
 
ConHome is still going very, very strong but you know Iain’s off the 
scene now.  Des is not blogging very much.  You could argue that the 
bloggers fear may very well be a tool of opposition but you know time 
will tell. 
 
Anthony Newman: You mentioned specifically that the party deals or dealt with bloggers 
quite separately to the social medial element and that bloggers were 
dealt with through the publicity department. 
 
Craig Elder: The press department. 
 
 
Anthony Newman: The press department, the press office.  So, could you describe what 
kind of relationship the party would have had, a little bit like you 
described the BlackBerry scenario in terms of its relationship with 
ConHome, Iain Dale, Guido Fawkes that sort of type of thing. 
 
Craig Elder: Yes I meant the thing is I mean Guido is an interesting one because 
he’s in theory and independent, I mean he is a right wing independent 
but he is nonetheless an independent he could sting you as hard as he 
would sting any of the other parties.  He is a great guy but it doesn’t 
change the fact that you know he likes mischief.  You know Tim and 
Iain they would receive the same press releases as any other 
mainstream journalist or if you were political correspondent to the 
Telegraph you would get exactly the same thing as being you know the 
editor of ConservativeHome.  But it is more than that; it is about that 
one to one relationship and about that access.   
 
So, you know Tim and Iain would you know regularly be called up for 
one to one conversation by our press team if they said something that 
we perceived to be wrong they would call up and they would discuss 
why they thought that was wrong and press would amend on the story 
but it is more than that it is about being proactive with them and 
making them feel valued.  Making them feel close to the central party 
machine and making them feel that they are not you know some guys 
tapping away on their laptops in their bedrooms which is absolutely not 
what they are doing.  They are both guys working for professional 
offices.   
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It is making them one, feel like they are professional journalists but 
two, recognising the fact that they are professional journalists and 
treating them as such.  
 
Anthony Newman: I have had a conversation with Iain Dale and he said that he didn’t feel 
that he had a close enough relationship with the Conservative Party and 
also he offered to write a guide to blogging that would potentially be 
helpful for other people in the blogger sphere, candidates, activists and 
he said that wasn’t developed any further.  Do you have any comments 
to make on that? 
 
Craig Elder: I mean certainly that offer was never come across my path but I mean 
knowing Iain as I do and knowing him to be a very trustworthy 
individual I have no doubt that offer was made to somebody and wasn’t 
developed any further.  I think that’s a great shame because Iain’s a 
really great writer, very passionate about the Conservative Party and is 
also a very effective communicator.  I think it is a great shame we 
didn’t take him up on that opportunity.   
 
I mean you know I am obviously you know giving my last answer 
somewhere gingerly knowing that either one of Tim or Iain would have 
said that we didn’t feel like we got the access that we should have had 
but what I can say absolutely categorically is they had the same level of 
access to any-, as any other journalist.  If they feel that they should 
have had more than that is all well and good but I think you know it is 
kind of my duty, my responsibility to give my colleagues in the press 
office their due and say that they had the same access as any other 
journalist.   
 
Anthony Newman: Last question.   
 
Craig Elder: Yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: David Cameron first used the internet with WebCameron and later said, 
“Too Many Tweets make a twat,” is there any conflict in those two 
examples? 
 
Craig Elder: That’s funny you have mentioned that because on the way here I was 
recalling the Channel 4 event where I was put on the spot and was 
asked about, “Too many tweets make a twat,” and my answer remains 
firm to this day.  The thing about this was it was taken massively out of 
proportion not least because it was-, David swore and everyone was 
fascinated about that but we need to separate the use of the internet in a 
productive, in an effective and in a targeted way than with kind of 
blindly using the internet as much as possible and in an untargeted you 
know kind of spreading your message everywhere, not necessarily we 
need to be able to hit.   
 
I think David was absolutely right saying too many Tweets make a 
twat, to be honest I still believe that to this day.  I think the fact is if you 
spend a lot of your time on Twitter getting involved in needless debate 
and conversation with people who are ultimately just there to make 
mischief as indeed Kerry McCarthy at Labour did sometimes find 
herself doing.  You do end up looking for want of a better phrase of 
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twat if you will forgive my language on a piece of academic research.  I 
don’t think those two things in any way contradictory.   
 
You know David always believed in using the internet to reach a big an 
audience as possible in an effective way to communicate the values of 
the modern compassionate Conservative Party.  He didn’t believe in 
sitting at his laptop or on his BlackBerry every day replying to loads of 
stuff on Twitter. I think you know as far as-, you know I would 
certainly-, would I have preferred that David hadn’t said it yes probably 
would of because people misunderstood what he said and it created a 
bit of a storm for us you know I find myself defending that statement a 
lot.  But defend it I did and defend I still happily will, I think he had a 
point.  It is just a shame people didn’t understand it slightly better. 
 
Anthony Newman: Craig Elder, thank you very much. 
 
Craig Elder: My pleasure. 
 
END AUDIO 
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START AUDIO 
 
Anthony: Anthony Ridge-Newman interviewing Councillor Hugh Meares. Thank 
you for agreeing to be interviewed today, Councillor Meares.  Could 
you just start by telling me how you got involved with the Conservative 
Party? 
 
Hugh: Yes, I got involved fairly late in life, having had a wonderful year, 
myself and my family, on the back of the Health Service.  We were all 
‘rescued’ and then somebody suggested that I might like to become a 
local Councillor.  
 
 All my life, this was the sort of thing I’d decided that I didn’t want to 
do and during that year I felt it was time to perhaps join up and do 
something by way of public service.  To my great surprise, I found that 
I enjoyed it and I became a local Councillor in Runnymede, obviously 
joined the party, and then moved on through various deputy chairman 
roles, political and fundraising membership, and ended up as chairman 
of the association during a very exciting decade of change.  I was 
particularly interested to be the chairman of the association during the 
2010 General Election, which I felt was a really important task which 
we, the Conservative Party, had in hand. 
 
Anthony: Now you’ve just mentioned that you were chairman during the 2010 
General Election.  Could you just give a little bit of background of your 
role in the 2010 General Election? 
 
Hugh: Yes, Runnymede & Weybridge is a curious seat because it’s a 
particularly safe seat and the directions from the local party and from 
our MP and from Central Office was that Runnymede should primarily 
use its campaigning resources to assist other constituencies.  We 
particularly helped in Richmond Park, where it was felt that we could 
make a material contribution, and I think we did and I think we found it 
really interesting devoting ourselves to a long campaign in another 
association. 
 
Anthony: Could you give me some background on how the local party of 
Runnymede & Weybridge is organised? 
 
Hugh: We’re organised into a series of branches and we have a traditional 
association with an office and an agent and we’re one of only two 
associations in the Surrey area to have actually made a small surplus in 
2009/10.  
 
 Over Surrey there is a significant problem of how you run the 
associations going forward.  All of the associations have got bricks and 
mortar, they’ve got cash balances and they’re running at deficits and 
their memberships are declining.   
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 So we have something of an issue as to how the party will be running in 
Surrey in, shall we say, five and ten years’ time, because there’s a limit 
to the amount of time that you can live off the reserves and then by 
‘selling the family silver’.  We, in Runnymede, we’re in a partnership 
grouping with our neighbours, Spelthorne.  We’d like a third or fourth 
association to join us and I think that would then probably provide the 
critical mass for us to support a full-time agent and a staff of one or two 
to handle all the essential work to do with membership and canvassing 
and elections. 
 
Anthony: You’ve been kind enough to give me your AGM Report that was 
delivered on 17
th
 of March 2011, and covered the year of the General 
Election.  I note from the report that you mention that cash-flow has 
been a problem throughout Surrey and you’ve just mentioned that you 
will be looking to take steps to join with other associations.  Are there 
other things you can do internally to try and address this issue? 
 
Hugh: It’s a very difficult question and it’s often quite an emotional one.  
There are strong voices in Runnymede and Weybridge that actually 
believe that we would do better if we split away from our partnership in 
Spelthorne and head our own local office in Runnymede. 
 
 I think the interesting question is, what do you actually do in an office, 
what are the activities that take place there, and do they actually have to 
take place there?  As far as Cherry Orchard is concerned, which is our 
association office in Staines, I do work on the Cherry Orchard 
computers, probably one to two hours every day, but I probably only 
visit Cherry Orchard, apart from meetings, about four or five times a 
year, so almost all my work is done remotely and I suspect that this will 
be the model going forward which will have a series of agents who 
travel around the patch hot-desking from where they go. 
 
Anthony: You’ve used the word ‘remotely’.  Presumably, the internet would play 
some role in that? 
 
Hugh: The internet has been such an enormously powerful force over the last 
ten years and what fast broadband links, or relatively fast broadband 
links, both where I live in Englefield Green and in Staines, mean is that 
I can sit at my desk in Englefield Green, I can use something like 
‘Remote Desktop’ or ‘LogMeIn’ to log straight on to the Cherry 
Orchard computers.  I can print material out on the Cherry Orchard 
printers or I can print it out at home.  I just don’t have to travel every 
day down to Cherry Orchard. 
 
Anthony: If that is the case, what is the role of the bricks and mortar? 
 
Hugh: You probably need one main office every so often and I suspect that 
one over three or four associations might well be the right proportion of 
offices to associations.  You need to have a Merlin computer that 
contains the central contact data, membership data and electoral roll 
data for the party, and you need to have somebody there who knows 
what they’re doing with this application. 
 
 You need to have a high-speed, high-quality, big volume duplicator, 
normally a Risograph or a Duplo or a Rikoaz.  Last year, I think, 
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printed 300,000 copies.  You need to have some medium volume laser 
printers, black and white, and colour laser printers, and you probably 
want some sort of network sitting on a domain so that you have a group 
of network computers with the security that this type of information 
demands.   
 
 You probably also need to have reserves of paper so that you can do the 
printing during the election, and you may want to have things like 
stakes and posters and things of this sort.   
 
 That, really, is the only essential function of an association office.  The 
other thing that happens in most of these association offices, which is 
meetings, can actually be achieved in a different way.  You can hold 
meetings locally, you can rent halls for a relatively small amount.  So I 
don’t think that an association office needs to be a meeting place in the 
way that it was, shall we say, 10 or 20 years ago. 
 
Anthony: Did the association office play an important role in the 2010 General 
Election? 
 
Hugh: I think it played an important role with regard to printing and on the 
election day itself it played quite an important role.  We have a bank of 
telephones there and we were able to have a telephone centre there, 
where the telephone operators were knocking up people who hadn’t 
voted and we were knocking them up across Runnymede, in Richmond 
and in Woking.  This is a sort of Geneva Call Centre idea and that’s 
probably the most useful role that Cherry Orchard played. 
 
Anthony: In terms of geography, how would an office that is shared between 
three to five associations work out? 
 
Hugh: I think I’ve probably already given you the answer to that question.  
You’re going to have to have one office that contains all the necessary 
machinery and, perhaps, one or two skilled operators.  Apart from that, 
I think that little local sub-offices that could be really quite small, 
where people meet, where leaflets are delivered, where canvass cards 
are picked up.  Those could be across the other associations and those 
might, for example, have some sort of local printing, some sort of black 
and white laser printer, they might have one or two PCs that were 
connected to the main office through the internet.  The agent would 
then be hot-desking his way around the patch. 
 
Anthony: In terms of the role of the internet, how do you see that being played 
out? 
 
Hugh: The internet means different things to different people.  There is an age 
divide here and there is a digital divide.  The internet started off as a 
means of sending email messages, and to the younger generation now 
it’s an enormously powerful communication device using new media 
tools, such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter and so forth.  
 
The difficulty that we have in the Conservative associations is that they 
tend to be populated by two sorts of people.  There are the young and 
enthusiastic political volunteers, who join in their twenties, they work 
hard and they pass through.  We then have a cadre of people who are 
there always.  These are people in their fifties and sixties and seventies.  
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The difficulty that many of these people face is that they may struggle 
when it comes to putting a new cartridge in their laser printer.   
 
So, they’re perhaps not entirely hands-on. The internet, to an 
association that is run by this older cadre, is probably going to make 
less effective use of what the internet offers than might be the case, for 
example, in a young business or with some of the younger volunteers. 
 
Anthony: Would some of these individuals require training to be able to ensure 
that this new type of office would function? 
 
Hugh: I’m afraid I’m a pessimist here.  I think that this age barrier can be 
almost insuperable. 
 
Anthony: Does that mean, then, that there is a challenge to this type of 
arrangement with associations coming in the near future? 
 
Hugh: I think it does and, of course, this is a problem that will wash its way 
out because the generation that is 65 today, in 10 years’ time will be 75 
and there’ll be a new generation, which has perhaps been more hands-
on during its working life. 
 
Anthony: How did you campaign during the 2010 General Election? 
 
Hugh: In what specific way? 
 
Anthony: What was the main use of communication with constituents? 
 
Hugh: The traditional way, when I first joined, of getting your message out 
and communicating with the voters, was to print material usually in 
black and white and to deliver it through the network of volunteers.  
We then had a wonderful three or four years where we began to collect 
telephone numbers into, what was then, the Blue Chip database, and we 
were able to supplement the physical deliveries with telephones.  
Telephones are particularly useful in the winter when the evenings are 
dark and people don’t like to answer their doors and you can also get a 
very high hit rate compared to knocking on doorsteps. 
 
 In Runnymede we have some 80,000 electors, we have about 30,000 
telephone numbers, but of those only 25% now are not TPS, so we now 
have a very small number of telephone numbers which we can use to 
make political telephone calls.  So the telephone, having come in as a 
very important means of supplementary communication, has now 
disappeared. 
 
 We have a much smaller number of emails but we and all of the other 
associations are doing our best to harvest email addresses.  That, then, 
raises another series of questions.  We all get an enormous number of 
emails every day and it’s hard work to answer our important emails and 
our work emails, and how we’re going to respond when we get, as we 
have over the last year, maybe every two weeks we get an email from 
Eric Pickles; every two weeks one from Baroness Wallasey, and every 
three weeks one from David Cameron. 
 
 The plain fact of the matter is that this is relatively low-quality, 
undifferentiated marketing material, and we’re just not going to read it.  
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Because all of the email addresses that are held on Merlin are available 
to the party centrally, what we have is the party involved in a 
communications programme in which the associations are not involved.  
What I believe they’re doing is damaging our ability to use this 
communication. 
 
 I’ll be a little bit more specific here.  When you are doing a widespread 
email letter, it’s quite difficult to know how to pitch this.  Are you 
going to pitch this at the level of the Mail, or the Telegraph, or the 
Spectator?  The difficulty with not really differentiating the email 
product is that everybody gets the emails and the people for whom the 
level of communication is wrong are very shortly simply going to direct 
all of  the Conservative communications into their junk email box. 
 
Anthony: You’ve mentioned email quite specifically.  How did you practically 
use email during the 2010 election specifically? 
 
Hugh: We made very little use of email.  We only have around 1,000 email 
addresses.  We did try to work up some quite thoughtful email letters 
but it was early days for us.  It’s a full-scale endeavour communicating 
in this way, as it’s also a full-scale endeavour in maintaining a web 
presence.  It’s easy enough to create a web presence but you then have 
to maintain it and that requires continuing effort, which you are not 
necessarily going to get from a voluntary party 
 
Anthony: Did you use a website in the election? 
 
Hugh: Yes, and I don’t think it was particularly effective. 
 
Anthony: How was that website maintained? 
 
Hugh: The party has quite an effective central website and they have put a lot 
of energy into this over the last two years.  They have improved it 
considerably.  Central Office made a content management website 
product available to the associations.  It was pretty clunky, it looked 
pretty old-fashioned, it was just about adequate for putting up factual 
material. 
 
 I think this slightly depends on what you see a website for – is it a 
passive site where there’s useful material, for example, councillors’ 
names and addresses, contact points, the names of the local council 
official who deals with the rubbish when it hasn’t been taken away?  Or 
is it something that is offering news and marketing ideas?  I think that 
the Conservative product that we had last year was a very old-
fashioned, passive, fact-based website.  There’s everything to play for 
over the next two to three years as we see how this develops.   
 
 It’s going to be difficult for associations because everyone enjoys 
setting up websites, but they do not enjoy maintaining them so much I 
think the energy for this will come from Central Office.   
 
Anthony: How did your website compare to your neighbouring seat’s, bearing in 
mind that Runnymede & Weybridge is a safe seat? 
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Hugh: I would say it was adequate and I think you’ve answered the question 
in posing it.  This was a safe seat, this was not where our energy was 
going to go in 2010. 
 
Anthony: Did the party monitor the content of your website? 
 
Hugh: The party didn’t.  The party’s monitoring of associations is another 
very interesting topic.  The nature of a centralised database like Merlin, 
which is updated regularly into a central repository, means that the 
party at all times has access to our latest polling, our latest membership, 
our latest activities.  So for the first time, the party is in a position to 
actually decide what performance metrics are important to it and to 
monitor those on a regular basis.   
 
 Now I was surprised in 2010 that, with the previous database which 
was Blue Chip, which wasn’t all that easy to use but which, 
nevertheless, provided that central information to Central Office, that 
there was no area-wide or nation-wide monitoring of the metrics. 
 
Anthony: Was the internet used at constituency level in order to organise local 
campaigns during the 2010 election? 
 
Hugh: Yes.  We used it extensively for this purpose.  This comes back to the 
relationship between the branches and the associations because all the 
field activity has to take place by the branches.  It’s the branches that 
have the volunteers, they have the energy, and they have the local 
knowledge.  So our principal role in the association is to motivate the 
branches and to monitor what they’re doing, to encourage them when 
they’re doing well and to encourage them and perhaps apply a bit of 
stick when they’re not doing well.  
 
 During the course of an election, the branches will collect canvass 
information that has to somehow get onto the central Merlin system.  
Fresh canvass cards have to be handed back to the branches and then, 
on election day, this information has to be married up with the telling 
results coming from the polling stations, so that in the evenings we can 
identify the people who are our supporters and who have not voted.  
This is a classic ‘get out the vote’ campaigning technique.   
 
 In the past, this has all been paper-based.  The branch would fill in the 
canvass card, it would then motor the canvass card over to the 
association office and this was the reason why you wanted an 
association office that was relatively nearby and relatively accessible.  
Volunteers would then put this into the computers and that information 
would then go out to branches. 
 
 We built an internet application that sat on top of Blue Chip, so that our 
branches were able to enter in their canvass information directly from 
their branch office, which was usually a bedroom or an office in 
somebody’s home.  They were able to pick up the results immediately, 
they could enter the telling results in immediately and they could then 
see who the people were who needed to be knocked up.  Because this 
was all networked into the servers at Cherry Orchard, the telephone 
team at Cherry Orchard was able to see the same information in real 
time.  We were able then to direct the telephone team at Cherry 
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Orchard to back up the key stress points in our constituency and in the 
neighbouring constituencies that we were supporting. 
 
Anthony: How does that approach compare to the traditional approach before 
internet was used in that way? 
 
Hugh: The traditional approach from about 1997, when Blue Chip was first 
issued to associations, was that each branch would have its own little 
committee room on campaign day.  There would be one PC operating 
there, the telling results would be coming in to the committee room and 
then that computer in the committee room would be printing out lists 
for people to go out and actually bang on doors to get out their vote.  In 
some ways it is the same but in the pre-internet days every branch 
committee room was its own little silo of information.  In the 2010 
context everybody’s connected, which means there’s mutual sharing of 
support and support can be directed to the point at which it is most 
needed. 
 
Anthony: Are there any other pros and cons to both methods? 
 
Hugh: There is always the issue of branch ownership, and I think one of the 
many reasons why the party has had a membership crisis over the last 
10 to 15 years is that the whole nature of politics and membership, and 
people’s attitudes to parties, have changed.  One of the things that used 
to happen before membership was computerised was that the branches 
had responsibility for, and ownership for membership, so that every 
October they would go out and knock on the doors.   
 
They knew the people.  They said, “Hello Doris, how’s the dog, are you 
going to Renéw?”  This kept the branches in a healthy state of mind.  
Once the membership was computerised, we moved to a situation 
where the association would send out standard mail-merge letters, 
that’s an impersonal form of communication, and it may not be 
followed up in a timely way.  That probably was the only way to do it 
because this army of volunteers that we had in the 90s was gradually 
disappearing, so I don’t think there was any option about that change. 
 
 What the new internet environment perhaps enables us to see is the 
possibility of the branches being re-empowered, in that all this 
membership and canvassing information can be available in real time, 
in an easy way, to the branches.  They can then take up responsibility 
for managing their membership and maintaining contact with the 
members, the helpers, the deliverers, the supporters, the canvassers, 
which make up the party in the country. 
 
Anthony: Did your activists use the internet in terms of email and social media in 
any way? 
 
Hugh: The young ones, yes; the old ones, most definitely no. 
 
Anthony: What is the role of the agent? 
 
Hugh: That’s a very difficult question and it’s becoming more and more 
difficult to answer as the traditional agent is disappearing.  Once upon a 
time to run an association office needed an office, it needed people 
there, it had files, it had paper and the agent was the person who ran 
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that office.  In the modern digital age where, as we’ve already said, 
people can work from home and things aren’t filed in paper form, 
they’re filed as PDFs on their computers, they’re all indexed, we have 
things like Merlin. 
 
 The question then arises - what is the agent there for?  He fulfils one 
role that is extremely important.  That is that the whole business of 
running a political party and running an election has now become very 
much more exacting, in terms of meeting strange legal requirements 
about how things are filed, how much money is spent, when they’re 
recorded and bits of paper are sent in.  So the agent fulfils that role and 
without an agent you are very likely to make a mistake.   
 
 The second thing that the agent can do is to see that the central data 
applications like Merlin are properly managed and the staff are trained.  
One of the problems that the party has is that Merlin, the new national 
database – not an easy thing to write, with perhaps 40,000,000 or 
50,000,000 people on it, this is a major piece of software engineering – 
one of the difficulties with Merlin is that it has a user interface that does 
not seem to recognise that we are in a modern internet age where 
people expect applications to be intuitive, as easy to use as something 
you find on an iPad.  It has an old-fashioned, unfriendly, unintuitive 
interface and it also tends to fall over.  This means that Merlin needs 
trained operators to use it, and that means that behind those trained 
operators you probably need an agent to see that this is happening. 
 
 The agent has another set of responsibilities, which are branch building, 
party building and membership building.  I think it’s probably true to 
say that the current breed of agents that we’re seeing are more skilled 
on campaigning and on the election sides than they are on the branch 
building and the membership.  In Surrey we have one or two agents 
who are legendary for their skills as branch builders and fundraisers 
but, of course, they are now coming to the end of their terms. 
 
Anthony: What was the workload of your agent during the 2010 General 
Election? 
 
Hugh: We have, and we had, a part-time agent.  During the six weeks of the 
election he was more or less full-time, working between two 
associations.  I think we have this paradox that during much of the year 
one agent between two associations is possibly more than you need, but 
during the high point of an election it’s rather less than you need.   
 
 We had some difficulties because one or two key things that needed to 
be achieved weren’t quite achieved on the critical timeline.  That put 
everything back and that meant that with only one agent serving two 
associations he became very overloaded in the middle of the campaign. 
 
Anthony: Did the internet play a role in the agent’s election tasks on a day to day 
basis? 
 
Hugh: I think you’d have to ask Kim to get his views on it.  I was speaking to 
him about this last week and he was saying that he had definitely 
noticed how the way in which he worked had changed over the last four 
to five years.  In particular, that he was now able to do many things 
from home that previously he had to go to the office to do.   
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 So I think that during the last election he was able to, perhaps, achieve 
more than he would have been able to had he - had everything that he 
was doing had to be done at the association office.  He did a lot of work 
from home and from other places that he happened to be. 
 
Anthony: In your agent’s report, ‘An Election Review of 2010’, he mentions that 
there was significant competition for resources at Cherry Orchard, the 
association office, during that period.  Does this create conflict within 
the association? 
 
Hugh: It creates conflict in the association and between the associations in a 
grouping, but this is something that simply has to be managed.  Perhaps 
what 2010 as a really important election, not only the local election but 
also the general election, indicated to us was that there was a very 
significant rise in the activities being taken on at the association office.  
Perhaps we hadn’t anticipated these fully and we hadn’t also realised 
that they were going to bump into each other.  There’s a series of 
critical paths – you disturb something on the critical path and 
everything else gets moved.   
 
 I think that this is an area where perhaps, if we were doing it again, we 
could improve.  Looking forward to, shall we say, 2015 I think that my 
message to my successors would be, “Try and run with a shared agent 
between associations for most of the year, but come election time see 
whether you can find a retired agent to come on board and to take on 
some of that extra load during this key period of six weeks before the 
election proper.” 
 
Anthony: The agent’s report also talks about the main administrative contribution 
during a parliamentary election.  Talking about nomination papers, 
preparation for public mailings, organisation of hustings and the control 
of expenses.  Did the internet play a facilitating role in any of these? 
 
Hugh: No it didn’t.  These are very legalistic requirements.  This is 
knowledge-based.  The agent needs to be on top of the latest 
regulations; he has to keep a close eye on what all the volunteers are 
doing to see that, frankly, nobody slips up. 
 
Anthony: The agent also mentions other bits of administration that filter in 
directly to the campaign, such as leaflets and photographs, and that he 
sent some reminders about getting hold of the photographs.  How 
would he have managed these reminders? 
 
Hugh: Ten years ago, the individual candidates would have come into the 
association office and they would either have brought a black and white 
photograph, perhaps taken when they were five or ten years younger.  
Or, he would have taken a photograph using a digital camera.  What we 
now have is the possibility that the candidates can provide us with all 
this material during the year, in other words well in advance of the 
election proper. 
 
 You then have the difficulty that people are - and again we’re talking of 
people mostly in their 40s, 50s and 60s - who are becoming councillors 
and who may be struggling with some of this new media.  They’re 
using their new digital camera, they’re taking images that may be five 
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megabytes in size, they’re sending these down the wire to us, they may 
not get through the email size limitation.   
 
 So it’s not altogether easy assembling this but this is something that we 
did manage to achieve in 2010.  We assembled a library, we then edited 
all those photographs and took all the redeye out and cropped them 
suitably.  We then reduced them in size so that they could be assembled 
into publisher documents.  Those publisher documents were then of an 
acceptable size so that they could pass between us and the agent, and 
between the agent and the printer.  So the internet was pretty vital to 
this exercise. 
 
Anthony: Focusing specifically on the reminders, firstly would the reminders 
have gone out by email?  If so, the agent mentions that despite the 
reminders the photographs didn’t come until the last minute.  Did the 
digital divide play any role in this? 
 
Hugh: I think that’s too difficult to speculate on.  What we’re saying is, had 
these candidates been a little younger would they have found it easier 
and therefore done it more quickly?  I suspect the answer is, no.  I think 
that life is full of people that get things done on the first asking, and it’s 
equally full of people who do things only when you’ve really pushed 
them. 
 
Anthony: We’ve mentioned telling during the campaign, briefly, but could we be 
quite specific about the role of the internet in that process? 
 
Hugh: Yes, and of course this is all going to change very shortly, because we 
cannot be more than one or two years away from a telling process that 
takes place straight through an iPad or some sort of mobile telephone 
device.   What I’m talking about, clearly, is the collection of voters’ 
numbers at the polling stations as they leave the station. 
 
 What that number enables you to do is to identify who has voted and if 
you have done your canvass with reasonable coverage and you’ve been 
assiduous over the years, you will understand how maybe 80% of your 
electorate are likely to vote.  Canvass information in Runnymede and 
Weybridge is pretty reliable.  We’ve done a lot of canvassing over the 
years and people are generally truthful about their voting intention. 
 
 Once we have those elector numbers coming out of the polling station, 
we more or less know how the vote is going to fall.  So we need to 
capture those numbers back at the committee rooms, or at the 
association office – although, as I’ve indicated to you earlier, these now 
in electronic terms are one and the same. The information that’s 
available at the association office is available in the committee rooms. 
 
 What will actually happen is that the telling slips, which are bits of 
paper filled in by a teller sitting outside the polling station, which will 
be walked or bicycled or motored back to the nearest committee room 
or to the association office.  That will then be put into a computer 
running an appropriate election day piece of software.  That 
information then goes down the internet to the main servers, so that 
everybody has the same information about the state of play.   
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 This will be particularly important as the evening of an election day 
begins, because that’s when people are coming back from work, that’s 
when you’ve got a window of opportunity to go out and knock on doors 
and get people out and say, “Look I know you’ve just got back from 
work and I know you’re about to sit down to supper, we are short of 
votes, it would really help us if you could get out and cast your vote.” 
 
 You’ve got a window of about two hours where you can really turn 
people out and the only way you’re going to get all that information 
together, the telling information, who you’ve knocked up already, 
who’s since voted, the only way you’ll bring all that together will be a 
real time application, and that means the internet. 
 
Anthony: The agent’s report also notes that in some areas there was a lack of a 
delivery network.  Firstly, could you explain what a delivery network is 
and its role within the association and branches? 
 
Hugh: If we have, in Runnymede & Weybridge, something like 35,000 
households and we wish to deliver them a campaign manifesto or some 
other form of leaflet, like an ‘In Touch’ for example, to say how we’re 
getting on nationally in government or locally in government, we have 
to find some way of getting that out to them.  Even using a franking 
machine, which saves you around seven or eight pence a copy, postage, 
frankly, becomes unaffordable. 
 
 The only way to handle this is to have a network of volunteers who we 
call ‘deliverers’ and they will see that this material is delivered.  It’s not 
just a question of whether we have the funds, there’s also the issue of 
election expenses, and during an election, even if you had the money, it 
is not possible to post your election literature and remain within 
election expense limits.  So you have to deliver these by hand.   
 
 What the branches will want to do is they will want to have two types 
of volunteers – the candidate himself and the volunteers that are 
courageous enough and enjoy doing it – they need to go out and knock 
on doors and canvass and present the party and its policies.  The ones 
that wish to help but don’t wish to canvass; they can best serve the 
party by going out and delivering this literature.   
 
 What you do is you have a list of roads, you know how many houses 
that are in these roads because you’ve been doing it for years.  You 
split the thing up into patches and you hand these out to your deliverers. 
 
Anthony: Did email, in the 2010 election, play any role in the delivery network? 
 
Hugh: None really, no.   
 
Anthony: Is there any potential for internet to be involved in the delivery process? 
 
Hugh: I don’t think so at all.  I think the delivery process is primarily about 
bits of paper, and the way that you identify your deliveries and you 
keep them on board is you meet them, you press the flesh, you ring 
them up.  This needs to be a personal process. 
 
Anthony: That would then suggest that there is an importance of membership and 
support.  Is there a difference in terms of a member and a supporter? 
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Hugh: Well, there’s obviously a formal difference in that a member pays a 
subscription and he’s entitled to vote in certain party matters, like the 
choice of candidates.  I think what we’ve all noticed and been rather 
puzzled by over the last 10 years is how many people are clearly 
Conservatives, and are unflinchingly loyal and will always turn up 
regularly to vote, and will help, but don’t actually wish to become a 
member. 
 
Anthony: Focusing on membership, over the last five years in the run-up to the 
2010 General Election, your association membership dropped between 
2006 and 2007.  It then plateaued until 2008.  Between then and 2010 
there was a steady increase, although membership in 2010 was lower 
than in 2006.  Is this the expected trend? 
 
Hugh: It would seem to be a trend that’s very general across Surrey and my 
understanding is it’s a national trend too.  It’s partly, I’m afraid to say, 
just people getting older, and that fantastic body of members that we 
had in the ‘90s are now getting very old and they won’t be with us 
forever.  So we have a natural attrition of our membership. 
 
 We’ve then got to go out and raise new members and it has to be said 
that it’s been a great deal easier to find new supporters and members in 
2008, 09, and 10 than it was, say, in 2000 and the three years following 
that.  The Tory Party and its ideas seem exciting once again, and what’s 
really exciting is we’re getting lots of people in their late teens and 
early twenties who are interested in politics and feel that the 
Conservatives have a more coherent and modern message than any of 
the other parties. 
 
Anthony: Did the internet play a role in this trend? 
 
Hugh: I think not in terms of direct marketing, definitely not, but the whole 
way in which the Conservative Party has re-presented itself as having 
ideas that are relevant, attitudes that are relevant and being populated 
by younger and more interesting and fashionable people, I think that 
has been one plank on which membership and support in the country 
has begun to rebuild.   
 
 Of course, the other issue is when you get to the period when you’ve 
had more than 10 years of one party in government, it becomes stale, 
the wheels begin to fall off the economy, inevitably, at some stage 
there’s going to be some sort of economic crisis. Being something of a 
pessimist, I suspect that this is the only real time when the people in the 
country at large really begin to focus on the achievements of 
government, is when something begins to go wrong with the economy. 
 
Anthony: The centrally-managed website of the Conservative Party allows for 
people across the nation to join up as national members.   Has this 
played any role in the membership trends of your association? 
 
Hugh: Yes it has.  It’s the national site, it’s easy to join, we get credited with 
the members.  For a lot of the period that I was involved in our local 
association, we didn’t get full credit for a national member, but there is 
no such thing really as a national member now.  If a Runnymede 
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member joins up nationally he becomes a Runnymede member.  So I 
think, yes, that’s working well. 
 
Anthony: Assuming that the general trend of membership is declining in political 
parties, which is more important to you as an Association Chairman – 
having an un-active member or an active supporter? 
 
Hugh: I think this is an issue of semantics.  If he’s prepared to support us, 
that’s the only thing that matters.  Of course, a supporter won’t just 
deliver, he’ll probably turn up to our parties, he’ll buy a raffle ticket, 
he’s interested in what the Conservative Party and the local MP have to 
say.  I think there’s probably not a great deal of difference between a 
member and an active supporter. 
 
Anthony: Did you use the internet to recruit new members during the run-up to 
the 2010 General Election? 
 
Hugh: I didn’t, no. 
 
Anthony: Did the association employ any methods to attract new members via the 
internet? 
 
Hugh: Beyond the general presentation of the party, no. 
 
Anthony: Looking at the party’s expenditure – 
 
Hugh: ...if I could just come back into that.  One of the reasons is that we have 
so few email addresses.  Out of 85,000 people, I think we have some 
850 email addresses and most of those are already people who are close 
to the party. 
 
Anthony: What, then, does the local party do to attempt to get hold of email 
addresses? 
 
Hugh: Well, you can capture them because there’s something on a – maybe 
there’s an issue, something like AirTrack for example, which has 
caused a great deal of local interest.  You can have something about 
AirTrack on your website and you can capture email addresses when 
people respond to surveys.  You can do the same thing with paper 
surveys - when you put any form of material out it’ll say, “Please 
contact us if you’d like to help or if you’re concerned about this and 
please put your name and address and email address in.”   
 
 It’s hard work and also you have to manage it.  You’ve got TPS issues; 
we’ve had one or two members who’ve had inappropriate 
communications and they said, “Look, I didn’t give you my email 
address for you to try and promote this or that service and I want you to 
take my name off your address list.”  Then you don’t quite manage to 
do so and – not altogether easy.  This is a skill in its own right and 
maybe this is something that the party needs to think more about. 
 
Anthony: Turning our attentions to the expenditure and overheads, which is 
mentioned in the financial highlights of the AGM Report, it details that 
the main expenditure and overheads consists of postage, printing, 
telephones, the office establishment, salary costs of staff.  Did the 
internet play a role in increasing or decreasing these costs? 
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Hugh: Unquestionably, it played a role in decreasing them.  If you consider 
what goes on in an association office, and there’s I think we said earlier 
– it’s not the fact that it’s bricks and mortar, it’s not the fact that there 
are employed staff or volunteers there.  What matters are the useful 
activities that take place there and these associations are primarily 
about campaigning.  So if you see that the money that is being raised 
over the association’s being spent on election material, election 
campaigning, telephoning, printing and to some extent postage, then 
you will probably feel confident that it is going in the right direction. 
 
 You will expect to see some degree of expenditure on staff.  As we’ve 
already considered, you’re going to need some form of permanent staff 
there to put all this information in.  There are issues of quality, 
timeliness, training which indicate that you can’t just do this with 
volunteers.  You’re going to need some form of agent.  I don’t think 
you’re going to see a full-time agent on any, or on many, association’s 
profit and loss accounts over the next 10 years.  I suspect that we will 
all be looking to part-time or shared agents.   
 
 We would ideally be looking for around a quarter of an agent and, as 
I’ve indicated already, this way of lean working, it’s only possible in a 
modern office where everybody has the internet, has remote access to 
the office, remote printing and so on. 
 
Anthony: Turning our attentions to the local branches within the association, and 
their financial records, the highest performing branch in the report was 
Virginia Water and Thorpe branch.  The lowest performing branches 
were the CF branch and the Egham Hythe branch.  What are the 
reasons for the differences in performance between these branches? 
 
Hugh: The two bottom ones are easily explained.  I don’t think that 
Conservative Future is about raising money.  Their memberships are £5 
a year.  The sort of age group that you want in Conservative Future 
isn’t going to have the money in their pockets to contribute to the party 
in that way.  This is building for the future. 
 
 You mention the Egham Hythe branch.  This is an area that was solid 
Labour until recently.  I don’t think its demographic suggests it’s going 
to raise a great deal of money, and the fact that the Conservative 
presence there is relatively weak is another reason why it’s not going to 
raise a lot of money. 
 
 The question that you might have asked is, “Why is it that some of the 
branches in the more solid and wealthier areas raise very different sums 
of money?”  That, frankly, is down to the branch chairman, and not the 
current branch Chairman, the branch Chairman over the last 10 years.  
If a solid branch has been built, these people are all mates, they’ve been 
doing it for a long time, they enjoy each other’s company, and that’s 
certainly what you have in Virginia Water. 
 
Anthony: Excluding Conservative Future, the CF branch, does the internet play 
any role in the way these branches are run? 
 
Hugh: Almost none.   
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Anthony: If so, how are the branches organised in terms of communication and 
general day-to-day organisation? 
 
Hugh: I think we’ve perhaps really answered that question.  All of the 
branches, without exception now, have adopted the internet as a 
messaging tool, but not very much more than that.  I think, as we’ve 
said earlier, the type of people, the type of age, the type of skill and the 
type of interest suggests that, for the time being, these branches are 
going to continue in fairly traditional ways. 
 
Anthony: What was the role of the Conservative Future branch in the 2010 
General Election? 
 
Hugh: It was quite disappointing in a way.  The Conservative Future branches 
in Runnymede tend to focus around Royal Holloway, for obvious 
reasons - a very important, energetic university and there’s a good 
interest in politics.  So we tend to see Conservative Future groups form 
one year, then they wither again and then they re-form.   
 
 In 2009 we had a very strong Conservative Future; in 2010 it was much 
less strong and didn’t really have the time to turn out and contribute on 
the doorstep.  That’s not something which we can criticise in any way, 
because people who are at university, they’ve got degrees, they’ve got 
exams and there’s a whole series of things competing for their time. 
 
Anthony: I’d like to focus finally on the role of Merlin.  First of all, what is 
Merlin 2 and how does it differ to the original Merlin? 
 
Hugh: Merlin is a non-trivial application.  We’ve seen from things like the 
National ID Scheme, the centralised hospital record, that building 
databases that cover the country is a very difficult thing to do.   
 
 What Merlin, I think, has done quite successfully is to build a solid 
back end which is focused primarily on the contact rather than the 
electoral roll record.  The way that Blue Chip operated was that it 
focused on the electoral roll record, with the obvious difficulty that the 
main key to this roll, which was the polling district and the roll number, 
changed every year.  Then behind that you had people moving 
addresses – Miss Brown would become Miss Smith, Mr John Smith 
would have a son who he would call Mr John Smith.  You have a whole 
series of identity-matching issues. 
 
 Merlin is better-built.  It has a contact database as its core and that is 
then attached to the electoral roll, which changes every year and as 
people move around.  It also has a membership system which is added 
on, and a branch system, so contacts can exist within a constituency 
where they have an electoral roll identity.  They can exist within one or 
more branches to which they belong and they can have membership 
history. 
 
 So the underlying architecture of Merlin feels right.  The difficulty with 
Merlin is that its user interface is really quite poor.  The whole 
appearance of it is non-intuitive, it doesn’t have a modern feel about it, 
it tends to fall over and things are very difficult to find.  To take a 
simple example, if you wanted to print out some canvass cards, which 
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is a pretty basic thing you’d want to do, you’ve probably got to go 
through five or six screens before you get there. 
 
 This has meant that the party in the country, which would always have 
found the transition from Blue Chip to Merlin something difficult to 
manage, the task has been made more difficult than it needed to have 
been. 
 
 It’s also not been helped by the fact that Central Office perhaps haven’t 
had enough training and induction as these machines were rolled out.  
Our box arrived on the 1
st
 of October last year.  It had a few 
instructions in and it didn’t work until the 23rd of December, because it 
actually needed a Central Office intervention to make it work.  The 
machine that arrived was a three year-old Dell, they’d all been bought 
as a single lot, it was running Windows XP which is an obsolescent 
operating system designed in 2003, now very close to being end of life.  
The whole thing was not as forward-looking as it might have been.   
 
 From the point of view of the individual associations, the membership 
side was very difficult because the data migration from Blue Chip was 
chancy and troubled.  The agent in two of our adjacent constituencies, 
as they’ve gone through their membership Renewal process in the New 
Year, they’ve found that members appear to slip from view when they 
know jolly well that these are paid-up members.  This has caused a 
great loss of confidence.  None of that, of course, will matter because it 
will all wash through as the fresh memberships go on in 2011.   
 
 These are the sort of glitches that lead to a loss of confidence and I’m 
afraid that, whenever one goes to a Conservative function and people 
start talking about Merlin, it does not get a good press. 
 
Anthony: What are the specific differences between what Merlin 2 does and what 
Merlin originally did? 
 
Hugh: I can’t tell you as I never saw Merlin 1.  What we have done locally is 
what we did with Blue Chip – we wrote a package that was a read-only 
package that sat on top of Blue Chip to get us the sort of reports that we 
wanted, particularly some of the more analytical and data-mining tools.  
We’ve now plugged that into Merlin and that’s giving reasonably good 
results. 
 
Anthony: In your Chairman’s Report, you mention that Merlin 2 has been rolled 
out to all constituencies for membership and campaigning.  What is 
Merlin’s role in membership? 
 
Hugh: It’s absolutely critical because you have to find some way of recording 
the fact that people have joined up.  You’re handling their money; 
sometimes they pay in a single payment or a multiple payment.  You’ve 
got to keep a record of all of that.  Any sort of membership system is 
quite complicated and it’s best done on computers.   
 
 Then come Renewal time, of course the subscription lasts for a year.  
You then want to have good warning that the Renewal point is coming 
up because you may want to contact the member, say, “Thank you for 
being a member last year, I hope you’ll continue.”  If it’s a standing 
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order you might want to say, “Your standing order was debited on the 
14
th
 of January and we look forward to you staying with us.” 
 
 So I think the role of computers in membership is absolutely central 
and I don’t think that Merlin does a bad job.  Although, I think it’s had 
an unfortunate press, as I said earlier, because of the data migration 
problems. 
 
Anthony What is Merlin’s role in campaigning? 
 
Hugh: It’s the classic role that we’ve understood since we were using NCR 
paper back in the ‘90s and then Blue Chip.  We have an electoral roll, 
we go out and canvass, we mark the result of that canvass up on the 
electoral roll.  On polling day we collect the numbers of the people who 
have voted as they come out of the polling station.  We then match up 
those who haven’t voted against our known Conservative supporters 
and we go and knock on their doors to get them out to vote for us. 
 
 That’s the active campaigning.  In a more general sense, Central Office, 
by looking at this data, will begin to get early indications of how an 
election campaign is working. 
 
Anthony: What is the role of the internet in Merlin’s application? 
 
Hugh: In one sense it’s really quite good; in another sense it isn’t as good as it 
might be and it needs to be.  Blue Chip, the predecessor to Merlin, used 
to what was called ‘roll over’ once a month.  What would happen is 
you’d send your Blue Chip data up to Central Office, they would put 
the latest electoral roll on and take a copy for their own purposes and 
then they would send it back again.  You had a suspension of service 
around three to four days. 
 
 Merlin replicates from the association computers to Central Office 
computers overnight.  That means that everybody has up-to-date 
information, so this is absolutely critical.  Also, when it comes to 
polling day the telling information replicates so that in the 2010 
election, for example, there were many instances of call centres in the 
South of England supporting key seats in the North of England, where 
the volunteer network wasn’t as strong as it was in the South. 
 
 The other side of Merlin is how the information is made available to 
branches, so that branches can take more ownership and also that we 
don’t perhaps need to spend the money on a paid employee, such as the 
agent, doing something that the branches in an ideal world would be 
able to do.   
 
 This is difficult for two reasons.  The first, as I’ve indicated, is that 
Merlin is not an easy application to use and we don’t want volunteers 
making mistakes on data that is really important.  The second issue is 
one of access and security.  Central Office have had to balance the 
requirements to keep this data secure, both in terms of data protection 
and because it’s politically important, against the possibility of 
branches having access.   
 
 I think the difficulty that they have at the moment is, it is locked down 
so that it appears to be secure, so the branches don’t have the 
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opportunity of remote access they would like to have.  I use the word 
‘apparently’ because, actually, the old security model for the way that 
Merlin strips its branches is actually desperately weak.  So we have the 
paradox of data that is completely insecure, whilst blocking people out 
from accessing it. 
 
Anthony: This situation with Merlin, in terms of security and other issues that 
you’ve mentioned - Merlin seemed to sit between the Central Office 
and the local associations.  What role, then, does Merlin play in the 
relationship between CCHQ and local associations? 
 
Hugh: I think that depends on your point of view.  As a local association you 
will be very much aware that ‘Big Brother’ might be looking over your 
shoulder.  For example, in February this year we got a letter from Head 
Office saying, “We can see that some of you haven’t started using the 
membership system.  Please start using it quickly and if not we may 
have to send a team in to support you.” 
 
 Looking at it from Central Office’s point of view, for the first time I 
think we actually had the opportunity to manage the party in the 
country to get real time information about what is actually going on, as 
opposed to what people say is going on.  I think this could be – this will 
be a marvellous management tool once Central Office begins to use it.  
I’m not yet convinced that Central Office has yet adopted the methods 
of modern management in driving their associations through the 
country. 
 
Anthony: In your report, you mention that branches will be able to access Merlin 
remotely.  How does the remote access work? 
 
Hugh: Well, Merlin has a client application but that will only work within a 
closed network, and it has no provision at the moment for branches to 
access the Merlin machine.  There is a different way of doing this, 
which is to multi-home the Merlin machine so that the Merlin machine 
not only sits on its private, highly secure network connected to Central 
Office, it also sits on the local sub-net of the association.  That then 
permits the branches to remote in to that local sub-net and then to get 
on to a machine that will access Merlin. 
 
Anthony: How does your association compare to that of other associations locally 
to you, and with a view to how that then relates to other associations 
nationally? 
 
Hugh: I wish I knew more about that and I think the sort of person you’d want 
to address that question to would be somebody like Nick Wood-Dow 
who’s been a past Chairman of the Surrey area.   
 
 Obviously we work very closely with Spelthorne, with whom we are 
grouped, and the points of likely similarity and difference are really 
quite marked.  Spelthorne seems to have a rather different 
demographic; I suspect that Runnymede and Weybridge will perhaps 
be closer to somewhere like Surrey Heath than they would to 
Spelthorne.  We have a different type of volunteer.  In some ways 
they’re stronger, they’ve got more volunteers, the volunteers are still 
running things like coffee mornings that haven’t taken place in 
81 
 
Runnymede for a long, long time.  Runnymede is more progressive, I 
would say, in terms of its management tools and its management skills.   
 
 Looking to the South, and without being specific, I think that both of 
the associations to the south are fairly conservative in terms of their 
understanding of how modern offices would work.  One association is 
very well-funded, which means that it still has an agent and two staff 
and operates a very high-class act from there, which we couldn’t hope 
to emulate because we don’t raise funds in the way that they do. 
 
 Another one of the neighbouring associations struggles significantly 
doesn’t have offices as good as ours, are weak on IT skills and frankly 
struggled in the 2010 election.  I think they hadn’t really had some 
bitterly contested elections for quite a long time. 
 
 The Surrey AGM which I referred to earlier pointed out that our 
membership per 10,000 Conservative voters is at the low end for 
Surrey, but that our membership is rising.  In fact, we were one of only 
two associations that I mentioned whose membership was rising, and 
we are one of only two associations in Surrey who are operating at a 
surplus.   
 
 So, confused answer; confused message. 
 
Anthony: How is the groupings of associations nationally, the National Group of 
Associations, managed by the central party? 
 
Hugh: I don’t know but at the Surrey AGM in November this was a topic that 
was vigorously discussed.  Everybody realised that the ways of 
working were going to have to change and that grouping, in some form 
or other, was inevitable.  What was puzzling was that that meeting took 
place in November and very little, in fact nothing, material has actually 
come out of that meeting.   
 
 I suspect what we may have is the sort of process that’s quite common 
in voluntary organisations, that difficult decisions aren’t taken 
overnight.  They’re mulled about one year, they’re talked about another 
year and finally solutions begin to emerge, but quite a lengthy process.  
This is partly being driven by Julian Walden, the Surrey Area Director.  
I keep in regular contact with him.  I keep emphasising the fact that we 
need to move forward ourselves, and he is supportive of the idea and 
recognises that this probably is going to be a very general trend, but it 
isn’t actually happening as we speak. 
 
Anthony: Has the internet played any role in facilitating a closer relationship 
between your association and other associations further afield? 
 
Hugh: I don’t think it has, I really don’t think it has, and were this to take 
place it would take place either through the Surrey Area Chairman or 
through the Surrey Area Director.  The form in which I would expect 
that process to begin would be through the request for regular 
information, if this doesn’t already emerge through Merlin, or, if it does 
emerge through Merlin, regular meetings or regular contact saying, 
“We looked at the statistics for the first quarter of the year and you’re 
doing well, or you’re not doing well, please tell us about this.”  We’re 
not seeing this type of management approach yet. 
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Anthony: That’s fantastic.  Thank you very much for your contribution. 
 
 
END AUDIO 
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4. Iain Dale 
 
Role in 2010:   Author of and commentator on the Iain Dale’s Diary blog 
Other Roles:   LBC Radio Presenter, former Conservative candidate 
 
Interview Date:  3 May 2011 
Duration:   00:38:03 
 
START 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How did the “Iain Dale’s Diary” blog come about? 
 
Iain Dale:  I began blogging when I was a 2005 Conservative 
parliamentary candidate for Norfolk North.  There was no 
agenda with my blog.  I am not very technical and found other 
types of websites complex.  A friend in the US set up a blog for 
me and I liked it because it was simple to use – it was 
something you could just do. 
 
As a candidate, my blog developed quite a following.  I was 
getting over 800 hits per day, which seems like nothing now – 
but was a lot back then. 
 
I had worked on David Davis’s leadership campaign and when 
that didn’t turn out as we had hoped, I thought I’d use the blog 
to give the world my views.  Due to my contacts inside 
Westminster, I was able to break stories and build an audience. 
 
It also got me back on the media circuit, after a lull after having 
been a candidate.  The blog gave me profile – it was my USP. 
 
However, since 2010, I realised that I couldn’t do it properly.  I 
couldn’t give it the time that my audience were expecting – 
which was in excess of three to four posts per day.  I couldn’t 
do it with two full time jobs – it was just too much. 
 
So, although I made some money at it through advertising - 
which wasn’t very much – I decided to have a four month 
break. 
 
I am about to start a new political website and blog that will 
involve contributions from my friends, I have had about 80 
people come forward and offer to write for it.  I will write one a 
week. 
 
I have to say that if it hadn’t been for my blog, I wouldn’t have 
got my Telegraph column and after that my LBC show came. 
 
I didn’t set out with an agenda, the blog just evolved. 
 
Anthony Ridge: Newman: What is your account of the role of blogging in the run-up to 
the 2010 General Election? 
 
Iain Dale: I find that party conferences and elections are the worst times 
for blogging.  There is so much going on. I didn’t have much 
time to blog.  I went to two of the TV debates and reported on 
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those - but after the debates, no blogs had any real effect in the 
election.  No one broke any effective stories in the mainstream 
media.  I really don’t think blogging had much impact on the 
campaign.  
 
The TV debates dominated the campaign and squeezed out any 
other medium. 
 
I’m not in favour of the way the three debates were spaced out 
evenly in the three weeks before the campaign.  It would be 
better to have two debates at the beginning of the campaign – it 
would then give the election some time to breath. 
 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: What is your assessment of the Conservative Party’s 
relationship with internet technologies? 
 
Iain Dale: The Conservative Party seemed to understand the power of 
email in the lead up to the 2010 election and before that.  I 
remember as far back as 2001, when email was being used 
quite extensively.  The party had been thinking along these 
lines for a while, for example in the 1980s they brought in Sir 
Christopher Lawson, who was the head of marketing for Mars. 
 
Conservatives seemed to be well ahead in embracing 
technological innovation in 2010, but, of course, they had the 
money for it. 
 
It was only after the 2005 general election that the party looked 
at using the internet from a campaigning point of view.  Before 
that, and to a large extent after 2005, the party was in fear of 
the internet and its applications. 
 
Francis Maude was the one in the party who broke away from 
the idea that the internet is something that should be avoided in 
campaigns.  He argued that the party should attempt to master 
it. 
 
However, CCHQ didn’t really do much to beef-up its internet 
operations.  There was every opportunity to contact the many 
Conservative bloggers – they could have used us to beef-up the 
campaign and develop a greater influence. 
 
The party certainly didn’t ask me.  They did a bit with Tim 
Montgomerie on ConHome, but it was not that successful. 
 
Things got better with Andy Coulson, but I was one of the 
Country’s leading Conservative bloggers and he didn’t speak to 
me more than about five times during the run-up to the 
election. 
 
Conversely, Labour did try to manage their blogging 
community – but, as you would expect, they did it with the 
typical top down approach. 
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There was the perception from others that I was given my daily 
marching orders by the party, and off I would go to put them 
into action on my blog.  It was nothing of the sort – in fact, 
quite the contrary. 
 
At the time, I was championing the methods used by the 
Obama presidential campaign.  But the Conservative Party 
were very slow in learning from this example.   
 
My impression is that the internet didn’t play much of a role in 
the last campaign in terms of reaching voters. 
 
In line with Obama’s campaign, the Conservatives did 
eventually develop “myconsevatives.com” – but it was far too 
late in the day.  Sam Coates played a role in progressing it 
forward – but he was also brought in later in the lead up to the 
campaign. 
 
The actual functionality of “MyConservatives” did work. But it 
was unsuccessful as a campaigning tool because it didn’t have 
enough time to mature.  Candidates should have had access to 
it as soon as they were selected, so they could have started 
raising money from the outset.  Most had it less than six 
months before the election. 
 
As far as blogging is concerned, candidates seemed too 
afraid to actively use blogs and Twitter.  They were often 
worried they would say something wrong and there would 
be consequences if they deviated from the party line. 
 
I offered to write a candidates guide on the best practices 
for the use of blogs and Twitter.  The party initially 
thought it was a good idea, but nothing happened. 
 
Any candidate with a massive email database did really well.  
Some thought that if they had 500 email addresses for 
constituents they’d done a good job.  Some candidates had 
collected thousands. To be effective, these types of initiatives 
need to be led from the centre, but they were not. 
 
Resourcing was the reason this was not the case.  Although the 
party brought in a couple of people on the internet side, it was 
to give the appearance that they were doing something – when 
actually they were brought on too late to do anything 
significant in terms of campaigning with the internet. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Who were the main figures in the Conservative Party working 
in internet matters? 
 
Iain Dale:  Sam Coates was one of the driving forces behind the party’s 
use of the internet. 
 
Rishi Saha, who was previously head of social action, was 
moved to lead the online operations.  However, he didn’t have 
the depth of understanding in terms of internet campaigning. 
 
86 
 
Rishi saw the party website as more of a PR opportunity rather 
than a tool for raising campaign funds and reaching voters. 
 
The Conservative Party have always operated by putting people 
into the wrong jobs and not making the best use of what is 
available to them.  This is because CCHQ is governed by a 
culture of small-p politics. 
 
In 2006, Francis Maude sent Tim Montgomerie to the 
Republican Party to write a paper on how they were using the 
internet.  He wrote a good paper, but it was put on a shelf and 
not used. 
 
CCHQ becomes the preserve of the party leader – well, for 
example, David Cameron made his best friend Chief Executive. 
 
Before the general election, Cameron engendered good 
relations with the CCHQ workers who were brought in.  Many 
of whom were young twentysomethings in slick suits with 
something to prove.  Interestingly, Cameron hasn’t been seen 
much in Central Office since. 
 
 
END 
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5. Jonathan Isaby 
 
Role in 2010:   Co-Editor of the ConservativeHome blog 
Other Roles:   Former Telegraph journalist 
 
Interview Date:  31 March 2011 
Duration:   1:00:43 
 
START AUDIO 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Anthony Ridge-Newman interviewing Jonathan Isaby of 
ConservativeHome. Well thank you Jonathan for agreeing to be 
interviewed and I’d just like to start by asking you how you got 
involved with ConservativeHome. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well the site was obviously founded back in 2005 by Tim 
Montgomerie when I was still working at the Telegraph. And 
over that following three year period I came to hugely respect 
the site, and Tim, and the work that it did in terms of reporting 
what was going on in Conservative politics and basically 
providing a service that was nowhere else provided.  
 
And then in 2008 Tim’s deputy, Sam Coates, was moving on 
and he needed a new person to come onboard for the site. And I 
think I and 164 other people applied for the job and I got it. 
And I’ve been there – well I got the job in the summer of ’08 
but didn’t actually start until I’d left the Telegraph finally at the 
end of October, beginning of November 2008, but have been 
there ever since.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How is the blog actually organised in terms of staff and 
process? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well when I joined there was Tim and myself with Harry 
Phibbs as local government editor on a part-time basis. Now, 
since the general election, we've had a third full-time member 
of staff come onboard in the form of Paul Goodman, former 
Member of Parliament. And we are currently in the process of 
recruiting an assistant to the editors, another person who would 
be able to kind of help with putting the news links together and 
research and comment moderation and so on.  
 
And so between the three full-time staff at the moment we 
divide – each of us is on duty two or three days a week duty 
editing the site. So putting together the front page of a morning, 
which involves getting up at half five or so, reading all the 
papers online, summarising the main stories by nine o’clock, as 
well as putting up our own unique content onto the site at that 
time.  
 
And then during the course of the day reporting things as they 
happen, posting opinion pieces if there’s a particular timely 
thing that is submitted that needs to go up, finding video 
content from YouTube and Sky and the BBC and ITN and 
other sources to share with our readers. And indeed yes, kind of 
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following the comments that are being made and moderating 
those when necessary. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How does the organisation of the ConservativeHome blog 
compare to working in more traditional media, for instance the 
Telegraph? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean the blog I suppose is extremely liberating in that 
you don’t have that massive food chain of editors and news 
editors and lawyers and all kinds of people making various 
demands of you. Or indeed instructing you what to write or 
how to write it. The nature of the blog is very much that you 
publish what you want when you want and how you want.  
 
I mean that’s not to say that we don’t adhere to the libel laws of 
the land as one had to when one was working at the Telegraph. 
And indeed there is a sense of structure to what we do in that a 
newspaper has a news section, an editorial section, a politics 
section, an international section.  
 
We have got our own sections in terms of categories of post, 
whether it be the Tory diaries, the parliament coverage, the 
local government coverage, the op-ed stuff, our comment 
section. And indeed some of that is obviously just reporting 
what happens on a day by day or hour by hour basis if 
necessary whereas there’s also other stuff which is kind of 
scheduled in advance.  
 
And we’ll commission opinion pieces from people. And those 
– we generally have a grid in advance, at least a week in 
advance, of what is likely coming up opinion wise and we – 
rather like a newspaper you’d shift around who gets what slot 
depending on what’s going on.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Is there something about the nature of the internet and 
subsequently blogging that is attractive to journalists and 
people with an interest in Conservative politics? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean it’s interesting that there are increasing numbers of 
so-called mainstream media, journalists, who are now 
blogging. And I think a lot of them rather like the freedom that 
it gives them; that you're not writing to a specific word length 
to fit in a certain bit of the paper. You literally write as you 
wish.  
 
And if it’s a very short little nugget you want to share with the 
world you just write it up short. Or you can kind of write a far 
longer analysis piece if you want.  
 
And I suppose yes you can also I suppose be a bit more 
informal if you wish through the medium of blogging.  
 
You could also obviously put video content in there and link to 
what other people are saying in a way that you can’t in a 
traditional paper.  
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So it’s a lot more interactive and in that sense it does encourage 
interaction between the reader and the author in a way that you 
wouldn’t in a traditional newspaper which is kind of a one-way 
communication means. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How would you describe your political affiliation? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I – is that me personally or the site? 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Both you and the site. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean the site represents a broad church of Tory opinion. And 
certainly between the three of us on the editorial team we are 
by no means carbon copies of each other. There are some 
things that we agree on and there are other issues where we 
diverge and sometimes indeed take opposing views.  
 
I mean my own personal politics, I got fascinated by politics 
when they started televising the House of Commons in 1989 
when I was in short trousers and I suppose throughout my 
teenage years. I mean I joined the party in my own right in 
1993 I suppose during my teenage years so I was a bit of a kind 
of Daily Mail Tory if you like.  
 
And then at university – I went to university in York, got 
heavily involved in the Conservatives there and was vice 
chairman and chairman of the university Conservatives. And 
that kind of opened my eyes up to a more libertarian 
conservatism if you like and I suppose that’s the strand of 
conservatism that I would probably identify with now in the 
main, personally. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You've mentioned in previous responses the word freedom a 
number of times in terms of use of the internet and blogging. 
And you’ve just described yourself as a libertarian blogger. 
Would you say those two things go hand in hand in terms of 
the work that you do for ConservativeHome and your role in 
the Conservative Party? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I guess that is a kind of – freedom is a defining feature of my 
outlook I suppose, whether it be the freedom to not have to pay 
as much tax to government, the freedom to not be beholden to 
Brussels in everything we do, or indeed freedom in a more civil 
liberties sense; all those things.  
 
I think the internet has – in terms of the blogosphere there is 
more of a kind of libertarian tinge to blogging and the kind of 
outlook of bloggers than there would be probably in the 
country at large. And I think the medium does – is well suited 
to that.  
 
And it’s arguably – you could argue it’s one of the reasons that 
perhaps the Labour blogosphere hasn’t been as successful thus 
far, because a Labour, left-wing mentality is instinctively more 
statist, more top down rather than bottom up.  
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Anthony Ridge-Newman: Certainly in terms of the Total Politics site, which lists many of 
the political blogs in the blogosphere at the time of the general 
election and since, there appeared to be far more Conservative 
blogs. Would that be in line with the type of libertarian 
ideology that we've just talked about? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I think that comes into it. And certainly I mean the initial 
setting up of LabourList, when Derek Draper was involved 
with it, was the textbook example of how not to do the 
blogosphere.  
 
It was the Labour Party attempting to instil this particular 
viewpoint on everyone from above whereas the best blogs are 
the individual ones who do their own thing and engage with 
each other and let ideas flourish and argue causes rather than 
say the more kind of statist mentality.  
 
Sorry, what was the rest of the question? 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: It’s okay. I’ll move on. I think you answered it. In terms of the 
success of the ConservativeHome blog, how would you 
compare that to the other leading blogs of the other main 
political parties? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean ConservativeHome is unique in that I believe it is a one-
stop shop for – I mean one thing that we do that none of the 
other blogs for instance – I mean Lib Dem Voice is probably 
the most well known Lib Dem blog, on the Labour side you’ve 
got LabourList, Left Food Forward; all of which do a lot of 
comment, a lot of opinion related posts, people just putting 
their views out about things.  
 
And Lib Dem Voice, and I suppose the Labour sites too, are 
relatively good at kind of internal party news. But what 
ConservativeHome does that none of the others do is that 
fantastic service at nine in the morning of summarising the 
day’s news, for but specifically aimed at an audience of 
Conservatives.  
 
We specifically go through all the papers to seek out the Tory 
stories and the Tory slant on the big stories of the day which 
no-one else does.  
 
And we also, in terms of our coverage of parliament and local 
government, are writing about things which just isn’t done 
elsewhere. You get – obviously individual bloggers will cover 
those things but so putting everything together into that one 
package, it is pretty unique I think. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In your opinion, what is it about the way you address the Tory 
stories that come in the press and report on some of the issues 
within the Conservative Party that makes the blog so 
successful? 
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Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean I think between the three of us who run the site we 
are all I think pretty well connected within the party; which is 
essential in order to be able to write in an informed fashion.  
But also I suppose another aspect is that we do our regular 
grass roots surveys. Every month we do a survey of 
Conservative members and extrapolate statistics about all kinds 
of things.  
 
We do a regular – obviously a regular rating of the cabinet; so 
kind of who’s up, who’s down.  
 
But also ask questions about policy and the direction of the 
party and all those kinds of things; which I think is also quite 
important in terms of giving ordinary party members a voice in 
a party which is far from democratic and doesn’t have many 
opportunities for that. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You've mentioned that the party is far from democratic. Do you 
see the role of the blog central in changing that perhaps? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean the internet is a democratising force in that anyone can 
set up their own blog and have their voice heard; the barriers to 
entry are minimal; whereas you couldn’t just go and set up a 
newspaper off the cuff. So in that sense the internet definitely 
has been a democratising force.  
 
Whether you can necessarily argue that it kind of will 
encourage more democratisation of the party, specifically of 
the party, I'm not sure. But suffice to say I think certainly 
through the surveys we do members are able to get messages 
across in a way that there really isn’t any other way to do. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How does the blog generate revenue? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well the major proprietor, major shareholder of 
ConservativeHome, is Lord Ashcroft. Also involved – and the 
original financer of the site, who is still involved to a degree, is 
Stephan Shakespeare. And obviously with that ownership we 
have a kind of financial cushion there.  
 
At the same time, the site takes some advertising which brings 
money in.  
 
There is also a sister organisation called 
conservativeintelligence.com which hosts conferences which 
obviously people pay to attend and that brings revenue in.  
There is also an off-the-shelf subscription briefing service that 
we run that every week those who have subscribed to said list 
get a weekly email digest of our insight into Tory politics for 
the week. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of what the blog covers, it tends to be fairly free and 
frank, especially about matters concerning Conservative Party 
organisation.  
 
92 
 
In terms of the way the blog is funded, are there any issues of 
independence and freedom in terms of the major stakeholders 
having a say in what gets reported and what doesn’t? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Not at all. I mean complete editorial independence. Never have 
the proprietors in any way, shape or form tried to influence 
what we write or how we write it or what we cover. I mean it’s 
simply not an issue. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And could you give some background to how the relationship 
between the blog and the Conservative Party has developed 
over time? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean a lot of it I suppose depends on personalities. And 
I mean the site – the genesis of the site when Tim set it up was 
massively pushing against the plan to take away the right of 
party members to choose the party leader in 2005; which the 
campaign being waged by Tim at the time won. And so in that 
sense that was a move against the party.  
 
And I suppose the next big thing that the party – where there 
was not necessarily conflict but where the site challenged the 
party was over the A list when the site back in ’06 was very 
sceptical about the A list. And when the A list was decided on, 
the site sought to establish who was on it and did so within 
24/48 hours; much to the annoyance of the party.  
 
But again that’s a factor of the way that the internet works and 
the speed at which messages can get across and that 
information flows. And again, people saw ConservativeHome 
as a kind of democratising force in that sense I suppose.  
 
But no, we have very good relations with all kinds of people up 
and down the party. We’re talking to cabinet ministers, special 
advisors, press officers, you name it; kind of people on a daily 
basis.  
 
And I think – yes I mean David Cameron I think has said this 
himself in the past. There are times when he and others will be 
frustrated at ConservativeHome. But I think they all respect it. 
And certainly they know it is very widely read within 
Conservative circles, and wider than that, and therefore it’s 
important that they engage with us; which they do. That was 
when David Cameron had Tim and I up into his hotel room at a 
conference last year.  
 
Yes, so they engage with us and obviously seek to persuade us 
when they think that we have – we’re on the wrong track. But 
obviously we’re trying to put messages out to them too.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: When the blog first came about was there any input from the 
central party machine on the aims and objectives of the actual 
site itself? 
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Jonathan Isaby: No. I mean there just never has been. I mean the whole point 
about ConservativeHome is that it is completely independent of 
the centre.   
 
And I mean obviously I only joined in 2008 but it was set up in 
’05. But as I say, in ’05 there was that considerable element of 
the site campaigning against the effort by Michael Howard, 
who was then leader, to take away the right of party members 
to have a vote in leadership elections. So in that sense there’s 
never been any suggestion that the centre was trying to dictate 
an agenda. I mean far from it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And is there any dialogue on a day to day basis from the central 
party machine? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Oh I mean there’s dialogue, absolutely. I mean like any 
journalist I get press releases from the party. And similarly I 
will phone up press officers, phone up ministers directly if 
necessary, whoever, if there are questions I want to ask that are 
going to inform the way I write; of course. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How does ConservativeHome go about getting its information? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean very much like any journalist would do. You’re 
obviously scouring other sources: other blogs and the 
newspapers and so on. But at the same time I am accredited as 
a lobby journalist at the House of Commons. I spend time 
talking to MPs and others around the Commons and putting 
together what people have told me and formulating it into 
journalism.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Is there any stage in your daily cycle that you feel that your 
judgment may come in conflict with your connections to the 
party? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: In what sense? 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of an editorial sense. In terms of what information you 
hold and what information you post on the site. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I think any journalist in any situation is always going to have to 
make those kinds of judgments. Yes, I mean clearly 
ConservativeHome is not trying to be a straight down the line, 
completely neutral, unbiased source of information. We clearly 
– I mean I – some of what we do is utterly straight news 
reporting of so-and-so said this, there you are. But obviously 
there is editorialising as well. And people know that’s what 
they're going to get. So I don’t think we’re selling anyone short 
or misleading anyone in that sense. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Does the party, to your knowledge, ever take any steps in order 
to prevent any information getting into the hands of 
ConservativeHome? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I don’t think they’ve ever acted in a way specifically to try and 
stop us getting information. I mean clearly there are times 
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when the party would want particular information in the hands 
of no journalists. I'm not aware of any attempts specifically to 
target us on anything like that.  
 
I mean say the A list situation back in ’06 was something 
where ConservativeHome took the lead in establishing who 
was on that list. And that was information which the party 
didn’t want published but the site did and they had to lump it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You've described the site and your role in the site a number of 
times as journalistic during this interview. And recently Harry 
Cole, a former Conservative blogger, was featured on a 
Channel 4 political programme, ‘10 O’clock Live’, and the 
strap-line described him as a journalist. Would you say there is 
a trend within the blogosphere of bloggers considering 
themselves as journalists? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean it’s not for me to say how other people should describe 
themselves. I am a journalist.  I worked for the BBC for four 
years.  I worked for the Daily Telegraph for five years.  I have 
worked for ConservativeHome for two and a half years.  As far 
as I am concerned, I am still pursuing a journalistic career by 
doing ConservativeHome.   I suppose a lot of bloggers would 
regard themselves as kind of individual citizen journalists.  If 
they want to call themselves that I don’t object to that. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Did you have a role in the 2010 general election? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well, in that obviously I was co-editor of ConservativeHome 
throughout it. I was writing about the election every day on the 
site. I also spent some time helping a few friends who were 
candidates in different constituencies along the way.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And from your perspective, what role did the internet, in terms 
of social media like Facebook and Twitter, blogs, email, play in 
the general elections process? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I think it’s had a role in just massively speeding up the news 
cycle. I mean it’s not really a cycle anymore because it’s just 
24/7 whereas kind of pre 24 hour cable television and so on, 
once ‘Newsnight’ had aired that was it until the ‘Today’ 
programme. And between the ‘Today’ programme and the 
‘One O’clock News’ you had a lull and all the rest of it; 
whereas it’s now just constant.  
 
And I suppose in terms of how the internet was able to cover 
what was going on. You had – it was just – for instance when 
the Gordon Brown incident in Rochdale happened it was just 
relentless. And the blogosphere just went absolutely nuts. And 
like with the rolling news channels it just became the only story 
in town. And I suppose in that sense it serves to potentially 
exaggerate the coverage of a particular incident because 
everyone’s talking about that one thing.  
 
And I suppose what else about the internet and the election? I 
suppose through kind of viral videos and blog posts and so on 
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one was able to do a lot of holding to account the other parties 
and quite a lot of attack dog stuff.  
 
And I suppose in a sense bloggers supportive of different 
parties were able to be more edgy in their campaigning and 
their criticism of other parties than the parties formally 
themselves. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of technology in general, how do you see that taking a 
role in Conservative Party organisation? And when I talk about 
technology I'm specifically talking about internetised 
technology: mobile phones, iPads and the applications that we 
see on the internet. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean I'm not hugely au fait with any particular plans the party 
might have or what the party might want to be doing. But 
suffice to say, all those devices have revolutionised the way 
that we live our lives and the way we communicate with each 
other and organise ourselves. And it is inevitable that those 
things will influence the way that politics is done in the same 
way that it influences any other aspect of people’s lives.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Is there anything specific about the nature of the political 
sphere – of which you are a part – that differs to that outside 
the sphere? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Oh, I don’t know. I'm not sure. I haven’t really thought about 
it. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: That’s fine. In terms of how people interact with the site, the 
ConservativeHome blog, do you consider that to have played 
any role in the cultural organisation of the Conservative Party? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: In terms of how people react to us? 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How people interact within the party on policy issues, on 
getting their information, communicating with one another. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean certainly I lose count of the number of people who 
will say that they rely on ConservativeHome as their primary 
source of information about the Conservative Party and indeed 
generally find it more reliable/quicker/more comprehensive 
then the official party website; which by its nature is very 
anodyne. And in that sense I think when Conservative MPs and 
others within the party have got an announcement they want to 
make or something that’s going on that they would regard us as 
a very important medium that they need to engage with.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: One of the specific features of the ConservativeHome blog, 
which isn’t seen on other party sites, is the page or the blog 
feed that gives information about candidates and seats. Has that 
played a role that has been different to the traditions of the 
past? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I suppose – I mean again that’s a section which is unique 
to the site and provides information that is not available in any 
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traditional newspaper but is a specialist – it’s a niche market. 
But it’s one that we've got a lot of people interested in. Sorry, 
I'm throwing my wedding ring around. (Laughter)  
 
Historically, I suppose sometimes the party would officially not 
want to have internal selection information out in the public 
domain. But I would say that the nature of the information filter 
is such that it gets to us anyway. So I think the party before the 
last election became resigned to the idea that, “Oh well, 
ConservativeHome will find out anyway – so we might as well 
just release it.” I suppose in that sense the medium of the 
internet has assisted with creating a bit more openness and 
transparency about how these things are done. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Through my work in observing the party and 
ConservativeHome simultaneously, in the run-up to the general 
election and after, I noticed a number of incidences when 
something would be released on ConservativeHome and 
shortly after the party would appear to react.  
 
One example was that a note was placed on ConservativeHome 
that candidates had not really been thanked for the work that 
they did in the party. And shortly after as a candidate I received 
an email from Baroness Warsi. Is that a coincidence or do you 
see that ConservativeHome had a specific role in that type of 
scenario? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I think on that one I think we – I mean I'm not sure because it 
was so quickly after I’d posted it that it actually – I think that 
email went out. So perhaps on that occasion it was just a 
coincidence. But I think that is an example of how we – 
ConservativeHome – can speak out on behalf of the grass roots 
or candidates or sections of the party and allow a voice to be 
heard at a high level which actually then can provoke a 
response.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Would you then consider that ConservativeHome and other 
blogs like it have some degree of power within the party? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I'm not sure. I think it’s probably more influence than power. I 
think there’s probably a subtle distinction between those two 
things. Yes, I mean certainly before I joined 
ConservativeHome I took the view that it was influential and I 
have certainly no reason to believe that it’s become less so 
since I have been working there. Indeed I would like to think 
that it has become more so. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: What is the relationship between ConservativeHome and other 
traditional media like broadcasters, radio, rolling news? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Oh, I mean it’s very strong. I mean Tim and myself – and Paul 
to a degree as well – are called upon by television and radio 
broadcasters as pundits, as commentators, as people whose 
voice they think is worth airing. And I mean likewise the 
newspapers. ConservativeHome is quoted regularly in the 
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newspapers and indeed we break stories which are then 
followed up in the traditional media as well, so... 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of opposition parties they often use comments and 
items featured on ConservativeHome as a tool to fight general 
elections. Do you have a perspective on that? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I don’t think opposition parties have used us very much in that 
way. I mean certainly you said comments, you mean by the 
kind of comments underneath the fold? 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Yes. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean I don’t think they have. And I think – I can’t think of 
any instance where that has happened. And if they tried to do 
that I think it would – I mean it would be ridiculous because 
everyone knows that anyone can comment on 
ConservativeHome in the way that anyone can comment on 
Left Foot Forward or Lib Dem Voice or whatever it might be 
and- 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Well I can give you an example because it happened during my 
campaign in Anglesey when the Plaid Cymru candidate put out 
a leaflet that criticised the fact that people had noted on 
ConservativeHome that I wasn’t Welsh enough to stand in 
Ynys Mon; among other things.  
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I wasn’t aware of that at the time. I mean I'm certainly 
aware that that’s widespread because I think if one party – but 
basically any party can play at that game and kind of I don’t 
think you can take the comments of readers on a website with 
the same reverence that you would the pieces by the authors or 
the commissioned op-ed writers whoever they might be.  
 
I mean clearly when people have – I know Tim was quoted I 
think by either Tony Blair or Gordon Brown in the House of 
Commons when he’d said something on the site which took a 
particular perspective which he was unhappy about. I can’t 
remember what it was.  
 
And I think the other day Andy Burnham quoted a Tory MP 
who’d written a piece on the site saying one thing. I mean 
that’s the nature of politics. I mean wherever people write or 
say things they potentially are going to get it quoted back at 
them. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: I noted at one point there was a change in ConservativeHome’s 
attitude to its comment moderation. At one time it would leave 
pretty much all the comments on there and that seemed to 
change. Was there a particular reason for that? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I mean it’s all about the thing that with freedom comes 
responsibility. And there have been occasions or certain 
individuals who have taken liberties in terms of the comment 
facility.  
 
98 
 
And we took the view a short while ago that for the time being 
we would moderate comments in order that anything that was 
particularly offensive or off topic or libellous wouldn’t even be 
able to get up there before we could remove it as it were.  
 
I mean it’s an ongoing discussion about whether that’s the best 
way to do it or not. It can be frustrating in that it can slow down 
the pace of a discussion that might be going on amongst 
commenters. But at the same time we clearly don’t want to get 
ourselves into a position where people take advantage of that 
facility to libel people or to be gratuitously offensive. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So would you then say that is your understanding of the nature 
of blogging and its role in the political sphere is changing and 
evolving, adapting over time? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Yes. I mean of course it is. And it’s like any medium, the way 
you do things is going to change and evolve over time 
depending on circumstances and what’s there. No, it’s 
definitely fluid. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: What are the central aims and objectives of 
ConservativeHome? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Oh, the aims and objectives are to inform our readers on a daily 
basis, an hourly basis and a minute by minute basis if necessary 
about the things that are going to be important to them, that 
they're going to care about.  
 
Yes, so our aim is to kind of inform our readers of what’s going 
on in Tory politics and the world at large from a Tory 
perspective on a daily basis. And to provide a platform for 
debate and discussion of policy areas and issues and so on that 
are obviously important to the Tory party. And indeed to 
provide an outlet for information that wouldn’t – that isn’t there 
in any of the established media.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You mentioned that ‘platform’ which is a heading on your site. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: We've actually changed it to ‘comment’ now but yes. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: ‘Comment’. And it’s certainly still used as a platform for 
individuals to have their say. And how is – how do you go 
about editing the content of that and how free are people to 
really say what they think? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Oh, I mean people do say what they think. There is a piece by 
Philip Davis, a Conservative MP, up this morning which is 
highly critical of the party. In fact let me find it.  
 
He’s basically taken exception to the tobacco display ban that 
Andrew Lansley is promoting and Philip Davis refers to him as 
a, quote: “So-called Conservative Secretary of State for 
Health”. This is quite robust.  
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But no, I mean in terms of the platform it is a platform there for 
the Conservative family to discuss issues and so there will be 
times when you get completely contradictory articles by 
different authors.  
 
The other day we had a piece, somebody saying, “I think the 
census is intrusive. I'm going to refuse to fill it in.” And 
somebody else saying, “Well no, don’t be silly. It’s very 
important and we should all be filling it in.” You do get a bit of 
reaction to each other’s pieces like that.  
 
But it is there so effectively for Conservative supporters, 
Conservative counsellors, Conservative MPs, Conservative 
members, candidates, MEPs, you name it, to have their say.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Why would a Conservative candidate or a Conservative MP be 
critical of the party and the leadership through the blog? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well if they think that the party is doing the wrong thing then 
they want to make the point and argue their case. And 
ConservativeHome is the ideal place to do that because they 
know it will get noticed and it will be seen and read. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Do you then think the blog is challenging party unity and party 
discipline that we would have seen traditionally? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: No, because – no, the discussions that we promote would go on 
but just in a more traditional format. And it would be rather 
slower paced.  
 
You’d have a – it would be through the pages of a monthly 
newsletter or something whereas the beauty of this is that you 
can post something and someone can respond within hours.  
 
And traditionally – newspaper traditional lobby journalism has 
always relied on free and frank discussion of political issues 
and personalities and so on. And it’s nonsense to suggest that in 
some way we’re creating divides that weren’t already there. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Presumably the nature of the internet being cheap, being easily 
accessible and the content being permanent unless removed, 
allows greater access and readership of the types of issues that 
might be posted on ‘comment’, or previously ‘platform’? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Yes. I guess so, yes. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So therefore is there something different about the new way of 
challenging the party to the more traditional ways? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I guess it’s certainly speedier and more instant. And you 
can reach a lot more people in a far shorter space of time.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of your readership do you have any idea of how many 
regular readers you have at the site? 
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Jonathan Isaby: Tim kind of looks after the numbers and all that kind of thing. I 
think we were saying kind of 40 or 50,000 a day but if you 
want a specific answer then email him and ask him. I mean I 
don’t – I can’t give an authoritative answer on that. And as you 
know there are all kinds of different ways of measuring 
readership on these things. So it depends how you measure it as 
much as anything else but... 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Is the readership something that’s particularly important to you 
as editors of the site? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean obviously like any media outlet the more people 
who read us or look at us the better, obviously. Though I 
suppose it is particularly satisfying that we know that we are 
reaching the highest echelons of government on a daily basis.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Do you take steps to push up the readership of the site? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I suppose it’s not like a traditional – I suppose it’s not like 
a newspaper in that a newspaper might take out adverts on the 
Tube or something to try and promote itself.  
 
I mean one of the things that you can do on the internet that 
you can’t do with traditional media is the kind of cross-
fertilisation of kind of interacting with other publications, with 
other bloggers, with other journalists, through Twitter and 
elsewhere.  
 
So one can mention – you link to each other’s posts and 
effectively drive traffic to each other through that means which 
is one way that you get people coming to you and hopefully 
staying with you. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: How important is the role of social media in terms of 
ConservativeHome? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I mean we have – in terms of our Twitter feed now every 
single post that goes up on the site is tweeted. And obviously 
you then – hopefully our followers will sometimes be re-
tweeting that as a means of driving traffic to the site.  
 
And the three of us on the editorial team all individually tweet 
as well. And we've also – we've got a separate Twitter account 
called ‘Must Be Read’, which is on the front page of the site as 
well as on Twitter, which is us linking to other people’s articles 
or blogs which we think are worth reading; which again is 
obviously helping to inform our readers but hopefully also 
creating goodwill with those authors who might reciprocate. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: You've mentioned Twitter. Does Facebook play any role in the 
life of the site? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: We haven’t done so much on Facebook. I mean there is – there 
was a Facebook group for ConservativeHome readers and 
occasionally we message the however many thousand people 
that are members of that with information about what’s going 
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on or things they might want to read and so on.  But we haven’t 
done a huge amount. Although the one thing I did do on 
Facebook in 2009 was my Save General Election Night 
Campaign which was based through Facebook and... 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: So would you say it’s fair to say that Twitter, for use in terms 
of ConservativeHome, is used for driving traffic to the site and 
Facebook would be used on the odd occasion when you might 
want to organise an event for instance? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Yes; or to inform readers about our monthly survey or 
whatever. But yes, we haven’t done as much on Facebook. I 
mean perhaps we should have done but there’s only so much 
one can do I suppose.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: In terms of the party and your affiliation in a more general 
sense, what would you say being an editor of 
ConservativeHome has brought to that relationship? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Give me an example of what kind of thing you mean. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Have you – I have to be very careful not to lead you in your 
answers so that’s why I'm very careful about how I ask the 
questions. Have you developed closer links with the party since 
you’ve been an editor of ConservativeHome and has that been 
a benefit for your role in the party? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I've been in and around the Conservative Party for nearly two 
decades in one way shape or form. And one of the reasons that 
I was hired in ’08 was because I had good contacts within the 
party and therefore was well connected. And obviously since 
joining ConservativeHome those have been reinforced. 
Obviously I've got to know some people that I didn’t know 
before.  
 
But I suppose I am in a position where I – uniquely in 
Westminster – in that I am known and do know basically every 
single Conservative MP. Because obviously when – before 
they were elected – and obviously half the current House of 
Commons Parliamentary Party are the 2010 intake. And 
obviously before the 2010 election I was interacting quite a bit 
with candidates.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Do candidates feel it within their interest to have a good 
relationship with you and others at ConservativeHome? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Absolutely, yes.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: And is there something interesting to you about how that has 
changed in the sense that that may be different to traditional 
media? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well it’s different to the traditional media in that we offer them 
an avenue for publicity and an opportunity for a platform which 
the traditional media simply wouldn’t have afforded them. I 
mean I suppose – I mean back in the ‘90s some of those big 
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selections in very safe seats you might get a couple of lines in 
the Daily Telegraph. But even – I mean the Telegraph now 
wouldn’t kind of care about candidate selections really. So we 
are a kind of unique market for that kind of information. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Is there a type of candidate that is more inclined to want to 
have a presence through ConservativeHome? For instance – 
dividing it into three categories – so, seat candidates and MPs; 
target seat candidates and MPs; and non-target seat candidates 
and MPs? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I'm not sure one could draw lines like that. I mean if you look 
at the kind of people that write on – who write regularly for us 
there’s a genuine complete mixture of – I'm just trying to think 
of examples off the top of my head really but Mark Field has a 
very safe seat in Westminster and writes for us regularly.  
 
Charlie Elphicke fought marginal Dover and won it and still 
writes for us regularly as an MP with a marginal seat.  
 
But then equally there are other people who – I can’t off the top 
of my head think of someone but there have been candidates 
who fought difficult seats who write for us too and... 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: I suppose what I'm getting at – and there’s no right or wrong 
answer – I'm just interested if you have noticed any tendencies 
or trends in those types of three categories that are coming 
forward? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I can’t say I have really, no  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: Okay, that’s fine. We’re coming to the end now. I just have a 
couple of last questions for you. Many academics consider 
David Cameron as having led the way in terms of the use of the 
internet as a new political communication when he launched 
WebCameron. He then went on to say, “Too many tweets make 
a twat.” Do you feel there are any conflicts in those two ideas? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Well I think his latter comment was rather light-hearted. I mean 
I think the slightly serious point about the Twitter comment I 
suppose is that it is a medium where you can say something on 
the spur of the moment, press a button, and then perhaps 
afterwards think, “Was that the sensible thing to say?” Because 
we all know what you say on the internet is there forever and 
can’t be taken back.  
 
But I think you’ve got to be mature and grown-up about these 
things and also accept that what is there is there and that to not 
engage with the internet and social media and all the rest of it 
would be to say, “Oh well, we’re not going to engage with 
television. We’ll just engage with the print media.” I mean you 
can’t afford to do that.  
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: If hypothetically the internet vanished out of existence and was 
unable to be used during the 2010 general election campaign, 
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in your opinion would it have made any impact on the nature of 
the party and the result? 
 
Jonathan Isaby: I don’t know.  I mean it’s such a hypothetical question. I don’t 
know whether it necessarily would have changed the result but 
it certainly would have changed the way that the campaign 
unfolded and the story was told. 
 
Anthony Ridge-Newman: That’s excellent. Thank you very much. 
 
Jonathan Isaby: Alright.  
 
END AUDIO 
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6. Oliver Cooper 
 
Role in 2010:   Key London Conservative Future activist 
 
Interview Date: 31 March 2011 
Duration:  1:02:36 
 
START AUDIO 
 
Anthony: Anthony Ridge-Newman interviewing Oliver Cooper.  Thank you, 
Ollie, for agreeing to do the interview.  Could you just start by telling 
me how you got involved with the Conservative Party? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I got involved – I joined the Conservative Party on the day of my 18th 
birthday.  It started off as a reaction to my parents, who are from the far 
Left, and I gradually realised that being a Conservative and being a 
classic liberal was really for me, and they forbade me from involving 
myself in campaigns, but I joined up and I campaigned in the 2005 
election off the back of that. 
 
Anthony: And what was your role in the 2010 General Election? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I campaigned very heavily in my local area.  I would have wanted to 
campaign further afield in other areas, but we had a three-way marginal 
in Hampstead & Kilburn, and our local candidate was probably the best 
candidate I’ve ever met and, as a result, I couldn’t see anywhere else to 
campaign except the local areas, so I campaigned day, and literally, 
night to make sure he was elected.  Sadly, he fell 42 votes short. 
 
Anthony: And, did you have any campaigning experience before the 2010 
General Election? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I had, I had a more formalised role in the 2008 and 2009 elections in 
London.  The Mayoral Election, the Boris Johnson one in 2008, I was 
involved very heavily with Conservative Future in both campaigning 
myself and in organising it, and in the 2009 European Election, I was 
still involved with Conservative Future, and I campaigned very heavily 
in, obviously, trying to get out the vote in the core Conservative areas. 
 
Anthony: Were there any differences between the way you campaigned in the 
Boris campaign to how you campaigned in the 2010 General Election? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Very much so.  I mean, the Boris campaign and, for that matter, also 
the 2009 European Elections, it was a matter of getting out the vote 
because, of course, it’s an election across the entire area.  So getting 
people to realise and getting people to organise an election on a 
national – on a regional basis, on a London-wide basis, as opposed to a 
constituency basis, was hugely important.  I think that was the major 
difference between them, and that’s always going to remain so long as 
we have that distinction. 
 
Anthony: Why did you join the Conservative Party and get involved in 
campaigns? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I’m very opinionated and I’m very driven by a sense of injustice in the 
world and so, as a result, I was driven to politics, and the Conservative 
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Party is the natural driver of change in the direction that I want to see in 
greater freedom in our society.  Why I was involved in the campaigns?  
Again, it’s a sense that, if you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of 
the problem.  And, as a result, this is why I’m very heavily driven to 
campaign wherever and whenever I can, most week nights in election 
time, every weekend, even outside of election I have to campaign, 
because I reckon if I don’t, I feel pretty bad about not having been part 
of that solution. 
 
Anthony: How would you define your political allegiance?   
 
Oliver Cooper: I’m a Conservative.  I was – I was not born a Conservative, I was born 
to two members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, but I 
certainly will die a Conservative.  But, within that, obviously the 
Conservative Party’s a very broad coalition.   
 
My position is, some people would say, on the right of the party, I 
prefer saying a classical liberal line, I’m very comfortable with the 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats, I think they bring a lot to the 
table in terms of what we are as a party, and as a government, and I 
want to see, as I said, the government being in the direction towards 
freedom, and I do see candidates that want to move it towards freedom 
faster, or more assuredly, as better candidates than the ones that don’t. 
 
Anthony: What does classical liberalism mean to you? 
 
Oliver Cooper: It simply means that the government respects that it has to live within 
boundaries, and those boundaries aren’t relative, they’re not set by 
public opinion, they’re boundaries that are set by both principles – 
constitutional principles as well as a philosophical basis of their 
government.  As a result, if a government says, “We want the classical 
liberals, we believe in freedom as our guiding philosophy,” they’re not 
going to announce policy simply to win a couple of points in the 
opinion polls and they’re going to be more consistent in that matter.   
 
I think the Conservative Party is fundamentally a classical liberal party, 
certainly after Thatcher it’s been a classical liberal government.  The 
problem is, of course, the way they govern is like every party, on a 
press release, sort of, basis.  And, as long as you live by press cycle, 
you can’t necessarily say that any party, or any government, has a 
guiding philosophy. 
 
Anthony: You said that during the 2010 General Election you were a member of 
a campaign team for your candidate in Kilburn.  What role did you 
have on that campaign team? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I didn’t have a formalised role, our campaign wasn’t hugely interested 
in giving out titles and so on, but I was certainly the most active activist 
in our ward.  It’s a very safe Conservative ward, in which I live, and 
I’m now a chairman of a very safe Conservative ward next door and, of 
course, as a result, it’s a matter of trying to drive those people to get 
out.  And, I suppose, I was probably the leader in that particular ward, 
in trying to get out the vote, although I’m not – there wasn’t 
particularly a title that went with that position. 
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Anthony: When I talk about the run up to the 2010 General Election, I’m talking 
about the beginning of the previous parliament, really, and that was 
about a five-year period.  Over that time, in terms of your campaigning 
with the Boris campaign, the 2009 European Elections and, closer to 
the actual date of the actual 2010 General Election, what would you 
describe as your typical campaigning practices? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well, it would differ across all of those.  As I said, geographically, we 
concentrated our effort in very different places, depending on in which 
election we are fighting at that time and, as a result, we had to use 
different strategies.  If you have to, as Conservative Future, focus your 
attention – instead of focusing your attention in Westminster and 
Kensington & Chelsea trying to drive out the true blue voters in the 
Mayoral or the European Elections, you actually have to focus on the 
seats that aren’t true blue.  Then it means you do use your 
organisational strengths in different ways, and you maybe play on 
different organisational strengths. 
 
Anthony: What are those organisational strengths and weaknesses? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well, the advantage for young people is that, obviously, one, we have a 
social network that is based on age rather than location and, as a result, 
we feel fewer inhibitions about going across geographic boundaries and 
campaigning in areas where we’re needed most.  Whereas most 
activists would campaign in their back yard, year in, year out, maybe 
decade in, decade out, even if that campaign is either a lost cause or an 
easy victory.  Whereas, Conservative Future can be directed to places 
more easily, according to what the party needs, and also we’re better at 
using technology to achieve what the party needs as well. 
 
Anthony: In terms of practical mechanisms, how are those campaigns organised? 
 
Oliver Cooper: In terms of Conservative Future, the first thing you do is start on 
Facebook. You would say, “I want to have a campaign day”, because 
my agent in this constituency, or my chairman, or my candidate has 
said, “I want to have this many activists out.”  You would talk to them 
and either get money for refreshments or a lunch or so on.  We could 
then pledge that to our activists and put that on Facebook and you get 
more people turning up.  If you have done your job in getting money 
from the association for refreshments or lunch, then it is a much easier 
sell.   
 
Anthony: You as an activist, did you actually use Facebook in that way? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I organised council by-election campaigns in the local area, in 
Hampstead & Kilburn, leading up to 2008 and 2009, and we managed 
to get a lot of local campaigners from UCL, King’s College London, 
LSE and so on.  We did, explicitly, go out saying that we need to get 
young people involved, because, frankly, the old people are going to 
campaign in their backyard. The young people are the added bonus that 
are going to push you across the finishing line.  So, we did use 
Facebook very heavily.  I think I set up probably 10 campaign day 
events for every by-election going, and it is tried and tested - and it 
seemed to work. 
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Anthony: Can you talk me through, step by step, the process of using Facebook in 
order to achieve a campaign day? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Right.  Well, it, I mean, Facebook’s internal mechanism has changed 
slightly since then, but we still have a central hub of, obviously, a group 
or a page on Facebook that you would recruit, not just your friends in 
the local area to, but across London, as I said this large social network 
that organises based on age into it.  And, of course, they’re going to 
join this group, no matter whether they’re actually interested in the first 
place in campaigning in Westminster North or Hampstead & Kilburn or 
Hammersmith, they’re going to join it simply because other people are, 
and they might get something interesting out of it.   
 
And then, when you start organising campaign days and creating events 
on Facebook, people will start going in slightly larger and larger 
numbers, and the words Hampstead & Kilburn will stop looking like 
words on a page and start seeming like a real achievable victory and, 
again, a new social network, I guess, for them, in that area as well as in 
their age group. 
 
Anthony: Facebook is an internet application.  What does that have that 
traditional media don’t have, in order to facilitate this social network 
and this gathering and this organisation of campaigning? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well they have – certainly they have a captive audience, in a way that 
even television doesn’t, especially newspapers don’t, and we don’t 
have any other mechanism.  People log onto their Facebook every 
single day and, if you do pester them, then, in effect, they will cave in, 
which is why, if you do organise 10 campaign day events and only 10 
of your activists in your group of 300 friends on Facebook turn up, that 
is still 10 activists more than you would have otherwise – and 10 times 
your 10 campaign days is probably more activists than you will be able 
to put on the street than the association will itself. 
 
So, it’s having that captive audience and being able to effectively pester 
them and, maybe stepping on Facebook’s terminology, sort of, poke 
them a bit in trying to get them out and you should be very unreserved 
in, I suppose, harassing the people that you’re trying to get out and 
campaign for you. 
 
Anthony: You, as an activist, have been practicing this over the last five years, 
since Facebook came about.  Who taught you how to use Facebook for 
political issues in this way? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t think anyone taught me, per se. I joined Facebook in 2006, 
when I first went to university.  I had never heard of it before the day I 
signed up for it and there were very few people at university that were 
on it at that time.  One person that used it very effectively was the 
president of my conservative society at UCL - Richard Jackson.  He 
was very effective, and still is very effective in organising events and 
organising complete campaigns for CF and for otherwise on Facebook.  
He did not teach me - he did not sit me down and lecture me on exactly 
how to do it, but it is good best practice to copy, and it is pretty simple 
best practice to copy. 
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Anthony: Would you consider, if you hadn’t been taught to use Facebook, that 
the process of developing a Facebook group is something that evolved 
organically within Conservative Future? 
 
Oliver Cooper: To an extent, I mean, there is a great diversity of opinion about how 
you go about doing these things.  Within Facebook we have had groups 
and pages and then new groups have come along, and these different 
architectures are used by different people.  I guess there is a bit of an 
evolutionary aspect to it, in that the people that cannot use Facebook 
particularly well are kind of nudged aside by other people in the 
organisation in Conservative Future and told to follow the UCL 
Conservative Society group’s structure.  They get 400 people a year 
going to their event, so they obviously know what they’re doing.  And, 
I guess, best practice spreads that way.  Because there’s certainly no 
training days or courses that I’ve been to on how to use Facebook to get 
people to campaign. 
 
Anthony: You mentioned a lot about various different groups that you’ve been 
involved with, with Conservative Future, some of which are university-
based groups, which have a presence on Facebook.  Could you describe 
which groups you’ve had a relationship with through Facebook and 
how those groups interact? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Do you mean relationships solely through Facebook, or through…? 
 
Anthony: Both on and offline. 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well, there are some groups that I’ve encountered through Facebook 
that I’ve then had real world experiences with.  In fact, because I am a 
classical liberal, my beliefs aren’t generic Conservative Party beliefs.  
As a result of this, I have encountered a number of ideological groups, 
interest groups and so on, that I’ve encountered on Facebook, that have 
effectively been marketed almost virally when it says 23 of your friends 
are now fans of the, I don’t know what it would be, Free to Choose, or 
something else I would never have heard of before, or saying, you 
know, 17 of your friends are now attending The Next Generation at the 
Adam Smith Institute.  I would never have come across them in the first 
place.   
 
The Adam Smith Institute’s probably the better example.  And, as a 
result, if you know – if you do have a well-developed social network, in 
real life and on Facebook, these things almost suggest themselves in the 
way that Amazon would suggest new books to you, it’s almost saying, 
“You have 12 of your friends are going to this event, it’s probably 
something that you’d be interested in too.”  And so, it’s very easy to 
come across new groups if you are plugged into that, and so it’s a huge 
advantage to groups in that, sort of, part of the political spectrum and, 
you know, geographically within a certain area, to be able to rely on 
this snowball effect that Facebook allows you to achieve. 
 
Anthony: For a Conservative activist, is it better to be linked to, say, one specific 
Facebook group that services your local geographical area, or as many 
different Facebook groups as possible? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I would definitely say as many Facebook groups as possible.  I mean, 
Facebook, I think, has a limit of 300 groups you can join and unlimited 
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pages and I, for two years before they introduced pages, had joined 300 
groups, and had to weed out all the ones that were of sectional interest, 
that every other student would join, about hating 9.00am lectures and 
so on, and just dropped out of all of them and said, “I want to be a fan 
of Hammersmith Conservative Future and Cities of London & 
Westminster Conservative Future and so on,” because those groups 
actually benefited me.   
 
Those groups actually advertised events that I’ll be interested in, maybe 
not as regularly as I would organise them if I were in charge, but if you 
got 300 groups inviting you to every event that they’ve got going, then 
that’s the best way to keep plugged in.  It’s probably a better way than 
Conservative Future’s own website or any other medium.  It’s certainly 
the best way to keep track on lots of information at one time. 
 
Anthony: Again, is this something that happens by word of mouth, this idea of 
signing up to lots of groups, is it something that happens organically, or 
is it something that the Conservative Party teaches and actively 
encourages? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t know if the Conservative Party teaches and actively encourages 
it.  There are groups that organise explicitly social networking, 
campaigning days, or training days, Young Britons’ Foundation is one 
that comes, most obviously, to mind.  But, there’s no, I guess, formal 
training.   
 
But, if there is someone that, as I said, is annoying, that sets up a group 
and then invites all his or her 600 Conservatives Future friends, or 
Conservative friends to that group, most of them are going to say yes, 
even if they’re not those people that actively go out there and choose to 
sign up to groups, they’ll say yes.  And, once they’ve said yes, you can 
contact them as much as possible, without having to call them all up 
individually.  And, as a result, if you’re a campaigner, you can get 
people out, if you’re just that extra bit more assertive than you would 
be otherwise. 
 
Anthony: I’m trying to get to the bottom of what actually is pushing this trend, 
and one of the ideas that’s just sprung to mind, do you think that 
tribalism has played any role in people signing up to lots and lots of 
Facebook groups? 
 
Oliver Cooper: In terms of competition with other political parties’ organisations, do 
you mean? 
 
Anthony: Not necessarily in terms of competition, but in terms of, perhaps, 
identity and the sense of the need to wear the Conservative tree or motif 
or logo on one’s sleeve by joining as many Facebook groups. 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t think it’s that at all and, particularly in our age group, being 
Conservative is something to, kind of, keep under wraps, rather than 
wear on one’s sleeve.  I wish it weren’t the case, but it is, and so joining 
300 Facebook groups is maybe – of Conservative Future Facebook 
groups and being a fan of 500 Conservative Facebook pages is not 
going to send out a good signal, and so I don’t think it’s that at all.  
When it does come to inter-party competition on Facebook, I think the 
Conservative Party does a lot better at organising, particularly 
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Conservative Future, does a lot better at organising its people on 
Facebook than any of the other parties.   
 
And, I’ve seen a lot of friends in the Liberal Democrats and Labour and 
UKIP try to organise on Facebook and get much worse reception.  So, 
obviously, there are a lot of Conservative people that, even if they’re 
not wearing their heart or their tree on their sleeve, are signing up to 
these groups.  That’s obviously a better way to get people out and 
campaigning and involved than whatever the Left is doing. 
 
Anthony: What is it about the Conservative Party that means it’s more successful 
in using Facebook? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t know if there is anything that is necessarily something like the 
Conservative Party itself.  The Conservative Party has a very well-
organised, digital engagement team at headquarters, but the 
associations and the established activists, the older activists, aren’t any 
more computer-literate or biased than any other person and perhaps, in 
many cases, they’re less computer-literate and biased than other people.  
I think it’s the – perhaps the sense, certainly that springs up at 
universities, that Conservative activists in physical friendships and 
relationships maybe don’t have as many people that embrace their 
ideology as people from the left do.   
 
They almost as a natural reaction not to show off that they’re Right 
Wing or they’re Conservative, but to enable them to be Right Wing 
Conservative, reach out on Facebook.  And so, as a result, I have 
people add me every day as a friend that I’ve never met that are 
Conservatives.  I sadly have to say no to them because my Facebook is 
more of a private thing than that, but the – that might be one 
explanation, but I can’t think of anything that’s structurally within the 
Conservative Party beneficial towards using Facebook as a tool 
necessarily. 
 
Anthony: It is fair to say that you’re one of the younger members of the 
Conservative Party, and you mentioned the older age category.  Do 
they have the same type of participation with social media? 
 
Oliver Cooper: It depends what you mean by the older – I mean, I was, I have to say, I 
had to block my grandmother on Facebook, because she was posting on 
my wall almost every day and, I mean, she’s 86.  So, obviously, there 
are people that will be members of Facebook, it does tail off, and the 
people that are older tend to use it in more heterodox, more unusual 
ways, than I’ve seen best practice being used amongst younger people.  
So they obviously are less susceptible to this evolutionary improvement 
in the way they use Facebook, and obviously they’re fewer in numbers 
on Facebook.   
 
Obviously, if you want to reach out to them, traditional media is the 
way to go, and the same applies to their use of Twitter, or their use of 
other social networks.  They’re less involved and each individual is 
probably less likely to pick up on the best practice that we each, I don’t 
know, take for granted, I suppose, in the younger age group. 
 
Anthony: You’ve mentioned that you’re a classical liberal and that you believe in 
freedom, is that something that is common with Conservative Future? 
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Oliver Cooper: Yes, I think it’s probably the most common political philosophy within 
the Conservative Party, sorry, within Conservative Future, and, from 
my point of view, that’s a good thing.  Obviously, we don’t want to be 
exclusionary in a way that is very tempting if you are in a plurality of 
people within an organisation.   
 
The Conservative Party is a broad church and particularly at, in the 
older age groups, there are people who are more socially Conservative 
than the classical liberals are, although just as sceptical about the 
European Union and just as sceptical about big government, and so, as 
a result, yes, we’re very popular, I guess, but we don’t try to push, or 
throw our weight around, in that respect. 
 
Anthony: Does the internet, as a medium, have any properties that correlate with 
your ideals in classical liberalism? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Very much so.  The internet is seen within the libertarian, classical 
liberal community as being the biggest and best tool that has probably 
been put at our disposal since the printing press.  There are online 
communities and interests and ways of organising that can bypass 
government all together, with regulations that they want, it gives an 
internationalist aspect of competition and discourse that means that you 
can, in a real sense, benefit from the countries that do embrace freedom 
the most, on whatever particular issue.   
 
And things like Wikipedia was set up as explicitly – the founder of 
Wikipedia set it up explicitly to show that libertarianism worked, to 
show that spontaneous orders could create a society that worked 
harmoniously, without anyone trying to create a master plan.  The same 
is true of Skype, it was founded by a libertarian, the same is true of 
eBay, it was founded by a Libertarian.  And it’s no coincidence that’s 
the case.  Facebook is not founded with that philosophy in mind, but 
it’s just as capable of improving our ways of communicating, without 
relying on traditional or government-controlled mechanisms. 
 
Anthony: You say it’s no coincidence that a number of types of internet media 
have been brought to bear by libertarians.  Do you think the same could 
be said about Conservative Future’s use of Facebook? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Potentially, I’m not sure the reason that the Conservative Future net 
uses Facebook in that way is because of any guiding philosophy.  I 
mean, on Facebook, what you meet, what you encounter, on a day-to-
day basis depends on which friends you have, and most people’s 
friends in my age group is – are left wing, and so it appears to us as 
though Facebook is not necessarily this Libertarian medium, nor can 
we necessarily exploit it in that way.   
 
But I have, as a result of being on Facebook, had opportunities to link 
into the libertarian network in the United States, the libertarian 
networks in Australia and Switzerland, where my family lives, and 
New Zealand, where my family came from, and all sorts of places in 
the world as a result of that.  It’s just not something that is obvious in 
the first place, but it’s certainly a benefit that comes from it. 
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Anthony: With that in mind, could Facebook be considered as a liberating 
application? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Oh, absolutely.  I mean, we wouldn’t all be on Facebook if it were an 
enslaving application, I suppose, but it gives us more ability to choose 
to link into the networks that we want, whether we have personal, 
physical connections to those networks or not.  And so, in that respect, 
it is very, very useful in being able to transcend national boundaries. 
 
Anthony: Why would a candidate use Facebook? 
 
Oliver Cooper: It depends, do you mean a candidate that had been selected… 
 
Anthony: For the parliamentary elections. 
 
Oliver Cooper: Already selected.  Quite simply, every candidate is campaigning to get 
our activists in two senses, the first is they want to get activists in the 
local area, get people that are leaning towards the Conservatives to be 
Conservative members and therefore go out and campaign for them.  
But, also competing for that scarce resource of people that have no 
great affiliation to their local area or their local candidate or their local 
campaign, and are willing to transcend areas geographically, and go 
from one area – where they live, to campaign for you, because you use 
Facebook.   
 
And, if you can do that, as I said, you can increase the number of 
activists you have on the street in a campaign by 50%.  Or, quadruple it 
on any one given day, if you have a Facebook-driven campaign day.  
So, it’s very useful in that respect but, to an extent, there is a bit of a 
cannibalising each other’s activists, and a bit of competition between 
people, even within the party, to make sure you get the most effective 
campaigns going. 
 
Anthony: Why would an activist use Facebook? 
 
Oliver Cooper: We, as individuals, already use Facebook for all other reasons in our 
lives, and it’s not a huge, great step to then go, “Oh wait, there’s a 
campaign day in Hammersmith on Saturday where there’s a free lunch 
with a free drink involved, I’ll click yes attending.”  So, it’s not maybe 
as an express, an overt decision as a candidate would to use Facebook 
for his campaign, but it’s still, you know, it still yields the same result 
without quite so much effort on our part. 
 
Anthony: If individuals use Facebook in every other way in their daily lives, like 
you’ve just suggested, why then is it the Conservative Party is 
suggested to actively use Facebook more than the other parties for 
campaigning? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t know.  There’s one hypothesis that I have, is that Conservatives, 
at a younger level, are outnumbered in their everyday life at university 
or, to an extent, in their job by people that – but people don’t share our 
philosophy and, as a result, do instinctively look out to build 
connections with people that they don’t know through those means, and 
that means meeting people on campaign days and connecting through 
Facebook to enable that.  But, I don’t really know, but if that was a 
guess then that would be the one I’d make. 
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Anthony: Are you the administrator for any Facebook groups? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I am yes, I’m an administrator for – I don’t think any Facebook – I’m 
an administrator for a couple of Facebook groups and a few Facebook 
pages as well. 
 
Anthony: Could you describe which they are? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I’m an administrator for the Conservative Humanists Association’s 
Facebook group, which is the group for trying to promote secularism 
within the Conservative Party and the Conservative Party to Atheists, 
because I’m, in the real world, I’m one of the executive members of the 
Conservative Humanists.  I am an administrator and we use that very 
regularly to get out the news, because, again, it builds a sense of 
community amongst people that wouldn’t necessarily know each other, 
or share this philosophy or political opinion without having seen it 
expressly on Facebook.   
 
It’s not something that comes up in discussion, but it’s something that 
is on the back of a lot of people’s minds when religious groups can 
affiliate through these real world connections, humanists, kind of, have 
to resort to Facebook.  I’m also an administrator for Facebook pages 
that promote Capitalism, Daniel Hannan, the non-religious Right, the 
Progressive Conservatives, which is a classical liberal group despite the 
name, and I think that’s just about it.  And I was administrator in a 
couple of Conservative Future Facebook groups, but I’m not any more. 
 
Anthony: Can you recall a time in the 2010 General Election when you were an 
administrator for a campaign group? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Yes, during the 2010 election I was involved in the Hampton and 
Kilburn campaign group.  It wasn’t during the election itself, but 
leading up to it, in trying to get people involved.   
 
And, we’re fortunate in being located very close to a number of 
universities, the ones that I mentioned earlier, and they are a bedrock 
of, obviously, not just Facebook – people that use Facebook, but people 
that use Facebook every single day, and a lot – they’re people that we 
were capable of getting out and getting involved and connected to  
Hampton and Kilburn and feel like that’s the place they should 
campaign, instead of in Cities of London and Westminster or Holborn 
and St Pancras, neither of which the Conservative Party’s activists can 
change the result of. 
 
Anthony: What’s the range, in terms of numbers of members, of these groups? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I mean, it ranges dramatically.  The smallest Facebook group of which 
I’m an administrator has about 120 members, but I’ve run groups 
before for Conservative Future that have – obviously I’ve started them 
and they’ve started from nothing, and the largest has about 95,000 
members. 
 
Anthony: And if one of these groups was used in campaigning, for instance, how 
many, in terms of percentage of those people signed up to that group 
would come out and campaign on the ground? 
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Oliver Cooper: Well, it depends – again, you can say a percentage, because 10% of 
95,000 is considerably larger than 10% of 100.  But, if you were to 
have a Conservative Future group, their make-up is roughly consistent, 
they’re all going to be Conservative Future members in the wider local 
area, London and the South-East perhaps for Cities of London & 
Westminster or Hampstead & Kilburn, and if you do have a campaign 
group that has – that invites everyone from the UCL Conservative 
Society to a campaign day in Hampstead & Kilburn, you’ll probably 
have a turnout of something like 5%, but 5% of 300 members is still a 
very good turnout. 
 
Anthony: Would you consider the association between people on Facebook as a 
strong or weak association? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Between people that know each other only through Facebook? 
 
Anthony: In offline groups and societies there’s face-to-face interaction, and oral 
communication, which would be considered a strong link and a strong 
association, in terms of transplanting that onto Facebook, for instance, 
would you consider that a strong or weak association? 
 
Oliver Cooper: It depends.  Lots of people on Facebook use it in different ways.   As I 
said, I’ve been added by hundreds of people that I’ve never met and 
some of whom I’ve accepted because of who they were or because they 
have – I’ve some reason to meet them in the future, other than them 
simply being a Conservative.   
 
And, through that, we’ve developed very close friendships online from 
continents away from each other, where we will comment on each 
other’s statuses and give each other a like thumbs up when we each 
promote classical liberal or libertarian links on our walls or statuses and 
so on, and it does give a sense of actual community and cohesion, a bit 
of a pat on the back and assurance, and that’s very – that happens quite 
a lot and is very useful. 
 
Anthony: But, in comparison to the people with whom you interact in the offline 
world, would you consider those acquaintances on Facebook as strong 
as the acquaintances you have in the offline world? 
 
Oliver Cooper: No, I don’t think anyone can suggest that those pixels that you 
habitually click on someone’s profile are as close as you can have in 
the real world.  But, at the same time, when you have the whole range 
of humanity at your fingertips on Facebook, you can, to an extent, pick 
and choose with whom you correspond and connect and try to persuade 
to join your causes or campaign for you or be friends with you.   
 
You can actually actively choose them in a far more selective way in 
politics than you would be able to offline in politics if you just worked 
through your local association and met people through that.  As a result, 
there is a potential to form close relationships, but I don’t think anyone 
actually does form particularly close relationships through Facebook. 
 
Anthony: So that would be considered a weaker relationship? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Yes, I think so. 
115 
 
 
Anthony: With that in mind, does the Conservative Party do anything to 
encourage those weaker relationships to become stronger relationships? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t think the Conservative Party does too much to do that on 
Facebook.  There have been some initiatives on Twitter to try to 
improve the cohesion and sense of community among Conservative-
leaning tweets, I suppose, through regular Tweet-ups – meetings – with 
other like-minded people on Twitter, at party conference and Spring 
Forum and all sorts of other events, and between events, so that people 
can get to know the person behind those pixels, or behind that @ sign, 
and that does enable people to know with whom they’re 
communicating, with whom they’re cooperating on getting people to go 
to campaign days or getting people to promote a certain issue.   
 
And that does help, but I can’t think of anything that’s as – that’s 
organised by either the Conservative Party, or any other organisation 
for that matter, on Facebook. 
 
Anthony: How is Twitter used for campaigning? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Twitter is used very extensively to get information out, rather than to 
mobilise activists in the way that Facebook is.  Twitter is probably the 
fastest way that an aspirant, maybe council rather than a parliamentary, 
candidate can get information out to the rest of the world.  
Parliamentary candidates and MPs and established pressure groups and 
so on are plugged into the traditional media.   
 
You can bypass that if you have a strong enough message on Twitter, if 
you say the council is cutting this when they could be cutting that, and 
it gets re-Tweeted 30 times.  By the end of the day you’re going to have 
all the traditional media and the local press knocking down your door to 
get that story.  So, it’s a good way that you can become better 
established, if you have a good message.  It’s not good to organise 
campaign days quite as successfully, although there have been 
exceptions to that. 
 
Anthony: Are there any downsides to using social media? 
 
Oliver Cooper: There are a few downsides.  The first is that, obviously, it’s time-
consuming to do anything and if you are too reliant on social media, 
then you’re going to perhaps put everything else on a backburner to 
your disadvantage.  There have been cases where associations have 
almost completely ignored their traditional membership base because 
they go, “Oh don’t worry, we’ll get activists out because of Facebook.”  
And, as a result, have lost campaigns in that way.  And there are 
disadvantages in terms of using Twitter because, of course, it’s not 
private, it’s very, very public, and people have been caught out, there 
have been candidates that put up in-advised comments on Twitter, or on 
Facebook for that matter, and have had to be deselected as a result of 
that.   
 
People have to be advised that, if you’re going to use these things for 
politics, you should treat them as though they’re politics, rather than 
thinking that they’re banter with your friends, I suppose. 
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Anthony: In political terms, what is the difference between Facebook and 
Twitter? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Do you mean in how we use them? 
 
Anthony: In the contribution it makes to the Conservative Party. 
 
Oliver Cooper: Right.  I think Facebook is far more useful in being able to get the 
message out and also to get campaigners in, because its organisational 
mechanisms is better at campaigning, and it also means that you can 
target people that aren’t particularly interested in what you say.  There 
are people on Facebook, I have 1,350 friends of whom probably 700, 
600 are Conservative or libertarian or leaning that way, which means 
that I’ve got 600 or 700 people on my Facebook that do not have 
opinions – political opinions that are similar to mine, even within the 
remit of the entire political spectrum that are near mine.   
 
And, you can put out – you can post a link on Facebook to a newspaper 
article or whatever and spin it in a way that appeals to people that aren’t 
necessarily of your point of view, you can’t do that on Twitter, because 
if you try to do that on Twitter, the only people following you are 
people who have the same opinions as you already.  No-one adds 
people or follows people on Twitter just because you actually are 
friends in real life.   
 
So you can win people over on Facebook, and you can get people – get 
activists out.  Twitter is more a way for a more select few people to 
pass messages around and communicate about politics between 
themselves, and then maybe use other mechanisms to get that message 
that they’ve crafted between themselves out. 
 
Anthony: Does social media help win votes? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I don’t think it does help win votes particularly.  I would find it – I 
would think it would be very difficult for a candidate to try to use 
Facebook or Twitter to organise his or her campaign.  There are 
exceptions to that.  There’s very good usage on a ward by ward basis 
that I’m familiar with in Coventry – we haven’t used it.  I feel 
uncomfortable about using it – that would enable residents to join your 
Facebook page and then it would be non-partisan.   
 
And then, towards the election, they’d start posting from that Facebook 
page different links that are more and more and more politicised, until 
it gets to the stage where you’re almost saying, “Vote for this 
candidate.”  That’s a way you could do it, but I don’t see any other way 
that you could win votes explicitly as a campaign.  It is a good way to 
get campaigners out, and they win votes, and it’s a good way that 
individuals can win over their friends, that’s votes.  But, it’s probably 
very difficult for a politician him or herself to try to win over floating 
voters using Facebook or Twitter. 
 
Anthony: What is the role of blogging in the Conservative Party? 
 
Oliver Cooper: The Conservatives have a very strong blogging fraternity, far stronger 
than the corresponding Labour or Lib Dem or, for that matter, the 
United States Republican Party communities in terms of blogging.  It’s 
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slightly towards the classical libertarian side of the party, but we have a 
very strong community of people that just don’t repost old links from 
traditional media outlets, but actually put original content up.  That acts 
as a forum, a think tank for, I think, the entire party in that respect. 
 
Anthony: Again, let’s come back to this issue to talk about what the Conservative 
Party is perhaps doing differently than other parties that it encourages 
more blogging. 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well, I think the reason the Conservative Party is better placed on the 
blogosphere right now is because blogs emerged in the UK when the 
Conservative Party was in opposition.  And blogs are a good way for 
individuals to vent their spleen and to complain about the way the 
government is working, and then people, from that sort of blog, from 
the angry blogger blog, can move onto more articulate or more thought-
out blogs.   
 
And you can see Labour coming back in the blogosphere, becoming 
better connected in the blogosphere, as a result of their now being in 
opposition, because people can now complain about the government 
and put forward their own policies, without seeming like they’re 
criticising their own party, because Ed Miliband’s a blank slate in the 
same way as David Cameron was in 2006, and it’s a chance for 
everyone to feel as though they’re interacting.  That’s why the 
Conservative Party’s stronger but it’s also why Labour’s probably 
going to get to the same sort of strength we are now in the next few 
years. 
 
Anthony: Is this use of internet in terms of social media, email and blogging the 
same throughout the different geographical areas of the Conservative 
Party?  For instance, comparing a rural seat with a metropolitan seat. 
 
Oliver Cooper: Not at all.  Obviously, if you are a candidate in – for Penrith and the 
Borders, or somewhere very geographically isolated from large 
population areas, it’s difficult to use Facebook to get those few people 
out.  We, as Conservative Future, successfully used Facebook to corral 
people to the big by-election victories that we scored in the last 
parliament, in Norwich North and Crewe and Nantwich particularly, to 
get people to move very large distances geographically to move to 
completely different cities to campaign, but that wouldn’t be the case in 
General Election campaigns.   
 
So, we, in London, have been blessed in that respect in being able to 
call upon eight million people within an easy commute from each other, 
but I suppose people from outside that geographic area could probably 
get the word out, could probably make everyone aware that they’re 
doing great things and can probably share best practice and benefit 
from best practice using the internet.  But they wouldn’t be able to 
recruit campaigners from a wider areas, which is the main advantage 
we have in London, in that respect. 
 
Anthony: Which, in your opinion, is the main Conservative blog? 
 
Oliver Cooper: In terms of how much information it has on it and how useful it is for a 
Conservative, it’s ConservativeHome, by quite a long distance, because 
it does have, not just a synopsis of the traditional news media’s most 
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important articles at the beginning of the day, but it has political 
commentary from people that are established activists, candidates, 
members of parliament and members of the cabinet and so on.  And it’s 
by far the best digest of Conservative Party opinion broadly.  But, at the 
same time, from an ideological perspective, it’s always better to go to 
Guido’s blog and read about things from a world view that I guess, I 
suppose, I share more than I do with Tim Montgomerie. 
 
Anthony: Is, at least, part of the party organised in a different manner since 
ConservativeHome has been live? 
 
Oliver Cooper: ConservativeHome was set up explicitly to campaign on the issue of 
selection, because they were outraged at the fact that the Conservative 
party membership did not really have that much of a choice over who 
the leader of the Conservative Party was and, as a result, they have 
always had this campaigning streak – in trying to reform the party and 
keep the party to a form of Conservatism that the editors and, therefore 
by extension, the readers share. 
 
Anthony: What kind of values sum up ConservativeHome readers and editors? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well, the readers do cut across the political spectrum, or the 
Conservative spectrum, but with an emphasis on, I suppose, traditional 
right wing, as opposed to the so-called libertarian Right, simply 
because that’s Tim Montgomerie’s own political opinion, and because 
the libertarian Right has a far more developed blogosphere of its own.   
 
The libertarians are far disproportionately better represented on the 
blogosphere and on Twitter and on Facebook than any other political 
group and, as a result, people that are interested in the libertarian side 
of things will go to libertarian blogs and follow libertarian people on 
Twitter, but ConservativeHome has a political opinion that’s not 
libertarian, it’s explicitly not libertarian, but allows libertarians to read 
it and access it and post on it, because they’re an integral part of the 
Conservative coalition that ConservativeHome tries to represent in its 
entirety. 
 
Anthony: What benefits to the Conservative Party is the ConservativeHome blog? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I mean, at times, I’m sure Conservative headquarters thinks it’s one of 
the biggest thorns in its side.  But, at the same time, it is an invaluable 
way of Conservative Party members, as long as they approach it with 
the understanding they won’t agree with everything that’s being put 
forward, to read about the platforms that other people have.  So, if 
you’re a middle of the road Conservative Party member, you’ll have 
libertarians and social conservatives and Tory Reform Group, moderate 
centrists and progressive conservatives, and everyone else, trying to 
pull you in different directions.   
 
And it’s the way that you can facilitate internal debate without having 
to put the official Conservative Party trees stamp on it and a way of 
getting out lots of ideas, without having to expend too much time, or 
money, on the party’s part or the activist’s part, in trying to do so.  So, 
it’s a good central scratching post for the cats of liberty. 
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Anthony: How did – sorry, I’ll rephrase that – did the central party communicate 
with you directly using the internet during the 2010 General Election? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I received a lot of emails from the central party, and I am on Facebook 
a fan of the Conservative Party and David Cameron and Conservative 
Future and all the other officially run Conservative pages and 
organisations, but there’s not so much formal communication through 
those means.   
 
The Conservative Party has a very good digital engagement team, and 
they put out several websites – topical websites that campaigned on 
particular issues that went viral, or videos that went viral, WebCameron 
being an invaluable resource to show people what David Cameron 
thought, if they weren’t Conservatives before.  So, they’re good 
mechanisms, but there wasn’t too much direct engagement with 
Conservative Party activists, because the informal channels are just as, 
if not even more, successful. 
 
Anthony: You mentioned WebCameron.  Some academics believe that to have 
been the beginning of the real use of the internet in British politics and 
David Cameron was the first person who did that.  On the other side of 
the coin, he also said, “Too many Tweets make a twat.”  Do you think 
there is some conflict in those two issues? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I think what David Cameron was saying with, “Too many Tweets make 
a twat,” is his comment that, of course, you have to, I suppose, keep on 
your toes all the time on Twitter, too many people do use it as a way to 
communicate on an informal and laid back and, therefore, as a result, 
off-guard way.  Several politicians have been caught out on this.  
Labour have been, to an extent, too reliant on people that are Twitter 
personalities, rather than people with real substance.   
 
The difference is that the WebCameron was obviously a way for 
David Cameron to choose the moments that he wanted to share 
with the rest of the world.   Just as sincere but slightly more selective 
in what he wants to share than most people on Twitter that say – that 
even if they’re on Twitter because they’re Conservative activists, 
they’re saying, “I’m getting up in the morning and having a piece of 
toast with some marmalade on it,” well, I’m not interested in that and 
I’m not interested in your arguments that you have that might include 
the F word or the C word with a Labour activist, just because you 
disagree with them.  And neither of those is going to help you 
campaign, whereas I think WebCameron does. 
 
Anthony: Do party web pages play the same role in campaigns as social media 
and blogging? 
 
Oliver Cooper: No, I don’t think they do, and I think – I’m not entirely sure about the 
numbers, but I would suspect that the YouTube videos were either 
WebCameron ones or ones that were put together by organisations like 
the Taxpayers’ Alliance, were viewed by far more people than the apps 
on Conservatives.com.  Conservatives.com has to be, by its nature, 
more staid than the in your face libertarian bloggers or the multitude of 
people that put on videos on YouTube.   
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And so, as a result, things are less likely to go viral.  If they’re less 
likely to go viral, they’re less likely to be picked up that people that 
aren’t already engaged in politics.  And so it’s an integral part and an 
invaluable part of the online presence, but it’s not the game changer. 
 
Anthony: Think back to the run-up to the 2010 General Election and other high 
profile campaigns that you were involved in at that time.  If the internet 
had not existed, would your role have been different? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Absolutely.  There are a whole range of opportunities I wouldn’t have 
had through the internet, and therefore ways that I’ve become involved 
with different groups through the internet.  I’m including the 
Conservative Humanists and the Progressive Conservatives, I probably 
wouldn’t have known about them if it hadn’t been for the internet.  But, 
at the same time, in the 2010 General Election, I campaigned in my 
local area, it’s still an option that a lot of activists choose, particularly if 
they live in areas that are very marginal seats, and I did that in the same 
way as I would have done if there were no internet.  It just so happens 
that I was able to also use the internet in the run-up to the election to 
get campaigners out. 
 
Anthony: How could the party have improved its approach in terms of 
communicating with candidates, associations and the wider 
membership? 
 
Oliver Cooper: I think, actually, the Conservative Party is relatively good in doing that.  
Maybe not the official party itself, but the different mechanisms in 
informal party groups and blogs at getting messages out and getting 
unified messages, particularly, I don’t know, the ConservativeHome 
and the Taxpayers’ Alliance and so on, using different linguistic means 
that they can get their members to use, and their supports to use, the 
readers to use that then, sort of, infiltrate the rest of society.  I don’t 
think the Conservative Party itself, CCHQ, is particularly good at doing 
that, but they’re very good at using traditional media for the same 
reason, and they probably know their place in that respect. 
 
Anthony: Thinking about the parliamentary cycle from one parliament to the 
next, and thinking about the role of general internet media in the run-up 
to the 2010 General Election, has there been any difference, in your 
opinion, since before the 2010 General Election and afterwards? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Very much so, simply because the Conservative Party, now being in 
government, changes – moves the goalposts to the other side of the 
pitch.  I mean, it’s – and this was without 15 minutes in halftime with 
people really ascertaining that the goalposts have moved.  So, some of 
the blogs that were built up on being angry blogs, on being attack 
blogs, have suddenly had to realise that attacking someone with whom 
you agree, even 30%, 40%, 50% of the time is much more difficult than 
attacking someone that you disagree with all the time, and can afford to 
be seen to disagree with all the time.   
 
So, with the blogs, it’s very difficult, and a number of blogs have 
disappeared as a result of that.  A number of blogs have had to choose 
whether they want to be pro-government blogs or Conservative blogs, 
or which ones want to be explicitly libertarian, I suppose, anti-
government blogs.  But, the way that Facebook is used is probably just 
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about the same.  Its activists use it to organise in the same way and we 
post links that promote our party in the same way, and I don’t think 
that’s going to change, no matter who’s in government. 
 
Anthony: Since the outcome of the 2010 General Election, a number of high 
profile Conservative bloggers have disappeared, including Shane Greer, 
Tory Bear and Iain Dale.  Why do you think that would be the case? 
 
Oliver Cooper: Well those specific cases I can’t talk about.  Shane and Iain are very 
successful and have published their – they’re very successful, I don’t 
really need to go into that.  And other people like, I suppose, people 
that were specifically connected to the Conservative Party by their 
name, Tory Bear, have to, as a result, sort of, choose a lane, pick a lane 
between being Conservative Party people or libertarian people.  And 
he’s successfully navigated that and a lot of people have failed to do so, 
which is why a lot of the minor blogs, and I ran a Conservative – a 
libertarian Conservative blog myself, have decided that it’s not easy to 
sit on those two stools when they gradually move further and further 
away from each other. 
 
Anthony: Thank you very much for your contribution. 
 
Oliver Cooper: You’re welcome. 
 
 
END AUDIO 
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START AUDIO 
 
Interviewer: Thank you very much.  So just to start off with then how did you first 
become involved with the Conservative Party? 
 
René Kinzett: I first became involved with the Conservative Party in 2006.  This was 
after having a period of membership and activity with the Liberal 
Democrats.  And I joined the Conservative Party soon after David 
Cameron became leader that was in the tail end of 2005.  
 
 
So by 2006 I was convinced that the Conservative Party’s position, 
narrative and its general outlook had sufficiently been modernised and 
altered by David Cameron’s election and I then was persuaded and felt 
able to join the party in 2006. 
 
Interviewer: And how did you find initially that the Conservative Party differed 
from the Liberal Democrats? 
 
René Kinzett: Well it’s a hell of a lot bigger.  And there is a more diverse range of 
opinions within the party than perhaps in the Liberal Democrats.  I’m 
not saying that the Liberal Democrats is totally homogenous in its 
views.  There are red or orange book Liberal Democrats and more kind 
of Social Democrats and leftist elements in the Liberal Democrat Party.  
But the Conservative Party certainly is a party with a large, with a wide 
breadth of opinion and very historically held opinions and viewpoints. 
 
Interviewer: And in your opinion how does the Liberal Democrat Party compare to 
the Conservative Party in terms of general organisation? 
 
René Kinzett: The Conservative Party on one level has got a slicker national 
campaign office.  It’s got much more of an eye on media and that both 
in terms of traditional media where I think it’s always been strong and 
also in new media where it’s developed really quickly to get up to 
speed.  I think maybe smaller organisations and the Liberal Democrats 
may have had more on the Conservatives earlier on in the race in new 
media but the Conservative Party has certainly trail blazed lots of 
initiatives in that area.  
 
But I would also caveat that by saying that the local networks of 
constituency associations are not as centrally controlled as the Liberal 
Democrats.  And that may appear on one level to be rather topsy-turvy 
being that the Liberal Democrat Party policies favour decentralisation 
and subsidiary and so on and so forth.  Whereas the Conservative Party 
may be in one level seen as a more traditional centrist policy area in 
terms of the nation’s state and a unitary state approach to politics, to 
state politics.  
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But conversely for some reason or another the Conservative Party its 
network of constituency associations seems looser and less organised 
than the Liberal Democrats. 
 
Interviewer: There are two points I’d like to pick up on.  You mentioned the 
Association levels of the two parties and I’m interesting in how from 
the grass roots up to the Association level to the centrally controlled 
offices, what is the relationship between the Liberal Democrats and the 
Conservative Parties on those three tiers? 
 
René Kinzett: Well the Liberal Democrats seemed to have a more centralised 
approach to membership for a start.  And I think that goes back to 
Gladstone almost with his you know the founder of what we know as 
the Liberal Party in the 1850s.  And the way that he wanted very much 
to have a centralised party structure in terms of membership.  Whereas 
the Conservative Party with its more traditional, it’s almost an 
association of Conservative and Unionist Associations across the 
United Kingdom.  
 
So I think that there is that historical dynamic of how the two parties 
grew.  One being almost a centralised creation and the other being a 
group of people who came together to form a national association of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations and I think that psychology 
still pervades both parties.  Certainly the Conservative Party, where 
independence of associations is seen as a sacrosanct issue, or principle 
of the party organisation.  
   
And I mean recently there was some mystery shopping carried out by 
Central Office who were posing as normal punters asking you know 
which constituency and where’s that south, whether they could join.  
And they were getting various responses like you know the book’s full 
or we don’t need anybody at the moment or well if you can answer a 
questionnaire and come and present yourself you know we might 
approve your membership.  
 
So very odd way of organising membership whereas with the Liberal 
Democrats you just fill something in online and you’re a member or as 
soon as you’ve given your debit card details.  So yes there does seem to 
be a very different approach. 
 
Interviewer: And the second thing is you mentioned that the Conservative Party 
appeared to have taken over the Liberal Democrats in terms of use of 
perhaps the internet or social media.  Could you expand on that a little? 
 
René Kinzett: Well I think that the personnel of the Liberal Democrat Party in my 
experience is younger, more progressive and certainly perhaps more 
open minded and flexible to the use of new technologies.  
 
So I think early on in the political parties waking up to the existence of 
you know back to the basic web shop front to more interactive Web 2 
Technologies and social media.  I think the Liberal Democrats were 
quicker off the mark and the Conservative Party perhaps because of 
things like Constituency Associations being a looser confederation.  
And perhaps with the Membership being less open minded, less 
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progressive, less modernist than the Liberal Democrats perhaps lag 
behind.  
 
But the Conservative Party with its purchasing power, its economies of 
scale and its strong central organisation as opposed to the confederation 
of the Associations, the strong centre was able to press ahead and create 
a much better, much slicker online presence than the Liberal Democrats 
with their less money, less economies of scale problems.  
 
So the Conservative Party was then able to launch impressive website, 
use David Cameron as a brand to press that newness.  They won’t go so 
far as new conservatives a la Blair and New Labour.  But certainly 
liberal conservatism, David Cameron’s personal brand and his election 
in 2005 enabled the party to make a new start on its ‘e’-output.  And if 
you take things like Twitter for example where the party seems to really 
dominate the discussion.  It’s got some brilliant coordination I mean 
before the general election the Chairman of the Party, Eric Pickles, was 
meeting with Bloggers and Tweeters, not giving a line.  Being very 
careful not to say “This is what we want you to say.”  But nevertheless 
being very encouraging and providing material for party political 
bloggers and tweeters.  And also interact with general public and 
general opinion formers, non partisan opinion formers on Twitter. 
 
Interviewer: And, in terms of the process by which the Conservative Party used 
social media and the internet in its campaigning and communication 
with party members, where do you believe the leadership for that 
came?  Was it at the top of the party?  Was it within the 
professionalised area of the party?  Was it at the grassroots?  Was it 
somewhere else or was it a combination? 
 
René Kinzett: Well I think that with the election of the new leader, David Cameron, I 
think he brought with him a very clear focus on delivery of party 
message, which was not just going to be through the traditional media.  
I mean much was made of the catchphrase, there was a rather neat 
catchphrase in one of the party conferences leading up to the general 
election of Gordon Brown being an analogue leader in a digital age.  
And I think that rather kind of neatly encapsulated David Cameron’s 
approach to being a new leader in a digital age, you know a modern 
looking, forward looking, progressive, embracing of new technologies.  
 
I mean it was kind of redolent of Harold Wilson and Wyatt Heaton of 
technology and so forth.  So David Cameron explicitly linked himself 
to digital Britain and I think that gave the context in which the party 
could then refocus its marketing, its communications with members, its 
outreach to other groups in society.  So I think the leadership came 
from the top but the e-team, the web team at Central Office is fantastic 
at ensuring that every constituency association if it avails themselves of 
this service is able to have a slick, good looking website.  It enables 
constituency associations to cooperate on things like signing up of new 
members online.  And they’re very good at just making sure that you 
know even if a conservative association has nobody with any 
experience of building a website or managing content has got a quick 
and simple, easy route to do that. 
 
Interviewer: So, from your response, I’m summarising that you suggest the party’s 
movement towards the use of the internet was led by the centre? 
125 
 
 
René Kinzett: Hmm. 
 
Interviewer: Would you therefore consider that that would’ve had any influence on 
the use, throughout the wider party, of things like Facebook and 
Twitter, other social media in terms of organising campaigns? 
 
René Kinzett: Well absolutely the candidates who were then selected between 
Cameron becoming leader and the 2010 General Election of course 
bearing in mind we didn’t know if there was going to be an election in 
2007 when Blair stepped down and Brown first became Prime Minister.  
Whether there’d be a honeymoon election or whether there’d even be 
an election in 2008 or even 9.  It was all a rather guessing game.  
 
But all of those candidates who were selected in that period: One of the 
first things they did almost straight after they put out the press release 
or even before they put out the press release was that they set up a 
Facebook group.  You wanted to make sure that you had enough people 
to join it straight away.  You monitored what other political parties 
were doing in your area on Facebook and you used it as a way of not 
just signing up existing members. The age profile of constituency 
association members/officers means that perhaps they were not the 
most switched on in terms of e-access, and certainly the use of social 
media.  It was a good way of reaching out to new members or just new 
supporters. 
 
People who had never got involved in the political process before and 
certainly in my experience of running in a Constituency where (1) I 
knew that the probability of victory was fairly low but that we needed 
to increase our votes.  We hadn’t had an increase in our vote in the 
General Election since 1983 in that Constituency to gain 250 upwards 
followers, supporters on a Facebook site was a great way of me 
communicating with more people than we’d ever communicated before 
directly not through a leaflet, not through a third party like a newspaper 
or radio or television but directly with them. 
 
Interviewer: Is there anything unique and different about social media that would 
allow you to do that? 
 
René Kinzett: There’s no filtration, there’s no editorial line except the one that you 
want to give.  So using although in my professional life I work in media 
and communications, we all know that getting your message across in 
the local newspaper is a tricky affair because whilst they’re not 
bounded by rules on balance and impartiality they often have to make 
sure that if you’re saying “I don’t think this should happen.”  They’ve 
got to give space a lot of the time for somebody else to say well I think 
it should and he’s an idiot for saying it shouldn’t.  Or you might get 
very small piece in an article.  
 
So I think that in terms of Facebook certainly was a way of making sure 
that the message of our campaign could get across to people in an 
unadulterated fashion, in a message and a way and a distribution list 
that we could control.  And without, as I said without that filtration of 
editorial bias. 
 
Interviewer: Is there an element of age in this? 
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René Kinzett: Oh absolutely I mean in terms of that 250 odd people I had on my 
Facebook group, most were under 21, the vast majority. 
 
Interviewer: And what role then does other types of communication within the party 
organisation have to play in terms of mobilising other party members 
that don’t fit that age bracket? 
 
René Kinzett: Well I mean the, in my Constituency we had an email list of our party 
members and actually email is now something that most people seem to 
have who are certainly what you might call politically or socially 
engaged.  So for example if you are a member of a Rotary Club, 
involved in the Masons or any other social group you tend now to – or 
a Golf Society – you tend now to almost need an email address to keep 
in touch with your fellow members and officers.  
 
So I found that regardless of age, most people had the email address.  
So email contact databases are still very important for getting messages 
out, of even down to silly little details like this is where we’re meeting 
for a leafleting session.  So you then try to kind of marry that old 
campaigning method of leafleting with a new method, new 
communications tools of email and Facebook.  So on Facebook we 
would create an event that people could sign up to come to a campaign 
day.  But at the same time emailing party members as well to have that 
dual process to catch people who weren’t on the Facebook dataset.  
 
However I would say that things like newsletters now have totally gone 
by the wayside.  I mean it wasn’t so long ago that constituency 
associations that I’d been involved with would send out monthly 
newsletters.  I know that for example at slightly higher levels of 
political representation, at the MEP level, the MEP for Wales, the Tory 
MEP is juggling with this issue of considering whether or not to put 
money into a quarterly or biannual newsletter to members.  I mean it 
costs money.  I mean it costs nothing to press a button and send a 
communiqué via Facebook or email but you’re racking up hundreds of 
pounds of expenditure if you’re sending a snail mail newsletter across 
the whole of the Welsh party membership. 
 
Interviewer: You also mentioned Twitter.  How does Twitter differ to Facebook in 
terms of its use within Conservative Party organisation and its use in 
the run up to a campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes.  Well  Twitter in terms of constituency associations is probably 
still to be developed it’s still I the process of people know it’s there, 
they’re not really sure what to do with it, they’re a bit scared of it 
because of its rapidly changing nature, because of its instant 
conversational style, it’s instant you’ve said it’s out there.  There’s no, 
you know you can’t withdraw it very easily or without problem.  
 
It’s less – I mean like almost like Facebook has become, looks by now 
comparison more formal, more stayed.  More conservative, more old 
media than even something like Twitter now which is so immediate and 
so conservational in style.  
  
So I think constituency associations are still grappling with how they 
go about using it.  I know for example I mentioned before the Web 
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Team at Central Office who will help you set up a rather good looking 
website.  What they would also do is put the Twitter feed of the 
Conservative Party on it, to show what the Conservative Party officially 
is saying.  
 
But you know to be honest I find the official Tweets from political 
parties rather stayed, rather boring, rather predictable, rather well you 
would say that wouldn’t you.  People do follow those tweets of the 
official party account but it’s more of a kind of a rolling notice board.  
The real conversation is going on between political party candidates.  
And I think during the run up to the General Election it was very 
interesting to see a range of different types of Conservative candidates 
using Twitter from what you might call the more libertarian, freedom 
association, taxpayers’ alliance types right through to the centre 
ground.  And through to what I would describe as kind of myself as 
more kind of Tory Reform Group, Liberal Conservatives, socially 
liberal, economically centrist.  
 
And so you get that conversation not just between the candidate and 
electorate but between candidates intraparty and interparty as well.  
And Twitter’s one of those great tools for not just highlighting 
divisions between parties or even indeed internally within parties but 
also to show actually that there’s a great deal of common ground 
between candidates on different issues.  
 
And I think that’s the kind of politics that people who get their news 
content through social media are less concerned about what the official 
line is as actually what’s the underlying conversation. 
 
Interviewer: And in terms of practicalities, in terms of organising and mobilising 
campaigns does Facebook have a particular application that is different 
to Twitter or vice versa? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes I mean Facebook is much better for creating and developing an 
audience.  So you, people would tend I think to use Facebook now as a 
channel of communication.  To say right “This is my channel.”  Like 
YouTube as well is a really good example, another example of that 
kind of social media where you totally control the outputs.  And you 
have some degree of control over developing the audience to whom this 
is broadcast either by making it attractive to a certain group or by 
actively going out to find people through marketing, through I mean on 
Facebook you can put adverts up can’t you to drive traffic to your site.  
And all of those what you might now call traditional e-marketing tools 
that you would talk to Google about getting your search hits high up on 
their results pages.  If people Google certain words or phrases.  
 
Whereas Twitter is a way, I found it first of all a way to drive traffic to 
what you’re broadcasting in other medium like blogs and Facebook.  So 
you would use it to link, to drive traffic to what you’re saying on your 
blog or Facebook group.  But then that’s just one narrow aspect of it.  
Another aspect of Twitter I found is to build a wider audience for 
yourself to create a public profile that is quite honest, quite immediate.  
That is conversational, that enables you to partake in wider campaigns.  
I mean if you live in Swansea 200 miles from London and you want to 
get involved in the ongoing debate on Electoral Reform for example the 
alternative vote referendum in May, it’s very difficult to do that 
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physically.  It is a hell of a lot easier and very effective to do it via a 
medium like Twitter. 
 
Interviewer: Are there any downsides to using social media in terms of political 
engagement? 
 
René Kinzett: Well absolutely.  There is a risk of, as I said the immediacy of the 
output with Facebook, blogs to a certain extent.  But definitely with 
media releases and so forth there is a degree of stages of editorial 
process, of who, what, why, where.  What do you want to say?  Who 
are you saying it to?  What are you trying to get?  And that may take 
you anything from half an hour to a day to sort that out before you 
press the button to make something live or send a communication to 
another broadcaster or print journalist.  
 
With Twitter there is the risk of saying something you will regret.  
There is the risk of posting in haste, repenting at leisure.  We know 
there are examples of not just Conservatives but other candidates who 
have lost their positions, lost their candidacies due to ill conceived 
remarks on Twitter or Facebook.  
 
So you’ve always got to bear that in mind that… 
 
Interviewer: Was there, is there any example during your campaign in the run up to 
2010 that you would say “The social media that you were using had a 
negative impact on your campaign?” 
 
René Kinzett: No I don’t think there was.  Because whilst I am happy to say things 
that are not on the party line 100% I’m not so foolish as to say 
something that’s going to either get me in trouble with the party in a big 
way.  I mean for example I did a blog on the suspension of the MEP 
who stood in the way of our party’s favoured candidate for Vice 
President of the European Parliament from being elected and I can’t 
remember his name off hand.  But anyway the MEP.   
 
And I supported him.  I said actually I don’t want this chap, this from 
the polish, one of the polish political parties being elected to the 
European parliamentary position of Vice President not least because I 
find his views not in line with what I call Conservative mainstream 
views on issues of immigration, race and sexual orientation and so 
forth.  
 
I got a phone call from the Chairman’s office just saying you know 
“You ought not to have done that and we don’t appreciate it.”  But as 
slaps on the wrist go that was fairly minor as opposed to…  And I think 
it’s when somebody says something not pol-…  I mean my position on 
that was I thought worked out, understandable…  Was in opposition to 
what the party’s position was but was nevertheless a considered and 
intellectually honest argument.  
 
The things people get in trouble for are what I call the puerile childish 
scatter logical commentary.  I mean you know is it acceptable for 
somebody in a pub to joke about the disappearance of Madeline 
McCann but in a tweet and on a Facebook comment actually making 
that same joke?  Well you know the life isn’t fair and those people 
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making those kinds of comments will be in trouble because they’re just 
socially unacceptable.  
 
And they’re less socially acceptable – this is weird isn’t it?  It’s less 
socially acceptable to say something in words that you could read on a 
social network site than it is to say the words out loud in a pub or a club 
or whatever.  And people have just got to get used to that, that is just 
how it is.  People are held to words that are written whether it’s 
electronically or on paper. 
 
Interviewer: Presumably there are many members of political parties who practice 
the writing of nuggets of information and comments on sites like 
Facebook and Twitter.  What would make it in your opinion interesting 
to someone in the public sphere like a journalist to report perhaps what 
they would consider a negative comment? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes they would look at ways of causing a divide so the press like 
stories about parties who were divided.  It’s just a, isn’t it that that 
narrative is interesting to the press party split on x or senior party 
member or parliamentary candidate slams party leader for x, y or z.  I 
mean one of the live issues I have at the moment is that I support the 
yes to AV campaign in the referendum forthcoming.  
 
And I have now had a couple of requests from journalists who read my 
Tweet, Twitter feed to want me to come on and expand my comments.  
Now I’m not so daft as to think that they just want to speak to me 
because I’m well known, I’m not.  They want to speak to me because 
they feel there’s a story here that they could say the official party line 
from the leadership is that the Conservative Party is against AV.  But 
look here here’s a former parliamentary candidate and current sitting 
councillor who is disagreeing with his party’s leadership.  
 
So yes there obviously is that trap there that people will want you to 
expand on any issues, any views, any opinions that you have shared 
electronically which may with further tweaking enhancements and the 
following wind be turned into a party splits story. 
 
Interviewer: I think the focus of my question really is to get to the heart of which 
members of the party are most interesting to, for people to follow?  Is 
that just anybody in the party?  Is that someone within a particular 
activist’s role?  Is it candidates?  Is it the leadership?  Is it potential 
Ministers and front benchers?  Is it all of those or is it very specific? 
 
René Kinzett: No I think all of those play a key role.  As I said the official party 
tweets are like the notice boards you know this is what the party, these 
are the orders of the day, this is what the party’s thinking, this is what 
the party is wanting the public to take on board and the particular story. 
 
It’s then interesting to follow the official Tweets of cabinet ministers 
although there is obviously some speculation as to which cabinet 
ministers actually do their own Tweets and which are done by 
underlings.  And actually to the, you know not so trained eye it 
becomes quite obvious which ones are honest themselves and which 
ones are done by underlings.  
 
So there are cabinet ministers.  In the run up to the general elections 
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candidates were a great draw to follow and the people who run one of 
the Tweet accounts, Tweet Minster did a fantastic analysis of party 
political candidates in the run up to the General Election of 2010.  They 
did a great analysis afterwards about who was followed the most, who 
was re-tweeted the most, who was mentioned the most?   
 
And yes that was you know political, party political candidates who 
were not shadows, who were not, who hadn’t held political office were 
the most followed and the most interactive.  Because they’re the ones 
who say the most and interact the most themselves.  So you’ve got a 
cabinet minister who might only tweet a couple of times a day not least 
because their diaries are rather fully but also because them saying 
something wrong or out of turn has a huge risk.  And really they’re 
using their Twitter account to push their departmental line, push their 
own agenda.  And then don’t get really that much involved in the 
conversation. 
 
Interviewer: How then in your opinion and experience of the run up to 2010 General 
Election being a candidate did and does the party manage these many 
channels of communications, many individuals using their Twitter page 
or their Facebook page.  How does the party control that and manage it 
if they do at all. 
 
René Kinzett: Well they can’t, I mean that’s the issue.  They just can’t do it in the 
same way that they can manage their web output, their own Twitter 
output and their own output to traditional media.  It’s a huge risk and 
that’s why the party now does put effort into what I would call the kind 
of soft soaping of Tweeters, bloggers who are either Conservative Party 
members or are wider centre, centre right commentators, non party 
political.  
 
So Eric Pickles hosted an event in the run up to the General Election 
party and food and so on.  And then you’ve got this other phenomenon 
of Tweet ups at party conferences where people who are both members, 
activists and those who are observers and commentators and so forth 
can meet up to exchange ideas and views about what they’re saying on 
Twitter.  But the party can only suggest and give a certain amount of 
affection and hospitality to these people they can’t and I mean Eric 
Pickles at one of the events I went to before the General Election 
actually said “We’re not going to tell you what to write because that 
almost…  That would defeat the whole purpose of something like 
Twitter.” 
 
So I think on one hand the party can’t do something about it and may 
see a risk in that.  But on the other hand it’s sufficiently clever enough 
to recognise that even the act of trying to manipulate the conversation 
on Twitter would negate the very purpose of it. 
 
Interviewer: So then does the central party, CCHQ London give free rein to 
candidates and leading activists in terms of their expression on social 
media? 
 
René Kinzett: I wouldn’t go that far because as I said my example of the, of defending 
the MEP who was in trouble with the party did get me a, you know a 
minor slap on the wrist from the Chairman’s office.  And we’ve seen 
haven’t we with candidates in the run up to the Welsh Assembly 
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elections in, this year who have been asked to stand down by their 
constituency associations because of some offensive or inappropriate 
remark on Twitter or Facebook.  
 
So no there isn’t a, you know, go forth and do what you want.  I think 
they’ve, certainly in terms of leafleting.  So if you were writing  a 
leaflet for a run up to a general election or Welsh Assembly election 
that leaflet will need to be seen by the appropriate persons both locally, 
nationally, regionally whatever to approve that.  So there’s a much 
stronger editorial line on things like Twitter and Facebook because it’s 
not practical to do that.  The party tends to have a more laissez-faire 
approach of trust but if you do something completely unacceptable or 
inappropriate you will pay the price for that. 
 
Interviewer: How does the party monitor the text of leaflets?  Do they do that in 
traditional methods, by post or would that be done in more modern 
ways using new technology? 
 
René Kinzett: Well yes it’s now done in more modern ways.  I mean in the run up to 
the Welsh Assembly elections in the one before in 2007 there was an 
online template.  So you got the, you knew what your leaflet was going 
to look like and then there were text boxes to fill in to say “This is what 
I want.  Here’s what I want there, photo capped boxes, captions.”  So it 
was all very much something you could do online.  That then got 
submitted to the printers via an electronic signoff by the agent or one of 
the agent’s representatives at the national party level, welsh party or 
CCHQ London.  
 
In the General Election run up to 2010 again there were templates that 
you had to fill in and then send off by email back to the appropriate 
authorising officer for signoff before it went to the printers. 
 
Interviewer: And did that method do anything to make the process more efficient or 
less efficient? 
 
René Kinzett: It certainly made it more efficient as far as I was concerned in terms of 
using – because I was using the party’s preferred printers for the 
election addresses.  I put out three different election addresses during 
my, two election addresses during my general election campaign both 
of which were done via the party’s template.  And their preferred 
supplier and I then didn’t see it until it came through the door from the 
Royal Mail.  I thought that was very efficient.  
 
I think it was less efficient if you weren’t going to use the party’s 
preferred suppliers and you needed to get approval to different 
timescales than the party was running.  But certainly even the few 
leaflets I printed outside of the party’s preferred suppliers using local 
suppliers for my introductory leaflet and my final week leaflet that was 
delivered by hand by volunteers, it was a quick turnaround. 
 
Interviewer: In terms of the more traditional types of communication that you’ve 
just described did your local party, your association organisation play 
any role in the production of that?  And then communicating that with 
the central party at CCHQ? 
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René Kinzett: No I mean running the campaign in Swansea West as I did was like a 
bit of a cottage industry you know it was in my house.  I saw 
everything through from start to finish.  
 
In other political, in other areas of the country where I’ve worked both 
for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in the past, I have seen 
other examples of where the candidate rarely writes a leaflet and is 
done by other volunteers within the party.  And then approved and goes 
through the process as described whereas in a party the size of Swansea 
West and with a lack of appropriately experienced or qualified 
members of the voluntary party who could in my standards write a 
good leaflet, I had to do it myself.  
 
But the agent has to see everything legally but didn’t really interfere in 
the content. 
 
Interviewer: Are you saying then in terms of the experience within the Conservative 
Party as a candidate there is no set format to how a campaign is run and 
constructed? 
 
René Kinzett: Well they do try to en- again they give you a book, the handbook the 
campaign handbook for that forthcoming General Election.  And they 
will give you a calendar of key dates.  They will tell you when you 
ought to have got your letter to postal voters.  When you ought to have 
contacted your pledge base and so on and so forth.  
 
So they will give you pointers and give you direction.  But unless 
you’re a target seat candidate then no you won’t be given much 
instruction.  You’ll be given lots of suggestions. 
 
Interviewer: And you’ve got talked about the candidate handbook was there any 
relationship with that handbook and perhaps information coming over 
the internet in terms of email or other methods? 
 
René Kinzett: Oh absolutely.  We got daily emails about what was in the news that 
day, what particular spokespeople, shadow ministers had said on 
certain issues.  There were sections in the email on what the other 
parties had said and what the line was and what they had said – lines to 
take on attacking other parties or promoting their own policies. 
 
And that came through everyday yes there was that kind of level of 
email communication. 
 
Interviewer: So you’ve described two very distinct forms of communicating with 
candidates in terms of the relationship between CCHQ London and its 
candidates around the country.  One a traditional method on paper, a 
candidate handbook and the other email.  How effective in your opinion 
were those two methods and are there any other ways that the party 
could have improved its communication? 
 
René Kinzett: Well the party handbook was very good.  The campaign handbook was 
very good and it also came on a disk version as well and on the disk 
version were templates, stories, articles, photographs, library 
photographs of the Prime Minister of the, no not – of the then Leader of 
the Opposition and key spokespeople which you could use in your 
leaflets.  So that was very practical and very useful.  
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The email communications were good in the sense that on each day you 
knew what the party was going to talk about, what was going to be in 
the national news.  And whether or not you could find an example 
locally to perhaps release to your local media.  So for example when we 
knew that it was going to be the day that the party were going to be 
discussing transport and public transport issues, we were able to go into 
Swansea City Centre and do something about bus transport in Swansea.  
And highlight our policies and proposals and what we thought were the 
problems locally.  
 
So in that sense that email communication allowed us to tie our local 
campaign in with what was going on nationally. 
 
Interviewer: You previously mentioned the difference between a non-target seat, a 
target seat and presumably there is within the party the designation of a 
safe seat.  Could you explain the role and organisational differences 
within the party in terms of communication and the use of the internet 
between those different designations? 
 
René Kinzett: Well a target seat, well a non-target seat which is what I thought was 
expected to be pretty much self sufficient, run a campaign to maximise 
new voters to vote for our party, to attract new party voters.  To attract 
new candidates and perhaps to make a start on key council target 
wards.  So in the local authority area that you think you can win votes 
in, to concentrate your efforts there.  
 
Now the party didn’t provide me with huge amounts of support to do 
that.  And indeed expected the campaign to evidence where it’d 
actually helped in some way a neighbouring or nearby seat that may 
have been a target seat.  
 
Now if you’re a target seat you will be expected to perform against 
certain criteria.  So the party will be more prescriptive in what it wants 
you to achieve and how it wants you to achieve it.  And there’s also that 
issue that if you’re a target seat you can apply to the Lord Ashcroft 
money which is a separate pot of funding, under the control of staff 
who are responsible to him and not Central Office.  And if you apply 
for that funding and get it, you are then expected again to perform to 
certain criteria and performance indicators or the money will be taken 
back or you won’t get another chance at it.  
 
Now in terms of social media and networking and so forth, it was quite 
different to see that it probably wasn’t so much target seat candidates 
getting involved in lots of Twitter conversations and lots of Facebook 
output.  They I think were much more directed towards that local level, 
traditional campaign output of leafleting, door knocking, local press 
and media management.  And the national campaign of what it could 
do to help win that seat. 
 
Interviewer: Is there a reason for that? 
 
René Kinzett: The reason for that I suppose is that Twitter and Facebook are not 
geographically discriminating.  I mean I may have had 250 people on 
my Facebook group but how many of them actually had a vote in 
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Swansea West either because of geographic issues or because of age of 
not being eligible to vote.  
 
So you could put lots of effort in to helping the party get a better image 
and gaining votes across the piste.  But if you’re a target seat candidate 
you’ve just got to ensure that you get more votes, one more vote than 
the nearest person to you, the next person down to win that seat.  
You’re going all out to win that one seat. 
 
Interviewer: In the 2010 General Election did all the candidates to your knowledge 
manage their own social media sites or were they given help to manage 
those? 
 
René Kinzett: It would depend on the size of the party association in question.  I mean 
as I said mine was a pretty much a cottage industry and I managed my 
tweets, my Twitter account, my Facebook group.  My own blog and 
other social media output as well as the writing the traditional leaflets, 
press releases and so on.  
 
In larger associations with more experienced members or more 
qualified members, places that could afford an agent or campaign 
organiser then that may be done by other people.  There may be more 
of a division of labour. 
 
Interviewer: And we haven’t yet mentioned in detail safe seats.  And those 
individuals that were standing for re-election that had no real risk of 
losing their seat.  What is the incentive for them to use social media 
within the Conservative Party? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes.  Well there’s always, nobody wants to turn or they shouldn’t want 
to turn down new support.  No matter if you’re in a safe seat or a 
marginal.   
 
There are examples of where Tory MPs in safe seats totally turn their 
back on social media.  For example one of the members of Parliament 
in the New Forest who was actually from Swansea, Dr Julian Lewis 
doesn’t have an email contact on his website because you know he says 
you know you need to write to me, I deal with so much correspondence 
that if I opened up to email then I’d be totally deluged.  And on that 
traditional method that only an MP’s constituent, somebody living in 
that constituency ought to be writing to that member about an issue in 
any case.  Then you should just be sending me a letter to my 
Constituency Office or my Parliamentary Office in Westminster. 
 
So there are examples of where members of Parliament in safe seats 
don’t engage at all in electronic media let alone social media.  But there 
are others who do better Peter Bottomley in Worthing; one of the 
Worthing seats has a great website showing his speeches, his diary, 
his…  What he’s doing that day, what the issues are.  So I think it will 
just go from MP to MP about how open they are to social media and 
electronic media.  
 
There may also be an age thing I mean this is just anecdotal but I 
wonder if many of the MPs in safe seats are perhaps older members of 
Parliament and perhaps aren’t as open to electronic media and social 
networking as younger members of Parliament. 
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Interviewer: You did mention David Cameron’s role as Leader of the Party earlier.  
Now you mentioned that he did play a role in leading the party in terms 
of social media and certainly his team at CCHQ London did that. 
 
However he also made a comment too many tweets make a twat.  Do 
you therefore see any conflict in those two statements? 
 
René Kinzett: No I think he was making the point in a humorous way that you’ve got 
to watch what you say.  If you’re sitting there endlessly tweeting about 
what you’re having for breakfast and other mundanities is one thing.  
You just carry on doing that.  
 
If you want to be more serious, have a political discussion that’s 
another way of using Twitter.  And then there’s another way, as I said 
that you know people who get in trouble for saying stupid things for 
saying insulting, insensitive, in appropriate things on Twitter.  Then 
you are going to find yourself in that category that David Cameron 
described of making a fool of yourself, of your colleagues, of your 
party for which you will pay the price. 
 
Interviewer: When then do candidates use Twitter? 
 
René Kinzett: I think there’s a certain amount of self aggrandisement in it.  I think 
there is a certain amount of vanity in that if I Tweet something I will 
have 11, 1200 people potentially reading it.  That’s quite good you 
know for somebody who isn’t currently a political party candidate and 
isn’t particularly well known outside of the party.  
 
So candidates tend to use Twitter I think to find that wider audience, to 
give vent to what they want to say.  And it’ll be interesting actually to 
see over the next few years those candidates that have used Twitter in 
regard to the 2010 election.  Now we’re obviously going to be 
considering candidates for the 2015 elect in the not too distant future.  
Whether or not a high profile on things like Twitter and Facebook will 
be a help or a hindrance to getting selected in a better seat.  
 
Now on one level you might say it’s a help because you’re going to 
have a name, I mean you got to party conference now and go to an 
event and you say “Oh I’m René Kinzett.”  And they say “Well my 
goodness good to meet you in the flesh at last because I’ve read 
everything that you’ve said on Twitter and your blog and Facebook.”  
I’m a member of your Group blah blah blah.  
 
So if you then go to a constituency association seeking nomination for a 
better seat then maybe they’ll say “Well we know him, we know his 
views.  We think he sounds okay.  We’ll have him.”  Obviously 
conversely those people who’ve been saying things like me might then 
find themselves “Well we don’t really want that kind of chap because 
we know his views on Saatchi and Saatchi.  Got in a bit of trouble 
about what he said on Facebook.  You know we think that he spends 
too much time writing about these things and actually we want a 
different kind of member of Parliament.”  
 
And that’s going to be critical because as we’ve said earlier the types of 
members, membership of the Conservative Party that make up the bulk 
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of the Members maybe less happy to consider people who are very 
active on social network.  Given their own degree of conservatism, 
cynicism or just general lack of knowledge about what social media’s 
all about. 
 
Interviewer: You’ve talked about how people have followed your social media 
communications.  Those presumably are weak relationships if you have 
not met that person in the flesh.  Do you or have you or do you intend 
to in the future use any innovative ways, experimental ways to adapt 
those weak connections into stronger links? 
 
René Kinzett: Absolutely and we did try that.  In the General Election 2010 in the run 
up we used Facebook and Twitter as a way of trying to attract people to 
come and do some physical work of actually getting leaflets out 
through doors.  
 
And we did have some success in that in that people would turn up with 
promise of refreshment and so forth.  As I said creating a Facebook 
event, getting people to consider coming along and helping.  So yes 
there are ways of doing that and they do work to a certain extent.  And 
also to come to social events and networking events and so on.  
 
So yes we have made some effort and I think party candidates using 
Twitter and Facebook do have an eye on well it’s all very good 
knowing this person virtually but leaflets don’t get delivered by virtual 
persons.  They get delivered by physical work.  So yes I think 
candidates have that in mind. 
 
Interviewer: In terms of usage, is there a greater intensity at any particular point in 
the parliamentary cycle?  We’re talking and focussing on the run-up to 
the general election we’re now post general election have you noticed 
any differences? 
 
René Kinzett: In the run-up to the general election I think tweeters became very much 
more partisan as we got nearer to the election date.  Either because they 
didn’t want to cause risk to their party in saying something that could 
be construed as against the party line in the run up to an election – 
being a very sensitive time.  Or because you get whipped up in the hype 
of the election and you want your side to do well so you keep to the 
line.  
 
But now in the post election period I suppose soon after May 2010 
sorry you may have thought that the traffic would die down.  But of 
course we’re in this wholly new situation of coalition government, 
peacetime coalition government for the first time in 80 years.  So we’re 
in that odd position now where the coalition itself the very existence of 
a coalition, the way that the anti Liberal Democrat tweeters can twist 
Liberal Democrat messages and say “Well you didn’t say this before 
the election.  Now you’re pushing through tuition fees and you’re at a 
different policy.”  
 
So the very existence and the modus operandi of this coalition is itself a 
huge issue on Twitter it’s massive.  So that’s now driving conversation 
and of course we’ve got referendum on the alternative vote that’s 
causing a lot of political traffic.  And so yes it hasn’t died down and I 
now just think that each time there is a significant event, an election, a 
137 
 
referendum, a policy issue, a policy change like tuition fees, 
demonstration, cuts to local services.  The spending review that soon, 
the budget that’s coming up soon.  All of these issues create another 
fresh wave of tweeting and blogging. 
 
Interviewer: You’ve just spoke greatly about Twitter.  But you also briefly 
mentioned Facebook events has the intensity, the use of Facebook 
events to organise campaigning and general party events changed since 
the general election? 
 
René Kinzett: Oh yes it’s fewer of them.  And I think if we’re not careful we’ll just 
sink back into our own networks again, our own actual physical party 
networks rather than... The trick won’t it, the trick will be who can 
harness and keep harvesting those new supporters who aren’t party 
members, who haven’t been party political, who joined up because 
electronic media is how they join things, is how they get involved in 
clubs and societies.  It’s how they organise their social lives and their 
calendars professionally and socially.  How do we keep those people on 
board now?  Or are they just going to dissipate?  Are we just going to 
allow those people just to shuffle off again and then have to start the 
process all over again at the next election? 
 
Interviewer: Well that leads me on to the next question because we’ve talked about 
the use of Facebook Groups and events for supporters.  And there 
maybe a couple of hundred supporters on that.  And we’ve also talked 
about weak, strong and weak relationships – those people that are 
registered on the Facebook events, how strong or how weak are those 
relationships in terms of using the leverage to get those individuals out 
to campaign?  Out of 200 people on your Facebook group how many of 
those would’ve come out in the 2010 General Election to help deliver 
leaflets? 
 
René Kinzett: About ten.  Yes absolutely and again because Facebook and Twitter are 
not geographically discriminating so out of the 250 on Facebook maybe 
only 50 or less were actually based in Swansea.  And of them only 
about 5 or 6 were willing to come out and deliver leaflets added to the 
existing number of activists.  We already had amongst things like our 
student group and other members.  
 
So yes it’s very difficult to get people to come out and do something.  I 
think it was a lot easier, well not a lot easier but in America when 
Obama’s team credit so much of their success to online recruitment and 
online organisation of activists, when you’re organising a nationwide 
campaign for a single elected, a post for a single person – the President 
of the United States of America you could coerce less people around 
that. 
 
When you’re fighting 650 parliamentary seats and you’re trying to get 
people to come out for you to deliver leaflets I think that’s a lot harder.  
I think what we’ve got to do in future is perhaps use social networking 
like Facebook to really draw people around the party nationally and the 
figure of the party leader.  
 
And perhaps there needs to be ways of then making sure that people 
who sign up nationally are told what’s going on in their area.  I mean 
the way that Facebook works, the way that other social networks work 
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I’m not sure if it would stand this level of interrogation of data.  But 
you know if you’ve got a national party campaign you know re-elect 
David Cameron as Prime Minister whether or not those people who 
then signed up in Luton, Leeds, Swansea will be, will be then their 
details will then be sent to the local association as somebody to go out 
and fire up for the campaign.  To do some physical work. 
 
Interviewer: You’re talking here about geography is there anything different about 
social media that allows a different approach to the geographical 
location of an activist or a party member? 
 
René Kinzett: Well yes I mean a party member or an activist or just a general 
supporter may want to sign up to their hometown.  They may want, 
they’re living in London but they sign up to their hometown, a 
candidate in their hometown.  
 
Now what do you with those people?  Do some of those people want to 
do anything geographically?  Do they want to actually come out and do 
something or are they happy just to sit as a, you know as a mark of 
support to that candidate?  Now the party has got to really kind of work 
out how it wants to engage those people to do things like telephone 
canvassing or electronic canvassing.  I mean I had an email the other 
day from the Liberal Democrat candidate for Swansea West.  Totally 
unsolicited email – I think they put on the bottom some small print 
about we sent you this email because once you provided us with your 
email address.  Now in my case I may have done when I was a Liberal 
Democrat but I know that everybody I know with an email address in 
Swansea had that e-communication from that candidate.  
 
Now somebody’s got to have organised that.  Somebody’s got to do 
that.  So could we not use the people that sign up on our Facebook 
groups and our Twitter who are you might think electronically savvy 
technically aware, should they not be engaged to do more aggressive E 
marketing and e-campaigning for the candidate that they support.  
Whether it’s through telephone canvassing, mass texts because you 
know the party uses text messages as well to get its messages across or 
emails or whatever it is. 
 
Interviewer: Is there then competition between candidates for the use of social 
media to attract potential activists and supporters who are not local to 
them? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes no absolutely.  If you’re fighting a target seat and all around you 
are non target seats then clearly it’s in your interests as the candidate in 
the target seat to attract more people on the social network than your 
rivals in your own party.  Locally you want to get people to come and 
sign up to you.  
 
And then within a constituency, there is a huge amount of activity 
absolutely to sign people up on Facebook.  I now use, on my leaflets I 
put out in the general election I had my Facebook page and my Twitter 
feed written on the leaflet for people to sign up to.  And whilst nobody 
would be so crass at this stage to say “Oh I’ve got 250 but he’s got 500 
therefore he’s winning an Election.”  Nobody would say that that it 
correlates to how you’re going to do in the general election, it certainly 
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is good for morale not just of the candidate but of the candidate’s team 
to know that you’ve got more people signed up than your rivals. 
 
Interviewer: So then is their direct competition in practical terms between 
candidates… 
 
René Kinzett: Yes I mean… 
 
Interviewer: …who have a presence on these sites? 
 
René Kinzett: No absolutely.  It’s a mark of popularity, it’s seen as a…  Again going 
back to the ego thing that yes people do want to have more followers, 
people do want to have more people signed up to their Facebook page.  
People will do that in a variety of manners of if you’ve got a thousand 
Facebook friends but only 90 people signed up to your page then you’ll 
be constantly harassing people to sign up to that.  You’ll be hoping to 
gain as many recommendations for follow Friday on Twitter as you 
can. 
 
So yes there is, there is healthy competition. 
 
Interviewer: And specific to your campaign, you for a non target seat achieved an 
award for your Twitter activity.  You were also known for mobilising a 
strong campaign in terms of gaining support from local supporters.  
How is that viewed in terms of the central party and do they use any 
methods to take those resources to other seats like the target seats for 
example? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes.  Absolutely good question.  I don’t know that they’ve got the 
tradition yet and the ability to monitor such activity so whereas an 
independent organisation like TweetMinster will actually publish their 
findings.  They did a report that put me something like third out of all 
of the candidates across all the political parties in the UK – the third 
most mentioned…  So the third most engaged with candidate, the 
fourth most re-tweeted of all the candidates across the UK. 
 
Now I’m not, the party itself hasn’t captured that data or analysed it I 
don’t think to say okay there is a correlation between like there was in 
my campaign between getting a large number of followers on Twitter 
and on Facebook.  And engaging those people to come out and help.  
But I don’t know if they would see that as a skill set that they would 
want to then export to another constituency using me or using the case 
study to try to put it on to another seat.  
 
I think you get more, you still get more recognition from Central Office 
for membership recruitment to the party membership or fundraising and 
so forth. 
 
Interviewer: In terms of your campaign were there any tangible benefits to the 
energies that you put into the social media activity in terms of the 
electoral result? 
 
René Kinzett: I don’t know if there was.  I mean we went up by nearly 5% and about 
2,000 more voters voted for us than in 2005.  And it was the first 
increase in the vote that we’d had since 1983.  How much of that you 
can have a direct correlation to my social networking is probably a 
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moot point.  But I would say that things like getting media coverage 
was not easier but certainly was more interactive whereas traditionally I 
would have to send out media releases to broadcast and print 
journalists.  With Twitter and Facebook being almost, being that 
constant source of my thoughts, ideas, views and opinions I found it 
refreshing that media output, managers, journalists and editors would 
actually come to me and say “Oh you’ve said this on Facebook or 
Twitter.  We’re really interested in this can we expand on it in an 
article?” 
 
Interviewer: Is what you’re saying then that rather than communicating directly with 
constituents over social media the benefits of the social media sites are 
to raise candidate profile in order to have a stronger relationship with 
the wider media? 
 
René Kinzett: Oh absolutely.  That is one aspect of it absolutely.  That using new 
media, social media can actually enhance your profile and therefore 
enhance the likelihood of you receiving coverage in traditional media 
which let’s face it in many parts of the country and many 
constituencies, traditional media will still be by far the most popular 
form of news consumption. 
 
Interviewer: Therefore let’s take a scenario that in the 2010 General Election you 
were still the candidate for Swansea West.  However you did not have 
any access to internet technologies.  Do you believe that you would 
have had the same voice as a candidate? 
 
René Kinzett: No I would.  But I wouldn’t say that’d be the same thing as saying I 
wouldn’t have got as many votes.  I can’t because I say because I can’t 
directly correlate that.  But what I can say is it would’ve been a less 
enjoyable campaign which is important when you’re trying to mobilise 
supporters and keep morale high.  I think we would’ve had fewer 
younger people helping us get leaflets out.  We had you know that.  It’s 
very easy to dismiss half a dozen more supporters as being not very 
much but when you’ve only got, you’re only starting with half a dozen 
or 12, half a dozen or a dozen that extra is a big increase. 
 
And as I said yes the media, and the wider media not just local but 
national, regional, sub regional media as well helps to I suppose what 
I’m looking for is to saying it makes it look as though you’ve got a 
more serious campaign.  It’s a bit like an army tactic of if you’ve only 
got a dozen people defending an installation keep them moving about 
to different positions because it makes it look as though there’s more of 
you.  
 
So I suppose with social media and networking is it’s a great way of, 
for little physical effort, for ensuring that your campaign is seen to a 
wider audience.  That it’s picked up on by those so those other 
traditional media networks and outputs that can get you wider 
coverage.  And it adds credibility to your campaign. 
 
Interviewer: Can key activists beside from candidates also be given this voice that 
you experienced in an election campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: Oh absolutely and there are key activists who are associated with 
different groups within the party.  So for example one of the groups I’m 
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involved in heavily is the Tory Reform Group.  They have a Twitter 
feed which is run by the officers of that group.  They are voluntary 
members of the party, they’re not party candidates yet they have a, a 
good voice on Twitter and the blogosphere.  
 
There are other groups likewise who do that.  So yes I think that party 
activists, key activists, key members of the voluntary party have a big 
role to play in developing the Conservative voice on Twitter. 
 
Interviewer: And how do key activists candidates and those at the top of the party 
communicate using internet technologies? 
 
René Kinzett: I think, well certainly when you’ve got things like elections to the 
national conservative convention and so forth.  And you’ve got internal 
party elections to different groups you get people setting up Facebook 
groups to support their candidacies.  You get Twitter feeds and so forth. 
 
So yes and just generally party members who hold office within the 
party but are not candidates in terms of public elections, they do use 
Twitter to communicate what they’re doing, what’s going on in the 
party.  The candidates department for example, the candidate assessors 
there are quite a few people who are on Twitter from that department. 
 
Interviewer: In your experience of the 2010 General Election were there any 
opportunities for key activists or candidates to express their views 
through social media to key figures at the top of the party? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes absolutely.  And some of that would be accidental in the sense that 
you’ve said something that wasn’t well received and therefore you’ll 
get a communication back.  Other times it’s more pleasant that you 
might say something on Twitter that’s agreed with and you’ll get a 
response back from a shadow minister.  
 
More recently I did a blog on trade union funding in local government 
and how much public money is being spent employing trade union 
officials.  Now I got a rather nice direct message then from the shadow 
minister for local government in the Conservative team at the National 
Assembly for Wales who wrote to me asking me for more opinions.  
And helping him to think about those issues. 
 
Interviewer: How did, I’ll start again.  Did the party use any other ways that we 
haven’t discussed to communicate with its candidates using the internet 
and give candidates access to party information? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes the intranet on the Conservative Party website.  There was an 
intranet there for key activists and candidates to use.  It had briefing 
notes, policy papers, images, logos, suggested stories – that kind of 
stuff.  There was also the other, there was also another website again 
that was aimed at candidates to again give them certain bits of 
information which was a log on, a password access. 
 
Interviewer: And how actively did you use the intranet? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes quite a lot to pull off press releases, draft press releases, logos, 
photographs, captions, suggested stories for leaflets and so forth. 
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Interviewer: Is there any benefit to using something like the intranet and email that 
is different to using traditional post and the traditional books like the 
notes for candidates for instance? 
 
René Kinzett: It’s cheaper for a start.  And it’s – and when you’ve got now a group of 
candidates that perhaps are from a socio demographic that just wants its 
information electronically.  I mean I don’t particular like getting huge 
amounts of paper post because it, you know recycling issues and waste 
of resources and clutter.  I prefer my news and information now 
electronically. 
 
I mean you know people who work, people who are in professional 
jobs rarely get memorandum or paper based documents now it’s all 
electronic distribution. 
 
Interviewer: It’s very easy for electronic information to be passed on to a third party 
or someone outside the political sphere.  Is there then a risk of security 
in using certain types of electronic media? 
 
René Kinzett: No absolutely.  I mean there’s…  But there is risk in, there’s risk in 
paper based documentation as well.  I mean I always say that if you’re, 
if you’re going to put something on paper or write it on electronic 
format and send it to somebody you’ve already lost security control 
anyway unless you are going to do what government does.  And set up 
a secure intranet the GSI system and password protect every single 
piece of communication you sent if it’s above a certain level of security 
requirement. 
 
Now there has been, I mean I have had stuff from the party where you 
do need a password to access the document.  Now I could just then 
print that document off and give it to somebody hardcopy but I can’t 
forward it to somebody without it being, without them having the 
password to open it. 
 
Interviewer: Were there any times during the run up to the 2010 Election campaign 
when the party that you were interacting with be that the local 
organisation or the national party, when they…  Did they express any 
concerns about security levels? 
 
René Kinzett: No I never heard anything about security levels except you know when 
we had the daily briefing email it would always just carry a Rider on it 
and saying “This is not for forward distribution this is for your own use, 
you know this is not for publication.” 
 
Interviewer: So then would you say that there has to be a level of trust within the 
party that the members that the national party is dealing with and the 
candidates are not passing this information on? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes absolutely I think that just has to be taken on trust but it also has to 
be expected that the information will probably get into the public 
domain or to other people.  I mean but the press and media are 
normally mature enough I mean something like the daily press briefing 
and the lines to take where it says “Not for publication.”  If you were 
just going to send that to a media outlet they’d just probably put it in 
the bin or just have a read of it and then you know it doesn’t contain 
anything sensitive. 
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Interviewer: I now have some very quick fire questions for you which are fine with 
very succinct answers.  How did you communicate with party members 
on the whole? 
 
René Kinzett: Mainly through email. 
 
Interviewer: And how often would you do this? 
 
René Kinzett: Daily during the general election campaign itself. 
 
Interviewer: What technologies would you use? 
 
René Kinzett: Email and Facebook. 
 
Interviewer: What applications of these technologies would you use? 
 
René Kinzett: Facebook email and Twitter direct messaging.  And just general Twitter 
tweets. 
 
Interviewer: How effective were those methods for you? 
 
René Kinzett: Email very effective in that we had the full party membership on the 
email and then Twitter, Twitter and Facebook were kind of secondary 
backups. 
 
Interviewer: Why did you prefer that over traditional methods? 
 
René Kinzett: Quick, easy, cheap. 
 
Interviewer: What was the use of language in terms of the way you were 
communicating?  Was it, for example formal sophisticated language or 
was it text speak like young people would use on a mobile phone or 
was it somewhere in between? 
 
René Kinzett: Somewhere in between informal conversational you know be here at 
the pub at eleven o’clock we’ll have a beer and sandwich afterwards. 
 
Interviewer: And was there much back and forth between you and the people you 
were communicating with or was it a case of you sending out a 
message and people would arrive wherever it was? 
 
René Kinzett: Twitter and Facebook lots of interaction, email usually one way. 
 
Interviewer: How was the style of communication on the internet different to other 
forms of communication? 
 
René Kinzett: So the internet was much more imparting of information almost like a 
shop front this is who I am, this is what we’re doing, this is why we’re 
here. 
 
Interviewer: How did CCHQ London communicate with party members? 
 
René Kinzett: CCHQ London communicated with party members that they had on a 
database through emails.  So they would be sending out daily email 
updates on what the campaign was doing but they were specifically 
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aimed at party members.  They would’ve been aimed at anybody that 
they had on their list as a potential Tory supporter. 
 
Interviewer: And you were a candidate in Wales, Wales is a Regional Office.  So 
what role did the regional office play in Cardiff? 
 
René Kinzett: Not much on electronic media mainly on approving drafts of election 
addresses. 
 
Interviewer: Were the communications that you were getting from CCHQ London 
and the communications that you were getting from CCHQ Wales 
synchronised in some way? 
 
René Kinzett: They were in some respects, in some respects not.  I mean we were 
getting communications on lines to take on certain policy issues but of 
course certain policy issues in a Westminster direction have no bearing 
on Wales because Wales has got so many devolved areas of 
responsibility.  So I think that they needed in some respects to be a 
clearer demarcation between what’s a Wales issue and what’s a 
Westminster issue. 
 
Interviewer: What methods did the Regional Office use to organise the 2010 
campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: The regional office used email and telephone calls. 
 
Interviewer: And what were the benefits and negatives of these? 
 
René Kinzett: I mean the regional office were only dealing with 40 parliamentary 
constituencies in – parliamentary candidates across Wales.  So I think 
that in that sense the email and telephone calls were probably the best 
way of doing it.  Because you didn’t really need to achieve too many 
economies of scale just trying to communicate with 40 candidates. 
 
Interviewer: What role do you think blogging played in the 2010 General Election 
campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: A lot to the people that it matters to but I don’t think much to the 
people who don’t read blogs.  I mean there were a certain amount of 
overspill stories from the blogosphere into the traditional media.  And 
certainly traditional media, broadcasters and print journalists do have 
an eye on what’s going on in the blogosphere.  But certainly I don’t 
think the blogosphere has an overbearing effect on how people vote. 
 
Interviewer: In terms of gaining votes do you think it is an effective use of time for a 
candidate in an election campaign to blog? 
 
René Kinzett: No. 
 
Interviewer: What is then the purpose of blogging for candidates? 
 
René Kinzett: Purpose of blogging for candidates it to develop their own narrative – 
who they are, what they are, what they believe in, what they think.  
What type of party they want their party to be.  What type of candidate 
will they be.  What kind of policies really get them going?  What 
interests them?  It’s their shop front, it’s themselves their shop front on 
145 
 
to the world. 
 
But during a campaign I would say that it’s one of the least effective 
tools. 
 
Interviewer: In terms of a crude percentage, what would you estimate was the 
percentage of time that you used on social media during your campaign 
as opposed to the amount of time that you used in traditional forms of 
campaigning? 
 
René Kinzett: Well leafleting and canvassing were by far the most amount of activity.  
So I would say that it’s going to be somewhere like an 80:20 split 
between traditional campaign methods and new media. 
 
Interviewer: And in terms of a differentiation between social media and email which 
in percentage terms took up the most time? 
 
René Kinzett: Again I would say that email probably took up the most time because 
you’re responding to more complex policy issues like constituents and 
people would say “Oh I’ve heard the Conservative Party have got this 
view on tuition fees, can you give me more information?” 
 
So I would say there it’s probably a closer 60:40 split between email 
and new media. 
 
Interviewer: And what types of emails were you dealing with on a daily basis? 
 
René Kinzett: Public enquiries about policy issues whether it’s just from a simple “Oh 
can you send me a copy of your party’s manifesto.”  Or “I’ve read your 
party’s manifesto, your policy on environment, health, social security 
whatever is this.  Can you give me more information?”  And 
journalists’ enquiries and then party communications like the deadline 
for leaflet number two is approaching can you make sure we have your 
photographs, your textbox.  Can you go and fill in the stuff online etc. 
 
So a bit of interaction, a bit of response and a bit of taking instruction. 
 
Interviewer: Did you feel compelled that you had to respond to all emails and if 
you’d chose not as a candidate would that of significantly impacted on 
your campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: I chose to respond to every email even if it was a polite refusal - you 
know somebody was trying to get me to commit to taking a position on 
something like abortion or on equality issues which I didn’t agree with.  
So I would just write a polite response back.  
 
I don’t think not responding to an email in of itself would cause you a 
problem but I think that in terms of the etiquette now that if somebody 
does write you an email you do feel that you need to respond within a 
day or so. 
 
Interviewer: At the time you were also leader of the Conservative group on Swansea 
Council.  You also held a professional role in terms of employment – in 
terms of time management what was the trade-off and how did you 
organise and manage your time? 
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René Kinzett: Well I had to take four weeks unpaid leave from work.  And during that 
four weeks of the campaign so early April to early May was just 
fulltime on the campaign. 
 
Interviewer: And how soon were you selected by the party.  And by which methods 
did the party select you as the candidate? 
 
René Kinzett: I was selected in late 2007 - October/November.  So it was a good two 
and a bit years until the General Election for me to, before the election 
came up.  And they used a usual turn up, party members turn up and 
vote at a general meeting of the party.  
 
There were no postal votes, there were no primaries and it was only 
party members of more than three months standing who could vote. 
 
Interviewer: In terms of the candidates selection process at any stage of that process 
was electronic communication used? 
 
René Kinzett: No we weren’t allowed to.  We could only, oh only the party the 
association sent out to party members the notice of the selection and the 
candidate profiles that we were able to submit to the local party. 
 
Interviewer: And in terms of communication between you and the candidates’ 
department in terms of application for various seats, what methods did 
the party use to administer that? 
 
René Kinzett: Emails telling you which seats were coming up, when and giving you a 
form to fill in that you then had to print outside and send back along 
with a passport photograph and so on.  But they used emails to tell you 
when seats were coming up for grabs. 
 
Interviewer: Would you then respond by email or were you expected to respond in a 
traditional manner? 
 
René Kinzett: You were able to respond by email but you had to follow it up with a 
traditional paper based application form by post. 
 
Interviewer: What role did the local association play in your campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: The local association is the base at which you get your agent, the 
chairman of the constituency, the treasurer and so forth.  So they played 
a role in setting the budget, agreeing well how much I could spend.  
And they also provided the legal agent for all the paperwork that comes 
with standing for an election.  
 
But in terms of campaign strategy and execution I had carte blanch. 
 
Interviewer: Did the internet and electronic communication methods play any role in 
that part of your campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: No. 
 
Interviewer: What methods did you employ to mobilise your supporters? 
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René Kinzett: Facebook messages, putting out Twitter feeds, Twitter tweets that we 
were going to be meeting in certain places.  Asking people to come 
along and email. 
 
Interviewer: In your campaign which were the most effective methods to reach your 
objectives? 
 
René Kinzett: In terms of objectives getting people to come out and help I’d say the 
most successful were Facebook and email.  In terms of gaining media 
coverage I’d say it’d be Twitter and Facebook.  And in terms of getting 
people out to vote I’d say it was legwork. 
 
Interviewer: Why would you consider that to be the case for all three of those 
examples? 
 
René Kinzett: Well with getting people to come and help get the vote out, to get 
people to come and help the campaign I needed to really focus my 
efforts on the younger members of the party who were most likely to 
come out on a day to day basis for a good few hours.  Rather than you 
know come out every other day for half an hour before their knees gave 
up. 
 
So I needed to communicate to them in a certain form so that was 
Facebook group messages, Facebook events and email.  To get to the 
media I needed a way that I didn’t have to just send out reams and 
reams and reams of paper or send lots and lots of addresses in an email 
that can be time consuming putting an email together.  So for getting 
press coverage it was really good just to put something out there on 
Twitter that I’d written on my blog or was on Facebook that they could 
come back to me on.  
 
And then in terms of getting people actually to get out and vote, 
especially in the last week of the campaign, you’ve got to be on the 
doors.  You’ve got to be putting bits of paper through people’s 
letterboxes.  They’ve got to have something immediate in their hand 
that they can respond to. 
 
Interviewer: Focussing on the social media and electronic methods that you’ve just 
described, would other candidates in the general election have been at a 
disadvantage if they hadn’t employed those methods to mobilise the 
types of supporters that you had? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes I would say so especially in a seat that’s a non target seat and 
where you don’t have a large membership. 
 
Interviewer: On the whole how did you communicate with constituents? 
 
René Kinzett: Leaflets. 
 
Interviewer: Did you attend hustings? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: And were the hustings, were there any electronic methods used to 
organise the hustings? 
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René Kinzett: Not from the org…  Well the organisers would coordinate with the 
candidates through email.  And I’m sure the organisers also sent out 
emails to their members.  
 
So for example we had a hustings organised by a church group and I’m 
sure the church group would’ve told their members it was happening 
electronically. 
 
But I would also back that up with Tweets and Facebook messages of 
my own telling people who you know who supported me or followed 
me that I would be at such and such a hall at a hustings. 
 
Interviewer: Did you have a campaign website? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: And how was that used? 
 
René Kinzett: That was used by me to put out press releases, events, news about what 
I was up to, photographs and so on. 
 
Interviewer: How would your site have compared to a target seat? 
 
René Kinzett: Not very different really.  They would’ve had more visits from 
important people I suppose to have shouted about.  But in terms of what 
it looked like and what it was saying generally then no. 
 
Interviewer: And what is the central purpose to having a website in a campaign? 
 
René Kinzett: Is to be your shop front.  Is for people locally if they Google your name 
or the party constituency or whatever it is that they find you.  It drives, 
it provides a contact point.  It helps you to identify, you know you’ll 
want to have a fill in a form to support our campaign. 
 
Its primary purpose is to raise awareness; secondary issues are to again 
be a recruitment tool to get people to contact you on certain issues.  
And to be, yes just to be visible. 
 
Interviewer: Was there any kind of continuity between your site at a local level and 
the national campaign sites? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes because as I said I bought in to the CCHQ’s design and build 
website plan.  So yes it…  And there was Twitter feeds, newsfeeds, 
RSS feeds from the national site onto my site. 
 
Interviewer: And did you have any technical support from the party? 
 
René Kinzett: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: And what would you consider to be the most typical for a candidate?  
Would they have used that type of system or would they have used 
their own site? 
 
René Kinzett: I think typically they would’ve used the Central Office’s site. 
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Interviewer: How did local members in your campaign communicate amongst 
themselves? 
 
René Kinzett: The younger members would be using Twitter and Facebook.  And the 
older members would be using email. 
 
Interviewer: Now that’s a generalisation. 
 
René Kinzett: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: Would there be examples of individuals within those two groups that 
you’ve identified that perhaps an older member used Facebook and a 
younger member used email? 
 
René Kinzett: Oh absolutely yes. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  And what benefits to the party organisation in your mind is the 
role of the internet? 
 
René Kinzett: Increasingly in, increasingly because party members have got less time 
on their hands to attend meetings.  They’ve got less time on their hands 
to be officers of the party.  So I think that yes electronic media, social 
media is a great way of keeping what would otherwise be a looser 
network of people in an area into a tighter and more frequent 
communications. 
 
Interviewer: Does it have any downsides? 
 
René Kinzett: No I don’t think it does no.  Exclusion maybe, exclusion of those 
people who aren’t comfortable with social media. 
 
Interviewer: And would you consider those people that aren’t, are they feeling left 
out? 
 
René Kinzett: No because I don’t think that it has completely replaced things like 
emails to those people as I said lots of people are on email now.  I don’t 
think it’s replaced that and indeed local Associations still do send out 
some paper based notifications of meetings and minutes and so forth. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that that will continue to be the case that the party’s 
organisation will be run with both traditional methods and new 
methods?  Or do you think there will come a time when the electronic 
methods will completely…? 
 
René Kinzett: Oh yes, yes the traditional methods will wither on the vine over time. 
 
Interviewer: And what is, thinking outside the box, the potential for the use of the 
internet in terms of electioneering? 
 
René Kinzett: I think much more capturing of information.  If we can capture 
everybody’s email address.  If email address became as available as 
telephone numbers.  If email addresses we could really harness, harvest 
the information and then harness that power to communicate on a daily 
basis or a weekly basis with constituents.  I think that’s a really big 
move forward for my thinking. 
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Interviewer: Presumably then an email address for a constituent or a member of the 
party or a supporter is a valuable, tangible piece of information.  What 
methods did you invest in to get access to that type of information? 
 
René Kinzett: Contact filling where you’re asking people to send back comments 
about things.  You’re asking people if they’ve got a problem about 
something you always have now a line asking for email address.  In fact 
I rarely ask for postal address now it’s kind of just postcode, house 
number, email address, telephone number. 
 
Interviewer: We’re coming to the end now and I just wondered if there were any 
further comments that you have or something that sprung to mind while 
you were speaking that we haven’t addressed.  That you think would be 
pertinent or relevant to the topic? 
 
René Kinzett: No I think we’ve covered everything. 
 
Interviewer: Okay thank you very much for your time. 
 
René Kinzett: Thank you. 
 
END AUDIO 
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8. Robin Walker 
 
Role in 2010:  Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Worcester (target seat) 
Other Roles:   Elected Conservative Member of Parliament for Worcester  
 
Interview Date: 28 March 2011 
Duration:  0:37:02 
 
START AUDIO 
 
Anthony: Anthony Ridge-Newman interviewing Robin Walker MP.   
 
So, Robin.  How did you first become involved with the Conservative 
Party? 
 
Robin: Well I have been involved one way or another all my life because my 
father was in politics before me and so I first volunteered and helped 
out in an election campaign in 1997 off my own bat and worked for 
Stephen Dorrell as his driver during that election campaign.   
 
Anthony: Did the internet play a role in the campaign at that time? 
 
Robin: Not for me, no.  And I don't think it was playing an important role for 
the party.  The closest we got was using some very early versions of the 
type of software that gets you from place to place which were 
incredibly inaccurate and not very useful.  
 
Anthony: So what was the kind of campaigning that you employed in that 
campaign? 
 
Robin: Very much face to face physical campaigning.  I was driving him 
around the country as a cabinet minister to go to as many target seats as 
possible.  Of course the idea of a target seat in 1997 was a bit ridiculous 
but we visited about one hundred of them and I think we lost every 
single one.   
 
Anthony: And what was your role in the 2010 General Election? 
 
Robin: In the 2010 Election I was the candidate for Worcester and I am very 
pleased to say that I won.  
 
Anthony: Congratulations. How did you communicate with your campaign team 
during that time? 
 
Robin: In a number of different ways.  I mean, personal contact still remains 
hugely important but certainly email and mobile phones have 
transformed the ease of getting hold of people and so it was very useful 
in terms of coordinating the campaign, both being able to email people 
directly myself and ring people up directly myself, but also in the office 
being able to do so.  
 
Anthony: And how did the party communicate with you during that process? 
 
Robin: Again, through a combination of different ways.  There were events 
that we were brought to be briefed so we got that face to face contact.  
There were regular emails from the party and there were also letters 
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through the post which were probably less useful because they tended 
to arrive rather late.  
 
Anthony: In your campaigning and your accessing background information did 
the internet play a particularly important role in your campaign? 
 
Robin: In terms of accessing information, certainly it is always there and it 
makes it a lot easier, for instance to search what has been in the local 
newspaper.  You can go online and looking at the online media is a 
good way of keeping up with the letters being sent in and the comments 
being made by the public.  But it was by no means the only means of 
campaigning and a large part of my campaign was old-fashioned door 
knocking and delivering of paper leaflets.  
 
Anthony: Did the party in any way give you information on a day-to-day basis 
using the internet? 
 
Robin: They did send information on a day-to-day basis but actually a lot of 
the time the information that you digested and used was the information 
that you had first hand from briefings with the party leader or with the 
higher echelons of the party.  And so I think a combination of the two is 
important and sending things by email in isolation would never have 
worked and we would never have got our messages across.   
 
Anthony: In terms of your campaign in the run up to the 2010 Election, how 
actively did you use the internet? 
 
Robin: I had a website and I tried to update that website regularly but I would 
say it was probably a first generation internet website which was 
largely about providing straightforward information rather than being 
heavily interactive.  I never use Twitter.  I did use Facebook but not so 
much as an active campaigning tool or as an organisation tool to 
organise my own supporters.  And I think the internet was definitely 
part of the campaign.  It was part of the campaign from an early stage 
bearing in mind that I was campaigning for four years before I got 
elected. But it was not at the heart of it.  The heart of it was really an 
effort to meet people face to face to get around Worcester and to see the 
public.  
 
Anthony: Did you use the internet in any capacity outside your political life? 
 
Robin: Yes.  I had in my City life, in my work, used the internet.  Again, as a 
tool for research more than anything else but also with companies I 
used to advise I occasionally had to advise them on their website.  So it 
was something that I was very aware of and it was definitely a tool 
there that I was used to using.  
 
Anthony: Did the internet play any role in the candidate selection process? 
 
Robin: Not to my knowledge although there was a work organisation sort of 
task during the candidate selection process in which you had to 
prioritise responding to emails or letters or things that you had seen on 
the internet.  So I suppose that was probably the only place in which it 
actually raised its head.  
 
Anthony: And did the Candidates' Department communicate with you by email? 
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Robin: Yes they did.  And they also did provide some information online and 
certainly the party provided some information online.  The extent to 
which you can actually use that during the busy period of an election 
campaign is limited because it does take time to go through these things 
and check them and one of the things I rapidly discovered once the 
election campaign properly kicked off was that I didn't have a lot of 
time to sit in my office and look at the information that was being 
provided on the internet.  
 
Anthony: And how did you campaign and correspond with constituents? 
 
Robin: I tried to respond to emails within a reasonable time all the way up until 
the election.  I have to say in the last few weeks of the election I had to 
stop and I had to put an “Out of Office” response on my email which 
said that I wouldn't be able to get back to them before the election itself 
because I was just too busy getting round, pressing the flesh, doing the 
hustings.  And I think in that moment that was the right approach to 
take.  I don't think it would have been right to sit inside and respond to 
all my emails at the expense of getting out and meeting the public.  
 
Anthony: So in an election campaign does a candidate have to employ their 
judgement at specific times to decide when and when not to use the 
internet? 
 
Robin: Yes.  I think that's absolutely right and I think also they have got to look 
at their constituency, they have got to look at their constituents and how 
many of those people they are likely to reach through the internet.  I 
was always very clear that the internet was an important tool but it was 
not going to reach the whole of my constituency.  There were a lot of 
people who didn't necessarily have a computer in their home in 
Worcester and getting the message across to those people was just as 
important as reaching those who could communicate online. 
 
Anthony: In your experience, how did CCHQ London communicate with party 
members during the election campaign? 
 
Robin: Again, a combination of the internet, email and snail mail post.  As I 
say, I think we were seeing during this election campaign a period in 
which the old-fashioned paper approach was becoming less and less 
effective.  So I think it was good that they did organise themselves to 
communicate electronically as well.  But as ever, the party will reach 
out to all its members and try and communicate but it won't necessarily 
reach all of them.  
 
Anthony: How effective, in your opinion, was the party's communication 
methods? 
 
Robin: Fairly.  I wouldn't say amazingly.  But I think they did manage to get 
their points across and certainly we were given regular updates.  As I 
say, as a candidate you have to divide your time very carefully and you 
can't always spend your time reading those updates.  Sometimes you 
need to be out there responding to the public and so it is up to the 
individual whether it is a candidate or a member how much time they 
are going to spend listening to what the party has to say as opposed to 
getting on with the campaigning. 
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Anthony: In your opinion, does the internet have some further opportunity for the 
party to communicate with its members in election campaigns? 
 
Robin: Yes, absolutely.  I am sure technologies will continue to develop and 
certainly things like the move from Blue Chip to Merlin which is more 
internet enabled and the promised golden land in which we can all have 
hand-held PDA's which give us the latest figures on Merlin all sounds 
brilliant.  We really haven't seen it work in practice yet and so getting 
that kind of system to deliver securely is very important.  Obviously 
there would be concerns about putting a system like that somewhere 
where the public or indeed your political opponents could get their 
hands on it and that is where we have to be very careful in developing 
these things, that we develop them effectively and securely. 
 
Anthony: Did you use Merlin in your campaign? 
 
Robin: Massively, yes.  We had used Blue Chip for most of the run up to the 
campaign but we did manage to transfer across and thanks to my very 
good agent we did manage to get Merlin up and running and use it 
effectively in the last few months of the campaign.  
 
Anthony: What are the main differences between Blue Chip and Merlin? 
 
Robin: I wasn't really at the sharp end of this, but from what I saw it is largely 
a question of interface.  Merlin is a much friendlier interface, it is much 
easier to use and it can provide you with much more relevant and 
targeted information than the Blue Chip system.  The Blue Chip system 
was getting on for twenty years old and it was beginning to show.  I 
think with Merlin it was a step forward, but it is still a pretty clunky 
piece of software and you could see the real difference between the 
business world in which you have a huge market, and therefore the 
software gets developed very quickly, and very effectively, and the 
political world in which the market is actually a lot smaller. Therefore 
the software is rather slower, more out of date and clunkier. And I 
suspect that is not going to change any time soon.  
 
Anthony: Does the internet play a potential role in the future of Merlin? 
 
Robin: Yes, I'm sure it does.  And I'm sure in allowing that communication but 
the key there has to be security and if you put something like that 
through the internet and if you use cloud based approaches and that sort 
of thing you have to be very clear that you have got a responsibility to 
guard people's private information and keep it to yourselves, both a 
responsibility and an interest. 
 
Anthony: Did your regional office employ methods to help organise your 
campaign? 
 
Robin: They tried. 
 
Anthony: What were the pros and cons of those methods? 
 
Robin: The regional organisation was there to support us and the most effective 
method was when they actually sent someone along to attend meetings 
and to actually talk to us face to face.  I'm afraid, along with all the 
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other information that we got sent, the things that they sent 
electronically or by post didn't necessarily get paid a huge amount of 
attention. 
 
Anthony: And what role did the local association play in the 2010 General 
Election? 
 
Robin: An enormous role and there was no doubt we needed the local 
association in order to run the campaign.  They were a key part of it.  It 
is, as is usual with these things, the same small band of people who 
contribute a huge amount and there was no way I could have done it 
without them.  
 
Anthony: And what role did the internet play in the organisation of the local 
party? 
 
Robin: Very little because the local party, a large number of the people 
involved would not be regular users of the internet or even if they were 
they would prefer to come along to meetings and get involved face to 
face.  And so actually the internet was not something we used 
particularly to organise local party, except for our younger members 
and in terms of organising events and getting people along from CF, 
that was done through things like Facebook and certainly through 
email. 
 
Anthony: Is there a digital divide between the demographic of the members? 
 
Robin: Yes, I think it is fair to say there is a bit of digital divide generationally 
although there are always exceptions to that rule.  Some of our oldest 
councillors are actually the most proficient users of email.  But overall, 
it is fair to say that younger people are more comfortable using the 
internet and more comfortable using email and that the older members 
tend to be a little bit more wary of it or treat it more like old media and 
so use email but use it like a letter and that means it is less effective as 
a tool for instant communication. 
 
Anthony: Did you engage with Facebook? 
 
Robin: Yes I have my own profile on Facebook which I think I am right in 
saying I had before I was a candidate.  But certainly I have been on 
Facebook for a long time and I decided about halfway through my 
campaign that I ought to politicise that a little bit and started using the 
limited profile status for people who are political friends but also 
started to put a little bit more political information on there.   
 
Towards the end of the campaign we discovered ways of directly 
linking Facebook with my website so when I put a new press release on 
my website it would go on a fan page on Facebook and that was a much 
more effective way of using it.  Because one of my concerns, and 
perhaps the reason why I never blogged or used Twitter, was that to use 
a tool like that and then not update it regularly could imply that you 
weren't keeping busy and you weren't doing a lot.  I was very 
concerned about that and so I wanted to find a way that when I did put 
something on my website proactively that would be reflected on 
Facebook and show that I was doing something.  But also not to have to 
spend hours of my time updating Facebook to show that I was busy.  
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Anthony: Did you use a website during your campaign? 
 
Robin: Yes. www.walker4worcester.com.   
 
Anthony: And how did you use it? 
 
Robin: I used it to put my press releases out on, speeches up on and campaigns.  
To put photographs of my campaign up on so people could see what 
was going on.  When I launched it first we actually put a discussion 
forum on there but we found that it got overwhelmed with spam and 
very little of any use was contributed to it.  I think that rather than 
having an open blog in which all my opponents could have come and 
attacked me, I decided at the end of the day it was better just to stick 
out my public statements and to get involved in the debate, whether it is 
debate to be had through other means, through live debate and through 
the media. 
 
Anthony: Was there any link between your website and social media? 
 
Robin: As I say, late in the campaign we worked out how to link it into 
Facebook and we started to use it so every time a press release went up 
there was an update on Facebook and that was really the only direct 
link with social media.   
 
Anthony: Do you think that was effective in getting your message across to your 
constituents? 
 
Robin: I think it was effective in getting my message across to my younger 
members of the association and the organisation.  I think because I am 
probably only in the hundreds rather than the thousands of friends on 
Facebook.  I don't think it is necessarily an effective campaigning 
technique and I would rely on other methods of campaigning. 
 
Anthony: Do you have any thoughts on Twitter and the use of it in political 
engagement? 
 
Robin: I think it can be very effective, but I do have the concern that you can 
become a bit of a slave to it on occasion and that you can tweet for the 
sake of tweeting rather than because you have something important to 
say and I think that is a risk of Twitter or indeed the over use of any 
social media.  But clearly in terms of engaging political journalists and 
that side of things it can be a useful way of getting a message across 
and certainly I do keep an eye on the Twitter page of my local political 
journalist. 
 
Anthony: David Cameron appeared at least to lead the way in terms of the use of 
the internet in the party with WebCameron.  He then went on to say 
later that “too many tweets make a twat”.  Is there any contradiction in 
that statement? 
 
Robin: No, I don't think there is actually because I think WebCameron was a 
way of getting a message across in a different way, communicating 
with a lot of people more effectively.  I think his point about Twitter 
was exactly the point that I just made, that sometimes it becomes self-
serving in a sense in that you are out there trying to say something in 
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order to be funny, in order to be listened to rather than in order to get a 
genuine point across.  WebCameron was, if you like, the second 
generation web media and Twitter is the third generation.  I think it is 
legitimate to draw a distinction between the two.  I have no doubt 
Twitter can be used as an effective campaign tool but I think it takes a 
certain type of politician to do it and we shouldn't all pretend to be that 
type of politician.  
 
Anthony: How many people in your local party joined Facebook groups to do 
specifically with your campaign? 
 
Robin: I would say probably about 10% of the local party would have been 
involved in joining Facebook groups and following them.  But certainly 
predominantly the younger members and in terms of the local CF 
group, the vast majority of them. 
 
Anthony: And out of that 10% what percentage would you say actually came out 
to actively campaign in a pragmatic way? 
 
Robin: Those 10% by nature were among the more active by the very fact that 
they had got involved with the group, but it is still a relatively small 
percentage.  At the end of the day with any election campaign you find 
there is a hard core of people who do a huge amount of the work and 
whilst other people will come along from time to time and get involved 
from time to time it is that hard core that you keep returning to.  And so 
it would be probably less than half of that 10% for certain who would 
be the people who actively came out time and time again.  That is not to 
say that all of them didn't get involved at some point or another. 
 
Anthony: Did you employ any use of Facebook in order to encourage people out 
on the ground? 
 
Robin: Yes we did start creating through Facebook and also through the party's 
own equivalent, the MyConservatives website.  We did do a few 
updates of campaigning activity and sent those across and we found we 
got a reasonable response to that.  It was a similar level of response to 
what you would expect to send an email out to a targeted group of 
people and so not by any means the majority, but a significant minority 
who would actually respond and say “Yes, I will come along”.  And so 
it is another way of getting that message across, another way of letting 
people know that something is happening.  
 
Anthony: How did the MyConservatives website work? 
 
Robin: It basically worked as a social media networking website to reach 
people who had clearly signed up to support the party with a message 
of what you were up to, what you were doing and also usefully to raise 
money and to get donations from people.  It has been one of my 
complaints that I discovered very rapidly when I did a big charity walk 
using JustGiving about how incredibly easy it is to raise money for 
charity online and I was complaining to the party for years that they 
didn't have something similar.  Actually with the MyConservatives 
website they got close to something which was nearly as effective, it 
was not quite up there with JustGiving, but certainly it was a big 
improvement on what there was before.  And we did raise a few 
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hundred quid for it.  We didn't raise tens of thousands, but we raised 
some money for the campaign which was certainly helpful. 
 
Anthony: Do you have any recommendations on how it could be improved? 
 
Robin: Well I think they just need to look at charity websites like JustGiving 
and that sector to see how these things could be done, could be made 
even more effective.  Clearly they have challenges to overcome in 
terms of the Slater rules and in terms of making sure that there are 
people giving multiple donations which charities wouldn't have but I 
am sure that the technology will develop over time.  And I think if 
anything it will be useful for the party to have a website of that sort 
running all year round and even in peacetime because actually one of 
the big challenges we have as an association is raising the money we 
need to keep going.  It would be very useful if the party was directing 
people towards a website where they could support their local 
association and simply give small donations when they can afford to.  
That is certainly something that I would support. 
 
Anthony: Do you consider the internet to be playing any role in Conservative 
Party organisation? 
 
Robin: Well I don't know whether Conservative Party organisation.  In this 
place we do largely get that organisation through the whips and through 
direct email contact from Central Office.  But certainly the internet is 
playing a huge role in the party in its discussion with the grassroots and 
ConservativeHome has made notable strides in that area as a website 
that really does reach a huge number of people within the party.  I can 
pretty much guarantee if there is a controversial article in 
ConservativeHome I will hear from members of my association about 
that issue and so that has been very effective in a way that strangely 
none of the other political parties have managed to match.  
 
Anthony: Do you interact regularly with ConservativeHome? 
 
Robin: Not over regularly.  I generally consider my job is to get on with 
focusing on my constituency and communicating with my constituents 
rather than communicating with the Conservative Party at large and so 
that has been my priority.  But if ConservativeHome ask me to write 
pieces I am happy to do that and where they have covered topics in 
Parliament they will sometimes pick up on what I am doing.  I am 
always very happy to speak with them as I am to any journalists and I 
know that they will give us a fair hearing.  
 
Anthony: Did you access ConservativeHome during your election campaign? 
 
Robin: Yes. 
 
Anthony: And what, for you, was the point of that? 
 
Robin: Partly to get good ideas of what other people were up to.  To get tips for 
campaigns and useful things that we could take on.  Partly to see what 
the mood of the party was on some issues and keep abreast of that.  
And partly, as with any candidate I suspect, as a tool for self promotion 
and where you are involved with something positive you want to try 
and get it out there.  And certainly we got a nice article up there two 
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weeks before the election about a Labour defector showing that we 
were making good progress in Worcester.  I think that helps, not just 
our own egos, but also to keeps the morale of local party up when they 
go on there and have a look at something and see that your good works 
are getting reported on.  And so I think it is a useful tool in that respect.  
 
Anthony: You identified ConservativeHome as playing a role in Conservative 
Party organisation, especially in terms of the grassroots.  What 
elements of ConservativeHome would you pinpoint as playing a role in 
that organisation? 
 
Robin: I think the discussions that it is able to have on issues like candidate 
selection, on issues of policy and the fact that they are able to attract the 
big hitters to come and write for them makes it attractive.  The fact that 
it really is an open forum and that there is widespread debate on there is 
positive.  The only negative there is obviously it is a place for people to 
sound off and in terms of party unity it is not always helpful.  There 
will always be negative comments which unfortunately our opponents 
can pick up and use in their literature and that was certainly used 
against me in the election, that Labour did put things on leaflets which 
came from comments on ConservativeHome.  But on balance, I think it 
is a good organ of debate and it is useful for the party to be able to have 
those debates.  
 
Anthony: The party has talked a lot about transparency in government and using 
the internet to do that.  Would you see the application of 
ConservativeHome the equivalent for that in terms of party 
organisation? 
 
Robin: I think transparency is a great thing and making information available 
over the internet is logical rather than storing and sending massive 
reams of paper here, there and everywhere but I am not sure you can 
necessarily draw across comparisons from the way ConservativeHome 
works as a discussion within a political party and the way you want the 
Government to work.  I think inevitably even where these organisations 
have great reach they are always going to represent a minority of 
people and that if you had an online community trying to run the 
country you would get a slightly distorted world view.  I think you need 
to reach more broadly than that whilst appreciating the opportunities 
that exist for government and for political parties in the internet. 
 
Anthony: Do you think ConservativeHome and blogs like them should be 
controlled from the Centre? 
 
Robin: No.  I don't think they would have any credibility if they were and I 
think it is very important that they are not.  Clearly the key success of 
ConservativeHome has been showing that it is free spoken and often 
outspoken but also that it is has got the best interests of the party at 
heart and I think where I sometimes fall out with them is where I feel 
that they are not doing that and that they are not serving the party's 
interests.  It is healthy that they should be independent but that they will 
only continue to attract the huge following that they do as long as they 
show that they are supporting the party's general interest. 
 
Anthony: And in terms of the interaction with ConservativeHome, who would 
you say its main audience is? 
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Robin: Its main audience are broadly Conservative people who are interested in 
politics.  And certainly people who are politicos of all sorts I suspect 
dip into it to see what is going on because they understand its power 
and its influence.  As I say, a lot of members of my local party do read 
it and pick up on it and it is influential in that respect in the way that 
perhaps ten or twenty years ago you would expect The Times, 
Telegraph and the Mail to be but actually I think the newspapers are 
losing some of that influence. 
 
Anthony: Which is the most influential Conservative blog? 
 
Robin: From my perspective, again I come back to ConservativeHome.  There 
are others, there are a lot of good ones out there but I don't have a great 
deal of time for browsing blogs and reading them all and that is the first 
one I will tend to go to.   
 
Anthony: How effective is the party using the internet in your opinion? 
 
Robin: More effectively than any other party, I think is the first point to make.  
But I think there is still undoubtedly further to go.  I think over time as 
the technology develops there will be more opportunities to use the 
internet.  But I think we have to be very wary and this is where 
WebCameron was clever.  WebCameron did focus on giving people a 
close personal view of David Cameron.  We have to be wary and I 
think it distances us from our public and our electorate and we need to 
use the internet as a tool of communication and a tool to bring people 
closer, not a tool to keep them at bay.  And that is where we need to be 
careful that we don't go too far down the route of relying on a 
technology to get across what, at the end of the day, is a personal 
message and a very personal gain in politics, trying to persuade people 
that you are the right person to represent them.  
 
Anthony: If the internet had not been allowed to be used during your campaign 
how would your role as a candidate have been different? 
 
Robin: That is a very interesting question.  I am not sure it would have been 
massively different.  I think I would have perhaps had to spend a bit 
more time struggling to get my message in front of journalists and 
make sure that it came across to people.  But actually, a lot of my 
campaign was based on leaflets which we were hand delivering, getting 
out to people.  It was based on door knocking, it was based on seeing 
people face to face.  And so in terms of the allocation of time on my 
campaign, apart from perhaps multiplying the number of emails I 
responded to as opposed to letters, it wouldn't have made an enormous 
difference if the internet hadn't been there.  I think we use the internet 
as an effective tool to bolster all the other work that we are doing and 
so in that respect it wouldn't have helped me because I think we 
probably had a better online presence than the competition.  But I don't 
think it would have actually transformed the way I fought the election.  
 
Anthony: Do you feel you have more of a voice in using the internet as a back 
bench MP, previously as a target seat candidate? 
 
Robin: Yes, I think the internet does allow you to reach a further audience.  It 
does allow you to post up what you have said and what you feel about 
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things in a way that you couldn't do in the old media except by going 
out and speaking to public groups.  And that is helpful.  It is certainly 
helpful being able to relay that information.  And for instance being 
able to put out a response to the budget on the day of the budget and not 
having to depend on the amount of space your local newspapers can 
give you in order to do that.  It has its uses but I think it is really 
important that we understand that it is just one medium, it is just one 
tool and transformative though it can be, it doesn't replace personal 
communication. 
 
Anthony: Do you think that has the potential to change over time? 
 
Robin: It has the potential to become a more and more important medium over 
time.  I don't think it will every transcend that.  I don't think it will ever 
replace human interaction.  I think it would be a very sad world if it 
did.  
 
Anthony: And are there any security risks to using the internet for political 
communication? 
 
Robin: Undoubtedly.  I think one of my colleagues here found, although he 
didn't use Twitter, someone was able to set up a Twitter account in his 
name and make unacceptable political statements in his name.  That's 
concerning.  I think, going back to the party use of the internet, the 
personal data is at risk once you use the internet and I think that is a 
serious concern.  Misrepresentation of all forms is very easy and that is 
something we need to be wary of.  But having said that, it can also be a 
way of getting a message across to a huge number of people, so it is 
something that the party I'm sure will keep a very close eye on, the 
legal implications of everything they are doing on the internet and be 
very wary of the risks.  But that we should clearly, as we have with 
every technology, embrace the opportunities that it can give us and 
make the most of it to get our message across.  
 
Anthony: You have talked about your involvement in earlier campaigns previous 
to your own.  Has there been a different trend since then in terms of the 
use of the internet within the party? 
 
Robin: It has certainly grown.  It has certainly become more important.  I 
remember in 1997 and also in 2001 there were lots of jokes about the 
beepers that people had and the little things that they could put onto 
their belt which gave them a message for the day.  Those have clearly 
been surpassed and replaced now by the BlackBerry and by new 
generations.  So mobile phones have made a difference.  The internet 
has made a difference.  It has all changed the way in which we 
communicate but it hasn't actually changed the fundamentals of the 
game which is getting your message across to as many people as 
possible and trying to get them to vote for you.  
 
Anthony: Earlier you said that you believe the Conservative Party to be ahead of 
the other Parties in this trend.  What, within the party or outside the 
party, is leading this trend? 
 
Robin: I think the Conservative Party embraced the opportunities of the 
internet while we were in the process of being a very effective 
opposition.  I think all parties go through phases and in the last years of 
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opposition we got very, very good at it just as Labour had done in 
1996/1997.  I think had Labour had the internet developed of a level at 
current years in that period they would probably have become the pass 
masters in this as well.  I think we have to try to keep some of that 
energy and some of that urge to communicate now that we are in 
Government because one thing you can guarantee is that when the next 
election comes around it will be all the more important.  
 
Anthony: Are you saying that technologies are exploited for the opposition party? 
 
Robin: I think they provide an opportunity for the opposition party.  How 
effectively the opposition party takes them is down to them and their 
organisation and what you will tend to see as we are seeing now is that 
in the early years the opposition tends to be pretty ineffective and pretty 
bad at getting their message across.  They have to learn the art of 
opposition just as governments have to learn the art of government. 
 
Anthony: Is there anything specific about the Conservative Party that you say 
would imagine it to be more effective in terms of using technology 
whilst it is in opposition? 
 
Robin: Well, I think we encourage individualism and we thrive on debate and 
on being a broad church certainly in terms of developing something 
like ConservativeHome.  That has been hugely important.  You couldn't 
see anything as lively and vibrant as that within the Labour Party 
because the Labour Party was being run with top down control under 
Gordon Brown.  And so I think actually that is something that we were 
politically in a much better position to make the benefits of it.  But in 
terms of things like Merlin or Blue Chip or that kind of technology, that 
is absolutely down to the organisation of the party, what they are 
prepared to invest in it and making sure they have got as effective a tool 
as possible.  As I say, I think actually political parties are a million 
miles behind the corporate business world in that respect and probably 
always will be. 
 
Anthony: Does the party try to control or manage the use of social media? 
 
Robin: No.  I think the Party would be very wary of people obviously putting 
up anything stupid, doctored photographs and all that kind of thing.  
When I was working for Oliver Letwin I saw firsthand the Ed Matts 
disaster where he had doctored photographs and put them in a leaflet.  
But that just goes to show that can be done just as effectively on old 
media as it can on new.  And I think it is right that the party should try 
to control that.  What you won't see is the party clamping down on 
freedom of speech and certainly if you look at things like 
ConservativeHome that is why there are such lively debates on them.  
 
Anthony: Why do candidates use Twitter? 
 
Robin: It is another way of getting your message across.  I think it is very 
tempting.  I was certainly very tempted to go out there and use it as 
another method of putting my case across but I think I would have been 
wary of the backlash against that in terms of both when you say things 
unnecessarily and when you don't say things and people might think 
therefore that you are neglecting your campaign.  I think there is a 
balance to be struck in how regularly you communicate and certainly 
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during my election campaign I was doing two or three press releases a 
week.  I was happy with that in terms of output along with all the door 
knocking and all the leaflets rather than having to do something which 
needed quarter hourly updates.  
 
Anthony: Why do activists use Twitter? 
 
Robin: Again, it is a way of getting a message across.  It is a way of pestering 
people and so in that respect it can be very, very valuable.  It is a way 
of getting your opinions heard.  But I think there are pros and cons and 
you can choose your tools to get your message across.  It is one 
personally that I haven't felt the need to use.  
 
Anthony: As either a candidate or as an activist, what is the difference between 
using Twitter or Facebook in political engagement? 
 
Robin: Twitter has the potential to reach more people, it is more immediate.  
But I think Facebook is more targeted and certainly from my 
perspective one of the positive things about putting things on Facebook 
is that I knew those would be seen by the people I decided to include 
and not necessarily, say if I was going canvassing in a particular place I 
wasn't necessarily telegraphing it to my opposition.  And so from that 
perspective, Facebook has its attractions over Twitter.  But obviously 
Twitter has a wider reach and provides that more immediate update of 
what you are actually doing. And so both have their uses.  But from my 
perspective, I chose to use one and not the other.   
 
Anthony: Would you consider your association with followers on Twitter or 
Facebook a strong or weak association? 
 
Robin: A weak association.  But a deliberate one.  And I think it is an 
important point that you do have to be wary of who you choose to 
accept as friends.  You can't simply accept everyone who comes along 
and I took the view that I wasn't going to accept people unless I knew 
who they were.  That meant I excluded quite a lot of people who were 
probably perfectly well-meaning and genuine and might have even 
supported my campaign but I think it was better to take that view than 
to include people who you would subsequently regret. 
 
Anthony: Is there any attempt in the party to turn weaker online associations into 
stronger offline ones? 
 
Robin: I think the party will use tools like this to reach people.  One of the 
major things that the party always encouraged us to do, but actually 
never perhaps did much to facilitate, was email harvesting and making 
sure that all the people we contacted by email we kept their email 
addresses and got those people onto regular mailing lists.  I think I was 
shocked to find just before the election campaign that our email list 
numbered in the hundreds and not the thousands.  So there is probably 
more that could be done in that respect. 
 
Anthony: And in terms of the parliamentary cycle, are there any changes in 
intensity in the use of social media, blogs and other internet type 
applications? 
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Robin: I think they are gradually becoming more prevalent and more important 
and I think that is to be expected.  I certainly see a number of 
colleagues over recent months who have joined Facebook and I see 
them cropping up there.  I have also been in a Bill Committee where 
the government whip  was saying things on Twitter which got read out 
to him five minutes later by one of the opposition and so you have to be 
careful as you roll these things out and take them on.  
 
Anthony: So, comparing before and after the 2010 General Election.  Has the 
intensity and frequency of the use of Facebook and its events 
application declined in your use? 
 
Robin: For me personally it has probably declined but I would say in terms of 
the number of invitations I get it has certainly continued to expand. 
 
Anthony: Are there any new developments in the party's use of the internet since 
the 2010 General Election? 
 
Robin: Not that I have noticed. 
 
Anthony: Thank you very much.  
 
Robin: Okay.   
 
END AUDIO 
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START AUDIO 
 
Anthony Newman: Anthony Ridge-Newman, interviewing Therese Coffey MP.  Well 
thank you Therese for agreeing to do the interview.  I would just like to 
start by asking you how you got into Conservative politics. 
 
Therese Coffey: I joined the party back in 1988, partly inspired by Derek Hatton 
because I grew up in Liverpool and I got involved a little bit.  My sister 
was already involved in the 1987 election and I did a little bit there up 
in a seat in Liverpool Wavertree or Liverpool Mossley Hill as it 
probably was at the time and I got more involved at university.  
 
Anthony Newman: What was your role in the 2010 general election? 
 
Therese Coffey: I was a candidate for the seat of Suffolk Coastal and I was selected for 
that on February the 6
th
, three months just before Election Day and I am 
delighted to say I won the election. 
 
Anthony Newman: Congratulations.  How did the party communicate with you at the time?  
When I say, “the party,” I am here talking specifically about the central 
party, the central office. 
 
Therese Coffey: Almost exclusively by email whether that was daily briefings, whether 
that was instructions to groups of candidates. I was in what was 
considered to be-, to be considered a safe seat and being very late 
selected, I didn’t have much more of the informal briefings.  So, in a 
way it felt exactly the same as being a candidate in Wrexham five years 
before where you were left to get on with it.  So, it was really mainly 
email, both as I say centrally but also from say a regional agent. 
 
Anthony Newman: You have had experiences as a candidate before standing for a safe 
seat. 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes.  
 
Anthony Newman: With the fact that you have been selected to stand for a safe seat did 
your approach to that campaign differ in any way to previous elections? 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes it did, when I stood before I did do quite a lot of work in a seat but 
deliberately went and helped a neighbour who got in, in Clwyd West.  
However, this time being such a new candidate I also spent quite a lot 
of time in my seat but made sure that I went and helped in my two 
neighbouring seats.  I actually funnily enough if we had better use of 
technology within the party I could have been far more productive for 
my two neighbouring seats because a lot of time was spent travelling 
rather than actually doing political campaigning.   
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So, my temp as well in the run up to being selected and similar was 
frustrated by MyConservatives.com or whatever it was because none of 
it really worked.  It just ended up becoming in my view a message 
board rather than an action centre. 
 
Anthony Newman: In your opinion what types of technologies could have helped you do 
your job better with neighbouring constituencies? 
 
Therese Coffey: I wish that my associations were unable-, neighbouring associations 
and indeed my own were better enabled to make things like telephone 
canvassing easier, telephone knocking up easier.  I would have-, I 
would have may not have-, I won’t have delivered as many pieces of 
literature as I did but I would have contacted a lot more potential voters 
than I did. 
 
Anthony Newman: And your constituency at the time, at the run up to the 2010 general 
election, how was that organised and structured? 
 
Therese Coffey: Well, we did have a fulltime agent.  Interestingly the agent wouldn’t 
use any of the central party literature so we barely touched concept.  
Even though I think concept has improved over the years because five 
years ago if you we’re prepared to buy the full literature pack you were 
not allowed access to any of the templates of the party.  They have 
changed that approach which is good, so you can now go in and just get 
it and use your own local printer whatever.   
 
So, that’s a massive improvement but in terms of myself I started using 
Twitter and my own blog to give updates on where I had been, where I 
was going.  I would email, I think I managed to answer 90% of emails 
that were sent.  I am sure there will be some people who said that they 
never heard back from me.  But that was something that the previous 
Member of Parliament had not particularly done, had not done at all, 
didn’t have a web-, he had a website but it was very static.   
 
I think for any candidate it is a balance of how you spend your time, 
how many people really look at a website.  In hindsight I think-, I 
actually think I got the balance okay in terms of we didn’t try to build a 
sophisticated website before the election.  We just did a blog with a few 
photos and a little bit of twitter.  So, there was enough there to keep 
local media aware of things and that’s been driven since, so. 
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of the comparison between your previous seat and your most 
recent election experience how did they-, how do they compare in 
terms of the type of organisation and members and association? 
 
Therese Coffey: Well, when I was in Wrexham there was a dedicated group but they 
were small in number.  I from memory there were about 140 members.  
They didn’t have a lot of money to spend but we still spent quite a lot 
of money and when I stood in Suffolk Coastal which has something 
approaching I think they have got 900 paid and 200 still to renew this 
year for example.  We didn’t-, I know election limits can strain it but 
we didn’t specifically spend a lot more money than we did in Wrexham 
on the actual campaign.   
 
There was in Suffolk Coastal being much bigger geographically than 
Wrexham you tended to work with people in specific areas.  So, they 
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wouldn’t necessarily-, only a few people would travel say on a battle 
bus whereas in Wrexham people were a lot more mobile.  But in 
Wrexham we had to really target our activity, you know we would have 
delivered probably 40% of the seat whereas in Suffolk Coastal it would 
probably be closer to 90%, not 100% but that.  So, there are more 
established networks.  Sorry, remind me again of what you were trying 
to-, the different organisation and membership. 
 
Anthony Newman: Yes, yes. 
 
Therese Coffey: I did have the benefit of having a full time agent.  As I say my agent 
doesn’t always like to follow the party line in terms of specific 
templates.  I think in future I’ll be very keen to make sure that we do 
because again we spent a fair amount of time being bespoke when 
actually in a seat like Suffolk Coastal, in any seat really you just need 
to get a message out.  It doesn’t matter if it is the latest you know award 
winning literature or not.  But you know I was perfectly happy with my 
leaflets, they were nice but they took more time perhaps than they 
should have done. 
 
Anthony Newman: What was the daily role of your agent? 
 
Therese Coffey: In the actual three weeks of the campaign, we had started before then 
but I would go out most days in a battle bus with a group of volunteers.  
I would meet my agent at lunchtime and I would sign paperwork and 
do similar.  He helped to prepare all the aspects of the photographs that 
were needed.  I would do text for the leaflets, he would try and design 
it, then I would re-design it a little bit and his job was to try and make 
sure that we got in money for the fighting fund.  That there were groups 
of volunteers, he did organise the battle bus as it is called and trying to 
get people there and dealt with the legal paperwork.   
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of your battle bus presumably there were people on it.  How 
did you and your agent first of all… 
 
Therese Coffey: Sorry the other thing the agent did was he more or less defined where 
we would go.  So, he set out the routes and made sure we got to every 
parish and similar.  So, that was part of what he did and then during the 
day there were sometimes when we needed extra leaflets or whatever 
he would come out and get the stuff for us, sorry. 
 
Anthony Newman: How did between the two of you or your campaign team manage to get 
people out to help the campaign.   
 
Therese Coffey: Well, as I said being very new I didn’t really know-, I only knew a few 
people and the agent and I think the Deputy Chairman of Campaigning 
I think had a hand in encouraging people to come out.  Sometimes there 
were six of us in the bus; sometimes there were three of us in the bus so 
it varied.   
 
In the future I am not sure I would necessarily need to have the same 
approach, we’ll see.  People quite like it, people do quite like that 
although in classic modern campaigning techniques using a battle bus 
and a speaker phone is considered not good because you will awake an 
opposition.  But in a large rural area where it’s a-, how can I put it you 
may not see one person from you know you may not ever see them, 
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meet them in your lifetime, it is at least a communication vehicle which 
is traditional in that area. 
 
Anthony Newman: How did you and your agent communicate with the people on your 
campaign team during the election? 
 
Therese Coffey: Well, I would end up doing quite a lot of work at night after we had 
done the campaigning, responding to people who had contacted me 
directly or preparing items.  Then we would usually meet in the 
morning at the association office just to run through the things for the 
day.  I essentially didn’t-, I won’t say that I drove the campaign 
particularly apart from choosing which topics we would do in the 
leaflets.  I was quite reliant on others knowing their areas and making 
sure I was in the right place at the right time for different things.   
 
Again, as I build my knowledge of my own constituency I will be able 
to have more of an input into what we actually do during the election 
campaign.  We didn’t have any elections apart from one by-election on 
that day so I made sure that we went and spent quite a bit of time that 
needed the by-election even though it is a mixed division.  So, it needed 
help and I made sure that went and spent some time there. 
 
Anthony Newman: How many months or weeks previously to your-, to the election 
campaign on May the fifth were you selected? 
 
Therese Coffey: Three months to the day, so thirteen weeks quite literally and I could 
not give up work straight away.  I gave up work about-, I was able to 
spend long weekends in Suffolk but I wasn’t able to give up until Mid 
March.  So, then I was able to give it about seven weeks run through, 
right through where I was there every day.   
 
Anthony Newman: During that period did members, conservative supporters and activists 
communicate with you? 
 
Therese Coffey: During the first six weeks, well I was-, I went to a few kinds of social 
functions within the association and some members were very good in 
hosting kind of coffee mornings in their houses.  Not many about four 
people did, kind of to introduce me to their friends; not as friends but 
this is the new candidate.  I think some more of those would have been 
very helpful.  You know that said I am very grateful to the people who 
did what they did.   
 
I was able to move straight into Suffolk into temporary accommodation 
a week after being selected. I said I would move in by Valentine’s Day 
and I did because friends of friends from where I used to live lived in 
the constituency and they put me up in their granny flat.  Where I 
stayed for just over a month and then I managed to rent my own home 
and that was very important to me to make sure that in the campaign I 
was able to be on the electoral register.  So, I did that from mid-march 
and to the surprise of other candidates and other political parties I was 
able to say that I lived in the constituency. 
 
Anthony Newman: The latter stages of your campaign… 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes. 
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Anthony Newman: What technologies or methods were used to communicate with your 
members, activists and supporters?   
 
Therese Coffey: That was to be mainly phone.  I would say that’s because a lot of my 
members are not particularly technology literature that is not true of all 
of them.  I shouldn’t say literate, what is a better way of saying it?  Not 
everybody is on email and not everybody who is on email checks it 
every day.  So, there are a significant number of politically active 
people who are.  Also councillors in my area avoid using their council 
email addresses for anything policy political which I didn’t realise at 
first and then I found out.  So, there were some bits of learning for me 
to do.  So, email and phone were the main ways of communicating.   
 
Anthony Newman: You’re an experienced candidate in the sense that you have stood for 
other elections for instance, the 2009 European Elections.  
 
Therese Coffey: Yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: So, you have seen a number of different types of environments and 
campaigns.  Does being a candidate within a rural constituency differ to 
the metropolitan areas? 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes I believe it does, literally because of-, regardless of how many 
emails you may send to people I still believe that personal, visual 
contact is an important part for quite a lot of people in perhaps deciding 
whether or not they will vote for you.  I would say that’s even true of 
people who are inclined to vote Conservative depending on where you 
are to some extent.   
 
But if they happen to say Wrexham where the seat was not particularly 
a likely territory for a Conservative gain and Liberal Democrats had 
been strong there making council gains, council seat gains and actually 
running the council.  I think the proximity of the candidate being 
supported by local counsellors for the Liberals and having such a 
physically tight seat it helps that having been selected and having that 
building that presence was reinforced by individual visits or meets and 
greets in the high street.   
 
I think from within a constituency that is rural where there is no one 
centre.  There are seats actually where-, there are plenty of rural seats 
where there is a defined single centre for the constituency and I think 
that’s different say to my seat where Felixstowe is the biggest town in 
my constituency.  It is at the very bottom and it’s on a peninsular.  So 
people at the top at Halesworth never go to Felixstowe.  So, you have to 
build your campaign around a series of market towns plus the villages.  
So, I effectively have five market towns to cover as well as other areas.  
Whereas say in the seat where I used to live in Northwest Hampshire, 
Sir George Young his main town is Andover plus villages but I would 
say that probably 60% of his electorate live in one place, at least.  He 
has that ability to be a strong presence in one area, can actually tough a 
lot of the constituency.  
  
So, I think that’s where there are challenges in different kinds of rural 
seats and my neighbour Dan Porter is probably the same.  He has got a 
chunk of Ipswich but then for the rest of his seat there is no one centre 
of gravity. 
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Anthony Newman: Did you do canvassing during your campaign? 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes I did, yes we did and to the surprise of the association we made 
sure we recorded that.  We are very religious about it and this was also 
true in Wrexham because they introduced me in Wrexham to a way of 
canvassing I had never done before.  But that was fine and we made 
sure we recorded that information as well.  When I was a European 
candidate a big difference to that was that it was at the same time as the 
County Council Elections so we never recorded our preferences 
specifically for Europe.   
 
It was always focused around the County Council except for those 
areas like Brighton and elsewhere there didn’t have County Council 
elections.  The other thing from being a European candidate is just 
trying to get people to come out and campaign for the European 
election was virtually a waste of time even those seats like 
Southampton, Portsmouth, Brighton and Hove where they didn’t have 
council elections but should have been using it as a dry run for the 
following year.  Some of those associations were better than others. 
 
Anthony Newman: What was the general age group, the people that actively got involved 
in your campaign in Suffolk Coastal? 
 
Therese Coffey: Err; I’d say 55 plus, 55 to 85. There was a smaller number of people 
who-, but this reflects the age profile of Suffolk Coastal.  27% of 
people are over 65, something like half are over 55 of the profile of the 
seat reflecting it as a place where people do retire to.  There are a lot of 
second homes people buy and when their kids have left wherever or 
when they have stopped work, they then sell their big house in London 
and come up and live properly in the constituency.  So, you get a lot of 
that anyway.   
 
There was a smaller group of people actively engaged probably in their 
late 30’s, 40’s my kind of age and very few young-, very few young 
people and there is a-.  One of the reasons for that is there was a 
conservative future branch I think in the south of the constituency.  But 
Ben Gummer had already been installed for some time as candidate in 
Ipswich and not surprisingly Ben had built a good campaign team 
around him and it was attractive to go and help Ben in Ipswich.  
Actually it was the right thing for them to do.   
 
So, no complaints at all and yes I remember going to my first campaign 
to help Ben, there were about three young people from Felixstowe 
helping which I thought was great.  So, I am not surprised that they 
were not helping me.  If I had been in their shoes I would have done 
exactly the same I would have gone and helped Ben.  I know if I had 
been at the top I would have helped Peter Aldous in Waveney.   
 
Anthony Newman: Were there any uses of social media within your campaign team or the 
local area? 
 
Therese Coffey: Well, I use Twitter and a blog.  I might-, one of my candidates, one of 
my active candidates was proactive in using Twitter and her website.  
Then the Labour candidate was not particularly proactive on it mainly 
because he worked for the Labour candidate in Ipswich who was the 
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MP.  So, he spent a lot of his time helping the Ipswich campaign.  So, I 
would it was more that kind of thing rather than anything else.  
Interestingly enough on previous elections I had done more on that kind 
of side but trying to judge priorities and use of time it was fairly evident 
that I didn’t have enough time to say do videos or similar.  Because 
what mattered was getting around to areas and being able to say, “I 
have been to every parish.”   
 
They are quite powerful statements because even if the person didn’t 
see them you know people will talk in the pub about, “Oh we met the 
new Tory candidate today,” for example and I think it was important to 
do that.  
 
Anthony Newman: In a rough sense… 
 
Therese Coffey: In terms of I was about to, I’m sorry I forgot to ask I did use 
MyConservatives.com as a fund raising tool.  What was useful about 
that I didn’t raise a lot of money but we raised about £450.  It was just 
an easy way for people to give some cash.  So, a few friends gave a 
£10, £50, one gave £150 so, that was not wonderful to particularly do.  
I don’t know how much the party spent on MyConservatives.com and I 
haven’t really seen it used since, that doesn’t mean to say that it can’t 
be revitalised.  But for me it was easy to give money but it failed in the 
bit about making campaigning easier. 
 
Anthony Newman: We’ll come back to that shortly.  How much time roughly on a daily 
basis did you invest in using the internet compared with more 
traditional campaigning? 
 
Therese Coffey: I would say I was probably on the internet about an hour and half a day 
but I would be out campaigning probably closer to 11 hours a day.  A 
lot of that was spent driving but yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: In addition to that were there other points in your day when you would 
be using the internet in terms of catching up or was it that specific hour 
and half was enough to do everything you needed? 
 
Therese Coffey: Err, well. 
 
Anthony Newman: You mentioned that you… 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes, I mean I had my BlackBerry. 
 
Anthony Newman: Spent time at night doing stuff 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes, I mean there were some simple things you could do on 
BlackBerry, some quick responses.  But I would tend to do it in the 
evening all that I needed to do more or less.  I think since applications 
have got easier although I don’t have an iPhone I can imagine that I’ll 
become a lot more dynamic in the future. Other things like using voice 
Dictaphones to text I think will be also-.  I can see technology already 
changing that will make it easier to do that kind of thing.   
 
Now I am an established politician in my area actually things like 
Twitter, My Local Media will pick up on.  We send out press releases 
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as well.  I did send out press releases in the election campaign, I would 
say that was not particularly successful. 
 
Anthony Newman: Why would a safe seat candidate bother using Twitter? 
 
Therese Coffey: Great question, especially as last summer I got hacked which was very 
unpleasant.  I got hacked on Facebook, Webmail, Twitter, oh the lot, 
my blog.  It’s a good point, why is it?  For one thing it is an easy way to 
get out a quick message to people.  There is a risk that you give away 
too much information perhaps on the campaign.  So, that’s why 
speaking to other colleagues since the election quite a lot of them 
would say what they have done rather than what they were going to do.  
This particularly true in tighter seats where they were concerned about 
disruption to their activity.   
 
I think it’s-, I very rarely use Facebook now, I find Facebook very time 
consuming.  Twitter is, it is not a two-, it’s not a one way process but 
you can be if you want it to be if that makes sense.  You don’t have to, 
you don’t have to get involved in long streams of conversation, it is 
very quick.  In terms of blogs, I don’t blog as much as I used to again 
because they are time consuming so what I find is that something is on 
the go, that’s easy gets out a quick message I think is quite useful to do 
that.   
 
The other thing I use Twitter for actually is to be keep abreast of news.  
So, I fallow all the news breaking sites, my local media sites just to 
have a quick, what they have got on their headlines.  Instead of again 
having to go buy the paper or get online subscription so.  It’s quite 
interesting, some reaction, a lot of people who follow me on Twitter 
from the constituency are not particularly pro-me.  But what I think it 
does I am able to at least demonstrate that I am being proactive within 
the constituency because one of the accusations about us being in a so 
called safe seat is that you’ve won your seat, we will never see you ever 
again.  I think this is an easy way to track it. 
 
On another side I actually use Twitter to help me with my expenses.  
So, for some reason our email system keeps deleting diaries.  I don’t 
know why, I don’t know what’s up with Outlook, Twitter is there and 
fairly permanent unless you delete it yourself and I go back and can 
track exactly what I have done.  So, it is quite helpful as a little social 
mental record as well. 
 
Anthony Newman: Do you publish your expenses on Twitter? 
 
Therese Coffey: No I don’t, no.  Although the very first time they came out I put a link 
to it.  Now people know where to go and what to do, the newspaper 
does it for them anyway.  So, the very first one it did put all my 
expenses on twitter, yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: Do you think that social media converts into votes in your constituency, 
the use of it sorry? 
 
Therese Coffey: Err, possibly, possibly and that’s where Facebook is more likely.  But I 
think the risk of social media, emails or whatever it is; it is too easy to 
get involved if that makes sense.  I think people can be concerned and 
doubt your genuine commitment, you know if you just join a group on 
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Facebook, it doesn’t require any active involvement.  I think -, I know 
there was an incident that happened, it affected more my opponent than 
me where a local charity got quite cross and thought the candidate was 
trying to hijack an event for their own gain.  Because they had brought 
a video camera with them and they made sure they were in the front 
and so on.   
 
They got quite cross, a little bit with both of us but I went to the 
following two events that they held and then I was able to build my 
credibility through that.  So, so I think social media allows people to 
see some of the things you’re interested in.  There may be a bit of 
cynicism but if you follow through on it that might be converted to 
some extent in, “Well she’s alright.”   Interestingly although we haven’t 
got the referendum on AV yet, I think that kind of credibility to show 
that you are proactively engaged and social media is a way to use that if 
you want to may mean that in the future, “Well I might not agree with 
everything the Conservative Party is doing but Therese’s okay and I 
know she’s keen on this and so on.”   
 
It can work the other way you know I do express views on particular 
issues and I am-, would vote for the Hunting repeal, to reveal the 
Hunting Act.  A lot of constituents don’t like that but they have to make 
their decision in the end what they are going to vote on.  But it’s the 
one thing any politician has to remember elected or not is once you’ve 
published it, it can never be retracted.  I think that’s one of the risks a 
little bit of social media but rarely is it life threatening if that makes 
sense.  So, as long as you’re again seen to be credible but you have got 
to be careful you shouldn’t Tweet when you’ve had a few drinks. 
 
Anthony Newman: On that note are there any security risks involving social media? 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes, I was hacked last summer.  I think it was somebody in the House 
of Commons, I think I made the mistake of not clearing my data when I 
logged off a computer, a shared computer.  The person who hacked me 
probably in an odd way they put such unpleasant things on that it was 
obvious that it wasn’t me.  Perhaps if they had been a little bit cleverer 
they could have done something that could potentially have been far 
more damaging.  So, I am not going to refer to what they said and 
through one- and it made me change my security procedure.  I did 
actually have different passwords for them all but the common link was 
an email address, my Webmail.  Once they got into that they could 
basically you know do the forgotten password and change it all and 
that’s what happened and it took me a while to get control back.   
 
I got control back of Facebook, my blog and Webmail within about two 
hours, three hours.  I didn’t manage to get control of Twitter for about 
four days so that was a-, that was a pain.  So, that’s where I think it can 
be-, I think when people set up fake sites I haven’t done that.  Sorry, 
people haven’t yet done that to me.  I have made sure that I have 
bought extra domains so that people can’t set up as me.  I have 
registered an extra Twitter account; I probably should register a few 
more.   
 
I think Facebook, I am not aware of many fake sites on Facebook.  I 
don’t know but the other thing that is quite interesting Anthony is 
Wikipedia.  You’ll be aware that anybody can write anything on 
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Wikipedia and it was Tim Montgomerie who advised candidates before 
the last election to make sure they checked it rigorously and got stuff 
changed or whatever.  I’ve taken a different view, I have never touched 
Wikipedia.  So, I can confidently say whatever is on there I have never 
put on there. I feel in a way if I started changing things you can’t be on 
top of it 24 hours a day.   
 
So, if an entry comes up and a journalist takes it or whatever and I 
challenge them and I do challenge journalists on some of the things 
they put in my name, I can say, “Look I have never touched it, that has 
no credibility whatsoever,” and then it is more difficult for them to use 
it whereas if I say, “Yes I put that on there,” and then it gets like that 
so...  So, Wikipedia is a bit of an odd one but I think a lot more people-, 
are a lot more people aware to it?  Actually they are not, I think the 
majority of the population believe in Wikipedia is true but at least I can 
say well I have never put any information on there. 
 
Anthony Newman: Social media, the use of the internet, things like Wikipedia are all fairly 
new in terms of their role in politics. 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: Does the central party have a good understanding of these phenomena 
and does the central party advise its members, activists and candidates 
in general. 
 
Therese Coffey: In my view the party I am not aware really of any advice it has ever 
given on any of these issues.  I know some groups within the party have 
given advice.  I am about to re-launch the parliamentary branch of the 
Conservative Technology Forum and we have a group on the 1922 
which is looking at campaigning.  One of the aspects of that is I think 
we need to work out how we can be a bit more-, significantly more 
proactive on internet based communication.  I would be surprised if we 
even had the appropriate legal things on there or something like that.  I 
think that’s not very well understood.  
 
 What I hope to see from the party is that they will continue to put some 
stress on this.  I believe they have just recruited somebody or in the 
process of recruiting people on the social media side.  I think things 
slipped away a little bit generally in central office when we got into 
government because a number of people moved from central office into 
Number 10 and other government departments.  That rebuilding work 
had started and I think is being accelerated of core competence within 
our headquarters.  I haven’t seen much evidence of it in the run up to 
the May elections of this year and the referendum; we’ve started to see 
more.   
 
But I think that it is quite interesting and this is a personal reflection, I 
find that people up until the age of about 25 to 30 are more Facebook 
orientated.  People like me 30 plus or perhaps even closer to 40 as I am 
and a lot of the media are Twitter orientated.  So, we need to work out 
how we make that work.  Somebody who works for me said, “Therese 
the problem with your generation is you are all Tweeting and we’re all 
Facebooking,” So we need to work on that.   
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But we should be able to cover a wide range of issues and I think what 
the party did do well on the general election last year was a lot of 
different campaign based sites which I think responded to the single 
issue driven interests of a lot of younger people.  We need to make sure 
we keep on top of that.  
 
Anthony Newman: If there is something about the nature of Facebook and the nature of 
Twitter that differs so that one would attract younger individuals in 
political engagement and one would attract people of your age. 
 
Therese Coffey: I think Twitter is very much news and chat.  Facebook has blossomed 
into-, and sorry and Twitter is trying to take things from Facebook and 
bring it into the Twitter atmosphere.  So, using pictures, links to other 
things.  Using the hash tag for trending I think is-, I don’t think 
Facebook does that which I think is distinctive.  I don’t know if there is 
the same obsession with followers are there are with friends, there 
might be. There is etiquette within Twitter, I’m not conscious quite the 
same with Facebook.  So, I think there is still something generational, 
the discipline of fitting something to 140 characters does seem 
challenging to people who are younger than me, who work for me.   
 
The brevity of it I think is a bit more challenging but as I say I think 
it’s, I think Twitter is just-, what I find is it’s very quick whereas 
Facebook for me trying to do it on a BlackBerry just doesn’t have the 
same impact because it is too big.  You have actually got to spend time 
at a computer doing it and then you get all this rubbish about games.  
One of the reasons I don’t like Facebook particularly is because forever 
people are sending you stuff that you then have to give permission and 
that opens up all your data.  I’m very conscious about that and I wonder 
if that’s something, I wonder if people realise on Facebook how much 
data they give away to other people.  Sorry I have diverted there, I 
apologise. 
 
Anthony Newman: I’ll bring us back. 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes, yes please do. 
 
Anthony Newman: Is there a social difference between Twitter and Facebook? 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes, I think there is.  I think as I say brevity, a quick chat with a few 
links here and there, Facebook is much more comprehensive and time 
consuming.  I don’t know quite why it appeals so differently to people 
with different ages.  Perhaps Facebook is that much more 
comprehensive safe area that people can do from the privacy of their 
own bedroom and home.  Whereas Twitter I feel is much more on the 
move.  You wouldn’t sit at your desk particularly and do Twitter. 
 
Anthony Newman: Which blog in your opinion is most central to the Conservative Party? 
 
Therese Coffey: Without question ConservativeHome, without a question.   
 
Anthony Newman: What role does ConservativeHome play in Conservative Party 
organisation? 
 
Therese Coffey: It-, the one thing it did and perhaps I’m talking as a you know for a 
candidate, it opened up the whole news about candidacies, it opened up 
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the conversations about different selections.  I think the risk of 
ConservativeHome is that it attracts people who are very strongly 
opinionated.  I don’t look at it as much as I used to.  I look at it once a 
day to get a quick headline on stories and see kind of what’s out there.  
I think it does serve a useful; it serves as a platform for people to float 
ideas and some policy kind of work, I think that’s good.  I find it 
mostly as a news portal.  The other websites that is particularly useful is 
PoliticsHome, but that’s not Conservative orientated. 
 
Whereas the parties own website is-, can be quite flash but I think 
things like the Blue Blog, it has got the imprint of the party.  So, there 
isn’t really much free and open discussion and although as I say 
ConservativeHome it can get a bit fixated, some of the people who 
write in it serves a very useful purpose. 
 
Anthony Newman: Have you written for ConservativeHome? 
 
Therese Coffey: I can’t remember if I have or not.  I think I have done one article, I’m 
not even sure.  I was going to do one on one.  I am trying to think 
because I have done something for Tim Montgomerie but I can’t 
remember if it was on ConservativeHome or for his-, or the more 
professional side of it.  I did an article for him on big society so I can’t 
remember.  I think that’s the other thing about blogging, Facebook it 
takes a lot more of your time and as a-, I now do a weekly column in a 
newspaper plus a fortnightly column in another newspaper and that 
takes up quite a lot of time as it is.   
 
The house magazine is often asking you to do things and if you want to 
craft something very good in 400 or 500 words it actually takes quite a 
lot of time and effort to do that whereas twitter it is 140 characters. 
 
Anthony Newman: Is there a type of candidate that would benefit from using 
ConservativeHome as a platform? 
 
Therese Coffey: I think it’s a good-, a good window a shop window for people to think 
through, suggest some ideas.  The risk is that of course there will be a 
lot of people who will disagree with you.  So, if you haven’t got a thick 
skin you might not like all the criticism that comes back as a 
consequence of it.  But I think it is a useful way if you are not well 
known to the party hierarchy, I think they do look at that.  I think they 
will see things they think are interesting.  It is also a way potentially to 
get involved with the mainstream media but again normally they only 
pick up stories that are particularly controversial or risky or whatever.  
 So, I think use it with care is the best way to suggest it but I don’t think 
people should be frightened of using it or putting their views forward.  
But they should always remember that it is there forever and that’s an 
important thing about all of this media stuff. 
 
Anthony Newman: Do you think ConservativeHome plays any role in the way CCHQ 
conducts its business? 
 
Therese Coffey: I don’t know I think, I think they are alert to it and it probably gives 
them an early warning system of issues.  I think ConservativeHome 
played a great part, did really well in the by-elections in the previous 
campaign.  You know they got people together and mobilised and went 
and helped, actually in Crewe, Nantwich.  That’s the one I remember 
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vividly and I think it can be a useful ally but it doesn’t pretend to be the 
voice of the Conservative Party and nor should it be.  I am sure at times 
the party finds ConservativeHome very irritating.  But what I think and 
hope is recognised is it a free-, it is a fair mouthpiece for people and 
sometimes I’ve been surprised by what people will put on there 
thinking is that really what you meant to say or what impact do you 
think you’re going to have as a result of that.  Sometimes damaging, 
other times I’m thinking yes I have never heard of this person before 
and they have really something valuable to contribute.   
 
So, I think it is in terms of defining the Conservative Party they might 
pick up on a few things like warning signals or, “Oh I don’t know this 
person.”  So, as I was just saying a little bit earlier good shop window.  
But I don’t think it determines conservative policy on any issue 
particularly it may give them as I say flash warnings about, “This is 
proving more difficult than we hoped,” Or similar but it doesn’t 
determine who wins the elections to the convention I don’t believe that 
kind of thing. 
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of the role that ConservativeHome plays in campaigns do you 
think it is a positive or negative force? 
 
Therese Coffey: I’d say largely positive yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: In terms of, I had questions coming out of my head… 
 
Therese Coffey: One of the risks for ConservativeHome is that when people write on 
there. 
 
Anthony Newman: I just have some notes on it. 
 
Therese Coffey: Sure, when people do write on there, there was a risk and I think it can 
still be used as if it is an official voice of the party.  So, when there are 
comments in there which are clearly quite outrageous or similar, I think 
it is a little bit of a risk.  But that I think was difficult to handle at first 
and now it’s easier to handle. 
 
Anthony Newman: The question I was going to ask which I forgot, it shot out of my head.  
The Conservative Party have talked a lot about transparency and using 
the internet in terms of government transparency.  Is 
ConservativeHome the equivalent for Conservative Party organisation? 
 
Therese Coffey: Err, yes and no which is a classic answer.  I think as I was suggesting 
earlier quite a lot of transparency opened up the news, comment, gossip 
about candidate selection which never used to be in the-, in the open 
atmosphere.  I think also for potential candidates they should realise of 
course that associations, not all do but can go looking on the internet 
finding out things about people as well.  ConservativeHome will be part 
of that so there may be negative stories put in.  I think the people who 
run ConservativeHome are a lot more sensitive to that and will block 
comments which are deliberately being done to denigrate people which 
is good because it shouldn’t be used to try and pre-emptively destroy 
people’s careers.   
 
In other ways is it the transparency, it’s not but as I was trying to 
suggest before it is a way that people can have a view and articulate a 
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view on the party and some of what’s going on.  But I don’t see it as the 
transparency vehicle, it might shed some sunlight on a few things 
which encourages people to be proactive in their discussions, I think is 
the best way of saying it. 
 
Anthony Newman: David Cameron is for some academics hailed as the first leader of a 
party to really use the internet in a significant way when he launched 
WebCameron.  He later went on to say, “Too many Tweets make a 
twat,” Is there any conflict in those two issues? 
 
Therese Coffey: Well, I think David Cameron you are absolutely right, WebCameron 
was a great thing but it was very controlled.  So, there was nothing 
interactive about it.  He then later I believe, I mean I wasn’t involved in 
the campaign in that regard, I believe he did some online chats, things 
with Mumsnet and other stuff where you don’t have control of the 
media.  So, you don’t have control of what people are asking you.  I 
think the thing about Twitter with him possibly I think originally 
Twitter did start off and it is kind of like a bit of a, “So what thing,” 
You know make a cup of tea or something but I think it has evolved 
significantly and not all but you know but not all the leading journalists 
on it but quite a lot are.  How can I put it, Number 10 now has its own 
Twitter account and continues to have it.  
  
There are many minister, William Hague has his own.  I don’t know 
that many of the cabinet who proactively use it but Grant Shapps is a 
veteran tweeter as it Eric Pickles.  Te is quite a few who are keen to use 
it; some will get more engaged than others.  Some people use it as a one 
way tool but I would say I don’t know how many of the new intake of 
conservative MPs have it.  Some people avoid it because they don’t 
want to take the risk but you know it is a bit of an element of control 
and you just need to be self-controlled in what you say.  W you are 
doing it to video and webcam how can I put it you can always have a 
second take.  But the Prime Minister is very adept to his 
communication strategy so he feels probably he doesn’t need to have 
his own Twitter account. 
 
Anthony Newman: Traditionally a party, political parties had been used to controlling the 
output of political communication has the internet done anything to 
change that.  Does the Conservative Party do anything to try and 
control the output of the party as a whole in terms of social media and 
other types of internet? 
 
Therese Coffey: I would say the one thing the party has possibly said from memory is 
about being careful on policy.  So, one of the big changes the internet 
brought was the requirement to be careful in what you say and have it 
robust to rebuttal.  The internet gives you great opportunity to do rapid 
rebuttal, or sorry to challenge.  So, there is that back and forth.  People 
do it in the chamber today, they will quickly look on their BlackBerry 
or now their iPads to say, “Yes but they said only three weeks ago this 
is what they said.”  So, it’s changed the pace of communication which 
is understandably why governments, political parties want to be very 
careful in the controlling of their communication.   
 
It only takes a couple of words to destroy.  If you are in a position of 
authority especially to destroy the message you are trying to get out and 
that then becomes the story.  So, I don’t think it’s unique, I don’t think 
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it is a recent phenomenon.  I think they have always been careful on 
how they control the message, it has got stronger and stronger perhaps 
and I think the internet has been able to give at least give a bit of a push 
back to say in terms of the rapid challenge.  I won’t say any more. 
 
Anthony Newman: You mentioned the use of internet phones and BlackBerry’s in the 
chamber. 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes. 
 
Anthony Newman: How between your colleagues has the internet changed the way you 
communicate? 
 
Therese Coffey: I would, what with each other or…? 
 
Anthony Newman: Yes, in terms of you know you said the use of BlackBerry’s in the 
chamber and getting information that is a fairly recent thing.  Has that 
changed the culture of being an MP and communicating with other…? 
 
Therese Coffey: Well I can’t tell if it has changed the culture because of only being here 
since last May.  What I think it’s done is, there are a few reasons why 
MPs will use their whatever and the BlackBerry.  One is because you 
are sitting there for several hours and you want to get through your 
email or at least look at issues or something like that.  There are times 
in speeches when people make quite strong statements and as I was just 
alluding to earlier getting onto the internet and checking it is a way that 
you can then stand up and intervene.  I am not sure strictly speaking 
you are supposed to do that but I find that-, the point is you either you 
go outside of the chamber and it or you just do it where you are.   
 
Interestingly the network signals in the chamber are very poor, in fact a 
lot of people can’t use them at all.  I don’t think that’s a bad thing.  You 
don’t need your little computer there all the time to say, “But on this 
day you said that,” But it is helpful from time to time but I think the 
risk is you end up missing the debate.  Interestingly I use the direct 
messages to people on my own side or on the other side to have a quiet 
conversation rather than just a one off really, rather than always 
sending notes along.  Because sometimes people have the habit of not 
always unless you put it in an envelope which is very un-green of not-, 
of making sure that they might have a quick scan of the message on 
route so therefore texts, direct messages are quite helpful with that. 
 
Anthony Newman: Final question, if, in a hypothetical sense, the internet had not existed in 
any way during your 2010 general election campaign, would your 
campaign have been significantly different? 
 
Therese Coffey: Yes, I think it would have been back to more the traditional campaign 
of the 80’s.  You probably would have had more direct press 
conferences, more direct contact with journalists.  I did speak to 
journalists but I was also able to email them press releases and similar.  
I think we possibly would-, would we have had more town meetings?  
Not necessarily.  People get quite a lot of information from their local 
radio and local TV, so more activity with that possibly.  I think that the 
advance of the internet as I tried to suggest earlier I don’t think it 
particularly converts into votes particularly or converting people 
especially.  But it may make people more inclined to go out and 
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actually vote in terms of recognising some of the work that people have 
been able to do or getting answers to people.   
 
I expect more-, fewer people-, nowadays a lot of my communications 
are by email and it is easier for people to get in touch.  I think that 
element of remoteness would have been reinforced in a rural seat if we 
didn’t have the internet.  So, at least people feel that they can get in 
touch.   It’s an interesting balance Anthony because I feel actually the 
internet, emails and others get in one way gets too much attention and 
can take you away from actually going and meeting people and you 
always have to bear that in mind.   
 
It would be very easy to spend all day on the computer and never 
actually go and see anybody but I think that would be wrong.  Because 
if all we needed to do was to employ computer people to be politicians 
then we would not have that expectation of going out and doing that.  
So, I don’t regret the internet at all, I think it is an all enhancing, it 
makes things more immediate.  It cuts down the timelines for people so 
it does add stress, there is an expectation of a lot more responsiveness 
which can be used both ways.   
 
How can I put it one of my favourite days in the campaign was when I 
was in an area where there was no signal.  So, we were able to go and 
frankly just go and have a nice old fashioned day of campaigning and 
pressing the flash and delivering leaflets and just having a nice time.  
Not necessarily being at the end of a phone or being able to see the 
latest headlines.  So, from time to time it is nice to chill out. 
 
Anthony Newman: And on that anecdotal moment, thank you very much Therese. 
 
Therese Coffey: Thank you.  
 
END AUDIO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
